Intermarket Technical Analysis: Trading Strategies for the Global Stock, Bond, Commodity, and Currency Markets
Author: John J. Murphy
Date: 1991-03-01 08:00:00+00:00
Keywords: Business
Description: Trying to trade stock, bond, commodity and currency markets without intermarket awareness is like trying to drive a car without looking out the side and rear windows--very dangerous. In this guide to intermarket analysis, the author uses years of experience in technical analysis plus extensive charts to clearly demonstrate the interrelationshps that exist among the various market sectors and their importance. You'll learn how to use activity in surrounding markets in the same way that most people employ traditional technical indicators for directional clues. Shows the analyst how to focus outw
Publisher: Wiley

INTERMARKET

TECHNICAL

ANALYSIS

TRADING STRATEGIES

FOR THE GLOBAL

STOCK, BOND, COMMODITY

AND CURRENCY MARKETS

John J. Murphy

Wiley Finance Editions

JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

New York • Chichester • Brisbane • Toronto • Singapore

In recognition of the importance of preserving what has been written, it is a policy of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. to have books of enduring value printed on acid-free paper, and we exert our best efforts to that end.

Copyright ©1991 by John J. Murphy

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

All rights reserved. Published simultaneously in Canada.

Contents

Reproduction or translation of any part of this work beyond that permitted by Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act without the permission of the copyright owner is unlawful. Requests for permission or further information should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Preface v

This publication is designed to provide accurate and 1 A New Dimension in Technical Analysis 1
authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that 2 The 1987 Crash Revisited—an Intermarket Perspective 12
the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other 3 Commodity Prices and Bonds 20
expert assistance is required, the services of a competent 4 Bonds Versus Stocks 40
professional person should be sought. From a Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the 5 Commodities and the U.S. Dollar 56

American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers.

6 The Dollar Versus Interest Rates and Stocks 74

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

7 Commodity Indexes 95

Murphy, John J.

8 International Markets 122

Intermarket technical analysis: trading strategies 9 Stock Market Groups 149
for the global stock, bond, commodity, and currency markets /

John J. Murphy.

10 The Dow Utilities as a Leading Indicator of Stocks 173
p. cm. — (Wiley finance editions)

Includes index.

11 Relative-Strength Analysis of Commodities 186

ISBN 0-471-52433-6 (cloth)

12 Commodities and Asset Allocation 206

1. Investment analysis. 2. Portfolio management. I. Title.

II. Series.

13 Intermarket Analysis and the Business Cycle 225

HG4529.M86 1991

14 The Myth of Program Trading 240

332.6-dc20 90-48567

15 A New Direction 253

Printed in the United States of America

Appendix 259

Glossary 273

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13

Index 277

III

To Patty, my friend
and

Preface
to Clare and Brian

Like that of most technical analysts, my analytical work for many years relied on traditional chart analysis supported by a host of internal technical indicators. About five years ago, however, my technical work took a different direction. As consulting editor for the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB), I spent a considerable amount of time analyzing the Commodity Research Bureau Futures Price Index, which measures the trend of commodity prices. I had always used the CRB Index in my analysis of commodity markets in much the same way that equity analysts used the Dow Jones Industrial Average in their analysis of common stocks. However, I began to notice some interesting correlations with markets outside the commodity field, most notably the bond market, that piqued my interest.

The simple observation that commodity prices and bond yields trend in the same direction provided the initial insight that there was a lot more information to be got from our price charts, and that insight opened the door to my intermarket journey. As consultant to the New York Futures Exchange during the launching of a futures contract on the CRB Futures Price Index, my work began to focus on the relationship between commodities and stocks, since that exchange also trades a stock index futures contract. I had access to correlation studies being done between the various financial sectors: commodities, Treasury bonds, and stocks. The results of that research confirmed what I was seeing on my charts—namely, that commodities, bonds, and stocks are closely linked, and that a thorough analysis of one should include consideration of the other two. At a later date, I incorporated the dollar into my work because of its direct impact on the commodity markets and its indirect impact on bonds and stocks.

The turning point for me came in 1987. The dramatic market events of that year turned what was an interesting theory into cold reality. A collapse in the bond market during the spring, coinciding with an explosion in the commodity sector, set the stage V
vi PREFACE

1
for the stock market crash in the fall of that year. The interplay between the dollar, the commodity markets, bonds, and stocks during 1987 convinced me that intermarket analysis represented a critically important dimension to technical work that could no longer be ignored.

• Another by-product of 1987 was my growing awareness of the importance of international markets as global stock markets rose and fell together that year. I noticed that activity in the global bond and stock markets often gave advance warnings of what our markets were up to. Another illustration of global forces at work was given at the start of 1990, when the collapse in the American bond market during the first quarter was foreshadowed by declines in the German, British, and Japanese markets.

A New Dimension

The collapse in the Japanese stock market during the first quarter of 1990 also gave advance warning of the coming drop in other global equity markets, including our own, later that summer.

in Technical Analysis

This book is the result of my continuing research into the world of intermarket analysis. I hope the charts that are included will clearly demonstrate the interrelationships that exist among the various market sectors, and why it's so important to be aware of those relationships. I believe the greatest contribution made by intermarket analysis is that it improves the technical analyst's peripheral trading vision. Trying to trade the markets without intermarket awareness is like trying to drive a car without looking out the side and rear windows—in other words, it's very dangerous.

The application of intermarket analysis extends into all markets everywhere on the globe. By turning the focus of the technical analyst outward instead of inward, intermarket analysis provides a more rational understanding of technical forces at work in the marketplace. It provides a more unified view of global market behavior.

One of the most striking lessons of the 1980s is that all markets are interrelated—

Intermarket analysis uses activity in surrounding markets in much the same way financial and nonfinancial, domestic and international. The U.S. stock market doesn't that most of us have employed traditional technical indicators, that is, for directional trade in a vacuum; it is heavily influenced by the bond market. Bond prices are very clues. Intermarket analysis doesn't replace other technical work, but simply adds much affected by the direction of commodity markets, which in turn depend on the another dimension to it. It also has some bearing on interest rate direction, inflation, trend of the U.S. dollar. Overseas markets are also impacted by and in turn have Federal Reserve policy, economic analysis, and the business cycle.

an impact on the U.S. markets. Events of the past decade have made it clear that The work presented in this book is a beginning rather than an end. There's still markets don't move in isolation. As a result, the concept of technical analysis is a lot that remains to be done before we can fully understand how markets relate now evolving to take these intermarket relationships into consideration. Intermarket to one another. The intermarket principles described herein, while evident in most technical analysis refers to the application of technical analysis to these intermarket situations, are meant to be used as guidelines in market analysis, not as rigid or linkages.

mechanical rules. Although the scope of intermarket analysis is broad, forcing us to The idea behind intermarket analysis seems so obvious that it's a mystery why we stretch our imaginations and expand our vision, the potential benefit is well worth haven't paid more attention to it sooner. It's not unusual these days to open a financial the extra effort. I'm excited about the prospects for intermarket analysis, and I hope newspaper to the stock market page only to read about bond prices and the dollar. The you'll agree after reading the following pages.

bond page often talks about such things as the price of gold and oil, or sometimes even the amount of rain in Iowa and its impact on soybean prices. Reference is John J. Murphy
frequently made to the Japanese and British markets. The financial markets haven't February 1991
really changed, but our perception of them has.

Think back to 1987 when the stock market took its terrible plunge. Remember how all the other world equity markets plunged as well. Remember how those same world markets, led by the Japanese stock market, then led the United States out of those 1987 doldrums to record highs in 1989 (see Figure 1.1).

Turn on your favorite business show any morning and you'll get a recap of the overnight developments that took place overseas in the U.S. dollar, gold and oil, treasury bond prices, and the foreign stock markets. The world continued trading while we slept and, in many cases, already determined how our markets were going to open that morning.

1

A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK 3

FIGURE 1.1
was a time when stock traders didn't watch bond prices too closely, when bond A COMPARISON Of THE WORLD'S THREE LARGEST EQUITY MARKETS: THE UNITED STATES, traders didn't pay too much attention to commodities. Study of the dollar was left to JAPAN, AND BRITAIN. GLOBAL MARKETS COLLAPSED TOGETHER IN 1987. THE SUBSEQUENT
interbank traders and multinational corporations. Overseas markets were something GLOBAL STOCK MARKET RECOVERY THAT LASTED THROUGH THE END OF 1989 WAS LED BY
we knew existed, but didn't care too much about.

THE JAPANESE MARKET.

It was enough for the technical analyst to study only the market in question. To consider outside influences seemed like heresy. To look at what the other markets World Equity Trends
were doing smacked of fundamental or economic analysis. All of that is now changing. Intermarket analysis is a step in another direction. It uses information in related markets in much the same way that traditional technical indicators have been employed. Stock technicians talk about the divergence between bonds and stocks in much the same way that they used to talk about divergence between stocks and the advance/decline line.

Markets provide us with an enormous amount of information. Bonds tell us which way interest rates are heading, a trend that influences stock prices. Commodity prices tell us which way inflation is headed, which influences bond prices and interest rates. The U.S. dollar largely determines the inflationary environment and influences which way commodities trend. Overseas equity markets often provide valuable clues to the type of environment the U.S. market is a part of. The job of the technical trader is to sniff out clues wherever they may lie. If they lie in another market, so be it. As long as price movements can be studied on price charts, and as long as it can be demonstrated that they have an impact on one another, why not take whatever useful information the markets are offering us? Technical analysis is the study of market action. No one ever said that we had to limit that study to only the market or markets we're trading.

Intermarket analysis represents an evolutionary step in technical analysis.

Intermarket work builds on existing technical theory and adds another step to the analytical process. Later in this chapter, I'll discuss why technical analysis is uniquely suited to this type of investigative work and why technical analysis represents the preferred vehicle for intermarket analysis.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK

The goal of this book is to demonstrate how these intermarket relationships work in a Reproduced with permisson by Knight Bidder's Tradecenter. Tradecenter is a registered trademark of Knight Ridder's Financial Information.

way that can be easily recognized by technicians and nontechnicians alike. You won't have to be a technical expert to understand the argument, although some knowledge ALL MARKETS ARE RELATED
of technical analysis wouldn't hurt. For those who are new to technical work, some of What this means for us as traders and investors is that it is no longer possible to the principles and tools employed throughout the book are explained in the Glossary.

study any financial market in isolation, whether it's the U.S. stock market or gold However, the primary focus here is to study interrelationships between markets, not futures. Stock traders have to watch the bond market. Bond traders have to watch to break any new ground in the use of traditional technical indicators.

the commodity markets. And everyone has to watch the U.S. dollar. Then there's the We'll be looking at the four market sectors—currencies, commodities, bonds, Japanese stock market to consider. So who needs intermarket analysis? I guess just and stocks—as well as the overseas markets. This is a book about the study of market about everyone; since all sectors are influenced in some way, it stands to reason that action. Therefore, it will be a very visual book. The charts should largely speak for anyone interested in any of the financial markets should benefit in some way from themselves. Once the basic relationships are described, charts will be employed to knowledge of how intermarket relationships work.

show how they have worked in real life.

Although economic forces, which are impossible to avoid, are at work here, the discussions of those economic forces will be kept to a minimum. It's not possible to IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
do intermarket work without gaining a better understanding of the fundamental forces Technical analysis has always had an inward focus. Emphasis was placed on a par-behind those moves. However, our intention will be to stick to market action and keep ticular market to which a host of internal technical indicators were applied. There economic analysis to a minimum. We will devote one chapter to a brief discussion

4 A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

BASIC PREMISES OF INTERMARKET WORK 5
of the role of intermarket analysis in the business cycle, however, to provide a useful widely watched gauge of commodity price direction. Other commodity indexes will chronological framework to the interaction between commodities, bonds, and stocks.

be discussed as well.

The strong inverse relationship between the CRB Index and bond prices will be shown. Events of 1987 and thereafter take on a whole new light when activity in the FOUR MARKET SECTORS: CURRENCIES,

CRB Index is factored into the financial equation. Comparisons between bonds and COMMODITIES, BONDS, AND STOCKS
stocks will be used to show that bond prices provide a useful confirming indicator and often lead stock prices.

The key to intermarket work lies in dividing the financial markets into these four I hope you'll begin to see that if you're not watching these relationships, you're sectors. How these four sectors interact with each other will be shown by various vi-missing vital market information (see Figure 1.2).

sual means. The U.S. dollar, for example, usually trades in the opposite direction of You'll also see that very often stock market moves are the end result of a ripple the commodity markets, in particular the gold market. While individual commodities effect that flows through the other three sectors—a phenomenon that carries important such as gold and oil are discussed, special emphasis will be placed on the Commod-implications in the area of program trading. Among the financial media and those ity Research Bureau (CRB) Index, which is a basket of 21 commodities and the most who haven't acquired intermarket awareness, "program trading" is often unfairly blamed for stock market drops without any consideration of what caused the program trading in the first place. We'll deal with the controversial subject of program trading FIGURE 1.2
in Chapter 14.

A LOOK AT THE FOUR MARKET SECTORS-CURRENCIES, COMMODITIES, BONDS, AND

STOCKS—IN 1989. FROM THE SPRING TO THE AUTUMN OF 1989, A FIRM U.S. DOLLAR HAD

BASIC PREMISES OF INTERMARKET WORK

A BEARISH INFLUENCE ON COMMODITIES. WEAK COMMODITY PRICES COINCIDED WITH

A RISING BOND MARKET, WHICH IN TURN HAD A BULLISH INFLUENCE ON THE STOCK

Before we begin to study the individual relationships, I'd like to lay down some basic MARKET.

premises or guidelines that I'll be using throughout the book. This should provide a useful framework and, at the same time, help point out the direction we'll be going.

Dollar Index Stocks

Then I'll briefly outline the specific relationships we'll be focusing on. There are an infinite number of relationships that exist between markets, but our discussions will be limited to those that I have found most useful and that I believe carry the most significance. After completion of the overview contained in this chapter, we'll proceed in Chapter 2 to the events of 1987 and begin to approach the material in more specific fashion. These, then, are our basic guidelines: 1. All markets are interrelated; markets don't move in isolation.

2. Intermarket work provides important background data.

3. Intermarket work uses external, as opposed to internal, data.

4. Technical analysis is the preferred vehicle.

CRB Index

Bonds

5. Heavy emphasis is placed on the futures markets.

6. Futures-oriented technical indicators are employed.

These premises form the basis for intermarket analysis. If it can be shown that all markets—financial and nonfinancial, domestic and global—are interrelated, and that all are just part of a greater whole, then it becomes clear that focusing one's attention on only one market without consideration of what is happening in the others leaves one in danger of missing vital directional clues. Market analysis, when limited to any one market, often leaves the analyst in doubt. Technical analysis can tell an important story about a common stock or a futures contract. More often than not, however, technical readings are uncertain. It is at those times that a study of a related market may provide critical information as to market direction. When in doubt, look to related markets for clues. Demonstrating that these intermarket relationships exist, and how they can be incorporated into our technical work, is the major task of this book.

EMPHASIS ON THE FUTURES MARKETS 7

6 A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

Technicians don't have to be experts in the stock market, bond market, currency INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION
market, commodity market, or the Japanese stock market to study their trends The key word here is "background." Intermarket work provides background and their technical condition. They can arrive at technical conclusions and make information, not primary information. Traditional technical analysis still has to be intermarket comparisons without understanding the fundamentals of each individual applied to the markets on an individual basis, with primary emphasis placed on the market. Fundamental analysts, by comparison, would have to become familiar with market being traded. Once that's done, however, the next step is to take intermarket all the economic forces that drive each of these markets individually—a formidable'

relationships into consideration to see if the individual conclusions make sense from task that is probably impossible. It is mainly for this reason that technical analysis an intermarket perspective.

is the preferred vehicle for intermarket work.

Suppose intermarket work suggests that two markets usually trend in opposite directions, such as Treasury bonds and the Commodity Research Bureau Index.

Suppose further that a separate analysis of the top markets provides a bullish outlook EMPHASIS ON THE FUTURES MARKETS
for both at the same time. Since those two conclusions, arrived at by separate analysis, Intermarket awareness parallels the development of the futures industry. The main contradict their usual inverse relationship, the analyst might want to go back and reason that we are now aware of intermarket relationships is that price data is now reexamine the individual conclusions.

readily available through the various futures markets that wasn't available just 15 years There will be times when the usual intermarket relationships aren't visible or, ago. The price discovery mechanism of the futures markets has provided the catalyst for a variety of reasons, appear to be temporarily out of line. What is the trader to do that has sparked the growing interest in and awareness of the interrelationships among when traditional technical analysis clashes with intermarket analysis? At such times, the various financial sectors.

traditional analysis still takes precedence but with increased caution. The trader who In the 1970s the New York commodity exchanges expanded their list of gets bullish readings in two markets that usually don't trend in the same direction traditional commodity contracts to include inflation-sensitive markets such as knows one of the markets is probably giving false readings, but isn't sure which one.

gold and energy futures. In 1972 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange pioneered the The prudent course at such times is to fall back on one's separate technical work, but development of the first financial futures contracts on foreign currencies. Starting in to do so very cautiously until the intermarket work becomes clearer.

1976 the Chicago exchanges introduced a new breed of financial futures contracts Another way to look at it is that intermarket analysis warns traders when they covering Treasury bonds and Treasury bills. Later on, other interest rate futures, such can afford to be more aggressive and when they should be more cautious. They may as Eurodollars and Treasury notes, were added. In 1982 stock index futures were remain faithful to the more traditional technical work, but intermarket relationships introduced. In the mid-1980s in New York, the Commodity Research Bureau Futures may. serve to warn them not to trust completely what the individual charts are Price Index and the U.S. Dollar Index were listed.

showing. There may be other times when intermarket analysis may cause a trader Prior to 1972 stock traders followed only stocks, bond traders only bonds, to override individual market conclusions. Remember that intermarket analysis is currency traders only currencies, and commodity traders only commodities. After meant to add to the trader's data, not to replace what has gone before. I'll try to 1986, however, traders could pick up a chart book to include graphs on virtually resolve this seeming contradiction as we work our way through the various examples every market and sector. They could see right before their eyes the daily movements in succeeding chapters.

in the various futures markets, including agricultural commodities, copper, gold, oil, the CRB Index, the U.S. dollar, foreign currencies, bond, and stock index futures.

EXTERNAL RATHER THAN INTERNAL DATA

Traders in brokerage firms and banks could now follow on their video screens the minute-by-minute quotes and chart action in the four major sectors: commodities, Traditional technical work has tended to focus its attention on an individual market, currencies, bonds, and stock index futures. It didn't take long for them to notice that such as the stock market or the gold market. All the market data needed to analyze these four sectors, which used to be looked at separately, actually fed off one another.

an individual market technically—price, volume, open interest—was provided by A whole new way to look at the markets began to evolve.

the market itself. As many as 40 different technical indicators—on balance volume, On an international level, stock index futures were introduced on various moving averages, oscillators, trendlines, and so on—were applied to the market along overseas equities, in particular the British and Japanese stock markets. As various with various analytical techniques, such as Elliott Wave theory and cycles. The goal financial futures contracts began to proliferate around the globe, the world suddenly was to analyze the market separately from everything else.

seemed to grow smaller. In no small way, then, our ability to monitor such a broad Intermarket analysis has a totally different focus. It suggests that important range of markets and our increased awareness of how they interact derive from the directional clues can be found in related markets. Intermarket work has a more development of the various futures markets over the past 15 years.

outward focus and represents a different emphasis and direction in technical work.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the main emphasis in this book will be One of the great advantages of technical analysis is that it is very transferable.

on the futures markets. Since the futures markets cover every financial sector, they A technician doesn't have to be an expert in a given market to be able to analyze provide a useful framework for our intermarket work. Of course, when we talk about it technically. If a market is reasonably liquid, and can be plotted on a chart, a stock index futures and bond futures, we're also talking about the stock market and technical analyst can do a pretty adequate job of analyzing it. Since intermarket the Treasury bond market as well. We're simply using the futures markets as proxies analysis requires the analyst to look at so many different markets, it should be obvious for all of the sectors under study.

why the technical analyst is at such an advantage.

8 A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK 9

Since most of our attention will be focused on the futures markets, I'll KEY MARKET RELATIONSHIPS
be employing technical indicators that are used primarily in the futures markets.

These then are the primary intermarket relationships we'll be working on. We'll begin There is an enormous amount of overlap between technical analysis of stocks and in the commodity sector and work our way outward into the three other financial futures, but there are certain types of indicators that are more heavily used in each sectors. We'll then extend our horizon to include international markets. The key area.

relationships are:

For one thing, I'll be using mostly price-based indicators. Readers familiar with traditional technical analysis such as price pattern analysis, trendlines, support and 1. Action within commodity groups, such as the relationship of gold to platinum resistance, moving averages, and oscillators should have no trouble at all.

or crude to heating oil.

Those readers who have studied my previous book, Technical Analysis of the 2. Action between related commodity groups, such as that between the precious Futures Markets (New York Institute of Finance/Prentice-Hall, 1986) are already well metals and energy markets.

prepared. For those newer to technical analysis, the Glossary gives a brief introduction to some of the work we will be employing. However, I'd like to stress that while 3. The relationship between the CRB Index and the various commodity groups and some technical work will be employed, it will be on a very basic level and is not markets.

the primary i focus. Most of the charts employed will be overlay, or comparison, 4. The inverse relationship between commodities and bonds.

charts that simply compare the price activity between two or three markets. You 5. The positive relationship between bonds and the stock market.

should be able to see these relationships even with little or no knowledge of tech-6. The inverse relationship between the U.S. dollar and the various commodity nical analysis.

markets, in particular the gold market.

Finally, one other advantage of the price-based type of indicators widely used in 7. The relationship between various futures markets and related stock market the futures markets is that they make comparison with related markets, particularly groups, for example, gold versus gold mining shares.

overseas markets, much easier. Stock market work, as it is practiced in the United States, is very heavily oriented to the use of sentiment indicators, such as the degree 8. U.S. bonds and stocks versus overseas bond and stock markets.

of bullishness among trading advisors, mutual fund cash levels, and put/call ratios.

Since many of the markets we will be looking at do not provide the type of data needed THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK
to determine sentiment readings, the price-oriented indicators I will be employing This chapter introduces the concept of intermarket technical analysis and provides lend themselves more readily to intermarket and overseas comparisons.

a general foundation for the more specific work to follow. In Chapter 2, the events leading up to the 1987 stock market crash are used as the vehicle for providing an THE IMPORTANT ROLE
intermarket overview of the relationships between the four market sectors. I'll show how the activity in the commodity and bond markets gave ample warning that the OF THE COMMODITY MARKETS
strength in the stock market going into the fall of that year was on very shaky ground.

Although our primary goal is to examine intermarket relationships between financial hi Chapter 3 the crucial link between the CRB Index and the bond market, which is sectors, a lot of emphasis will be placed on the commodity markets. This is done the most important relationship in the intermarket picture, will be examined in more for two reasons. First, we'll be using the commodity markets to demonstrate how depth. The real breakthrough in intermarket work comes with the recognition of how relationships within one sector can be used as trading information. This should commodity markets and bond prices are linked (see Figure 1.3).

prove especially helpful to those who actually trade the commodity markets. The Chapter 4 presents the positive relationship between bonds and stocks. More and second, and more important, reason is based on my belief that commodity markets more, stock market analysts are beginning to use bond price activity as an important represent the least understood of the market sectors that make up the intermarket indication of stock market strength. The link between commodities and the U.S. dollar chain. For reasons that we'll explain later, the introduction of a futures contract on will be treated in Chapter 5. Understanding how movements in the U.S. dollar affect the CRB Index in mid-1986 put the final piece of the intermarket structure in place the general commodity price level is helpful in understanding why a rising dollar and helped launch the movement toward intermarket awareness.

is considered bearish for commodity markets and generally positive for bonds and The key to understanding the intermarket scenario lies in recognizing the often stocks. In Chapter 6 the activity in the U.S. dollar will then be compared to interest overlooked role that the commodity markets play. Those readers who are more rate futures.

involved with the financial markets, and who have not paid much attention to Chapter 7 will delve into the world of commodities. Various commodity indexes the commodity markets, need to learn more about that area. I'll spend some time, will be compared for their predictive value and for their respective roles in influencing therefore, talking about relationships within the commodity markets themselves, and the direction of inflation and interest rates. The CRB Index will be examined closely, then place the commodity group as a whole into the intermarket structure. To perform as will various commodity subindexes. Other popular commodity gauges, such as the latter task, I'll be employing various commodity indexes, such as the CRB Index.

the Journal of Commerce and the Raw Industrial Indexes, will be studied. The However, an adequate understanding of the workings of the CRB Index involves relationship of commodity markets to the Producer Price Index and the Consumer monitoring the workings of certain key commodity sectors, such as the precious Price Index will be treated along with an explanation of how the Federal Reserve metals, energy, and grain markets.

Board uses commodity markets in its policy making.

10 A NEW DIMENSION IN TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK 11

Chapter 12 discusses how ratio analysis can be employed in the asset allocation FIGURE 1.3
process and also makes the case for treating commodity markets as an asset class BONDS AND COMMODITIES USUALLY TREND IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS. THAT INVERSE

RELATIONSHIP CAN BE SEEN DURING 1989 BETWEEN TREASURY BOND FUTURES AND THE
in the asset allocation formula. The business cycle provides the economic backdrop CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX.

that determines whether the economy is in a period of expansion or contraction.

The financial markets appear to go through a predictable, chronological sequence of Bonds versus CRB Index
peaks and troughs depending on the stage of the business cycle. The business cycle provides some economic rationale as to why the financial and commodity markets interact the way they do at certain times. We'll look at the business cycle in Chapter 13.

Chapter 14 will consider whether program trading is really a cause of stock market moves—or, as the evidence seems to indicate, whether program trading is itself an effect of events in other markets. Finally, I'll try to pull all of these relationships together in Chapter 15 to provide you with a comprehensive picture of how all of these intermarket relationships work. It's one thing to look at one or two key relationships; it's quite another to put the whole thing together in a way that it all makes sense.

I should warn you before we begin that intermarket work doesn't make the work of an analyst any easier. In many ways, it makes our market analysis more difficult by forcing us to take much more information into consideration. As in any other market approach or technique, the messages being sent by the markets aren't always clear, and sometimes they appear to be in conflict. The most intimidating feature of intermarket analysis is that it forces us to take in so much more information and to move into areas that many of us, who have tended to specialize, have never ventured into before.

The way the world looks at the financial markets is rapidly changing. Instant communications and the trend toward globalization have tied all of the world markets together into one big jigsaw puzzle. Every market plays some role in that big puzzle.

The information is there for the taking. The question is no longer whether or not we should take intermarket comparisons into consideration, but rather how soon we should begin.

International markets will be discussed in Chapter 8, where comparisons will be made between the U.S. markets and those of the other two world leaders, Britain and Japan. You'll see why knowing what's happening overseas may prove beneficial to your investing results. Chapter 9 will look at intermarket relationships from a different perspective. We'll look at how various inflation and interest-sensitive stock market groups and individual stocks are affected by activity in the various futures sectors.

The Dow Jones Utility Average is recognized as a leading indicator of the stock market. The Utilities are very sensitive to interest rate direction and hence the action in the bond market. Chapter 10 is devoted to consideration of how the relationship between bonds and commodities influence the Utility Average and the impact of that average on the stock market as a whole. I'll show in Chapter 11 how relative strength, or ratio analysis, can be used as an additional method of comparison between markets and sectors.

!

THE LOW-INFLATION ENVIRONMENT AND THE BULL MARKET IN STOCKS 13

2
in commodity prices and interest rate yields provided a low inflation environment, which fueled strong bull markets in bonds and stocks.

In later chapters many of these relationships will be examined in more depth.

For now, I'll simply state the basic premise that generally the CRB Index moves in the same direction as interest rate yields and in the opposite direction of bond prices.

Falling commodity prices are generally bullish for bonds. In turn, rising bond prices are generally bullish for stocks.

Figure 2.1 shows the inverse relationship between the CRB Index and Treasury bonds from 1985 through the end of 1987. Going into 1986 bond prices were rising The 1987 Crash Revisited -
and commodity prices were falling. In the spring of 1986 the commodity price level began to level off and formed what later came to be seen as a "left shoulder" in a major inverse "head and shoulders" bottom that was resolved by a bullish breakout in an Intermarket Perspective
the spring of 1987. Two specific events help explain that recovery in the CRB Index FIGURE 2.1

THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOND PRICES AND COMMODITIES CAN BE SEEN FROM

1985 THROUGH 1987. THE BOND MARKET COLLAPSE IN THE SPRING OF 1987 COINCIDED

WITH A BULLISH BREAKOUT IN COMMODITIES. THE BULLISH "HEAD AND SHOULDERS"

BOTTOM IN THE CRB INDEX WARNED THAT THE BULLISH "SYMMETRICAL TRIANGLE" IN

The year 1987 is one that most stock market participants would probably rather forget.

BONDS WAS SUSPECT.

The stock market drop in the fall of that year shook the financial markets around the world and led to a lot of finger pointing as to what actually caused the global equity Bonds versus CRB Index
collapse. Many took the narrow view that various futures-related strategies, such as program trading and portfolio insurance, actually caused the selling panic. They reasoned that there didn't seem to be any economic or technical justification for the stock collapse. The fact that the equity collapse was global in scope, and not limited to the U.S. markets, would seem to argue against such a narrow view, however, since most overseas markets at the time weren't affected by program trading or portfolio insurance.

In Chapter 14 it will be argued that what is often blamed on program trading is in reality usually some manifestation of intermarket linkages at work. The more specific purpose in this chapter is to reexamine the market events leading up to the October 1987 collapse and to demonstrate that, while the stock market itself may have been taken by surprise, those observers who were monitoring activity in the commodity and bond markets were aware that the stock market advance during 1987 was on very shaky ground. In fact, the events of 1987 provide a textbook example of how the intermarket scenario works and make a compelling argument as to why stock market participants need to monitor the other three market sectors—the dollar, bonds, and commodities.

THE LOW-INFLATION ENVIRONMENT AND THE BULL MARKET IN STOCKS

I'll start the examination of the 1987 events by looking at the situation in the commodity markets and the bond market. Two of the main supporting factors behind the bull market in stocks that began in 1982 were falling commodity prices (lower inflation) and falling interest rates (rising bond prices). Commodity prices (represented by the Commodity Research Bureau Index) had been dropping since 1980. Long-term interest rates topped out in 1981. Going into the 1980s, therefore, falling commodity prices signaled that the inflationary spiral of the 1970s had ended. The subsequent drop 12

14 THE 1987 CRASH REVISITED-AN INTERMARKET PERSPECTIVE

THE BOND COLLAPSE-A WARNING FOR STOCKS 15
in 1986. One was the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Russia in April 1986 which FIGURE 2.2
caused strong reflex rallies in many commodity markets. The other factor was that BONDS USUALLY PEAK BEFORE STOCKS. BONDS PEAKED IN 1986 BUT DIDN'T START TO
crude oil prices, which had been in a freefall from $32.00 to $10.00, hit bottom the DROP UNTIL THE SPRING OF 1987. THE COLLAPSE IN BOND PRICES IN APRIL OF 1987 (WHICH
same month and began to rally.

COINCIDED WITH AN UPTURN IN COMMODITIES) WARNED THAT THE STOCK MARKET RALLY

Figure 2.1 shows that the actual top in bond prices in the spring of 1986 coin-

(WHICH PEAKED IN AUGUST) WAS ON SHAKY GROUND.

-ided with the formation of the "left shoulder" in the CRB Index. (The bond market is particularly sensitive to trends in the oil market.) The following year saw side-Bonds versus Stocks
ways movement in both the bond market and the CRB Index, which eventually led to major trend reversals in both markets in 1987. What happened during the ensuing 12 months is a dramatic example not only of the strong inverse relationship between commodities and bonds but also of why it's so important to take intermarket comparisons into consideration.

The price pattern that the bond market formed throughout the second half of 1986 and early 1987 was viewed at the time as a bullish "symmetrical triangle."

The pattern is clearly visible in Figure 2.1. Normally, this type of pattern with two converging trendlines is a continuation pattern, which means that the prior trend (in this case, the bullish trend) would probably resume. The consensus of technical opinion at that time was for a bullish resolution of the bond triangle.

On its own merits that bullish interpretation seemed fully justified if the technical trader had been looking only at the bond market. However, the trader who was also monitoring the CRB Index should have detected the formation of the potentially bullish "head and shoulders" bottoming pattern. Since the CRB Index and bond prices usually trend in opposite directions, something was clearly wrong. If the CRB
index actually broke its 12-month "neckline" and started to rally sharply, it would b? hard to justify a simultaneous bullish breakout in bonds.

This, then, is an excellent example of two independent technical readings giving simultaneous bullish interpretations to two markets that seldom move in the same direction. At the very least the bond bull should have been warned that his bullish interpretation might be faulty.

Figure 2.1 shows that the bullish breakout by the CRB Index in April 1987 coincided with the bearish breakdown in bond prices. It became clear at that point that two major props under the bull market in stocks (rising bond prices and falling commodity prices) had been removed. Let's look at what happened between bonds and stocks.

THE BOND COLLAPSE- A WARNING FOR STOCKS

Many traditional stock market indicators gave "sell" signals in advance of the October collapse. Negative divergences were evident in many popular oscillators; Figure 2.2 compares the action between bonds and stocks in the three-year period several mechanical systems flashed "sell" signals; a Dow Theory sell signal was given prior to October 1987. Since 1982 bonds and stocks had been rallying together. Both the week prior to the October crash. The problem was that many technically oriented markets had undergone a one-year consolidation throughout most of 1986. Early in traders paid little attention to the bearish signals because many of those signals had 1987 stocks began another advance but for the first time in four years, the stock rally often proven unreliable during the previous five years. The action in the commodity was not confirmed by a similar rally in bonds. What made matters worse was the and bond markets might have suggested giving more credence to the bearish technical bond market collapse in April 1987 (coinciding with the commodity price rally). At warnings in stocks this time around.

the very least stock traders who were following the course of events in commodities Although the rally in the CRB Index and the collapse in the bond market didn't and bonds were warned that something important had changed and that it was time provide a specific timing signal as to when to take long profits in stocks, there's to start worrying about stocks.

no question that they provided plenty of time for the stock trader to implement a What about the long lead time between bonds and stocks? It's true that the stock more defensive strategy. By using intermarket analysis to provide a background that market peak in August 1987 came four months after the bond market collapse that took suggested this stock rally was not on solid footing, the technical trader could have place in April. It's also true that there was a lot of money to be made in stocks during monitored various stock market technical indicators with the intention of exiting long those four months (provided the trader exited the stock market on time). However, positions or taking some appropriate defensive action to protect long profits on the the action in bonds and commodities warned that it was time to be cautious.

first sign of breakdowns or divergences in those technical indicators.

16 THE 1987 CRASH REVISITED-AN INTERMARKET PERSPECTIVE

THE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR 17

Figure 2.3 shows bond, commodities, and stocks on one chart for the same three-FIGURE 2.4
year period. This type of chart from 1985 through the end of 1987 clearly shows the THE SURGE IN BOND YIELDS IN THE SUMMER AND FALL OF 1987 HAD A BEARISH INFLUENCE
interplay between the three markets. It shows the bullish breakout in the CRB Index, ON STOCKS. FROM JULY TO OCTOBER OF THAT YEAR, TREASURY BOND YIELDS SURGED
the simultaneous bearish breakdown in bonds in April 1987, and the subsequent FROM 8.50 PERCENT TO OVER 10.00 PERCENT. THE SURGE IN BOND YIELDS WAS TIED TO
stock market peak in August of the same year. The rally in the commodity markets THE COLLAPSING BOND MARKET AND RISING COMMODITIES.

and bond decline had pushed interest rates sharply higher. Probably more than any other factor, the surge in interest rates during September and October of 1987 (as a Interest Rates versus Stocks
direct result of the action in the other two sectors) caused the eventual downfall of the stock market.

Figure 2.4 compares Treasury bond yields to the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

Notice on the left scale that bond yields rose to double-digit levels (over 10 percent) in October. This sharp jump in bond yields coincided with a virtual collapse in the bond market. Market commentators since the crash have cited the interest rate FIGURE 2.3

A COMPARISON OF BONDS, STOCKS, AND COMMODITIES FROM 1985 THROUGH 1987. THE

STOCK MARKET PEAK IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1987 WAS FORESHADOWED BY THE RALLY

IN COMMODITIES AND THE DROP IN BOND PRICES DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THAT

YEAR.

Bonds versus Stocks versus CRB Index
surge as the primary factor in the stock market selloff. If that's the case, the whole scenario had begun to play itself out several months earlier in the commodity and bond markets.

THE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR

Attention during this discussion of the events of 1987 has primarily focused on the commodity, bond, and stock markets. The U.S. dollar played a role as well in the autum of 1987. Figure 2.5 compares the U.S. stock market with the action in the dollar.

It can be seen that a sharp drop in the U.S. currency coincided almost exactly with the stock market decline. The U.S. dollar had actually been in a bear market since early 1985. However, for several months prior, the dollar had staged an impressive rally. There was considerable speculation at the time as to whether or not the dollar had actually bottomed. As the chart in Figure 2.5 shows, however, the dollar rally

18 THE 1987 CRASH REVISITED-AN INTERMARKET PERSPECTIVE

SUMMARY 19

FIGURE 2.5

RECAP OF KEY RELATIONSHIPS

THE FALLING U.S. DOLLAR DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1987 ALSO WEIGHED ON STOCK

I'll briefly restate the key relationships here as they were demonstrated in 1987. In PRICES. THE TWIN PEAKS IN THE U.S. CURRENCY IN AUGUST AND OCTOBER OF THAT YEAR
subsequent chapters, I'll break down the relationships more finely and examine each COINCIDED WITH SIMILAR PEAKS IN THE STOCK MARKET. THE COLLAPSE IN THE U.S. DOLLAR
of them in isolation and in more depth. After examining each of them separately, I'll IN OCTOBER ALSO PARALLELED THE DROP IN EQUITIES.

then put them all back together again.

Stocks versus the Dollar

• Bond prices and commodities usually trend in opposite directions.

• Bonds usually trend in the same direction as stocks. Any serious divergence between bonds and stocks usually warns of a possible trend reversal in stocks.

• A falling dollar will eventually cause commodity prices to rally which in turn will have a bearish impact on bonds and stocks. Conversely, a rising dollar will eventually cause commodity prices to weaken which is bullish for bonds and stocks.

LEADS AND LAGS IN THE DOLLAR

The role of the dollar in 1987 isn't as convincing as that of bonds and stocks. Despite its plunge in October 1987, which contributed to stock market weakness, the dollar had already been falling for over two years. It's important to recognize that although the dollar plays an important role in the intermarket picture, long lead times must at times be taken into consideration. For example, the dollar topped in the spring of 1985. That peak in the dollar started a chain of events in motion and led to the eventual bottom in the CRB Index and tops in bonds and stocks. However, the bottom in the commodity index didn't take place until a year after the dollar peak. A falling dollar becomes bearish for bonds and stocks when its inflationary impact begins to push commodity prices higher.

Although my analysis begins with the dollar, it's important to recognize that there's really no starting point in intermarket work. The dollar affects commodity prices, which affect interest rates, which in turn affect the dollar. A period of falling interest rates (1981—1986) will eventually cause the dollar to weaken (1985); the weaker dollar will eventually cause commodities to rally (1986—1987) along with higher interest rates, which is bearish for bonds and stocks (1987). Eventually the higher interest rates will pull the dollar higher, commodities and interest rates will peak, exerting a bullish influence on bonds and stocks, and the whole cycle starts over again.

Therefore, it is possible to have a falling dollar along with falling commodity peaked in August along with the stock market. A second rally failure by the dollar in prices and rising financial assets for a period of time. The trouble starts when com-October and its subsequent plunge coincided almost exactly with the stock market modities turn higher. Of the four sectors that we will be examining, the role of the selloff. It seems clear that the plunge in the dollar contributed to the weakness in U.S. dollar is probably the least precise and the one most difficult to pin down.

equities.

Consider the sequence of events going into the fall of 1987. Commodity prices had turned sharply higher, fueling fears of renewed inflation. At the same time interest SUMMARY
rates began to soar to double digits. The U.S. dollar, which was attempting to end The events of 1987 provided a textbook example of how the financial markets inits two-year bear market, suddenly went into a freefall of its own (fueling even more terrelate with each other and also an excellent vehicle for an overview of the four inflation fears). Is it any wonder, then, that the stock market finally ran into trouble?

market sectors. I'll return to this time period in Chapters 8, 10, and 13, which dis-Given all of the bearish activity in the surrounding markets, it's amazing the stock cuss various other intermarket features, such as the business cycle, the international market held up as well as it did for so long. There were plenty of reasons why markets, and the leading action of the Dow Jones Utility Average. Let's now take a stocks should have sold off in late 1987. Most of those reasons, however, were visible closer look at the most important relationship in the intermarket picture: the linkage in the action of the surrounding markets and not necessarily in the stock market itself.

between commodities and bonds.

THE KEY IS INFLATION 21

3

FIGURE 3.1

A DEMONSTRATION OF THE POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND

10-YEAR TREASURY YIELDS FROM 1973 THROUGH 1987. (SOURCE- CRB INDEX WHITE PAPER:

AN INVESTIGATION INTO NON-TRADITIONAL TRADING APPLICATIONS FOR CRB INDEX

FUTURES, PREPARED BY POWERS RESEARCH, INC., 30 MONTGOMERY STREET, JERSEY CITY, NJ 07302, MARCH 1988.)

CRB Index versus 10-Year Treasuries

(Monthly averages from 1973 to 1987)

Commodity Prices and Bonds

Of all the intermarket relationships explored in this book, the link between commodity markets and the Treasury bond market is the most important. The commodity-bond link is the fulcrum on which the other relationships are built.

It is this inverse relationship between the commodity markets (represented by the Commodity Research Bureau Futures Price Index) and Treasury bond prices that provides the breakthrough linking commodity markets and the financial sector.

Why is this so important? If a strong link can be established between the commodity sector and the bond sector, then a link can also be established between the commodity markets and the stock market because the latter is influenced to a large extent by bond prices. Bond and stock prices are both influenced by the dollar.

However, the dollar's impact on bonds and stocks comes through the commodity sector. Movements in the dollar influence commodity prices. Commodity prices influence bonds, which then influence stocks. The key relationship that binds all four sectors together is the link between bonds and commodities. To understand why this is the case brings us to the critical question of inflation.

THE KEY IS INFLATION

The reason commodity prices are so important is because of their role as a leading indicator of inflation. In Chapter 7, I'll show how commodity markets lead other popular inflation gauges such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Producer during the early 1970s, trended sideways together from 1974 to 1977, and then rose Price Index (PPI) by several months. We'll content ourselves here with the general dramatically into 1980. In late 1980 commodity prices began to drop sharply. Bond statement that rising commodity prices are inflationary, while falling commodity yields topped out a year later in 1981. Commodities and bond yields dropped together prices are non-inflationary. Periods of inflation are also characterized by rising to mid-1986 when both measures troughed out together.

interest rates, while noninflationary periods experience falling interest rates. During For those readers who are unfamiliar with Treasury bond pricing, it's important the 1970s soaring commodity markets led to double-digit inflation and interest rate to recognize that bond prices and bond yields move in opposite directions. When yields in excess of 20 percent. The commodity markets peaked out in 1980 and Treasury bond yields are rising (during a period of rising inflation like the 1970s), declined for six years, ushering in a period of disinflation and falling interest rates.

bond prices fall. When bond yields are falling (during a period of disinflation like The major premise of this chapter is that commodity markets trend in the same the early 1980s), bond prices are rising. This is how the inverse relationship between direction as Treasury bond yields and in the opposite direction of bond prices. Since bond prices and commodity prices is established. If it can be shown that interest rate the early 1970s every major turning point in long-term interest rates has been ac-yields and commodity prices trend in the same direction, and if it is understood that companied by or preceded by a major turn in the commodity markets in the same bond yields and bond prices move in opposite directions, then it follows that bond direction. Figure 3.1 shows that the CRB Index and interest rates rose simultaneously prices and commodity prices trend in opposite directions.

20

COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

MARKET HISTORY IN THE 1980s 23

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The 1970s had been characterized by rising commodity prices and a weak bond It isn't necessary to understand why these economic relationships exist All that market. In the six years after the 1980 peak, the CRB Index lost 40 percent of its is necessary is the demonstration that they do exist and the application of that value while bond yields dropped by about half. The inflation rate descended from knowledge m trading decisions. The purpose in this and succeeding chapters is to the 12—13 percent range at the beginning of the 1980s to its lowpoint of 2 percent in demonstrate that these relationships do exist and can be used to advantage in market 1986. The 1980 peak in the CRB Index set the stage for the major bottom in bonds analysis. However, it is comforting to know that there are economic explanations as the following year (1981). A decade later the 1980 top in the CRB Index and the 1981
to why commodities ana interest rates move in the same direction bottom in the bond market have still not been challenged.

The disinflationary period starting in 1980 saw falling commodity markets along During a period of economic expansion, demand for raw materials increases along with the demand for money to fuel the economic expansion. As a result with falling interest rates (see Figure 3.1). One major interruption of those trends took prices of commodities rise along with the price of money (interest rates). A period of place from the end of 1982 through early 1984, when the CRB Index recovered about rising commodity prices arouses fears of inflation which prompts monetary author-half of its earlier losses. Not surprisingly during that same time period interest rates ities to raise interest rates to combat that inflation. Eventually, the rise in interest rates rose. In mid-1984, however, the CRB index resumed its major downtrend. At the same chokes off the economic expansion which leads to the inevitable economic slow-time that the CRB Index was resuming its decline, bond yields started the second leg down and recession. During the recession demand for raw materials and money of their decline that lasted for another two years. Figure 3.2 compares the CRB Index decreases, resulting in lower commodity prices and interest rates. Although it's and bond yields on a rate of change basis.

not the mam concern in this chapter, it should also be obvious that activity in the bond and commodity markets can tell a lot about which way the economy is heading FIGURE 3.2

THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BOND YIELDS CAN BE SEEN ON A 12-MONTH RATE OF CHANGE BASIS FROM 1964 TO 1986. (SOURCE: COMMODITY RESEARCH

BUREAU, 75 WALL STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005.) MARKET HISTORY IN THE 1980s

Rate of Change-CRB Futures Index and

Comparison of the bond and commodity markets begins with the events leading up Long-Term Yields (12-Month Trailing)

to and following the major turning points of the 1980-1981 period which ended the inflationary spiral of the 1970s and began the disinflationary period of the 1980s This provides a useful background for closer scrutiny of the market action of the past five years. The major purpose in this chapter is simply to demonstrate that a strong inverse relationship exists between the CRB Index and the Treasury bond market

:o suggest ways that the trader or analyst could have used this information to advantage Since the focus is on the Commodity Research Bureau Futures Price Index a bnet explanation is necessary.

The CRB Index, which was created by the Commodity Research Bureau in 1956, Presents a basket of 21 actively-traded commodity markets. It is the most widely-watched barometer of general commodity price trends and is regarded as the commodity markets' equivalent of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. It includes grams livestock, tropical, metals, and energy markets. It uses 1967 as its base year. While other commodity indexes provide useful trending information, the wide acceptance of the CRB Index as the main barometer of the commodity markets, the tact that all of its components are traded on futures markets, and the fact that it is the only commodity index that is also a futures contract itself make it the logical choice for intermarket comparisons. In Chapter 7, I'll explain the CRB Index in more depth and compare it to some other commodity indexes.

The 1970s witnessed virtual explosions in the commodity markets, which led to spiraling inflation and rising interest rates. From 1971 to 1980 the CRB Index appreciated in value by approximately 250 percent. During that same period of time bond yields appreciated by about 150 percent. In November of 1980, however a collapse in the CRB Index signaled the end of the inflationary spiral and began the disinflationary period of the 1980s. (An even earlier warning of an impending top in the commodity markets was sounded by the precious metals markets which began to fall during the first quartet of 1980.). Long-term bond rates continued to rise into the middle of 1981 before finally peaking in September of that year

24 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM THE 1987 TURNING POINTS 25

Although the focus of this chapter is on the relationship of commodities and FIGURE 3.3
bonds, it should be mentioned at this point that the 1980 peak in the commodity A COMPARISON OF THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BOND YIELDS FROM 1986 TO 1989.

markets was accompanied by a major bottom in the U.S. dollar, a subject that INTEREST RATES AND COMMODITY PRICES USUALLY TREND IN THE SAME DIRECTION.

is explained in Chapter 5. The bottom in the bond market during 1981 and the subsequent upside breakout in 1982 helped launch the major bull market in stocks Long-Term Interest Rates versus CRB Index
that began the same year. It's instructive to point out here that the action in the dollar played an important role in the reversals in commodity and bonds in 1980 and 1981
and that the stock market was the eventual beneficiary of the events in those other three markets.

The rising bond market and falling CRB Index reflected disinflation during the early 1980s and provided a supportive environment for financial assets at the expense of hard assets. That all began to change, however, in 1986. In another example of the linkage between the CRB Index and bonds, both began to change direction in 1986.

The commodity price level began to level off after a six-year decline. Interest rates bottomed at the same time and the bond market peaked. I discussed in Chapter 2 the beginning of the "head and shoulders" bottom that began to form in the CRB Index during 1986 and the warning that bullish pattern gave of the impending top in the bond market. Although the collapse in the bond market in early 1987, accompanied by a sharp rally in the CRB Index, provided a dramatic example of their inverse relationship, there's no need to repeat that analysis here. Instead, attention will be focused on the events following the 1987 peak in bonds and the bottom in the CRB

Index to see if the intermarket linkage holds up.

BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM THE 1987 TURNING POINTS

Figures 3.3 through 3.8 provide different views of the price action of bonds versus the CRB Index since 1987. Figure 3.3 provides a four-year view of the interaction between bond yields and the CRB Index from the end of 1985 into the second half of 1989. Although not a perfect match it can be seen that both lines generally rose and fell together. Figure 3.4 uses bond prices in place of yields for the same time span. The three major points of interest on this four-year chart are the major peak in bonds and the bottom in the CRB Index in the spring of 1987, the major spike in the CRB Index in mid-1988 (caused by rising grain prices resulting from the midwestern drought in the United States) during which time the bond market remained on the Index which then rallied sharply into July. Whereas the first quarter of 1988 had seen defensive, and finally the rally in the bond market and the accompanying decline in a firm bond market and falling commodity markets, the spring and early summer saw the CRB Index going into the second half of 1989. This chart shows that the inverse surging commodity markets and a weak bond market. This surge in the CRB Index relationship between the CRB Index and bonds held up pretty well during that time was caused mainly by strong grain and soybean markets, which rallied on a severe period.

drought in the midwestern United States, culminating in a major peak in the CRB

Figure 3.5 provides a closer view of the 1987 price trends and demonstrates Index in July. The bond market didn't hit bottom until August, over a month after the

- the inverse relationship between the CRB Index and bond prices during that year.

CRB Index had peaked out.

The first half of 1987 saw strong commodity markets and a falling bond market.

Figure 3.7 shows the events from October 1988 to October 1989 and provides a Going into October the bond market was falling sharply while commodity prices were closer look at the way bonds and commodities trended in opposite directions during firming. The strong rebound in bond prices in late-October (reflecting a flight to safety those 12 months. The period from the fall of 1988 to May of 1989 was a period during that month's stock market crash) witnessed a sharp pullback in commodities.

of indecision in both markets. Both went through a period of consolidation with Commodities then rallied during November while bonds weakened. In an unusual no clear trend direction. Figure 3.7 shows that even during this period of relative development both markets then rallied together into early 1988. That situation didn't trendlessness, peaks in one market tended to coincide with troughs in the other. The last long, however.

final bottom in the bond market took place during March which coincides with an Figure 3.6 shows that early in January of 1988 bonds rallied sharply into March important peak in the CRB Index.

while the CRB Index sold off sharply, hi March, bonds peaked and continued to drop The most dramatic manifestation of the negative linkage between the two markets into August. The March peak in bonds coincided with a major lowpoint in the CRB
during 1989 was the breakdown in the CRB Index during May, which coincided with

26 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM THE 1987 TURNING POINTS 27

FIGURE 3.4

FIGURE 3.5

THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BOND PRICES CAN

EVEN DURING THE HECTIC TRADING OF 1987, THE TENDENCY FOR COMMODITY PRICES

BE SEEN FROM 1986 TO 1989.

AND TREASURY BOND PRICES TO TREND IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION CAN BE SEEN.

CRB Index versus Bond Prices

Bond Prices versus CRB Index

1987

28 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM THE 1987 TURNING POINTS 29

FIGURE 3.6

FIGURE 3.7

BOND PRICES AND COMMODITIES TRENDED IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS DURING 1988. THE

THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND BOND PRICES CAN BE SEEN

BOND PEAK DURING THE FIRST QUARTER COINCIDED WITH A SURGE IN COMMODITIES.

FROM THE THIRD QUARTER Of 1988 THROUGH THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1989. THE

THE COMMODITY PEAK IN JULY PRECEDED A BOTTOM IN BONDS A MONTH LATER.

CORRESPONDING PEAKS AND TROUGHS ARE MARKED BY VERTICAL LINES. THE BREAKDOWN

IN COMMODITIES DURING MAY OF 1989 COINCIDED WITH A MAJOR BULLISH BREAKOUT IN

CRB Index versus Bonds

BONDS. IN AUGUST OF 1989, A BOTTOM IN THE CRB INDEX COINCIDED WITH A PEAK IN

1988

BONDS.

CRB Index versus Bonds

1989

30 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

HOW THE TECHNICIAN CAN USE THIS INFORMATION 31

FIGURE 3.8

FIGURE 3.9

THE POSITIVE LINK BETWEEN THE CRB INDEX AND BOND YIELDS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE

A MONTHLY CHART OF THE CRB INDEX FROM 1975 THROUGH AUGUST, 1989. THE

THIRD QUARTER OF 1988 TO THE THIRD QUARTER Of 1989. BOTH MEASURES DROPPED

INDICATOR ALONG THE BOTTOM IS A 14 BAR SLOW STOCHASTIC OSCILLATOR. MAJOR

SHARPLY DURING MAY OF 1989 AND BOTTOMED TOGETHER IN AUGUST.

TURNING POINTS CAN BE SEEN IN 1980,1982,1984,1986, AND 1988. MAJOR TREND SIGNALS

IN THE CRB INDEX SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY OPPOSITE SIGNALS IN THE BOND MARKET.

CRB Index versus Bonds

(SOURCE: COMMODITY TREND SERVICE, P. O. BOX 32309, PALM BEACH GARDENS, FLORIDA 1989

33420.)

CRB Index-Monthly
an upside breakout in bonds during that same month. Notice that to the far right of the chart in Figure 3.7 a rally beginning in the CRB Index during the first week in August 1989 coincided exactly with a pullback in the bond market.

Figure 3.8 turns the picture around and compares the CRB Index to bond yields during that same 12-month period from late 1988 to late 1989. Notice how closely of both charts is a 14-month stochastics oscillator. For those not familiar with this the CRB Index and Treasury bond yields tracked each other during that period of indicator, when the dotted line crosses below the solid line and the lines are above time. The breakdown in the CRB Index in May correctly signaled a new downleg in 75, a sell signal is given. When the dotted line crosses over the solid line and both interest rates.

lines are below 25, a buy signal is given.

Notice that buy signals in one market are generally accompanied (or followed) HOW THE TECHNICIAN CAN USE THIS INFORMATION
by a sell signal in the other. Therefore, the concept of confirmation is carried a step further. A buy signal in the CRB Index should be confirmed by a sell signal So far, the inverse relationship between bonds and the CRB Index has been demon-in bonds. Conversely, a buy signal in bonds should be confirmed by a sell signal strated. Now some practical ways that a technical analyst can use this inverse rela-in the CRB Index. We're now using signals in a related market as a confirming in-tionship to some advantage will be shown. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 are monthly charts dicator of signals in another market. Sometimes a signal in one market will act as of the CRB Index and nearby Treasury bond futures. The indicator along the bottom a leading indicator for the other. When two markets that usually trend in opposite

32 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

HOW THE TECHNICIAN CAN USE THIS INFORMATION 33

FIGURE 3.10

The next major turn in the CRB Index took place in late 1982, when a major down MONTHLY CHART OF TREASURY BOND FUTURES FROM 1978 THROUGH AUGUST, 1989. THE
trendline was broken, and commodities turned higher. The bond market started to INDICATOR ALONG THE BOTTOM IS A 14 BAR SLOW STOCHASTIC OSCILLATOR. MAJOR
drop sharply within a couple of months. In June 1984 the CRB Index broke its up TURNING POINTS CAN BE SEEN IN 1981,1983,1984,1986, AND 1987. BUY AND SELL SIGNALS
trendline and gave a stochastics sell signal. A month later the bond market began a ON THE TREASURY BOND CHART SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY OPPOSITE SIGNALS IN THE
major advance supported by a stochastics buy signal.

CRB INDEX. (SOURCE: COMMODITY TREND SERVICE, P.O. BOX 32309, PALM BEACH GARDENS, Moving ahead to 1986, a stochastics sell signal in bonds was followed by a buy FLORIDA 33420.)

signal in the CRB Index. This buy signal in the CRB Index lasted until mid-1988, when commodity prices peaked. A CRB sell signal was followed by a trendline breakdown T-Bonds Monthly Nearest Futures Contract
in the spring of 1989. Bonds had given an original buy signal in late 1987 and gave a repeat buy signal in early 1989. The late 1987 buy signal in bonds preceded the mid-1988 CRB sell signal. However, it wasn't until mid-1988, when the CRB Index gave its stochastics sell signal, that bonds actually began a serious rally.

Figure 3.11 shows that the May 1989 breakdown in the CRB Index coincided exactly with a bullish breakout in bonds. That bearish "descending triangle" in the CRB Index provided a hint that commodity prices were headed lower and bonds higher. Going into late 1989 the bond market had reached a major resistance area FIGURE 3.11

THE "DESCENDING TRIANGLE" IN THE CRB INDEX FORMED DURING THE FIRST HALF OF

1989 GAVE ADVANCE WARNING OF FALLING COMMODITIES AND RISING BOND PRICES.

THE BEARISH BREAKDOWN IN COMMODITIES IN MAY OF THAT YEAR COINCIDED WITH A BULLISH BREAKOUT IN BONDS. AS THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989 BEGAN, COMMODITIES

WERE RALLYING AND BONDS WERE WEAKENING. '

Treasury Bonds
directions give simultaneous buy signals or simultaneous sell signals, the trader knows something is wrong and should be cautious of the signals.

The analysis of the stochastics signals will be supplemented with simple trendline and breakout analysis. Notice that at the 1980 top in Figure 3.9, the monthly stochastics oscillator gave a major sell signal for commodity prices. The sell signal was preceded by a major negative divergence in the stochastics oscillator which then turned down in late 1980. The actual breaking of the major uptrend line in the CRB

Index didn't occur until June of 1981. From November of 1980 until September of 1981, bond and commodities dropped together. However, the CRB collapse warned that that situation wouldn't last for long. Bonds actually bottomed in September of 1981 when the stochastics oscillator also started to turn up and the inverse relationship reestablished itself.

34 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

THE ROLE OF SHORT-TERM RATES 35
message itself is relatively simple. If it can be shown that two markets generally trend FIGURE 3.12
in opposite directions, such as the CRB Index and Treasury bonds, that information A COMPARISON OF WEEKLY CHARTS OF TREASURY BONDS AND THE CRB INDEX FROM
is extremely valuable to participants in both markets. It isn't my intention to claim 1986 TO OCTOBER OF 1989. IN EARLY 1987 RISING COMMODITIES WERE BEARISH FOR

BONDS. IN MID-1988 A COMMODITY PEAK PROVED TO BE BULLISH FOR BONDS. ENTERING
that one market always leads the other, but simply to show that knowing what THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989, RISING BONDS WERE BACKING OFF FROM MAJOR
is happening in the commodity sector provides valuable information for the bond RESISTANCE NEAR 100 WHILE THE FALLING CRB INDEX WAS BOUNCING OFF SUPPORT NEAR
market. Conversely, knowing which way the bond market is most likely to trend tells 220.

the commodity trader a lot about which way the commodity markets are likely to trend. This type of combined analysis can be performed on monthly, weekly, daily, Treasury Bonds

. and even intraday charts.

200 Weeks

THE USE OF RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS

There is another technical tool which is especially helpful in comparing bond prices to commodity prices: relative strength, or ratio, analysis. Ratio analysis, where one market is divided by the other, enables us to compare the relative strength between two markets and provides another useful visual method for comparing bonds and the CRB Index. Ratio analysis will be briefly introduced in this section but will be covered more extensively in Chapters 11 and 12.

Figure 3.13 is divided into two parts. The upper portion is an overlay chart of the CRB Index and bonds for the three-year period from late 1986 to late 1989. The bottom chart is a ratio of the CRB Index divided by the bond market. When the line is rising, such as during the periods from March to October of 1987 and from March to July of 1988, commodity prices are outperforming bonds, and inflation pressures are intensifying. In this environment financial markets like bonds and stocks are generally under pressure. A major peak in the ratio line in the summer of 1988 marked the top of a two-year rise in the ratio and signaled the peak in inflation pressures. Financial markets strengthened from that point. (Popular inflation gauges such as the Consumer Price Index—CPI—and the Producer Price Index—PPI— didnt peak until early 1989, almost half a year later.)

In mid-1989 the ratio line broke down again from a major sideways pattern and signaled another significant shift in the commodity-bond relationship. The falling ratio line signaled that inflation pressures were waning even more, which was bearish for commodities, and that the pendulum was swinging toward the financial markets.

Both bonds and stocks rallied strongly from that point.

THE ROLE OF SHORT-TERM RATES

All interest rates move in the same direction. It would seem, then, that the positive near 100. At the same time the CRB Index had reached a major support level near 220.

Those two events, occurring at the same time, suggested at the time that bonds were relationship between the CRB Index and long-term bond yields should also apply to shorter-term rates, such as 90-day Treasury bill and Eurodollar rates. Short-term overbought and due for some weakness while the commodity markets were oversold and due for a bounce.

interest rates are more volatile than long-term rates and are more responsive to changes in monetary policy. Attempts by the Federal Reserve Board to fine-tune monetary To the far right of Figure 3.11, the simultaneous pullback in bonds and the bounce in the CRB Index can be seen. Figure 3.12, a weekly chart of bonds and the CRB Index policy, by increasing or decreasing liquidity in the banking system, are reflected more from 1986 to 1989, shows bonds testing overhead resistance near 100 in the summer in short-term rates, such as the overnight Federal funds rate or the 90-day Treasury Bill of 1989 at the same time that the CRB Index is testing support near 220.

rate, than in 10-year Treasury note and 30-year bond rates which are more influenced by longer range inflationary expectations. It should come as no surprise then that the CRB Index correlates better with Treasury notes and bonds, with longer maturities, LINKING TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES AND BONDS
than with Treasury bills, which have much shorter maturities.

The purpose of the preceding exercise was simply to demonstrate the practical Even with this caveat, it's a good idea to keep an eye on what Treasury bill and application of intermarket analysis. Those readers who are more experienced in Eurodollar futures prices are doing. Although movements in these short-term rate technical analysis will no doubt see many more applications that are possible. The markets are much more volatile than those of bonds, turning points in T-bill and

36 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

THE IMPORTANCE OF T-BILL ACTION 37

FIGURE 3.13

FIGURE 3.14

THE BOTTOM CHART IS A RATIO OF THE CRB INDEX DIVIDED BY TREASURY BOND PRICES

THE UPPER CHART COMPARES PRICES OF TREASURY BILLS AND TREASURY BONDS. THE

FROM 1987 THROUGH OCTOBER 1989. A RISING RATIO SHOWS THAT COMMODITIES ARE

BOTTOM CHART COMPARES THE CRB INDEX TO PRICES IN THE UPPER CHART. MAJOR

OUTPERFORMING BONDS AND IS INFLATIONARY. A. FALLING RATIO FAVORS BONDS OVER

TURNING POINTS IN TREASURY BILLS CAN BE HELPFUL IN PINPOINTING TURNS IN BONDS

COMMODITIES AND IS NONINFLATIONARY.

AND THE CRB INDEX. DURING MARCH OF 1988, BILLS AND BONDS TURNED DOWN

TOGETHER (WHILE COMMODITIES BOTTOMED). IN THE SPRING OF 1989, A MAJOR UPTURN

Bonds versus CRB Index

IN T-BILLS MARKED A BOTTOM IN BONDS AND WARNED OF AN IMPENDING BREAKDOWN

IN COMMODITIES.

Treasury Bonds versus Treasury Bills

1988/1989

Ratio of CRB Index Divided by Bond Prices

CRB Index

Eurodollar futures usually coincide with turning points in bonds and often pinpoint important trend reversals in the latter. When tracking the movement in the Treasury bond market for a good entry point, very often the actual signal can be found in the shorter-term T-bill and Eurodollar markets.

As a rule of thumb, all three markets should be trending in the same direction.

It's not a good idea to buy bonds while T-bill and Eurodollar prices are falling. Wait 1989. It can be seen that bonds and bills trend in the same direction and turn at the for the T-bill and Eurodollar markets to turn first in the same direction of bonds same time but that T-bill prices swing much more widely than bonds. To the upper before initiating a new long position in the bond market. To carry the analysis a step left of Figure 3.14, both turned down in March of 1988. This downturn in T-bills further, if turns in short-term rate futures provide useful clues to turns in bond prices, and T-bonds coincided with a major upturn in the CRB Index, which rose over 20
then short-term rate markets also provide clues to turns in commodity prices, which percent in the next four months to its final peak in mid-1988.

usually go in the opposite direction.

The bond market hit bottom in August of the same year but was unable to gain much ground. This sideways period in the bond market over the ensuing six months THE IMPORTANCE OF T-BILL ACTION
coincided with similar sideways activity in the CRB Index. Treasury bill prices continued to drop sharply into March of 1989. It wasn't until T-bill futures put in a One example of how T-bills, T-bonds, and the CRB Index are interrelated can be seen bottom in March of 1989 and broke a tight down trendline that the bond market in Figure 3.14. This chart compares the prices of T-bill futures and T-bond futures in began to rally seriously. The upward break of a one-year down trendline by T-bill the upper chart with the CRB Index in the lower chart from the end of 1987 to late futures two months later in May of 1989 coincided exactly with a major bullish

38 COMMODITY PRICES AND BONDS

SUMMARY 39
breakout in bond futures. At the same time the CRB was resolving its trading range on the CRB Index and bond yields, the study also suggests that, at least during the time the downside by dropping to the lowest level since the spring of the previous year.

span under study, the CRB Index led turns in bond yields by an average of four In this case, the bullish turnaround in the T-bill market in March of 1989 did two months.

things. It gave the green light to bond bulls to begin buying bonds more aggressively, In a more recent work, the CRB Index Futures Reference Guide (New York Futures and it set in motion the eventual bullish breakout in bonds and the bearish breakdown Exchange, 1989), correlation comparisons are presented between prices of the CRB
in the CRB Index.

Index futures contract and bond futures prices. In this case, since the comparison was made with bond prices instead of bond yields, a negative correlation should have been present. In the period from June 1988 to June 1989, a negative correlation

"WATCH EVERYTHING"

of -91 percent existed between CRB Index futures and bond futures, showing that The preceding discussion illustrates that important information in the bond market the negative linkage held up very well during those 12 months.

can be found by monitoring the trend action in the T-Bill market. It's another example The 1989 study provided another interesting statistic which takes us to our next of looking to a related market for directional clues. To carry this analysis another step, step in the intermarket linkage and the subject of the next chapter— the relationship T-Bills and Eurodollars also trend in the same direction. Therefore, when monitoring between bonds and stocks. During that same 12-month period, from June 1988 to June the short-term rate markets, it's advisable to track both T-Bill and Eurodollar markets 1989, the statistical correlation between bond futures prices and futures prices of the to ensure that both of them are confirming each other's actions. Treasury notes, which New York Stock Exchange Composite Index was +94 percent. During that 12-month cover maturities from 2 to 10 years and lie between the maturities of the 90-day T-bills span, bond prices showed a negative 91 percent correlation to commodities and a and 30-year bonds on the interest rate yield curve, should also be followed closely positive 94 percent correlation to stocks, which demonstrates the fulcrum effect of for trend indications. In other words, watch everything. You never know where the the bond market alluded to earlier in the chapter.

next clue will come from.

The numbers also demonstrate why so much importance is placed on the inverse The focus of the previous paragraphs was on the necessity of monitoring all relationship between bonds and the commodity markets. If the commodity markets of the interest rate markets from the shorter to the longer range maturities to find are linked to bonds and bonds are linked to stocks, then the commodity markets clues to interest rate direction. Then that analysis is put into the intermarket picture become indirectly linked to stocks through their influence on the bond market. It to see how it fits with our commodity analysis. A bullish forecast in interest rate follows that if stock market traders want to analyze the bond market (and they should), futures should be accompanied by a bearish forecast on the commodity markets.

it also becomes necessary to monitor the commodity markets.

Otherwise, something is out of line. This chapter has concentrated on the CRB

Index as a proxy for the commodity markets. However, the CRB Index represents a SUMMARY
basket of 21 active commodity markets. Some of those markets are important in their own right as inflation indicators and often play a dominant role in the intermarket This chapter presented graphic and statistical evidence that commodity prices, picture.

represented by the CRB Index, trend in the same direction as Treasury bond yields and

' Gold and oil are two markets that are inflation-sensitive and that, at times, can in the opposite direction of bond prices. Technical analysis of bonds or commodities play a decisive role in the intermarket picture. Sometimes the bond market will is incomplete without a corresponding technical analysis of the other. The relative respond in the opposite direction to any strong trending action by either or both of strength between bonds and the CRB Index, arrived at by ratio analysis, also provides those two markets. At other times, such as in the spring of 1988, during the worst useful information as to which way inflation is trending and whether or not the drought in half a century, the grain markets in Chicago can dominate. It's necessary investment climate favors financial or hard assets.

to monitor activity in each of the commodity markets as well as the CRB Index. The respective roles of the individual commodities will be discussed in Chapter 7.

SOME CORRELATION NUMBERS

This work so far has been based on visual comparisons. Statistical analysis appears to confirm what the charts are showing, namely that there is a strong negative correlation between the CRB Index and bond prices. A study prepared by Powers Research, Inc.

(Jersey City, NJ 07302), entitled The CRB Index White Paper: An Investigation into Non-Traditional Trading Applications for CRB Index Futures (March, 1988), reported the results of correlation analysis over several time periods between the CRB Index and the other financial sectors. The results showed that over the 10 years from 1978
to 1987, the CRB Index had an 82 percent positive correlation with 10-year Treasury yields with a lead time of four months.

In the five years from 1982 to 1987, the correlation was an even more impressive

+92 percent. Besides providing statistical evidence supporting the linkage between

THE BOND MARKET BOTTOM OF 1981 AND THE STOCK BOTTOM OF 1982 41

4
was mainly responsible for the bearish top in the commodity sector. The rising dollar in the early 1980s provided a supportive influence for financial assets like bonds and stocks and was mainly responsible for the swing away from tangible assets.

THE BOND MARKET BOTTOM OF 1981

AND THE STOCK BOTTOM OF 1982

The comparison of bonds and stocks will begin with the events surrounding the 1981
bottom in bonds and the 1982 bottom in stocks. Then a gradual analysis through the Bonds Versus Stocks
simultaneous bull markets in both sectors culminating in the events of 1987 and 1989
will be given. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are monthly charts of Treasury bonds and the Dow FIGURE 4.1

MONTHLY CHART OF TREASURY BOND FUTURES FROM 1978 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1989.

THE INDICATOR ALONG THE BOTTOM IS A 14 BAR SLOW STOCHASTIC OSCILLATOR. A MONTHLY CHART IS HELPFUL IN IDENTIFYING MAJOR TURNING POINTS. TURNS IN THE

In the previous chapter, the inverse relationship between bonds and commodities was BOND MARKET USUALLY PRECEDE SIMILAR TURNS IN THE STOCK MARKET. THE BOTTOM IN

BONDS IN 1981 GAVE AN EARLY WARNING OF THE MAJOR BULL MARKET THAT BEGAN IN
studied. In this chapter, another vital link will be added to the intermarket chain in STOCKS THE FOLLOWING YEAR. (SOURCE : COMMODITY TREND SERVICE, P.O. BOX 32309, order to study the positive relationship between bonds and common stocks. The stock PALM BEACH GARDENS, FLORIDA 33420.)

market is influenced by many factors. Two of the most important are the direction of inflation and interest rates. As a general rule of thumb, rising interest rates are bearish T-Bonds Monthly
for stocks; falling interest rates are bullish. Put another way, a rising bond market is generally bullish for stocks. Conversely, a falling bond market is generally bearish for stocks. It can also be shown that bonds often act as a leading indicator of stocks. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the strong positive linkage between bonds and stocks and to suggest that a technical analysis of stocks is incomplete without a corresponding analysis of the bond market.

Treasury bond futures, which have become the most actively traded futures contract in the world, were launched at the Chicago Board of Trade in 1977. In keeping with the primary focus on the futures markets, our attention in this chapter will be concentrated on the period since then, with special emphasis on the events of the 1980s. Toward the end of the book, a glance backward a bit further will reveal a larger historical perspective.

FINANCIAL MARKETS ON THE DEFENSIVE

As Chapter 3 suggested, the 1970s were a period of rising inflation and rising interest rates. It was the decade for tangible assets. Bond prices had been dropping sharply since 1977 and continued to do so until 1981. The weight of rising commodity prices kept downward pressure on bond prices as the 1970s ended. During that decade, bond market troughs in 1970 and 1974 preceded trading bottoms in the equity markets. A bond market top in 1977, however, pushed stock prices lower that year and kept the stock market relatively dormant through the end of the decade. In 1980 a major top in the commodity prices set the stage for a significant bullish turnaround in bond prices in 1981. This bullish turnaround in bonds set the stage for the major bull market in stocks that started in 1982.

To put things in proper perspective, the period from 1977 to 1980 was also characterized by a falling U.S. dollar, which boosted inflation pressures and kept downward pressure on the bond market. The U.S. dollar bottomed out in 1980, which

42 BONDS VERSUS STOCKS

BONDS AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS 43

The bullish turnaround began in 1981. In September of that year, bonds hit their FIGURE 4.2
lowpoint and began a basing process that culminated in an important bullish breakout MONTHLY CHART OF THE DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE FROM 1971 THROUGH SEPTEM-in August 1982. From September of 1981 to August of 1982, the bonds formed a BER 1989. THE INDICATOR ALONG THE BOTTOM IS A 14 BAR SLOW STOCHASTIC OSCILLATOR. MAJOR TRENDS IN THE STOCK MARKET USUALLY FOLLOW SIMILAR TURNS IN BONDS.

pattern of three rising bottoms. Those three rising bottoms in bonds coincide with THE STOCK MARKET BOTTOM IN 1982 AND THE PEAK IN 1987 WERE PRECEDED BY SIMILAR
three declining bottoms in stocks. A major positive divergence was in place. As stocks TURNS IN BONDS BY ELEVEN AND FOUR MONTHS, RESPECTIVELY. (SOURCE : COMMODITY
continued to drop, the lack of downside confirmation by the bond market provided TREND SERVICE, P.O. BOX 32309, PALM BEACH GARDENS, FLORIDA 33420.) an early warning that a significant turn might be in progress.

August 1982 stands out as a milestone in stock market history. During that month, Dow Jones Industrials-Monthly
while many stock market traders were relaxing at the seashore, the great bull market of the 1980s began. During that month, the Dow Industrials dropped to a two-year low before recovering enough to register a bullish monthly reversal. At the same time bonds were breaking out from the basing pattern that had been forming for a year.

After diverging from stocks for a year, the bullish breakout in bonds confirmed that something important was happening on the upside.

In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, notice the action of the stochastics oscillator during the bottoming process. The dotted line in the stochastics oscillator on the bond chart crossed above the solid line in the fall of 1981 from a level below 25, providing a buy signal in bonds. A similar buy signal in stocks didn't occur until the summer of 1982. The technical action in bonds preceded the bottom in stocks by almost a year.

It should seem clear that stock market traders would have benefited from a technical analysis of bonds during that historic turnaround.

BONDS AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. One is to demonstrate a strong positive relationship between bonds and stocks. In other words, the price action and technical readings in the two markets should confirm each other. As long as they are moving in the same direction, analysts can say that the two markets are confirming each other and their trends are likely to continue. It's when the two markets begin to trend in opposite directions that analysts should begin to worry.

The second point is that the bond market usually turns first. Near market tops, the bond market will usually turn down first. At market bottoms, the bond market will usually turn up first. Therefore, the technical action of the bond market becomes a leading technical indicator for the stock market.

The young bull market in bonds and stocks continued into early 1983. In May of 1983, however, the bond market suffered a bearish monthly reversal, setting up a potential double top on the bond chart (see Figure 4.1). At the same time, the stochastics oscillator gave a sell signal. As Figure 4.2 shows, stocks began to roll over Industrials with a monthly stochastics oscillator along the bottom of each. These are toward the end of 1983 and flashed a stochastics sell signal as the year ended. The the same types of charts that were used in Chapter 3 in comparing bond activity to setback in stocks wasn't nearly as severe as that in bonds. However, the weakness the CRB Index, except in this case the comparison is of bonds to stocks. Instead of in bonds warned that it was time to take some profits prior to the 15 percent stock looking for signals in the opposite direction as was done with bonds and the CRB
market decline.

Index, the analyst will be looking for buy and sell signals in both bonds and stocks In mid-1984 both markets flashed new stochastics buy signals at about the same to be in the same direction.

time. (Bonds actually began to rally a month before stocks.) The beginning of the As the charts show, the period from 1977 to 1981 saw a falling bond market second bull leg in the bond market had a lot to do with resumption of the bull and a relatively flat stock market. From 1977 to early 1980 the downward pull of the market in stocks. Both markets rallied together for another two years. It wasn't until bond market kept stocks in a relatively narrow trading range. In early 1980 a sharp early 1987, when the two markets began to move in opposite directions, that another bond rally began in March which helped launch a stock market rally the following negative divergence was given.

month. The bond rally proved short-lived as prices began to drop again into 1981.

hi April 1987 bonds began to drop (flashing a stochastics sell signal), which set After testing the upper end of its 14-year trading range, the Dow Industrials sold off the stage for the 1987 stock market crash in October of that year. Once again the bond again into 1982.

market had proven its worth as a leading indicator of stocks. The bullish monthly

44 BONDS VERSUS STOCKS

BONDS AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS 45
reversal in bonds in October 1987 also set the stage for the stock market recovery upturn in both markets in 1984; the top in bonds in early 1987, preceding the stock from the 1987 bottom. A stochastics buy signal in bonds at the end of 1987 preceded market crash of 1987; and both markets rallying together into 1989. To the upper right a similar buy signal in stocks by almost a year. During the entire decade of the 1980s, it can be seen that the breakout by stocks above their 1987 pre-crash highs has not every significant turn in the stock market was either accompanied by or preceded by been confirmed by a similar bullish breakout in bonds.

a similar turn in the bond market.

Figures 4.4 through 4.9 break the period from 1982 to 1989 into shorter time Overlay charts will show comparison of the relative action of bonds and stocks intervals to provide closer visual comparisons. I'll take a closer look at the events over shorter time periods. On the monthly charts used in preceding paragraphs, price immediately preceding and following the October 1987 stock market crash and will breakouts and stochastics buy and sell signals were emphasized. In the overlay charts, also examine the market events of 1989 in more detail. Figure 4.4 shows the relative attention will shift to relative price action. Price divergences are easier to spot on action of bonds and stocks at the 1982 major bottom. Notice that as the Dow Indus-overlay charts, and the leads and lags between the two markets are more obvious.

trials hit succeeding lows in March, June, and August of 1982, the bond market was Figure 4.3 compares the two markets from 1982 through the third quarter of 1989.

forming rising troughs in the same three months. In August, although both markets The similar trend characteristics of the two markets are more easily seen. The most rallied together, bonds were the clear leader on the upside.

prominent points of interest on this chart are the simultaneous rallies in 1982; the In May of 1983, bonds formed a prominent double top and began to drop. That breakdown in bonds in 1983 leading to a stock market correction; the simultaneous bearish divergence led to an intermediate stock market peak at the end of the year, which led to a 15 percent downward correction in the equity market. The downward correction in both markets continued into the summer of 1984 (see Figure 4.5). A FIGURE 4.3

A COMPARISON OF TREASURY BONDS AND STOCKS FROM 1982 TO 1989. ALTHOUGH BOTH

FIGURE 4.4

MARKETS GENERALLY TREND IN THE SAME DIRECTION, BONDS HAVE A TENDENCY TO TURN

A COMPARISON OF BONDS AND STOCKS DURING 1982 AND 1983. BONDS TURNED UP

AHEAD OF STOCKS. BONDS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A LEADING INDICATOR FOR STOCKS.

PRIOR TO STOCKS IN 1982 AND CORRECTED DOWNWARD FIRST DURING 1983.

Treasury Bond Prices versus the Dow Industrials Bonds versus Stocks

1982 through 1989

1982 and 1983

46 BONDS VERSUS STOCKS

BONDS AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS 47

FIGURE 4.5

FIGURE 4.6

BONDS VERSUS STOCKS DURING 1984 AND 1985. BONDS TURNED UP A MONTH BEFORE

BONDS VERSUS STOCKS DURING 1986 AND 1987. BONDS COLLAPSED IN APRIL OF 1987

STOCKS IN 1984. DURING 1985 TWO DOWNWARD CORRECTIONS IN TREASURY BONDS

AND PRECEDED THE AUGUST PEAK IN STOCKS BY FOUR MONTHS.

WARNED OF SIMILAR CORRECTIONS IN EQUITIES.

Bonds versus Stocks

Bonds versus Stocks

1986 and 1987

1984 and 1985

Bonds not only led stocks on the downside in the fall of 1987, they also led close inspection of Figure 4.5 will show that the mid-1984 upturn in bonds preceded stocks on the upside. Figure 4.7 shows the precipitous slide in bond prices which stocks by almost a month. Both entities then rallied together through the end of 1985.

preceded the stock market crash in October 1987. The bearish breakdown in bonds Notice, however, that short-term tops in bonds in the first quarter and summer of 1985
was too serious to be ignored by stock market technicians. However, as the actual preceded downward corrections in the stock market.

stock market crash began, the bond market soared in a flight to quality. Funds pulled Figure 4.6 compares the two markets during 1986 and 1987. After rising for out of the stock market in panic were quickly funneled into the relative safety of almost four years, both markets spent 1986 in a consolidation phase. However, at the Treasury bills and Treasury bonds. There was another important factor that helps beginning of 1987, stocks resumed their bull trend. As the chart shows, bonds did explain the sharp rally in interest rate futures in October 1987.

not confirm the bullish breakout in stocks. What was even more alarming was the In the ensuing panic during the stock market crash, the Federal Reserve flooded bearish breakdown in bonds in April of 1987 (influenced by a sharp drop in the U.S.

the financial system with liquidity in an attempt to calm the markets and cush-dollar and a bullish breakout in the commodity markets). Stocks dipped briefly during ion the stock market fall. At the time the consensus view was that a serious re-the bond selloff. During June the bond market bounced a bit, and stocks resumed the cession was at hand. As a result the sudden monetary easing pushed interest rates uptrend. However, bonds broke down again in July and August as stocks rallied. You'll sharply lower. The lowering of interest rate yields pushed up the prices of interest rate notice that bonds broke support at the May lows in August, thereby flashing another futures.

bear signal. This bear signal in bonds during August 1987 coincided with the 1987

At such times the normal positive relationship of bonds and stocks is temporar-peak in stocks the same month.

ily disturbed. Until the markets stabilized, an inverse relationship between the two

48 BONDS VERSUS STOCKS

BONDS AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS 49

FIGURE 4.7

FIGURE 4.8

BONDS VERSUS STOCKS DURING THE LATTER HALF OF 1987 THROUGH THE SUMMER OF

BONDS AND STOCKS ARE SHOWN RALLYING TOGETHER FROM 1988 THROUGH THE FOURTH

1988. THE STRONG REBOUND IN BONDS THAT BEGAN IN OCTOBER OF 1987 HELPED STA-QUARTER OF 1989. THE BULLISH BREAKOUT BY BONDS IN THE SPRING OF 1989 GAVE THE

BILIZE THE STOCK MARKET FOLLOWING THE 1987 CRASH.

STOCK RALLY A BOOST.

Bonds versus Stocks

Bonds versus Stocks

1987 and 1988

1988 and 1989
sectors was evident. However, as Figure 4.7 shows, that inverse relationship was short-lived. In fact, it's remarkable how quickly the positive relationship was resumed.

Within a matter of days, the peaks and troughs in bonds and stocks begin to move in the same direction. However, the sharp rally in bonds into the first quarter of 1988
reflected continued concerns about an impending recession (or depression) and the desire on the part of the Federal Reserve Board to lower interest rates to prevent such an eventuality.

By the middle of 1988, things seemed pretty much back to normal. However, through it all, on the downside first and then on the upside, important directional clues about stock market direction during the summer and fall of 1987 could be discovered by monitoring the bond market.

Figure 4.8 gives us a view of 1988 and the first three quarters of 1989. It can be seen that from the spring of 1988 to the fall of 1989, the peaks and troughs in both sectors were closely correlated and that both markets rallied together. However, in

50 BONDS VERSUS STOCKS

WHAT ABOUT LONG LEAD TIMES? 51

FIGURE 4.9
this instance the stock market proved to be the stronger of the two. Although both A COMPARISON OF BONDS AND STOCKS FROM OCTOBER 1988 TO SEPTEMBER 1989. THE
markets moved in the same direction, it wasn't until May of 1989 that bonds finally VERTICAL LINES SHOW THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE CORRESPONDING PEAKS AND
broke out to the upside to confirm the stock market advance.

TROUGHS. DURING SEPTEMBER OF 1989, THE RALLY TO NEW HIGHS BY STOCKS HAS NOT

Figure 4.9 gives a closer look at 1989. This chart shows the close visual correlation BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE BOND MARKET, WHICH IS BEGINNING TO WEAKEN.

of both markets. The timing of the peaks and troughs is extremely close together.

To the upper right, however, the bond market is beginning to show some signs of Dow Jones Industrial Average
weakness in what could be the beginning of a negative divergence between the two October 1988 to September 1989
markets.

BONDS AND STOCKS SHOULD BE ANALYZED TOGETHER

The moral of this chapter is that since bonds and stocks are historically linked together, technical analysis of one without a corresponding analysis of the other is incomplete. At the very least a stock market trader or investor should be monitoring the bond market for confirmation. A bullish technical forecast for bonds is also a bullish technical forecast for stocks. Conversely, a bearish analysis for bonds is a bearish forecast for stocks. As demonstrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the technical signals in bonds (such as stochastics buy and sell signals) usually lead similar signals in stocks. At the worst the signals are usually coincident. Analysts can use moving averages or any other tools at their disposal. The important thing is that bond activity be factored into the stock market analysis.

WHAT ABOUT LONG LEAD TIMES?

Although the charts of recent market history show a remarkable day-to-day correlation between bonds and stocks, turns in the bond market often lead those of stocks by long periods of time. The September 1981 bottom in bonds, for example, preceded the stock market bottom in August 1982 by 11 months. The April 1987 breakdown in bonds preceded the August stock market top by four months. How, then, does the stock market analyst take these long lead times into consideration?

The bond market is an important background factor in stock market analysis.

Buy and sell signals for stocks are given by the stock market itself. If the bond market starts to diverge from the stock market, a warning is being given—-the more serious the divergence, the more important the warning. In the summer of 1987, as an example, the collapse in the bond market simply warned the stock market trader that something was wrong. The stock market trader, while not necessarily abandoning long positions in stocks during the summer of 1987, might have paid greater attention to initial signs of impending weakness on his stock charts.

In 1981 and 1982 the bottoming action in the bond market gave the stock market traders plenty of warning that the tide might be turning. Even if the stock trader ignored the bottoming activity in bonds up to the summer of 1982, the bullish breakout in bonds in August of 1982 might have caused a stock market trader to become more aggressive in buying into the stock market rally. The long lead times in both instances, while less helpful to the short-term trader, were probably most useful to portfolio managers or those investors with a longer time horizon.

Having acknowledged the existence of occasional long lead times between the two markets, it should also be pointed out that on a day-to-day basis there is often a remarkable correlation between the two markets. This correlation can even be seen on an hour-to-hour basis on many days. Even for short-term timing, it's a good idea to monitor the activity in the bond market.

52 BONDS VERSUS STOCKS

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 53

SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE MARKETS AND THE BOND MARKET

FIGURE 4.10

AN EXAMPLE OF THE "THREE STEPS AND A STUMBLE" RULE. SINCE 1987, THE FEDERAL RE-Our main concern has been with the bond market. However, for reasons that were SERVE BOARD HAS RAISED THE DISCOUNT RATE THREE TIMES IN SUCCESSION. HISTORICAL-touched on in Chapter 3, it's also important to monitor the trend action in the Trea-LY, SUCH ACTION BY THE FED HAS PROVEN TO BE BEARISH FOR STOCKS.

sury bill and Eurodollar markets because of their impact on the bond market. Action in these short-term money markets often provides important clues to bond market Stocks versus the Discount Rate
direction.

During periods of monetary tightness, short-term interest rates will rise faster than long-term rates. If the situation persists long enough, short-term rates may eventually exceed long-term rates. This condition, known as an inverted yield curve, is considered bearish for stocks. (The normal situation is a positive yield curve, where long-term bond yields exceed short-term market rates.) An inverted yield curve occurs when the Federal Reserve raises short-term rates in an attempt to control inflation and keep the economy from overheating. This type of situation usually takes place near the end of an economic expansion and helps pave the way for a downturn in the financial markets, which generally precedes an economic slowdown or a recession.

The action of short-term rate futures relative to bond futures tells whether or not the Federal Reserve Board is pursuing a policy of monetary tightness. In general, when T-bill futures are rising faster than bond futures, a period of monetary ease is in place, which is considered supportive to stocks. When T-bill futures are dropping faster than bond prices, a period of tightness is being pursued, which is potentially bearish for stocks. Another weapon used by the Federal Reserve Board to tighten monetary policy is to raise the discount rate.

THE "THREE-STEPS-AND-A-STUMBLE" RULE

Another manifestation of the relationship between interest rates and stocks is the so-called "three-steps-and-a-stumble rule." This rule states that when the Federal Reserve Board raises the discount rate three times in succession, a bear market in stocks usually follows. In the 12 times that the Fed pursued this policy in the past 70
years, a bear market in stocks followed each time. In the two-year period from 1987
to 1989, the Fed raised the discount rate three times in succession, activating the

"three-steps-and-a-stumble rule" and, in doing so, placed the seven-year bull market in equities in jeopardy (see Figure 4.10).

Changing the discount rate is usually the last weapon the Fed uses and usually HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
lags behind market forces. Such Fed action often occurs after the markets have begun to move in a similar direction. In other words the raising of the discount rate generally Most of the focus of this study has been on the market events of the past 15 years. It occurs after a rise in short-term money rates, which is signalled by a decline in the would be natural to ask at this point if these intermarket comparisons hold up over a T-bill futures market. Lowering of the discount rate is usually preceded by a rise longer span of time. This brings us to a critical question. How far back in history can in T-bill futures. So, for a variety of reasons, short-term futures should be watched or should the markets be researched for intermarket comparisons? Prior to 1970 we closely.

had fixed exchange rates. Movements in the U.S. dollar and foreign currencies simply It's not always necessary that the bond and stock markets trend in the same didn't exist. Gold was set at a fixed price and couldn't be owned by Americans.

direction. What's most important is that they don't trend in opposite directions. In The price of oil was regulated. All of these markets are critical ingredients in the other words if a bond market decline begins to level off, that stability might be enough intermarket picture.

to push stock prices higher. A severe bond market selloff might not actually push There were no futures markets in currencies, gold, oil, or Treasury bonds. Stock stock prices lower but might stall the stock market advance. It's important to realize index futures and program trading hadn't been invented. The instant communication that the two markets may not always move in lockstep. However, it's rare when the between markets that is so common today was still in the future. Globalization was impact of the bond market on the stock market is nonexistent. In the end it's up to the an idea whose time hadn't yet come, and most market analysts were unaware of judgment of the technical analyst to determine whether an important trend change the overseas markets. Computers didn't exist to permit study of interrelationships.

is taking place in the bond market and what impact that trend change might have on Technical analysis, which is the basis for intermarket work, was still practiced behind the stock market.

closed doors. In other words, a lot has changed in the last two decades.

SUMMARY 55

54 BONDS VERSUS STOCKS

What needs to be determined is whether or not these developments have changed bearish. However, there are some qualifiers. Although a falling bond market is almost the way the markets interact with each other. If so, then comparisons prior to 1970
always bearish for equities, a rising bond market does not ensure a strong equity may not be helpful.

market. Deteriorating corporate earnings during an economic slowdown may over-shadow the positive effect of a rising bond market (and falling interest rates). While a rising bond market doesn't guarantee a bull market in stocks, a bull market in stocks THE ROLE OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE
is unlikely without a rising bond market.

Understanding the economic rationale that binds commodities, bonds, and the stock market requires some discussion of the business cycle and what happens during periods of expansion and recession. For example, the bond market is considered an excellent leading indicator of the U.S. economy. A rising bond market presages economic strength. A weak bond market usually provides a leading indication of an economic downturn (although the lead times can be quite long). The stock market benefits from economic expansion and weakens during times of economic recession.

Both bonds and stocks are considered leading indicators of the economy. They usually turn down prior to a recession and bottom out after the economy is well into a recession. However, turns in the bond market usually occur first. Going back through the last 80 years, every major downturn in the stock market has either come after or at the same time as a major downturn in the bond market. During the last six recessions bonds have bottomed out an average of almost four months prior to bottoms in the stock market. During the postwar era stocks have begun to turn down an average of six months prior to the onset of a recession and have begun to turn up about six months prior to the end of a recession.

Tops in the bond market, which usually give earlier warnings of an impending recession, are generally associated with rising commodity markets. Conversely, during a recession falling commodity markets are usually associated with a bottom in the bond market. Therefore, movements in the commodity markets also play an important role in the analysis of bonds and stocks. The economic background of these intermarket relationships will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 13.

WHAT ABOUT THE DOLLAR?

Discussions so far have turned on the how the commodity markets affect the bond market and how the bond market affects stocks. The activity in the U.S. dollar plays an important role in the intermarket picture as well. Most market participants would agree with the general statement that a rising dollar is bullish for bonds and stocks and that a falling dollar is bearish for bonds and stocks. However, it's not as simple as that. The U.S. dollar hit a major top in 1985 and dropped all the way to January 1988. For a large part of that time, bonds and stocks rose as the dollar weakened.

Clearly, there must be something missing in this analysis.

The impact of the dollar on the bond and the stock markets is not a direct one but an indirect one. The impact of the dollar on bonds and stocks must be understood from the standpoint of the dollar's impact on inflation, which brings us back to the commodity markets. To fully understand how a falling dollar can be bullish for bonds and stocks, one must look to the commodity markets for answers. This will be the subject of Chapter 5.

SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the strong link between Treasury bonds and equities. A rising bond market is considered bullish for stocks; a falling bond market is considered

COMMODITY PRICE TRENDS-THE KEY TO INFLATION 57

5

FIGURE 5.1

THE US. DOLLAR VERSUS TREASURY BOND PRICES FROM 1985 THROUGH 1989. ALTHOUGH

A RISING DOLLAR IS EVENTUALLY BULLISH FOR BONDS AND A FALLING DOLLAR IS

EVENTUALLY BEARISH FOR BONDS, LONG LEAD TIMES DIMINISH THE VALUE OF DIRECT

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO MARKETS. DURING ALL OF 1985 AND MOST OF 1986, BONDS WERE STRONG WHILE THE DOLLAR WAS WEAK.

U.S. Dollar Index versus Bonds

1985 through 1989

Commodities and the U.S. Dollar

The inverse relationship between bonds and commodity prices and the positive relationship between bonds and equities have been examined. Now the important role the dollar plays in the intermarket picture will be considered. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is often said that a rising dollar is considered bullish for bonds and stocks and that a falling dollar is considered bearish for both financial markets. However, that statement doesn't always hold up when examined against the historical relationship of the dollar to both markets. The statement also demonstrates the danger of taking shortcuts in intermarket analysis.

The relationship of the dollar to bonds and stocks makes more sense, and holds up much better, when factored through the commodity markets. In other words, there is a path through the four sectors. Let's start with the stock market and work backwards. The stock market is sensitive to interest rates and hence movements in the bond market. The bond market is influenced by inflation expectations, which are demonstrated by the trend of the commodity markets. The inflationary impact of the commodity markets is largely determined by the trend of the U.S. dollar. Therefore, we begin our intermarket analysis with the dollar. The path to take is from the dollar to the commodity markets, then from the commodity markets to the bond market, and finally from the bond market to the stock market.

THE DOLLAR MOVES INVERSELY TO COMMODITY PRICES

A rising dollar is noninflationary. As a result a rising dollar eventually produces lower COMMODITY PRICE TRENDS-THE KEY TO INFLATION
commodity prices. Lower commodity prices, in turn, lead to lower interest rates and higher bond prices. Higher bond prices are bullish for stocks. A falling dollar has the Turns in the dollar eventually have an impact on bonds (and an even more delayed exact opposite effect; it is bullish for commodities and bearish for bonds and equities.

impact on stocks) but only after long lead times. The picture becomes much clearer, Why, then, can't we say that a rising dollar is bullish for bonds and stocks and just however, if the impact of the dollar on bonds and stocks is viewed through the forget about commodities? The reason lies with long lead times in these relationships commodity markets. A falling dollar is bearish for bonds and stocks because it is and with the troublesome question of inflation.

inflationary. However, it takes time for the inflationary effects of a falling dollar to It is possible to have a falling dollar along with strong bond and equity markets.

filter through the system. How does the bond trader know when the inflationary Figure 5.1 shows that after topping out in the spring of 1985, the U.S. dollar dropped effects of the falling dollar are taking hold? The answer is when the commodity for almost three years. During most of that time, the bond market (and the stock markets start to move higher. Therefore, we can qualify the statement regarding market) remained strong while the dollar was falling. More recently, the dollar hit an the relationship between the dollar and bonds and stocks. A falling dollar becomes intermediate bottom at the end of 1988 and began to rally. The bond market, although bearish for bonds and stocks when commodity prices start to rise. Conversely, a rising steady, didn't really explode until May of 1989.

dollar becomes bullish for bonds and stocks when commodity prices start to drop.

58 COMMODITIES AND THE U.S. DOLLAR

THE DOLLAR VERSUS THE CRB INDEX 59

The upper part of Figure 5.2 compares bonds and the U.S. dollar from 1985

FIGURE 5.3
through the third quarter of 1989. The upper chart shows that the falling dollar, A COMPARISON OF THE BONDS AND THE DOLLAR (UPPER CHART) AND COMMODITY
which started to drop in early 1985, eventually had a bearish effect on bonds which PRICES (LOWER CHART) FROM LATE 1988 TO LATE 1989. THE BULLISH IMPACT OF THE
started to drop in the spring of 1987 (two years later). The bottom part of the chart FIRMING DOLLAR ON THE BOND MARKET WASN'T FULLY FELT UNTIL MAY OF 1989 WHEN
shows the CRB Index during the same period of time. The arrows on the chart show COMMODITY PRICES CRASHED THROUGH CHART SUPPORT. TOWARD THE END OF 1989, how the peaks in the bond market correspond with troughs in the CRB Index. It THE WEAKENING DOLLAR IS BEGINNING TO PUSH COMMODITY PRICES HIGHER, WHICH
wasn't until the commodity price level started to rally sharply in April 1987 that ARE BEGINNING TO PULL BONDS LOWER.

the bond market started to tumble. The stock market peaked that year in August, leading to the October crash. The inflationary impact of the falling dollar eventually pushed commodity prices higher, which began the topping process in bonds and stocks.

The dollar bottomed as 1988 began. A year later, in December of 1988, the dollar formed an intermediate bottom and started to rally. Bonds were stable but locked in a trading range. Figure 5.3 shows that the eventual upside breakout in bonds was delayed for another six months until May of 1989, which coincided with the bearish breakdown in the CRB Index. The strong dollar by itself wasn't enough to push the FIGURE 5.2

A COMPARISON OF BONDS AND THE DOLLAR (UPPER CHART) AND COMMODITY PRICES

(LOWER CHART) FROM 1985 THROUGH 1989. A FALLING DOLLAR IS BEARISH FOR BONDS

WHEN COMMODITY PRICES ARE RALLYING. A RISING DOLLAR IS BULLISH FOR BONDS

WHEN COMMODITY PRICES ARE FALLING. THE INFLATIONARY OR NONINFLATIONARY

IMPACT OF THE DOLLAR ON BONDS SHOULD BE FACTORED THROUGH THE COMMODITY

MARKETS.

bond (and stock) market higher. The bullish impact of the rising dollar on bonds was realized only when the commodity markets began to topple.

The sequence of events in May of 1989 involved all three markets. The dollar scored a bullish breakout from a major basing pattern. That bullish breakout in the dollar pushed the commodity prices through important chart support, resuming their bearish trend. The bearish breakdown in the commodity markets corresponded with the bullish breakout in bonds. It seems clear, then, that taking shortcuts is dangerous work. The impact of the dollar on bonds and stocks is an indirect one and usually takes effect after some time has passed. The impact of the dollar on bonds and stocks becomes more pertinent when its more direct impact on the commodity markets is taken into consideration.

THE DOLLAR VERSUS THE CRB INDEX

Further discussion of the indirect impact of the dollar on bonds and equities will be deferred until Chapter 6. In this chapter, the inverse relationship between the

60 COMMODITIES AND THE U.S. DOLLAR

THE DOLLAR VERSUS THE CRB INDEX 61

FIGURE 5.4

FIGURE 5.5

THE U.S. DOLLAR VERSUS THE CRB INDEX FROM 1985 THROUGH THE FOURTH QUARTER OF

THE U.S. DOLLAR VERSUS THE CRB INDEX DURING 1988 AND 1989. THE DOLLAR BOTTOM

1989. A FALLING DOLLAR WILL EVENTUALLY PUSH THE CRB INDEX HIGHER. CONVERSELY, AT THE START OF 1988 WAS FOLLOWED BY A CRB PEAK ABOUT SIX MONTHS LATER. THE

A RISING DOLLAR WILL EVENTUALLY PUSH THE CRB INDEX LOWER. THE 1986 BOTTOM IN

BULLISH BREAKOUT IN THE DOLLAR DURING MAY OF 1989 COINCIDED WITH A MAJOR

THE CRB INDEX OCCURRED A YEAR AFTER THE 1985 PEAK IN THE DOLLAR. THE 1988 PEAK

BREAKDOWN IN THE COMMODITY MARKETS.

IN THE CRB INDEX TOOK PLACE A HALF YEAR AFTER THE 1988 BOTTOM IN THE DOLLAR.

U.S. Dollar Index versus CRB Index

1988 through 1989

U.S. Dollar Index versus CRB Index

1985 through 1989

U.S. dollar and the commodity markets will be examined. I'll show how movements The fall in the dollar accelerated in 1972, which was the year the commodity in the dollar can be used to predict changes in trend in the CRB Index. Commodity explosion started. Another sharp selloff in the U.S. unit began in 1978, which helped prices axe a leading indicator of inflation. Since commodity markets represent raw launch the final surge in commodity markets and led to double-digit inflation by material prices, this is usually where the inflationary impact of the dollar will be seen 1980. In 1980 the U.S. dollar bottomed out and started to rally in a powerful ascent first. The important role the gold market plays in this process as well as the action that lasted until the spring of 1985. This bullish turnaround in the dollar in 1980
in the foreign currency markets will also be considered. I'll show how monitoring contributed to the major top in the commodity markets that took place the same year the price of gold and the foreign currency markets often provides excellent leading and helped provide the low inflation environment of the early 1980s, which launched indications of inflationary trends and how that information can be used in commodity spectacular bull markets in bonds and stocks.

price forecasting. But first a brief historical rundown of the relationship between the The 1985 peak in the dollar led to a bottom in the CRB Index one year later in CRB Index and the U.S. dollar will be given.

the summer of 1986. I'll begin analysis of the dollar and the CRB Index with the The decade of the 1970s witnessed explosive commodity prices. One of the descent in the dollar that began in 1985. However, bear in mind that in the 20 years driving forces behind that commodity price explosion was a falling U.S. dollar. The from 1970 through the end of 1989, every important turn in the CRB Index has been entire decade saw the U.S. currency on the defensive.

preceded by a turn in the U.S. dollar. In the past decade, the dollar has made three

THE KEY ROLE OF GOLD 63

62 COMMODITIES AND THE U.S. DOLLAR

THE PROBLEM OF LEAD TIME

FIGURE 5.6

THE DOLLAR VERSUS COMMODITIES DURING 1989. A RISING DOLLAR DURING MOST OF

Although the inverse relationship between both markets is clearly visible, there's still 1989 EXERTED BEARISH PRESSURE ON COMMODITIES. A "DOUBLE TOP" IN THE DOLLAR IN
the problem of lead and lag times. It can be seen that turns in the dollar lead turns JUNE AND SEPTEMBER OF THAT YEAR, HOWEVER, IS BEGINNING TO HAVE A BULLISH IMPACT
in the CRB Index. The 1985 top in the dollar preceded the 1986 bottom in the CRB

ON COMMODITIES. COMMODITIES USUALLY TREND IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF THE

Index by 17 months. The 1988 bottom in the dollar preceded the final peak in the DOLLAR BUT WITH A TIME LAG.

CRB Index by six months. How, then, does the chartist deal with these lead times?

Is there a faster or a more direct way to measure the impact of the dollar on the U.S. Dollar Index versus CRB Index
commodity markets? Fortunately, the answer to that question is yes. This brings us Dec. 1988 through Sept. 1989
to an additional step in the intermarket process, which forms a bridge between the dollar and the CRB Index. This bridge is the gold market.

THE KEY ROLE OF GOLD

In order to better understand the relationship between the dollar and the CRB Index, it is necessary to appreciate the important role the gold market plays. This is true for FIGURE 5.7

THE STRONG INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOLD MARKET AND THE U.S. DOLLAR

CAN BE SEEN OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. GOLD AND THE DOLLAR USUALLY TREND IN

OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS.

Cold versus U.S. Dollar Index

1985 through 1989
significant trend changes which correspond with trend changes in the CRB Index.

The 1980 bottom in the dollar corresponded with a major peak in the CRB Index the same year. The 1985 peak in the dollar corresponded with a bottom in the CRB Index the following year. The bottom in the dollar in December 1987 paved the way for a peak in the CRB Index a half-year later in July of 1988.

Figures 5.4 through 5.6 demonstrate the inverse relationship between the commodity markets, represented by the CRB Index, and the U.S. Dollar Index from 1985 to 1989. Figure 5.4 shows the entire five years from 1985 through the third quarter of 1989. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 zero in on more recent time periods. The charts demonstrate two important points. First, a rising dollar is bearish for the CRB Index, and a falling dollar is bullish for the CRB Index. The second important point is that turns in the dollar occur before turns in the CRB Index.

64 COMMODITIES AND THE U.S. DOLLAR

THE KEY ROLE OF GOLD 65
two reasons. First, of the 21 commodity markets in the CRB Index, gold is the most in gold in December 1987 took place as the dollar bottomed at the same time. The sensitive to dollar trends. Second, the gold market leads turns in the CRB Index.

leveling off process in the gold market in June of 1989 coincided with a top in the A trend change in the dollar will produce a trend change in gold, in the opposite dollar.

direction, almost immediately. This trend change in the gold market will eventually Figure 5.8 provides a closer view of the turns in late 1987 and mid-1989 and begin to spill over into the general commodity price level. Close monitoring of the demonstrates the strong inverse link between the two markets. Figure 5.9 compares gold market becomes a crucial step in the process. To understand why, an examination turns at the end of 1988 and the summer and fall of 1989. Notice in Figure 5.9 how of the strong inverse relationship between the gold market and the U.S. dollar is the two peaks in the dollar in June and September of 1989 coincided perfectly with necessary.

a possible "double bottom" developing in the gold market. Given the strong inverse Figure 5.7 compares price action in gold and the dollar from 1985 through 1989.

link between gold and the dollar, it should be clear that analysis of one market is The chart is striking for two reasons. First, both markets clearly trend in opposite incomplete without analysis of the other. A gold bull, for example, should probably directions. Second, turns in both markets occur at the same time. Figure 5.7 shows think twice about buying gold while the dollar is still strong. A sell signal in the three important turns in both markets (see arrows). The 1985 bottom in the gold dollar usually implies a buy signal for gold. A buy signal in the dollar is usually a market coincided exactly with the peak in the dollar the same year. The major top sell signal for gold.

FIGURE 5.8

THE DOLLAR VERSUS GOLD DURING 1988 AND 1989. PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN THE DOLLAR

FIGURE 5.9

USUALLY ACCOMPANY OPPOSITE REACTIONS IN THE GOLD MARKET. THE DOLLAR RALLY

THE DECEMBER 1988 BOTTOM IN THE DOLLAR OCCURRED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A PEAK

THROUGH ALL OF 1988 AND HALF OF 1989 SAW FALLING GOLD PRICES. THESE TWO

IN GOLD. THE JUNE AND SEPTEMBER 1989 PEAKS IN THE DOLLAR ARE CORRESPONDING

MARKETS SHOULD ALWAYS BE ANALYZED TOGETHER.

WITH TROUGHS IN THE GOLD MARKET.

U.S. Dollar Index versus Cold

Cold versus U.S. Dollar

1988 through 1989 .

December 1988 through September 1989

66 COMMODITIES AND THE US. DOLLAR

FOREIGN CURRENCIES AND GOLD 67

FOREIGN CURRENCIES AND GOLD
some index of overseas currencies.) Notice how closely the turns occur in both markets in the same direction. Three major turns took place in both markets during Now another dimension will be added to this comparison. Gold trends in the opposite that 10-year span. Both markets peaked out together in the first half of 1980 (leading direction of the dollar. So do the foreign currency markets. As the dollar rises, the downturn in the CRB Index by half a year). They bottomed together in the first foreign currencies fall. As the dollar falls, foreign currencies rise. Therefore, foreign half of 1985, and topped out together in December of 1987. Going into the summer currencies and gold should trend in the same direction. Given that tendency the of 1989, the mark (along with other overseas currencies) was dropping (meaning the deutsche mark will be used as a vehicle to take a longer historical look at the dollar was rising) and gold was also dropping (Figure 5.11). The mark and gold both comparison of the gold market and the currencies. It's easier to compare the gold's hit a bottom in June of 1989 (coinciding with a pullback in the dollar).

relationship with the dollar by using a foreign currency chart, since foreign currencies In September of 1989, the mark formed a second bottom which was much higher trend in the same direction as gold.

than the first. The gold market hit a second bottom at the exact same time, forming a Figure 5.10 shows the strong positive relationship between gold and the deutsche

"double bottom." The pattern of "rising bottoms" in the mark entering the fall of 1989
mark in the ten years from 1980 through 1989. (Although the mark is used in formed a "positive divergence" with the gold market and warned of a possible bottom these examples, comparisons can also be made with most of the overseas currency in gold. Needless to say, the rebound in the mark and the gold market corresponded markets—especially the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen—or FIGURE 5.11

FIGURE 5.10

GOLD VERSUS THE DEUTSCHE MARK FROM 1987 THROUGH MOST OF 1989. BOTH PEAKED

GOLD AND THE DEUTSCHE MARK (OVERSEAS CURRENCIES) USUALLY TREND IN THE SAME

TOGETHER AT THE END OF 1987 AND FELL UNTIL THE SUMMER OF 1989. THE PATTERN OF

DIRECTION (OPPOSITE TO THE DOLLAR). GOLD AND THE MARK PEAKED SIMULTANEOUSLY

"RISING BOTTOMS" IN THE MARK DURING SEPTEMBER OF 1989 IS HINTING AT UPWARD

IN 1980 AND 1987 AND TROUGHED TOGETHER IN 1985.

PRESSURE IN THE OVERSEAS CURRENCIES AND THE COLD MARKET.

Cold versus Deutsche Mark

Gold versus Deutsche Mark

1980 through 1989

1987 through 1989

68 COMMODITIES AND THE U.S. DOLLAR

GOLD AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF THE CRB INDEX 69
with a setback in the dollar. Given the close relationship between the gold market and FIGURE 5.13
the deutsche mark (and most major overseas currencies), it can be seen that analysis DURING THE SPRING OF 1989, GOLD LED THE CRB INDEX LOWER AND ANTICIPATED THE
of the overseas markets plays a vital role in an analysis of the gold market and of CRB BREAKDOWN THAT OCCURRED DURING MAY BY TWO MONTHS. FROM JUNE THROUGH
the general commodity price level. Since it has already been stated that the gold SEPTEMBER OF 1989, A POTENTIAL "DOUBLE BOTTOM" IN GOLD IS HINTING AT A BOTTOM
market is a leading indicator of the CRB Index, and given gold's close relationship IN THE CRB INDEX.

to the overseas currencies, it follows that the overseas currencies are also leading indicators of the commodity markets priced in U.S. dollars. Figure 5.12 shows why CRB Index versus Cold
this is so.

1989

GOLD AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF THE CRB INDEX

Gold's role as a leading indicator of the CRB Index can be seen in Figures 5.12 and 5.13. Figure 5.12 shows gold leading major turns in the CRB Index at the 1985 bottom and the 1987 top. (Gold also led the downturn in the CRB Index in 1980.) The 1985
bottom in gold was more than a year ahead of the 1986 bottom in the CRB Index. The December 1987 peak in the gold market preceded the CRB Index top, which occurred in the summer of 1988, by over half a year.

FIGURE 5.12

GOLD USUALLY LEADS TURNS IN THE CRB INDEX. GOLD BOTTOMED A YEAR AHEAD OF THE

CRB INDEX IN 1985 AND PEAKED ABOUT A HALF YEAR AHEAD OF THE CRB INDEX IN 1988.

CRB Index versus Gold

1985 through 1989

Figure 5.13 gives a closer view of the events entering the fall of 1989. While the CRB Index has continued to drop into August/September of that year, the gold market is holding above its June bottom near $360. The ability of the gold market in September of 1989 to hold above its June low appears to be providing a "positive divergence" with the CRB Index and may be warning of stability in the general price level. Bear in mind also that the "double bottom" in the gold market was itself being foreshadowed by a pattern of "rising bottoms" in the deutsche mark. The sequence of events entering the fourth quarter of 1989, therefore, is this: Strength in the deutsche mark provided a warning of a possible bottom in gold, which in turn provided a warning of a possible bottom in the CRB Index.

The relationship between the dollar and the gold market is very important in forecasting the trend of the general commodity price level, and using a foreign currency market, such as the deutsche mark, provides a shortcut. The deutsche mark example in Figures 5.10 and 5.11 combines the inverse relationship of the gold market and the dollar into one chart. Therefore, it can be seen why turns in the mark usually lead turns in the CRB Index. Figure 5.14 shows the mark leading the CRB Index in

70 COMMODITIES AND THE U.S. DOLLAR

COMBINING THE DOLLAR, GOLD, AND THE CRB INDEX 71

FIGURE 5.14

FIGURE 5.15

THE DEUTSCHE MARK (OR OTHER OVERSEAS CURRENCIES) CAN BE USED AS A LEADING

THE DEUTSCHE MARK VERSUS THE CRB INDEX FROM SEPTEMBER 1988 TO SEPTEMBER 1989.

INDICATOR OF THE CRB INDEX. IN 1985 THE MARK TURNED UP A YEAR AHEAD OF THE CRB

FROM DECEMBER TO JUNE, THE MARK LED THE CRB INDEX LOWER. THE "DOUBLE BOTTOM"

INDEX. IN LATE 1987 THE MARK TURNED DOWN SEVEN MONTHS PRIOR TO THE CRB INDEX.

IN THE MARK IN THE FALL OF 1989 IS HINTING AT UPWARD PRESSURE IN THE CRB INDEX.

SINCE OVERSEAS CURRENCIES TREND IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF THE DOLLAR, THEY

Deutsche Mark versus CRB Index

TREND IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS U.S. COMMODITIES WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF LEAD

1985 through 1989

TIME.

CRB Index versus Deutsche Mark
the period from 1985 through the third quarter of 1989. Figure 5.15 shows the mark leading the CRB Index lower in May of 1989 (coinciding with bullish breakout in the dollar and bonds) and hinting at a bottom in'the CRB Index in September of the same at short-term and intermediate changes in trend, gold will usually lead turns in the year. Going further back in history, Figure 5.10 shows the major peak in the deutsche CRB Index by about four months on average. This being the case, the same can be mark and gold in the first quarter of 1980, which foreshadowed the major downturn said for the lead time between turns in the U.S. dollar and the CRB Index.

in the CRB Index that occurred in the fourth quarter of that same year.

Figure 5.16 compares all three markets from September 1988 through September 1989. The upper chart shows movement in the U.S. Dollar Index. It shows a bottom COMBINING THE DOLLAR, GOLD, AND THE CRB INDEX
in December 1988, a bullish breakout in May 1989, and two peaks in June and September of the same year. The bottom chart compares gold and the CRB Index It's not enough to simply compare the dollar to the CRB Index. A rising dollar will during the same time span. The December 1988 peak in gold (coinciding with the eventually cause the CRB Index to turn lower, while a falling dollar will eventu-dollar bottom) preceded a peak in the CRB Index by a month. The setting of new lows ally push the CRB Index higher. The lead time between turns in the dollar and the by gold in March of 1989 provided an early warning of the impending breakdown CRB Index is better understood if the gold market is used as a bridge between the in the CRB Index two months later. The actual breakdown in the CRB Index in May other two markets. At major turning points the lead time between turns in gold and was caused primarily by the bullish breakout in the dollar that occurred during the the CRB Index can be as long as a year. At the more frequent turning points that occur same month.

72 COMMODITIES AND THE U.S. DOLLAR

SUMMARY 73

FIGURE 5.16
lower. The bullish impact of a rising dollar on bonds and stocks is felt when the A COMPARISON OF THE DOLLAR (UPPER CHART), GOLD, AND THE CRB INDEX (BOTTOM
commodity markets start to decline. The bearish impact of a falling dollar on bonds CHART). THE LATE 1988 BOTTOM IN THE DOLLAR PUSHED COLD LOWER, WHICH LED THE
and stocks is felt when commodities start to rise.

CRB DOWNTURN. ALTHOUGH THE BULLISH BREAKOUT IN THE DOLLAR DURING MAY OF

Gold is the commodity market most sensitive to dollar movements and usually 1989 PUSHED THE CRB INDEX THROUGH SUPPORT, GOLD HAD ALREADY BROKEN DOWN.

trends in the opposite direction of the U.S. currency. The gold market leads turns IN THE FALL OF 1989, A FALLING DOLLAR IS PULLING UP GOLD, WHICH IS BEGINNING TO
in the CRB Index by about four months (at major turning points, the lead time has PULL THE CRB INDEX HIGHER.

averaged about a year) and provides a bridge between the dollar and the commodity index. Foreign currency markets correspond closely with movements in gold and can U.S. Dollar versus Gold versus CRB Index
often be used as a leading indicator for the CRB Index.

In the next chapter, a mere direct examination of the relationship between the dollar, interest rates, and the stock market will be given. A comparison of the CRB

Index to the stock market will also be made to see if any convincing link exists between the two. Having already considered the important impact the dollar has on the gold market, the interplay between the gold market and the stock market will be viewed.

Dollar peaks in June and September of 1989 (upper chart of Figure 5.16) coincided with "double bottoms" in gold, which may in turn be signaling a bottom in the CRB

Index. In all three cases, the dollar remains the dominant market. However, the dollar's impact on the gold market is the conduit through which the dollar impacts on the CRB Index. Therefore, it is necessary to use all three markets in one's analysis.

SUMMARY

The relationship between the U.S. dollar and bonds and stocks is an indirect one. The more direct relationship exists between the U.S. dollar and the CRB Index, which in turn impacts on bonds and stocks. The dollar moves in the opposite direction of the CRB Index. A falling dollar, being inflationary, will eventually push the CRB Index higher. A rising dollar, being noninflationary, will eventually push the CRB Index

6

THE DOLLAR AND SHORT-TERM RATES 75
the dollar and interest rates for now. A falling dollar, being inflationary, eventually pushes interest rates higher. Rising interest rates make the U.S. dollar more attractive relative to other currencies and eventually pull the dollar higher. The rising dollar, being noninflationary, eventually pushes interest rates lower. Lower interest rates, making the U.S. currency less attractive vis-a-vis other currencies, eventually pulls the dollar lower. And so on and so on.

Given the preceding scenario, it can be seen how closely the dollar and bonds are linked. It is also easier to see why a rising dollar is considered bullish for bonds.

A rising dollar will eventually push interest rates lower, which pushes bond prices The Dollar Versus
higher. A falling dollar will push interest rates higher and bond prices lower. Bond prices will then impact on the stock market, the subject of Chapter 4. The main focus of this chapter is on the more direct link between the dollar and interest rates.

Interest Rates and Stocks

Although the dollar will be compared to the stock market, the impact there is more delayed and is more correctly filtered through the bond market.

DO COMMODITIES LEAD OR FOLLOW?

Although commodities aren't the main focus of this chapter, it's not possible to exclude them completely. In the relationship between the dollar and commodities, the dollar is normally placed first and used as the cause. Commodity trends are treated as the result of dollar trends. However, it could also be argued that inflationary trends Up to now I've stressed the importance of following a path through the four market caused by the commodity markets (which determine the trend of interest rates) even-sectors, starting with the dollar and working our way through commodities, bonds, tually determine the direction of the dollar. Rising commodity prices and rising in-and stocks in that order. The necessity of placing the commodity markets in between terest rates will in time pull the dollar higher. The rise in the dollar at the beginning the dollar and the bond market has also been stressed. In this chapter, however, of 1988 followed the rise in the CRB Index and interest rates that began in the spring movements in the dollar will be directly compared to the bond and stock markets.

of 1987. Are commodity trends the cause or the effect, then, of dollar trends? In a I'll also take a look at the direct link, if any, between the CRB Index and the stock never-ending circle, the correct answer is both. Commodity trends (which match in-market. Since gold is often viewed as an alternative investment in times of adversity terest rate trends) are the result of dollar trends and in time contribute to future dollar in stocks, gold movements will also be compared to the stock market during the trends.

1980s. ;

The problem with comparing the dollar to bonds and stocks directly, without Intermarket analysis usually begins with the dollar and works its way through using commodities, is that it is a shortcut. While doing so may be helpful in furthering the other three sectors. In reality there is no starting point. Consider the sequence of understanding of the process, it leaves analysts with the problem of irritating lead events that unfolds during a bull and bear stock market cycle. The dollar starts to times. While analysts may understand the sequence of events, they don't know when rally (1980). The rising dollar, being noninflationary, pushes commodity prices lower trend changes are imminent. As pointed out in Chapter 5, usually the catalyst in the (1980-1981). Interest rates follow commodity prices lower, pushing up bond prices process is a rally or breakdown in the general commodity price level, which is itself (1981). The rising bond market pulls stock prices higher (1982). For awhile we have often foreshadowed by the trend in the gold market. With these caveats, consider a rising dollar, falling commodity process, falling interest rates, and rising bond and recent market history vis-a-vis the dollar and interest rates.

stock prices (1982-1985).

Then, falling interest rates begin to exert a downward pull on the dollar (falling THE DOLLAR AND SHORT-TERM RATES
interest rates diminish the attractiveness of a domestic currency by lowering yields on interest-bearing investments denominated in that currency), and the dollar starts Short-term interest rates are more volatile than long-term rates and usually react to weaken (1985-1987). We then have a falling dollar, falling commodities, falling quicker to changes in monetary policy. The dollar is more sensitive to movements in interest rates, and rising bonds and stocks. Eventually, the falling dollar pushes com-short-term rates than to long-term rates. Long term-rates are more sensitive to longer modity prices higher (1987). Rising commodity prices pull interest rates higher and range inflationary expectations. The interplay between short- and long-term rates also bond prices lower. The lower bond market eventually pulls stock prices lower (1987).

holds important implications for the dollar and helps us determine whether the Fed-Rising interest rates start to pull the dollar higher (1988), and the bullish cycle starts eral Reserve is pursuing a policy of monetary ease or tightness.

all over again.

Figure 6.1 compares six-month Treasury Bill rates with the dollar from 1985

The ripple effect that flows through the four market sectors is never-ending and through the third quarter of 1989. Interest rates had been dropping since 1981 (as a really has no beginning point. The dollar trend, which was used as the starting point, result of the rising dollar from its 1980 bottom). In 1985 falling interest rates began is really a reaction to the trend in interest rates, which was initially set in motion to pull the dollar lower. From early 1985 through 1986, both the dollar and interest by the trend of the dollar. If this sounds very complicated, it isn't. Let's just consider rates were dropping. By late 1986, however, the inflationary impact of the lower

76 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

THE DOLLAR AND SHORT-TERM RATES 77

FIGURE 6.1
market plunge. At such times the interplay between the stock market, interest rates, SHORT-TERM RATES VERSUS THE DOLLAR FROM 1985 THROUGH 1989. THE DOLLAR WILL
and the dollar is immediate and dramatic.

FOLLOW THE DIRECTION OF INTEREST RATES BUT ONLY AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME. THE DOL-Rising interest rates eventually began to pull the dollar higher in 1988 (after the LAR TOP IN 1985 WAS THE RESULT OF FALLING RATES SINCE 1981. THE LATE 1987 BOTTOM
stock market had stabilized). Soaring short-term rates provided a bullish backdrop IN THE DOLLAR FOLLOWED A BOTTOM IN RATES OVER A YEAR BEFORE.

for the dollar rally. By April of 1989, short-term rates had peaked (see Figure 6.2).

Within two months the dollar started to weaken as a result.

Short-Term Rates versus U.S. Dollar Index

Figure 6.3 compares dollar trends to 30-year Treasury bond yields. While bond 1985 through 1989
swings aren't as dramatic as the T-bill market, the relationship to the dollar is basically the same. The bond market, being a long-term investment, is more sensitive to inflationary expectations as lenders demand a higher return to protect their investment from the ravages of inflation. Bond yields turned higher in 1987 as the inflationary implications of the falling dollar (and higher commodity prices) began to take hold.

The collapse in the dollar during the fourth quarter of 1987 was the direct result of the plunge in interest rates resulting from the October stock market crash. The dol-FICURE 6.2

THE DOLLAR FOLLOWED SHORT-TERM RATES HIGHER UNTIL MID-1989. THE PEAK IN T-BILL

RATES IN MARCH OF 1989 CONTRIBUTED TO A PEAK IN THE DOLLAR THREE MONTHS LATER.

Short-Term Rate versus U.S. Dollar Index

1988 and 1989
dollar began to push interest rates (and commodity prices) higher. Although the rise in interest rates was itself the direct result of the falling dollar as inflation pressures started to build, the 1986 interest rate bottom set the stage for the bottom in the dollar a year later in December of 1987.

Heading into the fall of 1987, the year-long rise in short-term interest rates began to have a mild upward impact on the dollar. However, the October 1987 stock market crash caused rates to plunge as the Federal Reserve Board flooded the monetary system with liquidity in a dramatic easing move to stem the stock market panic. In addition, funds pulled out of the stock market poured into Treasury bills and bonds in a dramatic "flight to safety". Prices of T-bills and bonds soared, and interest rates plunged. The sharp drop in interest rates contributed to the plunge in the dollar, which immediately dropped to new lows. In the fall of 1987, the dollar collapse was caused by the sharp drop in interest rates, which in turn was caused by the stock

78 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

SHORT-TERM RATES VERSUS LONG-TERM RATES 79

FIGURE 6.3

FIGURE 6.4

TREASURY BOND YIELDS VERSUS THE DOLLAR FROM 1985 TO 1989. A CIRCULAR RELATION-RISING BOND RATES KEPT THE DOLLAR FIRM INTO MID-1989. THE SHARP DROP IN BOND

SHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THE DOLLAR AND RATES. A FALLING DOLLAR WILL EVENTUALLY PUSH

YIELDS DURING THE SPRING OF 1989 CONTRIBUTED TO A FALLING DOLLAR DURING THAT

RATES HIGHER (1986), WHICH IN TURN WILL PULL THE DOLLAR HIGHER (1988). A RISING

SUMMER.

DOLLAR WILL EVENTUALLY PUSH RATES LOWER (1989), WHICH IN TURN WILL WEAKEN THE

DOLLAR.

Long-Term Interest Rates versus the Dollar

1988 and 1989

Treasury Bond Yields versus U.S. Dollar Index

1985 through 1989

SHORT-TERM RATES VERSUS LONG-TERM RATES
lar rally from early 1988 into 1989 (resulting from higher interest rates) eventually Figure 6.5 compares short- and long-term rates from 1985 to 1989. The chart shows lowered inflation expectations (pushing commodity prices lower), and bond yields that long-term yields are generally higher than short-term rates. In 1982, short-term began to drop in May of 1989 as a result. The fall in bond yields, in turn, helped rates were dropping much faster than long-term rates, reflecting a period of monetary weaken the dollar during the summer of 1989.

ease. Not surprisingly, 1982 also marked the beginning of bull markets in bonds Figure 6.4 provides a closer view of the dollar rally from its December 1987
and stocks. The dramatic rise in short-term yields in 1988 and early 1989 reflected bottom to its June 1989 peak. In May of 1989, the dollar scored a major bullish monetary tightness on the part of the Federal Reserve as concerns about inflation breakout above its 1988 peak. This bullish breakout in the dollar (which pushed intensified, and resulted in the so-called negative yield curve (when short-term rates commodity prices lower and bond prices higher) also had the result of dramatically actually exceed long-term rates), as shown in Figure 6.6.

lowering interest rate yields, which contributed to its own demise just a couple of That monetary tightness, lasting from 1988 to early 1989 was bullish for the dol-months later. What these charts demonstrate is the close interplay between the dollar lar. As a rule of thumb, periods of monetary tightness are supportive to the dollar.

and interest rates and why it's really not possible to determine which one leads the Periods of monetary ease are bearish for the dollar. (A negative, or inverted, yield other. Although it's not necessary to determine which leads and which follows, it is curve, which existed in early 1989, has historically been bearish for stocks.) The necessary to understand how they interact with each other.

drop in both long- and short-term rates that began in April of 1989 preceded a top

80 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

SHORT-TERM RATES VERSUS LONG-TERM RATES 81

FIGURE 6.5

FIGURE 6.6

LONG-TERM VERSUS SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES FROM 1982 TO 1989. LONG-TERM RATES

DURING THE PERIOD FROM THE SPRING OF 1988 TO THE SPRING OF 1989, SHORT-TERM

ARE USUALLY HIGHER THAN SHORT-TERM RATES. WHEN SHORT-TERM RATES ARE DROPPING

RATES ROSE FASTER THAN LONG-TERM RATES, REFLECTING MONETARY TIGHTNESS. DURING

FASTER THAN LONG-TERM RATES (1982), MONETARY POLICY IS EASY, WHICH IS BULLISH FOR

THE SPRING OF 1989, SHORT-TERM RATES EXCEEDED LONG-TERM RATES (AN INVERTED YIELD

FINANCIAL ASSETS. WHEN SHORT-TERM RATES RISE FASTER THAN LONG-TERM RATES (1988

CURVE), WHICH IS USUALLY BEARISH FOR FINANCIAL ASSETS. MONETARY TIGHTNESS IS

AND EARLY 1989), MONETARY POLICY IS TIGHT, WHICH IS BEARISH FOR FINANCIAL ASSETS.

BULLISH FOR THE DOLLAR, WHILE MONETARY EASE IS BEARISH FOR THE DOLLAR.

Long-Term Interest Rates versus Shojrt-Term Rates Long-Term Rates versus Short-Term Rates

1982 through 1989

82 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

THE DOLLAR VERSUS TREASURY BILL FUTURES 83
in the dollar by two months. While the direction of interest rates is important to the FIGURE 6.8
dollar, it's also useful to monitor the relationship between short- and long-term rates BOND PRICES VERSUS THE DOLLAR FROM 1987 TO 1989. BOTH MARKETS RALLIED TOGETHER

(the yield curve). Having considered interest rate yields, let's turn the picture around FROM EARLY 1988 TO 1989. THE BULLISH BREAKOUT IN THE DOLLAR IN MAY OF 1989 CO-now and compare the dollar trend to interest rate futures, which use prices instead INCIDED WITH A BULLISH BREAKOUT IN BONDS.

of yields.

Bond Prices versus the Dollar

THE DOLLAR VERSUS BOND FUTURES

A falling dollar is bearish for bonds. Or is it? Well, yes, but only after awhile. Figure 6.7 shows why it can be dangerous to rely on generalizations. From 1985 to well into 1986, we had a rising bond market along with a collapsing dollar. Bond bulls were well-advised during that time to ignore the falling dollar. Those bond traders who looked solely at the falling dollar (and ignored the fact that commodities were also dropping) probably left the bull side prematurely. From 1988 to mid-1989, however, FIGURE 6.7

THE DOLLAR VERSUS BOND PRICES FROM 1985 TO 1989. FROM 1985 TO 1986, THE BOND

MARKET RALLIED DESPITE A FALLING DOLLAR. BOTH RALLIED TOGETHER FROM THE BEGINNING OF 1988 THROUGH THE MIDDLE OF 1989. A FALLING DOLLAR IS BEARISH FOR BONDS, AND A RISING DOLLAR BULLISH FOR BONDS BUT ONLY AFTER AWHILE.

Bonds versus the Dollar
we had a firm bond market and a rising dollar. Figure 6.8 shows a fairly close correlation between bond futures and the dollar in the period from 1987 through 1989.

The bullish breakout in the dollar in the spring of 1989 helped fuel a similar bullish breakout in the bond market.

THE DOLLAR VERSUS TREASURY BILL FUTURES

Figures 6.9 and 6.10 compare the dollar to Treasury bill futures. It can be seen that the period from early 1988 to early 1989 saw a sharp drop in T-bill futures, reflecting a sharp rise in short-term rates. A strong inverse relationship between T-bill futures and the dollar existed for that 12-month span. This also shows how the dollar reacts more to changes in short-term interest rates than to long-term rates. It explains why T-bill and the dollar often trend in opposite directions. During periods of monetary tightness, as short-term rates rise, bill prices sell off. However, the dollar rallies.

During periods of monetary ease, T-bill prices will rise, short-term rates will fall, as

84 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

THE DOLLAR VERSUS TREASURY BILL FUTURES 85

FIGURE 6.9

FIGURE 6.10

THE U.S. DOLLAR VERSUS TREASURY BILL FUTURES PRICES FROM 1985 TO 1989. THE DOLLAR

THE U.S. DOLLAR VERSUS TREASURY BILL FUTURES PRICES IN 1988 AND 1989. FALLING T-BILL

AND TREASURY BILLS OFTEN DISPLAY AN INVERSE RELATIONSHIP. THE PEAK IN T-BILL PRICES

PRICES ARE USUALLY SUPPORTIVE FOR THE DOLLAR SINCE THEY SIGNAL HIGHER SHORTIN EARLY 1988 HELPED STABILIZE THE DOLLAR (BY SIGNALING HIGHER SHORT-TERM RATES).

TERM RATES (MOST OF 1988). RISING T-BILL PRICES (1989) ARE USUALLY BEARISH FOR THE

DOLLAR (SIGNALING LOWER SHORT-TERM RATES).

U.S. Dollar versus Treasury Bill Prices '

Treasury Bills versus U.S. Dollar

86 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

THE DOLLAR VERSUS THE STOCK MARKET 87
will the dollar. To the left of the chart in Figure 6.9, in the period from 1985 through FIGURE 6.11

1986, another strong inverse relationship existed between the dollar and Treasury bill THE U.S. DOLLAR VERSUS THE DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE FROM 1985 TO 1989.

futures. Figure 6.10 shows the sharp rally in T-bill prices that began in the spring of WHILE IT'S TRUE THAT A FALLING DOLLAR WILL EVENTUALLY PROVE BEARISH FOR STOCKS, 1989, which was the beginning of the end for the bull run in the dollar.

A RISING STOCK MARKET CAN COEXIST WITH A FALLING DOLLAR FOR LONG PERIODS OF

TIME (1985 TO 1987). BOTH ROSE DURING 1988 AND 1989.

THE DOLLAR VERSUS THE STOCK MARKET

U.S. Stocks versus the Dollar

It stands to reason since both the dollar and the stock market are influenced by interest rate trends (as well as inflation) that there should be a direct link between the dollar and stocks. The relationship between the dollar and the stock market exists but is often subject to long lead times. A rising dollar will eventually push inflation and interest rates lower, which is bullish for stocks. A falling dollar will eventually push stock prices lower because of the rise in inflation and interest rates. However, it is an oversimplification to say that a rising dollar is always bullish for stocks, and a falling dollar is always bearish for equities.

Figure 6.11 compares the dollar to the Dow Industrials from 1985 through the third quarter of 1989. For the first two years stocks rose sharply as the dollar dropped.

From 1988 through the middle of 1989, stocks and the dollar rose together. So what does the chart demonstrate? It shows that sometimes the dollar and stocks move in the opposite direction and sometimes in the same direction. The trick is in understanding the lead and lag times that usually occur and also the sequence of events that affect the two markets.

Figure 6.11 shows the dollar dropping from 1985 through 1987, during which time stocks continued to advance. Stocks didn't actually sell off sharply until the second half of 1987, more than two years after the dollar peaked. Going back to the beginning of the decade, the dollar bottomed in 1980, two years before the 1982
bottom in stocks. In 1988 and 1989 the dollar and stocks rose pretty much in tandem. The peak in the dollar in the summer of 1989, however, gave warnings that a potentially bearish scenario might be developing for the stock market.

It's not possible to discuss the relationship between the dollar and stocks without mentioning inflation (represented by commodity prices) and interest rates (represented by bonds). The dollar has an impact on the stock market, but only after a ripple effect that flows through the other two sectors. In other words, a falling dollar becomes bearish for stocks only after commodity prices and interest rates start to rise.

Until that happens, it is possible to have a falling dollar along with a rising stock market (such as the period from 1985 to 1987). A rising dollar becomes bullish for stocks when commodity prices and interest rates start to decline (such as happened during 1980 and 1981). In the meantime, it is possible to have a strong dollar and a together. Both rallied briefly in October before collapsing in tandem. The sharp weak or flat stock market]

selloff in the dollar during the October collapse is explained by the relationship The peak in the dollar in the middle of 1989 led to a situation in which a between stocks, interest rates, and the dollar. While the stock selloff gathered momen-weaker dollar and a strong stock market coexisted for the next several months. The tum, interest rates began to drop sharply as the Federal Reserve Board added res-potentially bearish impact of the weaker dollar would only take effect on stocks if erves to the system to check the equity decline. A "flight to safety" into T-bills and when commodity prices and interest rates would start to show signs of trending and bonds pushed prices sharply higher in those two markets, which pushed yields upward. The events of 1987 and early 1988 provide an example of how closely the lower.

dollar and stocks track each other during times of severe weakness in the equity As stock prices fall in such a scenario, the dollar drops primarily as a result sector.

of Federal Reserve easing. The dollar is dropping along with stocks but is really Figure 6.12 compares the stock market to the dollar in the fall of 1987. Notice how following short-term interest rates lower. Not surprisingly, after the financial markets closely the two markets tracked each other during the period from August to October stabilized in the fourth quarter of 1987, and short-term interest rates were allowed of that year. As discussed earlier, interest rates had been rising for several months, to trend higher once again, the dollar also stabilized and began to rally. Figure 6.13
pulling the dollar higher. Over the summer both the dollar and stocks began to weaken shows the dollar and stocks rallying together through 1988 and most of 1989.

THE DOLLAR VERSUS THE STOCK MARKET 89

88 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

FIGURE 6.12

FIGURE 6.13

THE DOLLAR AND EQUITIES ROSE TOGETHER DURING 1988 AND THE FIRST HALF OF 1989.

DURING THE 1987 STOCK MARKET CRASH, STOCKS AND THE DOLLAR BECAME CLOSELY

THE "DOUBLE TOP" IN THE DOLLAR DURING THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1989, HOWEVER, LINKED. AFTER DROPPING TOGETHER DURING AUGUST AND OCTOBER, THEY BOTTOMED

WAS A POTENTIALLY BEARISH WARNING FOR EQUITIES.

TOGETHER DURING THE FOURTH QUARTER OF THAT YEAR.

Stocks versus the Dollar

U.S. Stocks versus the Dollar

1987

90 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

GOLD AND THE STOCK MARKET 91

THE SEQUENCE OF THE DOLLAR, INTEREST RATES, AND STOCKS

FIGURE 6.14

The general sequence of events at market turns favors reversals in the dollar, bonds, COMMODITIES VERSUS EQUITIES FROM 1985 TO 1989. SOMETIMES COMMODITIES AND
and stocks in that order. The dollar will turn up first (as the result of rising interest STOCKS WILL RISE AND FALL TOGETHER AND, AT OTHER TIMES, WILL SHOW AN INVERSE
rates). In time the rising dollar will push interest rates downward, and the bond RELATIONSHIP. IT'S IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THEIR ROTATIONAL SEQUENCE.

market will rally. Stocks will turn up after bonds. After a period of falling interest rates (rising bond prices), the dollar will peak. After a while, the falling dollar will push Stocks versus Commodities
interest rates higher, and the bond market will peak. Stocks usually peak after bonds.

This scenario generally takes place over several years. The lead times between the peaks and troughs in the three markets can often span several months to as long as two years. An understanding of this sequence explains why a falling dollar can coexist with a rising bond and stock market for a period of time. However, a falling dollar indicates that the clock has begun ticking on the bull markets in the other two sectors. Correspondingly, a bullish dollar is telling traders that it's only a matter of time before bonds and stocks follow along.

COMMODITIES VERSUS STOCKS

Figure 6.14 compares the CRB Index to the Dow Industrial Average from 1985 through the third quarter of 1989. The chart shows that stocks and commodities sometimes move in opposite directions and sometimes move in tandem. Still, some general conclusions can be drawn from this chart (and from longer-range studies), which reveals a rotational rhythm that flows through both markets. A rising CRB Index is eventually bearish for stocks. A falling CRB Index is eventually bullish for stocks. The inflationary impact of rising commodity prices (and rising interest rates) will combine to push stock prices lower (usually toward the end of an economic expansion). The impact of falling commodity prices (and falling interest rates) will eventually begin to push stock prices higher (usually toward the latter part of an economic slowdown).

The usual sequence of events between the two markets will look something like this: A peak in commodity prices will be followed in time by a bottom in stock prices.

However, for awhile, commodities and stocks will fall together. Then, stocks will start to trend higher. For a time, stocks will rise and commodities will continue to weaken.

Then, commodities will bottom out and start to rally. For a time, commodities and stocks will trend upward together. Stocks will then peak and begin to drop. For awhile, stocks will drop while commodities continue to rally. Then, commodity prices will peak and begin to drop. This brings us back to where we began.

In other words, a top in commodities is followed by a bottom in stocks, which is followed by a bottom in commodities, which is followed by a top in stocks, which is GOLD AND THE STOCK MARKET
followed by a top in commodities, which is followed by a bottom in stocks. These, of Usually when the conversation involves the relative merits of investing in commodi-course, are general tendencies. An exception to this general tendency took place in ties (tangible assets) versus stocks (financial assets), the focus turns to the gold market.

1987 and 1988. Stocks topped in August of 1987, and commodities topped in July of The gold market plays a key role in the entire intermarket story. Gold is viewed as a 1988. However, the bottom in stocks in the last quarter of 1987 preceded the final top safe haven during times of political and financial upheavals. As a result, stock market in commodities during the summer of the following year. This turn of events violates investors will flee to the gold market, or gold mining shares, when the stock market the normal sequence. However, it could be argued that although stocks hit bottom in is in trouble. Certainly, gold will do especially well relative to stocks during times late 1987, the rally began to accelerate only after commodities started to weaken in of high inflation (the 1970s for example), but will underperform stocks in times of the second half of 1988. It also shows that, while the markets do tend to follow the declining inflation (most of the 1980s).

intermarket sequence described above, these are not hard and fast rules.

Gold plays a crucial role because of its strong inverse link to the dollar, its Another reason why it's so important to recognize the rotational sequence be-tendency to lead turns in the general commodity price level, and its role as a safe tween commodities and stocks is to avoid misunderstanding the inverse relationship haven in times of turmoil. The importance of gold as a leading indicator of inflation between these two sectors. Yes, there is an inverse relationship, but only after relatively will be discussed in more depth at a later time. For now, the focus is on the merits long lead times. For long periods of time, both sectors can trend in the same direction.

of gold as an investment relative to equities. Figure 6.15 compares the price of gold to

92 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

INTEREST-RATE DIFFERENTIALS 93

FIGURE 6.15

GOLD-A KEY TO VITAL INTERMARKET LINKS

GOLD VERSUS THE STOCK MARKET FROM 1982 TO 1989. GOLD USUALLY DOES BEST IN

Since the gold market has a strong inverse link to the dollar, the direction of the AN INFLATIONARY ENVIRONMENT AND DURING BEAR MARKETS IN STOCKS. GOLD IS A LEADING INDICATOR OF INFLATION AND A SAFE HAVEN DURING TIMES OF ADVERSITY.

gold market plays an important role in inflation expectations. A peak in the dollar STOCK MARKET INVESTORS WILL OFTEN FAVOR GOLD-MINING SHARES DURING PERIODS
in 1985 coincided with a major lowpoint in the gold market. The gold market top OF STOCK MARKET WEAKNESS.

in December 1987 coincided with a major bottom in the dollar. The dollar peak in the summer of 1989 coincided with a major low in the gold market. The gold market Gold versus the Stock Market
leads turns in the CRB Index. The CRB Index in turn has a strong inverse relationship with a bond market. And, of course, bonds tend to lead the stock market. Since gold starts to trend upward prior to the CRB Index, it's possible to have a rising gold market along with bonds and stocks (1985-1987).

A major bottom in the gold market (which usually coincides with an important top in the dollar) is generally a warning that inflation pressures are just starting to build and will in time become bearish for bonds and stocks. A gold market top (which normally accompanies a bottom in the dollar) is an early indication of a lessening in inflation pressure and will in time have a bullish impact on bonds and stocks. However, it is possible for gold to drop along with bonds and stocks for a time.

It's important to recognize the role of gold as a leading indicator of inflation.

Usually in the early stages of a bull market in gold, you'll read in the papers that there isn't enough inflation to justify the bull market since gold needs an inflationary environment in which to thrive. Conversely, when gold peaks out (in 1980 for example), you'll read that gold should not drop because of the rising inflation trend. Don't be misled by that backward thinking. Gold doesn't react to inflation; it anticipates inflation. That's why gold peaked in January of 1980 at a time of double-digit inflation and correctly anticipated the coming disinflation. That's also why gold bottomed in 1985, a year before the disinflation trend of the early 1980s had run its course. The next time gold starts to rally sharply and the economists say that there are no signs of inflation on the horizon, begin nibbling at some inflation hedges anyway. And the next time the stock market starts to look toppy, especially if the dollar is dropping, consider some gold mining shares.

INTEREST-RATE DIFFERENTIALS

The attractiveness of the dollar, relative to other currencies, is also a function of interest rate differentials with those other countries. In other words, if U.S. rates equities since 1982. Much of what was said in the previous section, in our comparison are high relative to overseas interest rates, this will help the dollar. If U.S. rates between commodities and stocks, holds true for gold as well. During periods of falling start to weaken relative to overseas rates, the dollar will weaken relative to overseas inflation, stocks outperform gold by a wide margin (1980 to 1985 and 1988 through currencies. Money tends to flow toward those currencies with the highest interest the first half of 1989). During periods of rising inflation (the 1970s and the period from rate yields and away from those with the lowest yields. This is why it's important to 1986 through the end of 1987), gold becomes a valuable addition to one's portfolio if monitor interest rates on a global scale.

not an outright alternative to stocks.

Any unilateral central bank tightening by overseas trading partners (usually to The period from 1988 through the middle of 1989 shows stocks and gold trending stem fears of rising domestic inflation) or U.S. easing will be supportive to overseas in opposite directions. This period coincided with general falling commodity prices currencies and bearish for the dollar. Any unilateral U.S. tightening or overseas eas-and a rising dollar. Clearly, the wise place to be was in stocks and not gold. Howing will strengthen the dollar. This explains why central bankers try to coordinate ever, the sharp setback in the dollar in mid-1989 gave warning that things might be monetary policy to prevent unduly upsetting foreign exchange rates. In determining changing. Sustained weakness in the dollar would not only begin to undermine one the impact on the dollar, then, it's not just a matter of which way interest rates are of the bullish props under the stock market but would also provide support to the trending in this country but how they're trending in the United States relative to gold market, which benefits from dollar weakness.

overseas interest rates.

94 THE DOLLAR VERSUS INTEREST RATES AND STOCKS

SUMMARY

7

This chapter shows the strong link between the dollar and interest rates. The dollar has an important influence on the direction of interest rates. The direction of interest rates has a delayed impact on the direction of the dollar. The result is a circular relationship between the two. Short-term rates have more direct impact on the dollar than long-term rates. A falling U.S. dollar will eventually have a bearish impact on financial assets in favor of tangible assets. During times of severe stock market weakness, the dollar will usually fall as a result of Federal Reserve easing. Rising commodity prices will in time become bearish for stocks. Falling commodity prices usually precede an upturn in equities. Gold acts as a leading indicator of inflation and Commodity Indexes
a safe haven during times of political and financial upheavals. The normal sequence of events among the various sectors is as follows:

• Rising interest rates pull the dollar higher.

• Gold peaks.

• The CRB Index peaks.

• Interest rates peak; bonds bottom.

One of the key aspects of intermarket analysis, which has been stressed repeatedly

• Stocks bottom.

in the preceding chapters, has been the need to incorporate commodity prices into

• Falling interest rates pull the dollar lower.

the financial equation. To do this, the Commodity Research Bureau Futures Price

• Gold bottoms.

Index has been employed to represent the commodity markets. The CRB Index is the most widely watched barometer of the general commodity price level and will remain

• The CRB Index bottoms.

throughout the text as the major tool for analyzing commodity price trends. However,

• Interest rates turn up; bonds peak.

to adequately understand the workings of the CRB Index, it's important to know what

• Stocks peak.

makes it run. Although all of its 21 component markets are equally weighted, some

• Rising interest rates pull the dollar higher.

individual commodity markets are more important than others. We'll consider the impact various commodities have on the CRB Index and why it's important to monitor This chapter completes the direct comparison of the four market sectors—currencies, those individual markets.

commodities, interest rate, and stock index futures. Of the four sectors, the one that In addition to monitoring the individual commodity markets that comprise the has been the most neglected and the least understood by the financial community CRB Index, it's also useful to consult the Futures Group Indexes published by the has been commodities. Because of the important role commodity markets play in the Commodity Research Bureau. A quick glance at these group indexes tells the analyst intermarket picture and their ability to anticipate inflation, the next chapter will be which commodity groups are the strongest and the weakest at any given time. Some devoted to a more in-depth study of the commodity sector.

of these futures groups have more impact on the CRB Index than others and merit special attention. The precious metals and the energy groups are especially important because of their impact on the overall commodity price level and their wide acceptance as barometers of inflation. I'll show how it's possible to view each group as a whole instead of just as individual markets. The relationship between the energy and precious metals sectors will be discussed to see if following one sector provides any clues to the direction of the other. Finally, movements in the energy and metals sectors will be compared to interest rates to see if there is any correlation.

There are several other commodity indexes that should be monitored in addition to the CRB Index. Although most broad commodity indexes normally trend in the same direction, there are times when their paths begin to differ. It is precisely at those times, when the various commodity indexes begin to diverge from one another, that important warnings of possible trend changes are being sent. To understand these divergences, the observer should understand how the various indexes are constructed.

First the CRB Futures Index will be compared to the CRB Spot Index. Analysts often confuse these two indexes. However, the CRB Spot Index is comprised of spot (cash) prices instead of futures prices and has a heavier industrial weighting than 95

96 COMMODITY INDEXES

GROUP CORRELATION STUDIES 97
the CRB Futures Index. The CRB Spot Index is broken down into two other indexes, All of the 21 commodity markets that comprise the CRB Index are themselves Spot Foodstuffs and Spot Raw Industrials. The Raw Industrials Index is especially traded as futures contracts and cover the entire spectrum of commodity markets. In favored by economic forecasters. Another index favored by many economists is the alphabetical order, the 21 commodities in the CRB Index are as follows: Journal of Commerce (fOC) Industrial Materials Price Index.

The debate as to which commodity index does a better job of predicting Cattle (Live), Cocoa, Coffee, Copper, Cora, Cotton, Crude Oil, Gold (New York), Heat-inflation centers around the relative importance of industrial prices versus food ing Oil (No. 2), Hogs, Lumber, Oats (Chicago), Orange Juice, Platinum, Pork Bel-prices. Economists seem to prefer industrial prices as a better barometer of infla-lies, Silver (New York), Soybeans, Soybean Meal, Soybean Oil, Sugar "11" (World), tion and economic strength. However, the financial markets seem to prefer the more Wheat (Chicago)

balanced CRB Futures Index, which includes both food and industrial prices. Although the debate won't be resolved in these pages, I'll try to shed some light on the Each of the 21 markets in the CRB Index carries equal weight in the preceding subject.

formula, which means that each market contributes 1/21 (4.7%) to the Index's value.

However, although each individual commodity market has equal weight in the CRB

Index, this does not mean that each commodity group carries equal weight. Some COMMODITY PRICES, INFLATION, AND FED POLICY
commodity groups carry more weight than others. The following breakdown divides Ultimately, inflation pressures are reflected in the Producer Price Index (PPI) and the CRB Index by groups to give a better idea how the weightings are distributed: the Consumer Price Index (CPI). I'll show how monitoring trends in the commodity markets often provides clues months in advance as to which way the inflation winds MEATS: Cattle, hogs, porkbellies (14.3%)

are blowing. Since the Federal Reserve Board's primary goal is price stability, it should METALS: Gold, platinum, silver (14.3%)

come as no surprise to anyone that the Fed watches commodity indexes very closely IMPORTED: Cocoa, coffee, sugar (14.3%)

to help determine whether price pressures are intensifying or diminishing. What the ENERGY: Crude oil, heating oil (9.5%)

Fed itself has said regarding the importance of commodity prices as a tool for setting monetary policy will be discussed.

GRAINS: Corn, oats, wheat, soybeans, soybean meal, soybean oil (28.6%) INDUSTRIALS: Copper, cotton, lumber (14.3%)

HOW TO CONSTRUCT THE CRB INDEX

A quick glance at the preceding breakdown reveals two of the major criticisms of Since we've placed so much importance on the CRB Index, let's explain how it is the CRB Index—first, the heavier weighting of the agricultural markets (62%) versus constructed and which markets have the most influence on its movements. The Com-the non-food markets (38%) and, second, the heavy weighting of the grain sector modity Research Bureau Futures Price Index was first introduced in 1956 by that (28.6%) relative to the other commodity groupings. The heavy weighting of the agri-organization. Although it has undergone many changes in the ensuing 30 years, it is cultural markets has caused some observers to question the reliability of the CRB
currently comprised of 21 active commodity markets. The key word here is commod-Index as a predictor of inflation, a question which will be discussed later. The heavy ity. The CRB Index does not include any financial futures. It is a commodity index, grain weighting reveals why it is so important to follow the grain markets when ana-pure and simple. The calculation of the CRB Index takes three steps: lyzing the CRB Index, which leads us to our next subject—the impact various markets and market groups have on the CRB Index. '

1. Each of the Index's 21 component commodities is arithmetically averaged using the prices for all of the futures months which expire on or before the end of the GROUP CORRELATION STUDIES
ninth calendar month from the current date. This means that the Index extends between nine and ten months into the future depending on where one is in the A comparison of how the various commodity groups correlate with the CRB Index current month.

from 1984 to 1989 shows that the Grains have the strongest correlation with the Index 2. These 21 component arithmetic averages are then geometrically averaged by mul-

(84%). Two other groups with strong correlations are the Industrials (67%)*and the Energy markets (60%). Two groups that show weak correlations with the Index are tiplying all of the numbers together and taking their 21st root.

the Meats (33%) and the Imported markets (-4%). The Metals group has a poor 3. The resulting value is divided by 53.0615, which is the 1967 base-year average overall correlation to the CRB Index (15.98%). However, a closer look at the six years for these 21 commodities. That result is then multiplied by an adjustment factor under study reveals that, in four of the six years, the metal correlations were actually of .94911. (This adjustment factor is necessitated by the Index's July 20, 1987
quite high. For example, positive correlations between the Metals and the CRB Index changeover from 26 commodities averaged over 12 months to 21 commodities were seen in 1984 (93%), 1987 (74%), 1988 (76%), and the first half of 1989 (89%).

averaged over 9 months.) Finally, that result is multiplied by 100 in order to (Source: CRB Index Futures Reference Guide, New York Futures Exchange, 1989.) convert the Index into percentage terms:

Correlation studies performed for the 12-month period ending in October 1989
show that the grain complex remained the consistent leader during that time span

'Copper, cotton, crude oil, lumber, platinum, silver

98 COMMODITY INDEXES

THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (JOC) INDEX 99
and confirmed the longer-range conclusions discussed in the previous paragraph. In Futures Index. Third, it has a heavier industrial weighting. The 23 spot prices that the 12 months from October 1988 to October 1989, the strongest individual compar-comprise the CRB Spot Index are as follows in alphabetical order: isons with the CRB Index were shown by soybean oil (93%), corn (92.6%), soybeans (92.5%), soybean meal (91%), and oats (90%). The metals as a group also showed Burlap, butter, cocoa, copper scrap, corn, cotton, hides, hogs, lard, lead, print cloth, strong correlation with the CRB Index during the same time span: silver (86%), gold rosin, rubber, soybean oil, steel scrap, steers, sugar, tallow, tin, wheat (Minneapolis), (77%), platinum (75%). (Source: Powers Associates, Jersey City, NJ) wheat (Kansas City), wool tops, and zinc

There are 23 commodity prices in the CRB Spot Index, while the CRB Futures GRAINS, METALS, AND OILS

Index has 21. Prices included in the CRB Spot Index that are not in the CRB Futures The three most important sectors to watch when analyzing the CRB Index are the Index are burlap, butter, hides, lard, lead, print cloth, rosin, rubber, steel scrap, tallow, grains, metals, and energy markets. The oil markets earn their special place because tin, wool tops, and zinc. One other significant difference is in the industrial weighting.

of their high correlation ranking with the CRB Index and because of oil's importance Of the 23 spot prices included in the CRB Spot Index, 13 are industrial prices for as an international commodity. The metals also show a high correlation in most years.

a weighting of 56 percent. This contrasts with a 38 percent industrial weighting in However, the special place in our analysis earned by the metals markets (gold in par-the CRB Futures Index. It is this difference in the industrial weightings that accounts ticular] is because of their role as a leading indicator of the CRB Index (discussed, in for the occasional divergences that exist between the Spot and Futures Indexes. To Chapter 5) and their wide acceptance as leading indicator of inflation. The important see why the heavier industrial weighting of the CRB Spot Index can make a major place reserved for the grain markets results from their consistently strong correlation difference in its performance, divide the Spot Index into its two sub-indexes—The with the CRB Index.

Spot Raw Industrials and the Spot Foodstuffs.

Most observers who track the CRB Index are quite familiar with the oil and gold markets and follow those markets regularly. However, the CRB Index is often driven RAW INDUSTRIALS VERSUS FOODSTUFFS
more by the grain markets, which are traded in Chicago, than by the gold and oil markets, which are traded in New York. A dramatic example of the grain influence was In spite of their different composition, the CRB Futures and Spot Indexes usually seen during the midwest drought of 1988, when the grain markets totally dominated trend in the same direction. To fully understand why they diverge at certain times, the CRB Index for most of the spring and summer of that year. A thorough analysis it's important to consult the two sub-indexes that comprise the CRB Spot Index—the of the CRB Index requires the monitoring of all 21 component markets that comprise Spot Raw Industrials and the Spot Foodstuffs. Significantly different trend pictures the Index. However, special attention should always be paid to the precious metals, sometimes develop in these two sectors. For example, the Raw Industrial Index bot-energy, and grain markets.

tomed out in the summer of 1986, whereas the Foodstuffs didn't bottom out until the first quarter of 1987. The Foodstuffs, on the other hand, peaked in mid-1988 and dropped sharply for a year. The Raw Industrials continued to advance into the first CRB FUTURES VERSUS THE CRB SPOT INDEX
quarter of 1989. While the Raw Industrials turned up first in mid-1986, the Foodstuffs The same six-year study referred to in the paragraph on "Group Correlation Stud-turned down first in mid-1988.

ies" in Chapter 7 (p. 97) contained another important statistic, which has relevance By understanding how industrial and food prices perform relative to one an-to our next subject—a comparison of the CRB Futures Index to the CRB Spot In-other, the analyst gains a greater understanding into why some of the broader com-dex. During the six years from 1984 to the middle of 1989, the correlation be-modity indexes perform so differently at certain times. Some rely more heavily on in-tween these two CRB Indexes was an impressive 87 percent. In four out of the six dustrial prices and some, like the CRB Futures Index, are more food-oriented. Many years, the correlation exceeded 90 percent. What these figures confirm is that, de-economists believe that industrial prices more truly reflect inflation pressures and spite their different construction, the two CRB Indexes generally trend in the same strength or weakness in the economy than do food prices, which are more influ-direction.

enced by such things as agricultural subsidies, weather, and political considerations.

Despite the emphasis on the CRB Futures Index in intermarket analysis, it's im-Still, no one denies that food prices do play a role in the inflation picture. One portant to look to other broad-based commodity indexes for confirmation of what the popular commodity index goes so far as to exclude food prices completely. Since CRB Futures Index is doing. Divergences between commodity indexes usually contain its creation in 1986, the Journal of Commerce (JOC) Index has gained a follow-an important message that the current trend may be changing. The other commodity ing among economists and market observers as a reliable indicator of commodity indexes will sometimes lead the CRB Futures Index and, in so doing, can provide price pressures.

important intermarket warnings. Study of the CRB Spot Index also takes us into a deeper discussion of the relative importance of industrial prices.

THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (JOC) INDEX

This index of 18 industrial materials prices was developed by the Center for In-HOW THE CRB SPOT INDEX IS CONSTRUCTED
ternational Business Cycle Research (CIBCR) at Columbia University and has been First of all, the CRB Spot Index is made up of cash (spot) prices instead of futures published daily since 1986. Its subgroupings include textiles, metals, petroleum prod-prices. Second, it includes several commodities that are not included in the CRB
ucts, and miscellaneous commodities. The components of the JOC Index were chosen

100 COMMODITY INDEXES

THE JOC INDEX AND RAW INDUSTRIALS 101
specifically because of their success in anticipating inflation trends. The 18 commodi-FIGURE 7.1
ties included in the JOG Index are broken down into the following subgroupings: A COMPARISON OF THE CRB FUTURES INDEX AND THE CRB SPOT INDEX FROM 1987 TO

1989. ALTHOUGH THESE TWO INDEXES HAVE A STRONG HISTORICAL CORRELATION, THEY

METALS: aluminum, copper scrap, lead, steel scrap, tin, zinc SOMETIMES DIVERGE AS IN 1989. WHILE THE CRB SPOT INDEX HAS A HEAVIER INDUSTRIAL

TEXTILES: burlap, cotton, polyester, print cloth WEIGHTING, THE CRB FUTURES INDEX HAS A HEAVIER AGRICULTURAL WEIGHTING.

PETROLEUM: crude oil, benzene

CRB Futures Index

MISC: hides, rubber, tallow, plywood, red oak, old corrugated boxes The JOG Index has been compiled back to 1948 on a monthly basis and, according to its creators, has established a consistent track record anticipating inflation trends.

It can also be used to help predict business cycles, a subject which will be tackled in Chapter 13. One possible shortcoming in the JOG Index is its total exclusion of food prices. Why the exclusion of food prices can pose problems was demonstrated in 1988 and 1989 when a glaring divergence developed between food and industrial prices. This resulted in a lot of confusion as to which of the commodity indexes were giving the truer inflation readings.

VISUAL COMPARISONS OF THE VARIOUS COMMODITY INDEXES

This section shows how the various commodity indexes performed over the past few years and, at the same time, demonstrates why it's so important to know what commodities are in each index. It will also be shown why it's dangerous to exclude food prices completely from the inflation picture. Figure 7.1 compares the CRB Futures Index to the CRB Spot Index from 1987 to 1989. Historically, both indexes have normally traded in the same direction.

The CRB Futures Index peaked in the summer of 1988 at the tail end of the midwestern drought that took place that year. The Futures Index then declined until the following August before stabilizing again. The CRB Spot Index, however, continued to rally into March of 1989 before turning downward. From August of 1989 into yearend, the CRB Futures Index trended higher while the CRB Spot Index dropped sharply.

Clearly, the two indexes were "out of sync" with one another. The explanation lies with the relative weighting of food versus industrial prices in each index.

FOODSTUFFS VERSUS RAW INDUSTRIALS

Figure 7.3 puts all four indexes in proper perspective. The upper chart compares the CRB Futures and Spot Indexes. The lower chart compares the Spot Foodstuff and Figure 7.2 shows the Spot Foodstuffs and the Spot Raw Industrials Indexes from the Raw Industrial Indexes. Notice that the CRB Futures Index tracks the Foodstuffs 1985 through 1989. The 23 commodities that are included in these two indexes are more closely, whereas the CRB Spot Index is more influenced by the Raw Industrials.

combined in the CRB Spot Index. An examination of the Raw Industrials and the The major divergence between the CRB Futures and the CRB Spot Indexes is better Foodstuffs helps explain the riddle as to why the CRB Spot and the CRB Futures explained if the observer understands their relative weighting of industrial prices Indexes diverged so dramatically in late 1988 through the end of 1989. It also explains relative to food prices and also keeps an eye on the two Spot sub-indexes.

why the Journal of Commerce Index, which is composed exclusively of industrial prices, gave entirely different readings than the CRB Futures Price Index.

THE JOC INDEX AND RAW INDUSTRIALS

In the summer of 1986, Raw Industrials turned higher and led the upturn in the Foodstuffs by half a year. Both indexes trended upward together until mid-1988

Figure 7.4 shows the close correlation between the Raw Industrials Index and the Jour-when the Foodstuffs (and the CRB Futures Index) peaked and began a yearlong nal of Commerce Index. This should come as no surprise since both are composed descent. The Raw Industrials rose into the spring of 1989 before rolling over to the exclusively of industrial prices. (One important difference between the two indexes is downside. The Raw Industrials led at the 1986 bottom, while the Foodstuffs led at that the JOC Index has a 7.1 percent petroleum weighting whereas the Raw Industri-the 1988 peak.

als Index includes no petroleum prices., The CRB Futures Index, by contrast, has a 9.5

THE JOC INDEX AND RAW INDUSTRIALS 103

102 COMMODITY INDEXES

FIGURE 7.3

FIGURE 7.2

A COMPARISON OF THE CRB SPOT AND CRB FUTURES INDEXES (UPPER CHART) WITH THE

CRB SPOT FOODSTUFFS INDEX VERSUS THE CRB SPOT RAW INDUSTRIALS FROM 1985 TO

CRB SPOT RAW INDUSTRIALS AND CRB SPOT FOODSTUFFS (LOWER CHART). THE CRB FU-1989. INDUSTRIAL PRICES TURNED UP FIRST IN 1986. HOWEVER, FOOD PRICES PEAKED

TURES INDEX TRACKS THE FOODSTUFFS MORE CLOSELY, WHILE THE CRB SPOT INDEX IS

FIRST IN 1988. IT'S IMPORTANT WHEN MEASURING INFLATION TRENDS TO LOOK AT BOTH

MORE CLOSELY CORRELATED WITH THE RAW INDUSTRIALS. THE CRB SPOT INDEX IS SUBDI-MEASURES.

VIDED INTO THE SPOT RAW INDUSTRIALS AND THE SPOT FOODSTUFFS.

Spot Foodstuffs

104 COMMODITY INDEXES

THE CRB FUTURES INDEX VERSUS THE JOC INDEX 105

FIGURE 7.4

FIGURE 7.5

A COMPARISON OF THE CRB SPOT RAW INDUSTRIALS WITH THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE

THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX VERSUS THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (JOC) INDEX FROM

(JOC) INDEX. SINCE BOTH INCLUDE ONLY INDUSTRIAL PRICES, THEY CORRELATE VERY

1985 TO 1989. SINCE THE CRB FUTURES INDEX INCLUDES FOOD PRICES WHILE THE JOC

CLOSELY.

INDEX INCLUDES ONLY INDUSTRIAL PRICES, THESE TWO INDEXES OFTEN DIVERGE FROM

EACH OTHER. IT'S IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO CONSIDER BOTH FOR A THOROUGH ANALYSIS

Spot Raw Industrials

OF COMMODITY PRICE TRENDS.

CRB Futures Index
percent energy weighting.) Notice how closely the two industrial indexes resemble each other. They both bottomed together in mid-1986 and peaked in 1989. The last recovery high in the JOC Index in late 1989, however, was not confirmed by the Raw Industrial Index, providing early warning that the JOC uptrend might be changing.

The picture gets cloudier from mid-1988 on. The CRB Index, heavily influenced That's another reason why it's so important to consult all of these indexes and not by a major top in the grain markets, peaked in the summer of 1988. Futures prices rely on just one or two. Having shown the important differences between food and declined until the following August before showing signs of stabilization. Meanwhile, industrial prices, now the CRB Futures Index will be compared with the J ournal of the JOC Index continued to set new highs into the fall of 1989. Figure 7.6 shows 1989

Commerce Index.

in more detail. For most of that year, the CRB Index and the JOC Index trended in opposite directions. During the first half of 1989, the JOC Index strengthened while the CRB Index weakened. By the time the JOC Index started to weaken in October of THE CRB FUTURES INDEX VERSUS THE JOC INDEX

1989, the CRB Index was already beginning to rally.

Figures 7.5 and 7.6 compare these two commodity indexes first from a longer view Anyone consulting these two indexes for signs of which way inflation was go-

(1985 through 1989) and then a shorter view (mid-1988 to the end of 1989). Not ing got completely opposite readings. The JOC Index was predicting higher inflation surprisingly, the JOC Index rose faster in 1986 as industrial prices led the commodity throughout most of 1989, while the CRB Index was saying that inflation had peaked advance. The more balanced CRB Index didn't accelerate upward until the following in 1988. Going into the end of 1989, the JOC Index was predicting a slowdown of in-spring. In this case, the JOC Index was the stronger and gave an excellent leading flation, whereas the firmer CRB Index was predicting an uptick in inflation pressures.

signal that inflation pressures were awakening.

What is the intermarket trader to do at such times?

106 COMMODITY INDEXES

INTEREST RATES VERSUS THE COMMODITY INDEXES 107

FIGURE 7.6

FIGURE 7.7

THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX VERSUS THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (JOC) INDEX DURING

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS TREASURY BOND YIELDS FROM 1985 TO 1989. A STRONG VISUAL

1988 AND 1989. BECAUSE OF THEIR DIFFERENT COMPOSITION, THESE TWO COMMODITY

CORRELATION CAN BE SEEN BETWEEN THESE TWO MEASURES. DURING THE SECOND HALF

INDEXES TRENDED IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS DURING MOST OF 1989.

OF 1988 AND MOST OF 1989, INTEREST RATES AND THE CRB INDEX DROPPED TOGETHER.

CRB Futures Price Index

Remember that the main purpose in performing intermarket analysis is not to peaks and troughs in bond yields were remarkably close to those in the CRB Index.

do economic analysis, but to aid analysts in making trading decisions. The pertiAn important peak in bond yields occurred in mid-1988 which corresponded closely nent question is which of the two commodity indexes fit into the intermarket sce-with the major CRB top. Both measures then declined into August of 1989. Upward nario better, and which one do the financial markets seem to be listening to. To help pressure in the CRB Index was beginning to pull bond yields higher as 1989 ended.

answer that question, refer to the most basic relationship in intermarket analysis—

Figure 7.8 shows that the correlation between the JOC Index and bond yields commodities versus interest rates. In previous chapters, the close positive link be-was completely "out of sync" from mid-1988 to the end of 1989. While bond yields tween commodity prices and interest rates was established. Compare interest rate were declining on reduced inflation expectations, the JOC Index continued to set yields to both of these commodity indexes to see if one has a better fit than the other.

new recovery highs. The JOC Index was predicting higher inflation and continued economic growth while declining bond yields were predicting just the opposite.

Figure 7.9 compares all three measures. The upper chart compares the CRB In-INTEREST RATES VERSUS THE COMMODITY INDEXES
dex and the JOC Index from the fall of 1988 to the end of 1989. The lower chart Figure 7.7 compares 30-year Treasury bond yields with the CRB Index. In Chapter 3
shows 30-year Treasury bond yields through the same time span. The chart shows a a similar chart was examined to demonstrate the strong fit between both measures.

much stronger correlation between bond yields and the CRB Index. For most of 1989, Although the fit is not perfect, there appears to be a close positive correlation between bond yields trended in the opposite direction of the JOC Index. In the first half of the bond yields and the CRB Index. Both measures formed a "head and shoulders" bottom year, bond yields fell as the JOC Index continued to set new recovery highs. As the in 1986 and 1987. Except for the upward spike in interest rates in the fall of 1987, the year ended, bond yields are showing signs of bouncing as the JOC Index is dropping.

108 COMMODITY INDEXES

THE CRB FUTURES GROUP INDEXES 109

FIGURE 7.8

FIGURE 7.9

THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (JOC) INDEX AND TREASURY BOND YIELDS FROM 1985 TO

TREASURY BONDS YIELDS (BOTTOM CHART) COMPARED TO THE CRB FUTURES INDEX AND

1989. THESE TWO MEASURES CORRELATE CLOSELY UNTIL 1989. DURING THAT YEAR, TREA-THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (JOC) INDEX (UPPER CHART) DURING 1989. DURING 1989, SURY BOND YIELDS DROPPED SHARPLY WHILE THE JOC INDEX CONTINUED TO SET NEW

BOND YIELDS HAD A CLOSER CORRELATION TO THE CRB INDEX THAN TO THE JOC INDEX.

HIGHS.

more closely to price trends in the more evenly-balanced CRB Index than in any of the indexes that rely exclusively on industrial prices. And this is our primary area During that time span, the trader would have had little success trying to fit the JOC
of concern. All of the other commodity indexes have value and should be monitored Index into his intermarket scenario. By contrast, the linkage between the CRB Index in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of commodity price trends. However, I and bond yields appears to have held up quite well during that period.

still prefer the CRB Futures Index as the primary commodity index for intermarket analysis.

THE CRB INDEX-A MORE BALANCED PICTURE

THE CRB FUTURES GROUP INDEXES

Inflation pressures subsided throughout 1989. At the producer level, inflation hovered around 1 percent in the second half of the year compared to more than 9 percent To look "beneath the surface" of the CRB Futures Index, it's also useful to consult the during the first half. As the Spot Foodstuffs Index shows, most of that decline in CRB Futures Group Indexes published by the Commodity Research Bureau. These price pressures could be seen in the food markets and not the industrials. Going into group indexes allow us to quickly determine which commodity groups are contribut-the fourth quarter of 1989, food prices began to stabilize. At the wholesale level, ing the most to the activity in the CRB Index. The seven commodity sub-indexes are food prices saw their strongest advance in two years. This pickup in food inflation as follows:

occurred just as industrial prices were starting to weaken.

The evidence shown on the accompanying charts seems to support the inclusion ENERGY: Crude oil, heating oil, unleaded gasoline of agricultural markets in the inflation picture. As always, the final judgment rests GRAINS: Corn, oats (Chi.), soybean meal, wheat (Chi.) with the markets. It seems that the financial markets, and bonds in particular, respond IMPORTED: Cocoa, coffee, sugar "11" '

110 COMMODITY INDEXES

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS GRAINS, METALS, AND ENERGY GROUPS 111

INDUSTRIALS: Cotton, copper, crude oil, lumber, platinum, silver FIGURE 7.10

OILSEED: Flaxseed, soybeans, rapeseed

THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX VERSUS THE CRB GRAINS FUTURES INDEX FROM 1985 TO

MEATS: Cattle (live), hogs, porkbellies

1989. A STRONG HISTORICAL CORRELATION EXISTS BETWEEN THE GRAIN MARKETS AND

THE CRB INDEX. THE 1988 PEAK IN THE CRB INDEX WAS CAUSED PRIMARILY BY THE GRAIN

METALS: Gold, platinum, silver

MARKETS.

All of the commodities in the commodity group indexes are included in the CRB

CRB Futures Price Index

Futures Price Index with the exception of unleaded gasoline, flaxseed, and rapeseed.

Also, notice that some commodities (crude oil, platinum, and silver) are included in two group indexes. The Commodity Research Bureau also publishes two financial Futures Group Indexes—Currency and Interest Rates. They include: CURRENCY: British pound, Canadian dollar, Deutsche mark, Japanese yen, Swiss franc

INTEREST RATES: Treasury Bills, Treasury Bonds, Treasury Notes The main value in having these nine Futures Group Indexes available is the ability to study groups as opposed to individual markets. It's not unusual for one market, such as platinum in the Metals sector or heating oil in the Energy sector, to dominate CRB Grains Futures Index
a group for a period of time. However, more meaningful trends are established when the activity in one or two individual markets is confirmed by the group index. Group analysis also makes for quicker comparison between the nine sectors, including the commodity and financial groups. By adding any of the popular stock indexes to the group, the trader has before him the entire financial spectrum of currency, commodity, interest rate, and stock markets, which greatly facilitates intermarket comparisons.

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS GRAINS, METALS, AND ENERGY GROUPS

I mentioned earlier in the chapter that the three main groups to watch in the commodity sector are the grains, metals, and energy markets. Although some other individual markets may play an important role on occasion, these three groups have the most consistent influence over the CRB Index. Figures 7.10 to 7.12 compare the CRB Index to these three CRB group indexes in the five-year period from 1985 through 1989.

Figure 7.10 reveals, in particular, how the upward spike in the grain markets in the spring and summer of 1988 marked the final surge in the CRB Index.

Figure 7.11 shows that the oil market bottom in 1986 was one of the major factors that started the general commodity rally that lasted for two years. A falling oil market in the first half of 1988 warned that the CRB rally was on shaky ground. An upward-trending oil market in the second half of 1989 quietly warned of growing inflation

' pressures in that sector, which began to pull the CRB Index higher during the final quarter of that year.

Figure 7.12 demonstrates the leading characteristics of the Precious Metals Index relative to the CRB Index. The strong metals rally in the spring of 1987 (influenced by the oil rally) helped launch the CRB bullish breakout. Falling metals prices during the first half of 1988 (along with oil prices) also warned that the CRB rally was too narrowly based. Stability in the metals sector during the summer of 1989 (partially as a result of the strong oil market) and the subsequent October-November 1989 rally in the precious metals played an important role in the CRB upturn during the second half of that year. To fully understand what's happening in the CRB Index, monitor all of the Futures Group Indexes. But pay special attention to the grains, energy, and metals.

COMMODITY INDEXES

ENERGY VERSUS METALS MARKETS 113

FIGURE 7.11 —

FIGURE 7.12

THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX VERSUS THE CRB ENERGY FUTURES INDEX FROM 1985 TO

THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX VERSUS THE CRB PRECIOUS METALS INDEX FROM 1985 TO

1989. THE ENERGY MARKETS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT TO THE CRB INDEX AND SHOULD BE

1989. THE PRECIOUS METALS GROUP IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO THE OVERALL TREND OF THE

GIVEN SPECIAL ATTENTION. THE 1986 BOTTOM IN THE CRB INDEX WAS CAUSED PRIMARILY

CRB INDEX. THE METALS MARKETS USUALLY LEAD THE CRB INDEX. THE LACK OF BULLISH

BY THE BOTTOM IN OIL PRICES.

CONFIRMATION BY THE METALS IN 1988 WAS A WARNING OF A PEAK IN THE CRB INDEX. A METALS RALLY IN LATE 1989 ALSO HELPED LAUNCH A CRB INDEX RALLY.

CRB Futures Price Index

CRB Futures Price Index

ENERGY VERSUS METALS MARKETS

I've already alluded to the interplay between the oil and precious metals markets.

Although the fit between the two is far from perfect, it's useful to keep an eye on both. Since both are leading indicators of inflation, it stands to reason that major moves in one sector will eventually have an effect on the other. Figure 7.13 compares the CRB Energy Futures Index to the CRB Precious Metals Futures Index from 1985
through the end of 1989. Although they don't always trend in the same direction, they do clearly seem to impact on one another. Although the metals had been trending irregularly higher going into mid-1986, they didn't begin to soar until the summer of that year when the oil price collapse had been reversed to the upside.

Both sectors dropped through the second half of 1987 and most of 1988, although the 1987 peak occurred in the precious metals markets first. Oil prices rose through most of 1989. However, it wasn't until the second half of 1989, as the oil rally gathered more momentum, that the inflationary implications of rising oil prices began to have a bullish impact on precious metals. And, of course, if both of those sectors are moving

114 COMMODITY INDEXES

METALS AND ENERGY FUTURES VERSUS INTEREST RATES 115

FIGURE 7.13
the financial community (bond traders, in particular) of a possible uptick in inflation.

THE CRB ENERGY FUTURES INDEX VERSUS THE CRB PRECIOUS METALS FUTURES INDEX FROM

The bond market seems especially sensitive to trends in oil futures. The trend in gold 1985 TO 1989. SINCE THESE TWO COMMODITY GROUPS ARE LEADING INDICATORS OF IN-and oil also plays a decisive role in the attractiveness of gold and oil shares, which FLATION, THEY USUALLY IMPACT ON EACH OTHER. THE METALS RALLY IN 1986 WAS HELPED
will be discussed in Chapter 9.

BY A BOTTOM IN OIL. BOTH PEAKED TOGETHER IN MID-1987. BOTH RALLIED TOGETHER

TOWARD THE END OF 1989.

METALS AND ENERGY FUTURES VERSUS INTEREST RATES

CRB Energy Futures Index

If precious metals and oil prices are so important in their own right, and if they have such a dominant influence on the CRB Index, do they correlate with interest rates?

This is always our acid test. You can judge for yourself by studying Figures 7.14
and 7.15. The bottom in bond yields in 1986 was very much influenced by rallies in both oil and metals. Conversely, tops in the metals and oil in mid-1987 preceded the top in bond yields by a few months. As 1989 ended, upward pressure in the metals and oils was able to check the decline in bond yields and began to pull bond yields higher.

FIGURE 7.14

TREASURY BOND YIELDS (BOTTOM CHART) VERSUS THE CRB PRECIOUS METALS FUTURES

CRB Precious Metals Futures Index

INDEX FROM 1985 TO 1989. SINCE PRECIOUS METALS ARE LEADING INDICATORS OF INFLATION, THEY HAVE AN IMPACT ON INTEREST RATE TRENDS. METALS PEAKED FIRST IN 1987

AND THEN BOTH MEASURES DROPPED UNTIL THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989.

CRB Precious Metals Futures Index
in tandem, their combined effect will have a profound influence on the CRB Index.

30-Year Treasury Bond Yields

It's always a good idea for metals traders to watch the oil charts, and vice versa.

THE INTERMARKET ROLES OF GOLD AND OIL

There are times when the gold and oil futures markets, either in tandem or separately, become the dominant markets in the intermarket picture. This is partly because the financial community watches both markets so closely. The price of gold is quoted on most media business stations and is widely watched by investors. For short periods of time, either of these two markets will have an effect on the price of bonds. Of the two, however, oil seems to be more dominant.

In the fall of 1989, surging gold prices (partially the result of a sagging dollar and stock market weakness) sent renewed inflation fears through the financial markets and helped keep a lid on bond prices. Unusually cold weather in December of 1989
pushed oil prices sharply higher (led by heating oil) and caused some real fears in

116 COMMODITY INDEXES

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS THE PPI AND THE CPI 117

F?GURE 7.15
modifies, and interest rate differentials (the yield curve)—in setting monetary policy.

A couple of weeks later, Fed Governor Angell added that movements in commodity TREASURY BOND YIELDS (BOTTOM CHART) VERSUS THE CRB ENERGY FUTURES INDEX (UPPER

CHART) FROM 1985 TO 1989. ENERGY PRICES ALSO INFLUENCE INTEREST RATE TRENDS. BOTH
prices had historically been a good guide to the rate of inflation, not just in the United TURNED UP IN 1986. OIL PRICES TURNED DOWN FIRST IN 1987. A BULLISH BREAKOUT IN

States but globally as well.

ENERGY PRICES IN LATE 1989 IS BEGINNING TO PULL INTEREST RATE YIELDS HIGHER.

Such admissions by the Fed Governors were significant for a number of reasons.

The Fed recognized, in addition to the reliability of commodity markets as a leading CRB Energy Futures Index
indicator of inflation, the importance of the interplay between the various financial markets. The discounting mechanism of the markets was also given the mantle of respectability. The Fed seemed to be viewing the marketplace as the ultimate critic of monetary policy. Fed governors were learning to listen to the markets instead of blaming them. As added confirmation that some Fed members had become avid commodity watchers, the recorded minutes of several Fed meetings included reference to activity in the commodity markets.

Rising commodity prices are associated with an increase in inflation pressures and typically lead to Fed tightening. Falling commodity prices often precede an easier monetary policy. Sometimes activity in the commodity markets make it more difficult for the Fed to pursue its desired monetary goals. During the second half of 1989, the financial community was growing impatient with the Federal Reserve for not driving down interest rates faster to stave off a possible recession.

One of the factors that prevented a more aggressive Fed easing at the end of 1989 was the relative stability in the commodity price level and the fourth quarter rallies in the precious metals and oil markets (Figure 7.16). To make matters worse, an arctic cold snap in December of 1989 caused oil futures (especially heating oil) to skyrocket and raised fears that early 1990 would see a sharp uptick in the two most widely-watched inflation gauges, the Producer Price Index (PPI) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The reasons for those fears, and the main reason the Fed watches commodity prices so closely, is because sooner or later significant changes in the commodity price level translate into changes in the PPI and the CPI, which brings us to the final point in this discussion: The relationship between the CRB Index, the Producer Price Index, and the Consumer Price Index.

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS THE PPI AND THE CPI

Most observers look to popular inflation gauges like the Consumer Price Index (CPI) The moral seems to be this: For longer-range intermarket analysis, the CRB Index and the Producer Price Index (PPI) to track the inflation rate. The problem with these is superior to either the metals or oil. However, there are short periods when either measures, at least from a trading standpoint, is that they are lagging indicators. The of these two markets, or both, will play a dominant role in the intermarket analysis.

PPI measures 2700 prices at the producer level and is a measure of wholesale price Therefore, it's necessary to monitor the gold and oil markets at all times.

trends. The CPI is constructed from 400 items, including retail prices for both goods and services, as well as some interest-related items (about one-half of the CPI is made up of the price of services and one-half of commodities). Both indexes are released COMMODITIES AND FED POLICY
monthly for the preceding month. (I'm referring in this discussion to the CPI-W, A couple of years ago, then Treasury Secretary James Baker called for the use of a which is the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers.) commodity basket, including gold, as an indicator to be used in formulating mon-The CRB Index measures the current trading activity of 21 raw materials every etary policy. Fed Governors Wayne Angell and Robert Heller also suggested using 15 seconds. (A futures contract on the CRB Index was initiated in 1986 by the New commodity prices to fine-tune monetary policy. Studies performed by Mr. Angell York Futures Exchange, which also provides continuous updating of CRB Index fu-and the Fed supported the predictive role of commodity prices in providing early tures prices.) Inasmuch as commodity markets measure prices at the earliest stage of warnings of inflation trends.

production, it stands to reason that commodity prices represented in the CRB Index In February of 1988, Fed Vice Chairman Manuel Johnson confirmed in a speech should lead wholesale prices which, in turn, should lead retail prices. The fact that at the Cato Institute's monetary conference that the Fed was paying more attention CRB Index prices are available instantaneously on traders' terminal screens can also to fluctuations in the financial markets—specifically movements in the dollar, com-create an immediate impact on other markets.

118 COMMODITY INDEXES

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS THE PPI AND THE CPI 119

FIGURE 7.16

FIGURE 7.17

THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX VERSUS ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE FOR THE CONSUMER

A SURGE IN OIL PRICES DURING THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989, SIGNALING HIGHER INFLATION, HAD A BEARISH INFLUENCE ON BOND PRICES AND HELPED PUSH INTEREST RATE

PRICE INDEX (CPI-W) AND THE PRODUCER PRICE INDEX (PPI) FROM 1971 TO 1987. (SOURCE:

YIELDS HIGHER.

CRB INDEX WHITE PAPER: AN INVESTIGATION INTO NON-TRADITIONAL TRADING APPLICA-

TIONS FOR CRB INDEX FUTURES, PREPARED BY POWERS RESEARCH, INC., 30 MONTGOMERY

March Treasury Bonds

STREET, JERSEY CITY, NJ 07302, MARCH 1988.)

CRB Index versus CPI-W and PPI

(Monthly Data from March 1971 to October 1987)

February Crude Oil

Despite their different construction and composition, there is a strong statistical correlation between all three measures. Comparing annual rates of change for the CPI and the PPI against cash values of the CRB Index also reveals a close visual correlation (see Figures 7.17 and 7.18). The PPI is more volatile than the CPI and 1980), the lag time averaged seven and a half months. The 1986 bottom in the CRB
is the more sensitive of the two. The CRB, representing prices at the earliest stage Index, which signaled the end of the disinflation of the early 1980s, led the upturn of production, tracks the PPI more closely than it does the CPI. Over the ten years in the CPI by five months.

ending in 1987, the CRB showed a 71 percent correlation with the PPI and a 68

What these statistics, and the accompanying charts suggest, is that the CRB Index percent correlation with the CPI. During that same period, the CRB led turns in the can be a useful guide in helping to anticipate changes in the PPI and CPI, often with a PPI by one month on average and the CPI by eight months. (Source: CRB Index White lead time of several months. Where the CRB Index lags behind the CPI (as happened Paper: An Investigation Into Non-Traditional Trading Applications for CRB Index in 1980 when the CRB peak occurred seven months after the downturn in the CPI), Futures, New York Futures Exchange, 1988, prepared by Powers Research, Inc. Jersey the commodity action can still be used as confirmation that a significant shift in the City, NJ.)

inflation trend has taken place. (Gold peaked in January of 1980, correctly signaling From the early 1970s through the end of 1987, six major turning points were the major top in the CPI in March of that year and the CRB Index in November.) seen in the inflation rate, measured by annual rates of change in the CPI. The CRB

A rough guide used by some analysts is that a 10 percent move in the CRB Index Index led turns in the CPI four times out of the six with an average lead time of eight is followed within six to eight months by a 1 percent move in the CPI in the same months. The two times when the CRB Index lagged turns in the CPI Index (1977 and direction.

120 COMMODITY INDEXES

SUMMARY 121

SUMMARY

FIGURE 7.18

A COMPARISON OF 12-MONTH RATES OF CHANGE BETWEEN THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX

This chapter took a close look at the various commodity indexes. We compared the AND THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (CPI) FROM 1970 TO 1989. (SOURCE: CRB COMMODITY

CRB Futures Index to the CRB Spot Index, and showed that the CRB Spot Index YEAR BOOK 1990, COMMODITY RESEARCH BUREAU, 75 WALL STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10005.) can be further subdivided into the Spot Raw Industrials and the Spot Foodstuff Indexes. Although the CRB Spot Index is more influenced by the Raw Industrials, the Rate of Change (12-Month Span)

CRB Index has a closer correlation with the Foodstuffs. We compared the Journal of CRB Futures Price Index and Consumer Price Index (CPI) Commerce (JOC) Index, which is comprised solely of industrial prices, to the more balanced CRB Futures Index, and showed that the latter Index correlates better with interest rates. We discussed why it's dangerous to exclude food prices completely from the inflation picture. Although it's important to keep an eye on all commodity indexes, it's also necessary to know the composition of each.

The nine CRB Futures sub-groups were considered as another way to monitor the various market sectors and to make intermarket comparisons. Special attention should be paid to the grain, metals, and oil sectors when analyzing the CRB Index.

Metals and oil prices are also important in their own right and often play a dominant role in intermarket analysis.

The Federal Reserve Board keeps a close watch on commodity price trends while formulating monetary policy. This is because significant price trends in the commodity price level eventually have an impact on the Producer Price Index (PPI) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

THE CRB, THE PPI, AND CPI VERSUS INTEREST RATES

The study cited earlier also shows why it's dangerous to rely on PPI and CPI numbers to trade bonds. The same study suggests that the CRB Index is a superior indicator of interest rate movements. In the 15 years from 1973 to 1987, the CRB Index showed an 80 percent correlation with ten-year Treasury yields, while the PPI and CPI had correlations of 70 percent and 57 percent, respectively. From 1982 to 1987, the CRB
had a correlation with Treasury yields of 90 percent, whereas the PPI and CPI had correlations with interest rates of 64 percent and —67 percent, respectively. (In previous chapters, the strong negative correlation of the CRB Index to Treasury bond prices was discussed.)

In every instance, correlations between the CRB Index and constant yields to maturity on ten-year Treasury securities are consistently higher than either of the other two inflation measures. Bond traders seem to pay more attention to the CRB

Index, which provides instant inflation readings on a minute-by-minute basis, and less attention to the PPI and CPI figures which, by the tune they're released on a monthly basis, represent numbers which are several months old.

8

WORLD STOCK MARKETS 123
show that global markets generally trend in the same direction. This shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone. On a domestic level, individual stocks are influenced by bull and bear markets in the stock market as a whole. Not all stocks go up or down at the same speed or even at exactly the same time, but all are influenced by the overriding trend of the market. The same is true on an international level. The world experiences global bull and bear markets.

Although the stock markets of individual countries may not rise or fall at exactly the same speed or time, all are influenced by the global trend. A stock investor in the United States wouldn't consider buying an individual stock without first determining International Markets
the direction of the U.S. stock market as a whole. In the same way, an analysis of the U.S. stock market wouldn't be complete without determining whether the global equity trend is in a bullish or bearish mode. (It's worth noting here that global trends are also present for interest rates and inflation.)

: Figure 8.1 shows the generally bullish trend from 1985 through the end of 1989, with the downward interruption in all three markets in the fall of 1987. Figure 8.2

The chapters on the intermarket field have concentrated so far on the domestic picture. We've examined the interrelationships between the four principal financial FIGURE 8.1
sectors—currencies, commodities, interest rates, and equities. The purpose was to A COMPARISON OF THE JAPANESE, AMERICAN, AND BRITISH STOCK MARKETS FROM 1985
show that the trader should always look beyond his particular area of interest. Since THROUGH 1989.

each of the four financial sectors is tied to the other three, a complete technical analysis of any one sector should include analysis of the other three. The goal is The Three Major Global Markets: U.S., japan, and Britain to consider the broader environment in which a particular market is involved. Let's carry the intermarket approach a step further and add an international dimension to the analysis.

The primary goal in this chapter will be to put the U.S. stock market into a global perspective. This will be accomplished by including as part of the technical analysis of the U.S. market an analysis of the other two largest world markets, the British and Japanese stock markets. I'll show how following the overseas markets can provide valuable insights into the U.S. stock market and why it's necessary to know what's happening overseas.

How global inflation and interest rate trends impact on world equity markets will be considered. By comparing these three world economic measures, the same principles of intermarket analysis that have been used on a domestic level can be applied on a global scale. I'll show why these global intermarket comparisons suggested that the world stock markets entered the 1990s on very shaky ground.

The world's second largest equity market is located in Japan. Going into 1990, intermarket analysis in that country showed a weakening currency and rising inflation.

Monetary tightening to combat inflation pushed interest rates higher and bond prices lower—a potentially lethal combination for the Japanese stock market. I'll show how an intermarket analysis of the Japanese situation held bearish implications for the Japanese stock market and the potentially negative implications that analysis carried for the U.S. stock market.

WORLD STOCK MARKETS

Figures 8.1 through 8.5 compare the world's three largest stock markets—United States, Japan, and Britain—in the five-year period from 1985 through the end of 1989.

The main purpose of the charts, which overlay all three markets together, is simply to 122

124 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

THE GLOBAL COLLAPSE OF 1987 125

FIGURE 8.2

FIGURE 8.3

THE WORLD'S THREE LARGEST STOCK MARKETS RESUMED UPTRENDS TOGETHER IN EARLY

AT THE 1987 PEAK, THE BRITISH STOCK MARKET PEAKED IN JULY, THE AMERICAN MARKET

1987 AND COLLAPSED TOGETHER IN THE FALL OF THE SAME YEAR.

IN AUGUST, AND THE JAPANESE STOCK MARKET IN OCTOBER. BRITAIN HAS HAD A LONG

HISTORY OF LEADING THE U.S. MARKET AT PEAKS.

Global Equity Markets Resumed Uptrend as 1987 Began and Crashed Together in the Fall of the Same Year The British Stock Market Peaked a Month Before the U.S. in 1987
while Japan Didn't Peak Until October
focuses on the events of 1986 and 1987. As 1987 began, all three markets were com-markets that didn't have program trading at the time? Clearly, there were and are pleting a period of consolidation and resuming their major bull trends. In the second much larger economic forces at work on the world stage. In Chapter 14, I'll have half of 1987, all three markets underwent serious downside corrections. Figure 8.3
more to say about program trading.

focuses on the 1987 top in the global markets and holds two important messages: The second message is the chronological sequence of the three tops. The British stock market peaked in July of 1987, a full month prior to the U.S. peak which

• All three equity markets collapsed in 1987.

occurred in August. The British market has a tendency to lead the U.S. market at

• Britain peaked first, while Japan peaked last.

peaks. (In the fall of 1989, the British stock market started to drop at least a month prior to a severe selloff in U.S. stocks in mid-October. Sixty years earlier, the 1929
collapse in the U.S. market was foreshadowed by a peak in the British stock market a THE GLOBAL COLLAPSE OF 1987
full year earlier.) In 1987, the Japanese market didn't hit its peak until October, when The first important message is that all world markets experienced severe selloffs in the more serious global collapse actually took place.

the second half of 1987. When events in the United States are examined on a global Figure 8.4 shows the Japanese market leading the world markets upward from perspective, one can see that the U.S. experience was only one part of a much bigger their late 1987 bottoms. Figure 8.5 shows that the global markets again corrected picture. The preoccupation with such things as program trading as the primary cause downward in October 1989. After a global rally that lasted into the end of that year, of the U.S. selloff becomes harder to justify as an adequate explanation. If program the new decade of the 1990s was greeted by signs that global stocks might be rolling trading caused the U.S. selloff, how do we explain the collapse in the other world over to the downside once again.

126 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

THE GLOBAL COLLAPSE OF 1987 127

FIGURE 8.4

FIGURE 8.5

A COMPARISON OF THE THREE STOCK MARKETS FOLLOWING THE 1987 GLOBAL COLLAPSE.

ALL MARKETS SUFFERED A MINI-CRASH IN OCTOBER 1989 AND THEN RECOVERED INTO

THE JAPANESE MARKET RECOVERED FIRST AND PROVIDED MUCH-NEEDED STABILITY TO

YEAREND. THE BRITISH MARKET STARTED TO DROP SHARPLY IN SEPTEMBER, LEADING THE

WORLD STOCK MARKETS.

U.S. DROP BY ABOUT A MONTH. THE FOURTH-QUARTER RECOVERY INTO NEW HIGHS IN

JAPAN BOUGHT GLOBAL BULL MARKETS SOME ADDITIONAL TIME. ALL MARKETS ARE START-The Japanese Market Led World Markets

INC TO WEAKEN AS 1990 IS BEGINNING.

Out of Their Late 1987 Bottoms

Global Markets Underwent Downward

Corrections in the Fall of 1989

128 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

BRITISH AND U.S. STOCK MARKETS 129

BRITISH AND U.S. STOCK MARKETS

FIGURE 8.7

A COMPARISON OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN STOCK MARKETS DURING 1986. THE

Figures 8.6 through 8.10 provide a visual comparison of the British and the U.S. stock BRITISH PEAK IN THE SPRING OF 1986 AND ITS UPSIDE BREAKOUT IN DECEMBER OF THE
markets from 1985 into the beginning of 1990. Although the charts are not exactly SAME YEAR COINCIDED WITH A MAJOR CONSOLIDATION PERIOD IN AMERICAN EQUITIES.

alike, there is a strong visual correlation. Given their strong historical ties, it can be seen why it's a good idea to keep an eye on both. As is often the case with intermarket U.S. Stocks (Dow Industrials)

comparisons, clues to one market's direction can often be found by studying the chart 1986
of a related market. I've already alluded to the tendency of the British market to lead the U.S. stock market at tops. In Figure 8.6, three examples of this phenomenon can be seen in the three peaks that took place in early 1986, late 1987, and late 1989.

(Going back a bit further in time, U.S. stock market peaks in 1929, 1956, 1961, 1966, 1972, and 1976 were preceded by tops in British stocks.) Figure 8.7 compares the British and American markets during 1986. The peak in the British market in the spring of 1986, and its ensuing correction, coincided with a period of consolidation in the U.S. market. The breaking of a major down trendline by the British market in December of that year correctly signaled resumption of the American uptrend shortly thereafter.

FIGURE 8.6

A COMPARISON OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN STOCK MARKETS FROM 1985 THROUGH

1989. SINCE BOTH MARKETS DISPLAY STRONG HISTORICAL CORRELATION, THEY SHOULD

BE MONITORED FOR SIGNS OF CONFIRMATION OR DIVERGENCE. THE BRITISH MARKET LED

THE U.S. MARKET AT THE LAST THREE IMPORTANT PEAKS IN 1986, 1987, AND 1989.

U.S. Stocks (Dow Industrial Average)

Figure 8.8 shows the British market hitting its peak in July of 1987, preceding the American top by a month. In the fourth quarter of that year, the British market completed a "double bottom" reversal pattern, which provided an early signal that the global equity collapse had run its course. Figure 8.9 shows both markets undergoing consolidation patterns before resuming their uptrends together in January of 1989.

Figure 8.10 shows the value of market comparisons and the use of divergence analysis. The British Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 share index (FTSE) peaked in mid-September of 1989 and started to drop sharply. The American Dow fanes Industrial Average actually set a new high in early October. Any technical analyst who spotted the serious divergence between these two global stock indexes should have known that something was seriously wrong and shouldn't have been too surprised at the mini-crash that occurred in New York on October 13, 1989. Figure 8.10 also shows that the rebound in the American market that carried to yearend in 1989 also began with the upside penetration of a down trendline in the British market. Both markets ended the decade on an upswing.

BRITISH AND U.S. STOCK MARKETS 131

130 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

FIGURE 8.8

FIGURE 8.9

A COMPARISON OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN STOCK MARKETS IN 1988 AND EARLY 1989.

A COMPARISON OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN STOCK MARKETS DURING 1987. THE

AFTER CONSOLIDATING SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGH THE SECOND HALF OF 1988, BOTH

BRITISH MARKET PEAKED A MONTH BEFORE AMERICAN STOCKS IN THE SUMMER OF 1987

MARKETS RESUMED THEIR MAJOR BULL TRENDS AS 1989 BEGAN.

AND COMPLETED A DOUBLE BOTTOM REVERSAL PATTERN AS 1987 CAME TO AN END.

Dow Industrials

Dow Industrials (U.S. Stocks)

US. AND JAPANESE STOCK MARKETS 133

132 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

FIGURE 8.10

FIGURE 8.11

A COMPARISON OF THE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN STOCK MARKETS FROM 1985 THROUGH

A COMPARISON OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN STOCK MARKETS DURING 1989 AND EARLY

1989. ALTHOUGH THE FIT BETWEEN THESE TWO MARKETS ISN'T AS TIGHT AS THAT BETWEEN

1990. THE MINI-COLLAPSE IN U.S. STOCKS DURING OCTOBER 1989 WAS FORESHADOWED

THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH MARKETS, THE AMERICAN MARKET IS VERY MUCH INFLUENCED

A MONTH EARLIER BY A FALLING BRITISH MARKET. AFTER RALLYING INTO YEAREND, BOTH

MARKET HAVE BROKEN UP TRENDLINES IN THE NEW DECADE.

BY MARKET TRENDS IN JAPAN.

U.S. Stocks

U.S. Dow Industrials

(Dow Industrials)

British FTSE-100

Japanese Stocks

(Nikkei 225)

U.S. AND JAPANESE STOCK MARKETS
global collapse began after the Japanese market began to roll over to the downside Figure 8.11 through 8.15 provide a comparison of the American market (utilizing in October of that year. This same chart shows the Nikkei 225 Average completing a the Dow Jones Industrial Average) and the Japanese market (utilizing the Nikkei 225
major "double bottom" in February of 1988. This major "buy" signal in Japan turned Stock Average). The fit between these two markets isn't as tight as that between the out to be an excellent early indication that the global uptrend was in the process of American and British markets. Still, there's no question that they have an impact on resuming following the late-1987 collapse. Figure 8.14 shows an upside breakout in one another. Figure 8.11 demonstrates the global bull market from 1985 through 1989

Japanese stocks in November of 1988, leading a similar bullish breakout in the States as reflected in the world's two largest stock markets.

almost two months later.

In late 1986, the Japanese market underwent a downward correction while the Figure 8.15 compares events in the United States and Japan in 1989. Both markets U.S. market was consolidating (Figure 8.12). In the fourth quarter of that year, the hit peaks in October and then stabilized. The events of that month show how aware Nikkei 225 Average broke a down trendline in early November and began another the world had become of global linkages. The Dow Jones Industrial plunged almost upward climb. The alert American chartist might have taken that bullish signal in 200 points on Friday, October 13th. The world watched through the weekend to see the Japanese market as an early warning of more upward movement in American how Japan would open on Monday morning (Sunday evening in New York). The fear shares.

was that continued weakness in Japan could start a worldwide selling panic. Fortu-We've already mentioned the fact that the American market peaked in August of, nately, the market stabilized in Japan. The ensuing Japanese rally calmed worldwide 1987, two months prior to the peak in Japan. Figure 8.13 shows, however, that the real jitters and helped spark a global bounce that carried to yearend.

134 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

U.S. AND JAPANESE STOCK MARKETS 135

FIGURE 8.12

FIGURE 8.13

IN THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1986, THE JAPANESE STOCK MARKET (REPRESENTED BY THE

THE JAPANESE STOCK MARKET DIDN'T PEAK UNTIL OCTOBER OF 1987 (TWO MONTHS AFTER

NIKKEI 225 STOCK AVERAGE) ENDED ITS CORRECTION AND PROVIDED AN EARLY WARNING

THE U.S. MARKET HIT ITS HIGH). HOWEVER, THE SELLOFF IN JAPAN COINCIDED WITH THE

THAT THE AMERICAN UPTREND WAS ABOUT TO RESUME.

GLOBAL SELLING PANIC THAT ENSUED. AS 1988 BEGAN, THE NIKKEI 225 STOCK AVERAGE

COMPLETED A MAJOR DOUBLE BOTTOM AND POINTED THE WAY HIGHER FOR THE REST OF

Dow Industrial Average

THE GLOBAL MARKETS. ______

Dow Jones Industrial Average

Nikkei 225 Index

Nikkei 225 Index

In mid-November of 1989, the Japanese market reached a crucial barrier, which was the peak set two months earlier. A failure at that important resistance level would carry bearish implications on a global scale. Figure 8.15 shows that the bullish breakout into new highs by the Nikkei 225 Average in late November coincided exactly left shows the Japanese yen weakening relative to the U.S. dollar as 1990 began.

with an upside breakout in the American market, which carried the Dow Jones Indus-Weakness in the yen helped boost inflation pressures in Japan. To make matters worse, trial Average all the way to a retest of its October highs. The ability of the Japanese an upward spike in oil prices (lower left) as 1989 ended intensified fears of Japanese market to rally to new high ground bought the global bull market some additional inflation. In an effort to control inflation and help stabilize the yen, Japanese interest time.

rates were raised. (Japanese central bankers had raised their discount rate three times While the Japanese stock market was resuming its bull trend, developments in in succession, activating the "three-steps-and-a-stumble" rule, which was discussed other sectors of the Japanese market were sending danger signals as 1989 ended. The in Chapter 4). The chart on the lower right shows a dramatic plunge in the price of yen was weakening, inflation in Japan was rising (largely owing to the jump in oil Japanese bonds. The collapse in Japanese bonds in January of 1990 began to pull prices), interest rates were rising, and Japanese bond prices were weakening. From Japanese stocks lower (upper right).

an intermarket perspective, things were beginning to look dangerous for Japanese The Japanese market dropped in eight of the first eleven trading days of the new equities.

decade, losing 5 percent of its value. In just over two weeks, the Nikkei 225 Aver-Figure 8.16 divides the Japanese markets into the four sectors utilized for inter-age gave back about a third of the previous year's gains. The yield on the ten-year market analysis—currencies, commodities, bonds, and stocks. The chart on the upper government bond soared to it's highest level since November 1985. Japanese inflation

US. AND JAPANESE STOCK MARKETS 137

136 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

FIGURE 8.14

FIGURE 8.15

A BULLISH BREAKOUT BY THE NIKKEI 225 IN NOVEMBER OF 1988 OCCURRED TWO MONTHS

THE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN MARKETS CORRECTED DOWNWARD TOGETHER IN OCTOBER

!FORE THE AMERICAN MARKET RESUMED ITS UPTREND IN JANUARY OF 1989.

1989. HOWEVER, STABILITY IN JAPAN PREVENTED ADDITIONAL GLOBAL WEAKNESS. THE

SETTING OF NEW HIGHS IN JAPAN IN NOVEMBER OF 1989 BOUGHT THE GLOBAL BULL

Dow Industrials

MARKETS SOME ADDITIONAL TIME. BOTH MARKETS ARE DROPPING TOGETHER AS 1990 IS

BEGINNING.

Dow Industrials

Nikkei 225

Nikkei 255

138 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

GLOBAL INTEREST RATES 139

FIGURE 8.16

FIGURE 8.17

THE FOUR MARKET SECTORS IN JAPAN-THE JAPANESE YEN (UPPER LEFT), CRUDE OIL (LOWER

THE COLLAPSE IN JAPANESE BONDS (UPPER LEFT) AS 1990 BEGINS IS PULLING JAPANESE

LEFT), JAPANESE BONDS (LOWER RIGHT), AND THE NIKKEI 225 STOCK AVERAGE (UPPER

STOCKS DOWN (LOWER LEFT) WHICH, IN TURN, IS SENDING BEARISH RIPPLES THROUGH

RIGHT). AS 1989 ENDED, THE WEAKER YEN AND HIGHER OIL PRICES RAISED INFLATION

LONDON (LOWER RIGHT) AND NEW YORK (UPPER RIGHT) STOCK MARKETS.

FEARS IN JAPAN. HIGHER INTEREST RATES TO COMBAT INFLATION ARE PUSHING BOND

PRICES LOWER WHICH, IN TURN, ARE HAVING A BEARISH IMPACT ON JAPANESE EQUITIES.

10-Year Yen Bond Dow Industrials

Japanese Yen Nikkei 225

Nikkei 225

FTSE

Crude Oil

Japanese Bonds

U.S. inflation rate was the upward spike in the price of oil the previous month. It had risen to 3 percent, which is low by our standards but higher than the Japanese seemed clear that the world markets were struggling with two major themes as the government's target of 2 percent. Besides its weakness relative to the U.S. dollar, the 1990s began—accelerating inflation and higher interest rates—both factors holding Japanese yen had lost 15 percent against the West German mark in the previous three potentially bearish implications for global equities.

months. The combined affect of these bearish intermarket factors weighed heavily on the Japanese market. On Friday, January 12, 1990, the Nikkei 225 slid 653 points GLOBAL INTEREST RATES
for its eighth worst performance ever. This bearish action in Tokyo stocks, caused mainly by the collapsing Japanese bond market, sent bearish ripples across the globe Figure 8.18 compares the bond prices for the United States, Japan, and Britain for the (Figure 8.17.)

last three months of 1989 and the first two weeks of 1990. All three bond markets are In London that same day, the FTSE-100 (pronounced Footsie) lost 37.8 points, weakening together. Japanese bond prices are relatively higher than both the United its largest loss in two months. In New York, the Dow Industrials tumbled over 71

States and Britain (meaning Japanese yields are lower than the United States and points. In addition to the bearish overseas action that Friday morning, the New York Britain) but are quickly trying to narrow the spread. British bond prices are lower market had troubles of its own. The producer price index for December was 0.7
than the other two (meaning British bond yields are actually higher than the United percent, which pushed the U.S. wholesale inflation rate for 1989 up to 4.8 percent, States and Japan). Figure 8.19 shows that British bonds had already been dropping the highest inflation number since 1981. The major culprit behind the surge in the for some time and revealed a bearish divergence with U.S. bonds.

140 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

GLOBAL BONDS AND GLOBAL INFLATION 141

FIGURE 8.18

FIGURE 8.19

A COMPARISON OF JAPANESE, AMERICAN, AND BRITISH BOND MARKETS. ALL THREE ARE

BRITISH BONDS HAVE BEEN DROPPING THROUGH MOST OF 1989 (BECAUSE OF HIGHER

DROPPING TOGETHER AS 1989 ENDS AND 1990 BEGINS. WEAKNESS ABROAD IS HAVING A BRITISH INFLATION) AND ARE SHOWING A BEARISH DIVERGENCE WITH AMERICAN TREA-BEARISH IMPACT ON U.S. TREASURY BONDS. IT'S IMPORTANT TO WATCH GLOBAL TRENDS

SURY BONDS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1990. THE WEAKER BRITISH BOND MARKET IS PULLING

WHEN ANALYZING THE U.S. BOND MARKET.

US. BONDS LOWER. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. BONDS SHOULD INCLUDE TECHNICAL

ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN BOND MARKETS.

Global Bond Prices

U.S. versus British Bonds

An examination of world interest rates showed a rising global trend. As a result, GLOBAL BONDS AND GLOBAL INFLATION
world bond prices were coming under additional downward pressure. The U.S. bond market appeared to be out of line with other global bond markets. As the new decade Figure 8.20 shows the interplay between U.S. and Japanese bond prices (two charts on began, the sharp drop in global bond prices finally began to pull U.S. bond prices the left) and the U.S. and Japanese stock markets (two charts on the right) during the lower.

fourth quarter of 1989 and the first two weeks of 1990. It can be seen that intermarket The U.S. Treasury bond market was lighting a losing battle on many fronts at comparisons can be applied on many different levels. Compare global stock prices to the start of 1990. Internationally, U.S. bond prices were trying to buck a global trend one another. Notice both stock markets beginning to weaken. Then compare global toward falling bond prices. Domestically, the bond market was struggling with rising bond prices to one another. Notice both bond markets beginning to weaken. Compare inflation (commodity markets had recently set a six-month high) and a falling dollar.

bonds to stocks both on a global and on a domestic level. If we accept that U.S. stock In the previous section, we showed the value of watching global stock market trends prices are influenced by U.S. bond prices, then what influences U.S. bond prices for insight into the U.S. market. The same lesson holds true for bonds. It's important becomes very important. If world bond prices are showing signs of moving lower, to watch global bond markets for clues to the U.S. bond market. As important as the chances are U.S. bond prices will follow. Technical analysis of global bond trends domestic U.S. markets are, they don't operate in a vacuum.

becomes a part of the analysis of the U.S. bond market.

142 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

GLOBAL BONDS AND GLOBAL INFLATION 143

FIGURE 8.20

FIGURE 8.21

AMERICAN STOCKS (LOWER RIGHT) ARE BEING PULLED DOWNWARD BY JAPANESE STOCKS

A COMPARISON OF GLOBAL INFLATION RATES FROM 1977 THROUGH 1989. (CHART COUR-

(UPPER RIGHT) AND A WEAKER U.S. BOND MARKET (LOWER LEFT) BOTH OF WHICH ARE

TESY OF BUSINESS CONDITIONS DIGEST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF

BEING PULLED LOWER BY JAPANESE BONDS (UPPER LEFT) AT THE START OF 1990.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 1989.)

Japanese Bonds Nikkei 225

U.S. Treasury Bonds

Dow Industrials

U.S. stock prices are influenced in two ways by global markets. First, by a direct comparison with overseas stock markets, such as Britain and Japan (which are influenced by their own domestic bond markets). And second, by U.S. bond prices which are themselves influenced by global bond markets. Discussion of the bond market and global interest rates naturally leads to the question of global inflation.

It's important to keep an eye on world inflation trends. This is true for two reasons. Inflation rates in the major industrialized countries usually trend in the same direction. Some turn a little ahead of others, and some are laggards. Some rise or fall faster than others. But, sooner or later, each country falls into line and joins the global trend. Global inflation peaked as the 1980s began. Japan, the United States, and Italy peaked in early 1980. Britain's inflation rate peaked a few months earlier, in in each individual country. If one country gets out of line with the others, it's only late 1979. Canada, France, and West Germany turned down in 1981. Six years later, a matter of time before it gets back into line. The second reason it's so important to in 1986, global inflation began to creep higher again. Inflation bottomed during that monitor inflation around the world is because the direction of inflation ultimately year in the U.S., Japan, West Germany, France, Britain, and Italy (see Figure 8.21).

determines the direction of interest rates, which is critical to bond and stock market Since all countries are influenced by global inflation trends, it's important to forecasting and trading. As you might suspect, in order to anticipate global inflation monitor what's happening around the globe to get a better fix on the inflation trend trends, it's important to study movements in world commodity markets.

144 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

THE ECONOMIST COMMODITY PRICE INDEX 145

GLOBAL INTERMARKET INDEXES
market prices have been dropping. This divergence, if it continues, holds bearish Figure 8.22 (courtesy of the Pring Market Review, P.O. Box 329, Washington, CT
implications for global stock prices.

06794) compares three global measures—World Short Rates (plotted inversely), the The lines in Figure 8.22 that accompany each index are 14-month exponential World Stock Index (calculated by Morgan Stanley Capital International, Geneva) and moving averages. Major turning points are signalled when an index crosses above or the Economist Commodity Index. This type of chart allows for intermarket compar-below its moving average line or when the moving average line itself changes direc-isons of these three vital sectors on a global scale. The world money market rates are tion. As 1989 ended, the chart shows stocks in a bullish moving average alignment, plotted inversely to make them move in the same direction as money market prices.

while money market prices are bearish—a dangerous combination. The chart also When world money market prices are rising (meaning short-term rates are falling), shows the generally inverse relationship between the two upper lines, representing this is bullish for global stocks. When world money market prices are falling (mean-world financial markets, and the lower line, representing global commodity price ing short-term rates are rising), it is considered bearish for global stocks. Money mar-trends, which is the Economist Commodity Price Index.

ket prices usually lead stock prices at major turning points. As the chart shows, the global bull market in stocks that began in 1982 was supported by rising money market THE ECONOMIST COMMODITY PRICE INDEX
prices. However, since 1987 global stock prices have risen to new highs, while money For analysis of commodity price trends on a global scale, the most useful index to watch is the Economist Commodity Price Index (published by The Economist maga-zine, P.O. Box 58524, Boulder, CO 80322). This index is comprised of 27 commodity FIGURE 8.22
markets and is about equally weighted between food (49.8%) and industrial prices THIS CHART COMPARES WORLD SHORT RATES (PLOTTED INVERSELY), THE MORGAN STAN-

(50.2%). The commodities are assigned different weightings, which are determined LEY CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL WORLD STOCK INDEX (MIDDLE LINE), AND THE ECONOMIST
by imports into the European market in the 1984-1986 period.

COMMODITY PRICE INDEX (BOTTOM LINE). INTERMARKET ANALYSIS CAN BE PERFORMED

The markets with the heaviest weightings are copper, aluminum, cotton, timber, ON A GLOBAL SCALE. (CHART COURTESY OF PRING MARKET REVIEW, PUBLISHED BY THE
coffee, and the soybean complex. The composite index is subdivided into foods and INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, P.O. BOX 329, WASHINGTON, CT
industrials. The industrials portion is further subdivided into metals and non-food 06794.)

agriculturals. The index uses a base year of 1985 = 100. The Economist Commodity Price Index does not include any precious metals (gold, platinum, and silver); nor Global Financial Markets
does it include any oil markets. The exclusion of those two markets may help explain the bearish position of the Economist Index in 1989.

Figure 8.22 shows that as 1989 ended, the global commodity index is dropping along with money market prices (rising short-term rates). This is an unusual alignment, given the historical inverse relationship between those two barometers. As the chart shows, when commodity prices are falling, world money prices are generally rising. How do we explain the discrepancy in 1989? The inflation scare that gripped the global markets as 1989 ended and 1990 began was centered around the strong rally in the world price of gold (which is a leading indicator of inflation) and the sharp global advance in the price of oil.

Weakness in the Economist Commodity Index in late 1989 might be partially explained by its exclusion of gold and oil prices from its composition. This brings us back to a point made in Chapter 7, namely, that it's always a good idea to keep an eye on what gold and oil are doing. The jump in those two widely-watched commodity markets as 1989 ended sent inflation jitters around the globe and caused global tightening by central bankers.

To add to the inflation concerns, the British inflation rate for 1989 was 7.8 percent, up from 4.9 percent the previous year, while the Japanese wholesale inflation rate for 1989 showed its first advance in 7 years. In the United States, it was reported in early January 1990, that the U.S. inflation rate for 1989 had risen to 4.6 percent, its highest level in eight years, with an even higher wholesale inflation rate of 4.8
percent. The British government had already raised the base interest rate from 7.5
percent to 15 percent from mid-1988 to October of 1989. There was fear that another rate hike was in the offing. Japanese central bankers had raised interest rates three times since the previous May. There was talk of more tightening in Tokyo as the yen weakened and inflation intensified.

146 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

SUMMARY 147

That bad news on the inflation front as the new decade began postponed any FIGURE 8.24
additional monetary easing by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, at least for the time GLOBAL BOND YIELDS ARE TRENDING HIGHER IN 1989, LED BY GERMAN RATFS. BRITISH
being. In mid-January of 1990, Fed Vice Chairman Manuel Johnson and Fed Governor AND JAPANESE YIELDS ARE JUST BREAKING OUT FROM BASING PATTERNS. RISING GLOBAL

Wayne Angell, both of whom were mentioned in the previous chapter, stated that any RATES EVENTUALLY PULL AMERICAN RATES HIGHER. (CHART COURTESY OF PRING MARKET
further Fed easing would be put on hold. Wayne Angell specifically mentioned the

REVIEW.)

need for commodity prices to start dropping as a requirement for further Fed easing.

Foreign Bond Yields

Advances in key commodity markets had heightened fears of a global shift to higher inflation and were clearly influencing monetary decisions made by central bankers around the world, including our own Federal Reserve Board. Figures 8 23 and 8.24
show the upward pressure on global interest rates as the new decade began. Figure 8.25 reveals a strong visual correlation between global equity markets, many of which were setting new highs as 1989 ended.

SUMMARY

This chapter extended our intermarket analysis to the international realm. It showed that trends in commodity prices (inflation), interest rates, and stocks are visible on FIGURE 8.23

FOREIGN SHORT RATES HAVE BEEN RISING AROUND THE GLOBE SINCE 1988 BUT STARTED

TO ACCELERATE UPWARD IN JAPAN IN 1989. (CHART COURTESY PRINC MARKET REVIEW.)

Foreign Short Rates
a global scale. International currency trends are also important. Global indexes are available that allow intermarket comparisons among the the major financial sectors.

AH world markets are interrelated. The U.S. market, as important as it is, doesn't operate in a vacuum. Intermarket analysis can and should be done on a global scale.

Overseas stock markets, especially those in Japan and England, should be monitored for signs of confirmation or divergence with the U.S. stock market. Overseas bond markets should also be watched for clues as to which way global interest rates are moving. To gain insights into global interest rates, it's also necessary to watch world commodity trends. For that purpose, the Economist Commodity Index can be used along with certain key commodities, such as gold and oil.

The study of gold and oil leads us to the next stop on the intermarket journey, and that is the study of industry groups. Two global themes that were seen as the 1980s ended were strength in asset-backed stocks, such as gold mining and energy shares, which benefit from rises in those commodities, and weakness in interest-sensitive stocks, which are hurt when bond prices fall (and interest rates rise). The relevance of intermarket analysis for stock groups will be examined in the next chapter.

FIGURE 8.25

A COMPARISON OF SEVEN WORLD STOCK MARKETS FROM 1977 THROUGH 1989. IT CAN BE

9

SEEN THAT BULL MARKETS EXIST ON A GLOBAL SCALE. WORLD STOCK MARKETS GENERALLY

TREND IN THE SAME DIRECTION. IT'S A GOOD IDEA TO FACTOR OVERSEAS STOCK MARKETS INTO TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC EQUITIES. (CHART COURTESY OF BUSINESS

CONDITIONS DIGEST.)

Stock Market Groups

It's often been said that the stock market is a "market of stocks." It could also be said that the stock market is a "market of stock groups." Although it's true that most individual stocks and most stock groups rise and fall with the general market, they may not do so at the same speed or at exactly the same time. Some stock groups will rise faster than others in a bull market, and some will fall faster than others in a bear market. Some will tend to lead the general market at tops and bottoms and others will tend to lag. In addition, not all of these groups react to economic news in exactly the same way.

Many stocks groups are tied to specific commodity markets and tend to rise and fall with that commodity. Two obvious examples that will be examined in this chapter are the gold mining and energy stocks. Other examples would include copper, aluminum, and silver mining shares. These commodity stocks tend to benefit when commodity prices are rising and inflation pressures are building. On the other side of the coin are interest-sensitive stocks that are hurt when inflation and interest rates are rising. Bank stocks are an example of a group of stocks that benefit from declining interest rates and that are hurt when interest rates are rising. In this chapter, the focus will be on savings and loan stocks and money center banks. Other examples include regional banks, financial services, insurance, real estate, and securities brokerage stocks.

The stock market will be divided into those stocks that benefit from rising inflation and rising interest rates and those that are hurt by such a scenario. The working premise is relatively simple. In a climate of rising commodity prices and rising interest rates, inflation stocks (such as precious metals, energy, copper, food, and steel) should do better than financially-oriented stocks such as banks, life insurance companies, and utilities. In a climate of falling inflation and falling interest rates, the better plays would be in the financial (interest-sensitive) stock groups.

STOCK GROUPS AND RELATED COMMODITIES

This discussion of the intermarket group analysis touches on two important areas.

First, I'll show how stock groups are affected by their related commodity markets, and vice versa. Sometimes the stock group in question will lead the commodity market, and sometimes the commodity will lead the stock group. A thorough technical analysis of either market should include a study of the other. Gold mining shares 14<»

149

COLD VERSUS GOLD MINING SHARES 151

150 STOCK MARKET GROUPS
gold mining shares. A technical analysis of one without the other is unwise and usually lead the price of gold. Gold traders, therefore, should keep an eye on what unnecessary. The accompanying charts show why.

gold raining shares are doing for early warnings as to the direction the gold market One of the key premises of intermarket analysis is the need to look to related might be taking. Stock traders who are considering the purchase or sale of gold mining markets for clues. Nowhere is that more evident than in the relationship between the shares should also monitor the price of gold.

price of gold itself and gold mining shares. As a rule, they both trend in the same di-The second message is that intermarket analysis of stock groups yields important'

rection. When they begin to diverge from one another, an early warning is being given clues as to where stock investors might want to be focusing their attention and cap-that the trend may be changing. Usually one will lead the other at important turning ital. If inflation pressures are building (commodity prices are rising relative to bond points. Knowing what is happening in the leader provides valuable information for prices), emphasis should be placed on inflation stocks. If bond prices are strength-the laggard. Many people assume that commodity prices, being the more sensitive ening relative to commodity prices (a climate of falling interest rates and declining and the more volatile of the two, lead the related stock group. It may be surprising inflation), emphasis should be placed on interest-sensitive stocks.

to learn, then, that gold mining shares usually lead the price of gold. However, that's not always the case. In 1980, gold peaked eight months before gold shares. In 1986, THE CRB INDEX VERSUS BONDS
gold led again.

Figure 9.1 compares the price of gold futures (upper chart) with an index of gold In Chapter 3, the commodity/bond relationship was identified as the most important mining shares (source: Standard and Poors). The period covered in the chart is from in intermarket analysis. The fulcrum effect of that relationship tells which way inflation and interest rates are trending. One way to study this relationship of commodities to bonds is to plot a relative strength ratio of the Commodity Research Bureau Price Index over Treasury bond prices. If the CRB Index is rising relative to bond prices, FIGURE 9.1
this means inflation pressures are building and higher interest rates will be the likely A COMPARISON OF GOLD AND GOLD MINING SHARES FROM 1985 INTO EARLY 1990. BOTH
result, providing a negative climate for the stock market. If the CRB/bond relation-MEASURES USUALLY TREND IN THE SAME DIRECTION. GOLD LED GOLD SHARES HIGHER IN
ship is weakening, this would suggest declining inflation and falling interest rates, a 1986. HOWEVER, GOLD SHARES TURNED DOWN FIRST IN THE FALL OF 1987 AND TURNED
climate beneficial to stock prices.

UP FIRST IN THE FALL OF 1989.

Now this same idea will be used in the group analysis. However, this time that relationship will help determine whether to commit funds to inflation or interest-Gold
sensitive stocks. There's another bonus involved in this type of analysis and that is the tendency for interest-sensitive stocks to lead other stocks.

In Chapter 4, the ability of bonds to lead the stock market was discussed at some length. Rising bond prices are positive for stocks, whereas falling bonds are usually negative. Interest-sensitive stocks are closely linked to bonds. Interest-sensitive stocks are often more closely tied to the bond market than to the stock market. As a result, (urns in interest-sensitive stocks often precede turns in the market as a whole.

What tends to happen at market tops is that the bond market will start to drop.

The bearish influence of falling bond prices (and rising interest rates) pulls interest-sensitive stocks downward. Eventually, the stock market will also begin to weaken.

This downturn in the stock averages will often be accompanied by an upturn in certain tangible asset stock groups, such as energy and gold mining shares.

S&P Cold Mining Share Index

COLD VERSUS GOLD MINING SHARES

The intermarket analysis of stock groups will begin with the gold market. This is a logical point to start because of the key role played by the gold market in intermarket analysis. To briefly recap some points made earlier regarding the importance of gold, the gold market usually trends in the opposite direction of the U.S. dollar; the gold market is a leading indicator of the CRB Index; gold is viewed as a leading indicator of inflation; gold is also viewed as a safe haven in times of political and financial turmoil.

A dramatic example of the last point was shown in the fourth quarter of 1989
and the first month of 1990 as gold mining shares became the top performing stock group at a time when the stock market was just beginning to experience serious deterioration. There is a strong positive link between the trend of gold and that of

152 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

GOLD VERSUS GOLD MINING SHARES 153
the middle of 1985 into January of 1990. There are three points of particular interest FIGURE 9.2
on the chart. Going into the summer of 1986, gold was going through a basing process ANOTHER COMPARISON OF GOLD AND THE S&P GOLD MINING INDEX FROM 1985 TO

(after hitting a low in the spring of 1985). Gold shares, however, where drifting to JANUARY OF 1990. AT THE 1987 PEAK, GOLD SHARES SHOW A MAJOR BEARISH DIVERGENCE
new lows. In July of 1986, gold prices turned sharply higher (influenced by a rising WITH GOLD. IN LATE 1989, COLD SHARES TURNED UP BEFORE GOLD.

oil market and bottom in the CRB Index). That bullish breakout in gold marked the beginning of a bull market in gold mining shares. In this case, the price of gold clearly Cold versus Cold Mining Shares
led the gold mining shares.

From the summer of 1986 to the end of 1987, the price of gold appreciated about 40 percent, while gold stocks rose over 200 percent. This outstanding performance gave gold stocks the top ranking of all stock groups in 1987. However, gold stocks took a beating in October 1987 and became one of the worst performing stock groups through the following year. Late in 1987, a bearish divergence developed between the price of bullion and gold stocks and, in this instance, gold stocks led the price of gold. From the October peak, the S&P gold index lost about 46 percent of its value.

The price of gold, however, after an initial selloff in late October, firmed again and actually challenged contract highs in December.

While gold was threatening to move into new highs, gold stocks barely managed a 50 percent recovery. This glaring divergence between gold and gold stocks was a clear warning that odds were against the gold rally continuing. Gold started to drop sharply in mid-December, and gold stocks dropped to new bear market lows. Back in 1986, gold led gold stocks higher. At the 1987 top, gold stocks led gold lower. It becomes increasingly clear that an analysis of either market is incomplete without a corresponding analysis of the other.

As 1989 unfolded, it was becoming evident that an important bullish divergence was developing between gold and gold shares. As gold continued to trend lower, geld shares appeared to be forming an important basing pattern. During September 1989, the gold index broke through overhead resistance, correctly signaling that a new uptrend had begun in gold mining shares. Shortly thereafter, gold broke a two-year down trendline and started an uptrend of its own.

Figure 9.2 is an overlay chart of gold and gold shares over the same five years; it shows gold shares leading gold at the 1987 top and the 1989 bottom. Figure 9.3
provides a closer view of the 1989 bottom and shows that, although the gold market was forming the second trough of a "double bottom" during October, gold mining shares were already rallying strongly (the last trough in the gold mining shares was hit in June 1989, four months earlier). It's worth noting, however, that the real bull move in gold mining shares didn't shift into high gear until gold completed its "double that an important down trendline in the ratio was broken and gold stocks really began bottom" at the end of October. Something else happened in October of 1989 that to shine. From the fall of 1989 through January of 1990, gold stocks outperformed all helped catapult the rally in gold and gold mining shares: That was a sharp selloff in other stock market sectors. Gold mutual funds became the big winners of 1989. Gold the stock market.

had once again proven its role as a safe haven in times of financial turmoil. Figure As so often happens, events in one sector impact on another. On Friday, October 9.5 shows the bullish breakout in the gold shares coinciding with the October 1989

13, 1989, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped almost 200 points. In the ensuing peak in the stock market.

weeks, some frightened money flowing out of stocks found its way into the bond Another intermarket factor that helped launch the bull move in gold was a sharp market in a "flight to quality." A large portion of that money, however, found its selloff in the dollar immediately following the mini-crash of October 1989. The week way into gold and gold mining shares. Gold-oriented mutual funds also experienced after the October stock market selloff, the U.S. dollar gapped downward and soon a large inflow of capital. Figure 9.4 shows the S&P gold mining share index (upper began a downtrend (Figure 9.6). Stock market weakness forced the Federal Reserve to chart) and a ratio of the gold mining index divided by the S&P 500 stock index (lower lower interest rates in an effort to stem the stock market decline. Lower interest rates chart).

(and expectations of more Fed easing to come) caused the flight of funds into T-bills Figure 9.4 shows that, on a relative strength basis, gold shares actually began to and T-bonds and pushed the dollar into a deep slide (lower interest rates are bearish outperform the S&P 500 index in June of 1989 after underperforming stocks during for the dollar). This slide in the dollar, in turn, helped fuel the strong rally in gold the preceding year. However, it wasn't until the end of October and early November and gold mining stocks.

154 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

GOLD VERSUS GOLD MINING SHARES 155

FIGURE 9.3

FIGURE 9.4

A CLOSER LOOK AT COLD VERSUS GOLD STOCKS FROM 1987 THROUGH THE END OF 1989.

THE UPPER CHART SHOWS THE BASING ACTIVITY AND BULLISH BREAKOUT IN THE S&P

GOLD SHARES SHOWED A MAJOR BULLISH DIVERGENCE WITH GOLD IN 1989 AND COR-GOLD MINING INDEX. THE BOTTOM CHART IS A RATIO OF GOLD STOCKS DIVIDED BY

RECTLY ANTICIPATED THE BULLISH BREAKOUT IN GOLD FUTURES IN THE AUTUMN.

THE S&P 500 STOCK INDEX AND SHOWS GOLD OUTPERFORMING THE MARKET FROM THE

SUMMER OF 1989. COLD SHARES REALLY BEGAN TO GLITTER IN NOVEMBER.

Cold versus Cold Stocks

S&P Cold Mining Index

156 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

GOLD VERSUS GOLD MINING SHARES 157

FIGURE 9.5

FIGURE 9.6

GOLD SHARES VERSUS THE S&P 5OO STOCK INDEX. THE STOCK MARKET PEAK IN OCTOBER

A GLANCE AT ALL FOUR SECTORS IN THE FALL OF 1989. AFTER THE MINI-COLLAPSE IN THE

1989 HAD A LOT TO DO WITH THE FLIGHT OF FUNDS INTO GOLD MINING SHARES. GOLD

DOW INDUSTRIALS (UPPER RIGHT) ON OCTOBER 13,1989, T-BILLS (LOWER RIGHT) RALLIED

AND GOLD MINING SHARES ARE A HAVEN IN TIMES OF FINANCIAL TURMOIL.

IN A FLIGHT TO QUALITY AND FED EASING. LOWER INTEREST RATES CONTRIBUTED TO A SHARP DROP IN THE DOLLAR (UPPER LEFT), WHICH FUELED THE STRONG RALLY IN GOLD

S&P 500 Index versus Gold

(LOWER LEFT). _ _ _ _ _

U.S. Dollar Index Dow Industrials

Gold

Treasury Bills

158 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

OIL VERSUS OIL STOCKS 159

WHY GOLD STOCKS OUTSHINE GOLD
prices of oil shares. Rising oil prices help domestic and international oil companies as well as other energy-related stocks like oilfield equipment and service stocks, and During 1987 gold rose only 40 percent while gold shares gained 200 percent. From oil drilling stocks. The discussion here will be limited to the impact of crude oil the fall of 1989 to January 1990, gold shares rose 50 percent while gold gained only futures prices on the international oil companies. The basic premise is the same; about 16 percent. The explanation lies in the fact that gold shares offer leverage Namely, that there is a strong relationship between the price of oil and oil shares. To arising from the fact that mining profits rise more sharply than the price of the gold do a complete technical analysis of one, it is necessary to do a technical analysis of itself. If it costs a company $200 an ounce to mine gold and gold is trading at $350, the other.

the company will reap a profit of $150. If gold rises to $400, it will appreciate in Figures 9.8 and 9.9 compare the price of crude oil to an index of international value by only 15 percent ($50/$350), whereas the company's profits will appreciate oil company shares (source: Standard and Poors) from 1985 to the beginning of 1990.

by 33 percent ($50/$150). Figure 9.7 shows some gold mining shares benefiting from While oil shares have been much stronger than the price of oil during those five the leveraged affect of rising gold prices.

years, the charts clearly show that turning points in the price of crude have had an important impact on the price of oil shares. The arrows in Figure 9.8 pinpoint where OIL VERSUS OIL STOCKS
major turning points in the price of oil coincide with similar turning points in oil shares. Important bottoms in oil shares in 1986, late 1987, late 1988, and late 1989

Another group that turned in a strong performance as 1989 ended was the energy coincide with rallies in crude oil. Peaks in oil shares in 1987 and early 1988 coincide sector. Oil prices rose strongly in the fourth quarter and contributed to the rising with peaks in oil prices.

FIGURE 9.8

FIGURE 9.7

A COMPARISON OF CRUDE OIL FUTURES AND THE S&P INTERNATIONAL OIL INDEX FROM

GOLD VERSUS THREE GOLD MINING STOCKS. GOLD STOCKS APPEAR TO BE LEADING THE

1985 INTO EARLY 1990. ALTHOUGH OIL SHARES HAVE OUTPERFORMED THE PRICE OF OIL, PRICE OF COLD HIGHER AS 1990 IS BEGINNING.

TURNING POINTS IN OIL FUTURES HAVE HAD A STRONG INFLUENCE OVER SIMILAR TURNING POINTS IN OIL SHARES.

Gold Futures Homestake Mining

Crude Oil

Newmont Gold

Placer Dome

160 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

ANOTHER DIMENSION IN DIVERGENCE ANALYSIS 161

FIGURE 9.9

FIGURE 9.10

ANOTHER LOOK AT CRUDE OIL FUTURES VERSUS INTERNATIONAL OIL STOCKS. A STRONG

A COMPARISON OF OIL AND INTERNATIONAL OIL SHARES IN 1988 AND 1989. UPSIDE BREAK-POSITIVE CORRELATION CAN BE SEEN BETWEEN BOTH INDEXES. IT'S A GOOD IDEA TO

OUTS IN OIL PRICES COINCIDED WITH RALLIES IN OIL SHARES.

WATCH BOTH.

Crude Oil

Crude Oil versus International Oil Stocks

S&POil Croup Index

As January of 1990 ended, both oil and oil shares are again trying to rally together. Figure 9.12 compares oil prices to individual oil companies—Texaco, Exxon, Figure 9.8 also shows oil prices challenging major overhead resistance near and Mobil. The "double top" referred to earlier can be seen in the Exxon and Mo-

$23.00 as 1990 begins. The inability of oil to clear that important barrier is causing bil charts. The late December top in Texaco occurred at about the same time as profit-taking in oil shares. Figure 9.9 uses an overlay chart to compare both markets that in crude oil. As January is ending, crude oil is rallying for a challenge of con-over the same five years. The strong positive correlation is clearly visible.

tract highs. All three oil companies appear to be benefiting from the rally in oil fu-Figure 9.10 provides a closer look at oil and oil shares in 1988 and 1989. While tures, but are clearly lagging well behind oil as the commodity is retesting overhead the two charts are not identical, it can be seen that turning points in the price of oil resistance.

had an impact on oil shares. The breaking of down trendlines by crude oil at the end of 1988 and again in the fall of 1989 helped launch strong rallies in oil shares. Figure ANOTHER DIMENSION IN DIVERGENCE ANALYSIS

9.11 provides an even closer look at the second half of 1989 and January of 1990.

In this case, oil shares showed a leading tendency. In November of 1989, oil shares What these charts show is that a technical analysis of the price of crude oil can resolved a "symmetrical triangle" on the upside. This bullish signal by oil shares shed light on prospects for oil-related stocks. At the same time, analysis of oil shares led a similar bullish breakout by crude oil a couple of weeks later. A "double top"

often aids in analysis of oil itself. The principles of confirmation and divergence appeared in oil shares as oil was spiking up to new highs in late December of that are carried to another dimension when the analysis of stock groups such as oil and year. This "double top" warned that a top in crude oil prices might be at hand.

gold are compared to analysis of their related commodities. The analyst is never sure

ANOTHER DIMENSION IN DIVERGENCE ANALYSIS 163

162 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

FIGURE 9.11

FIGURE 9.12

CRUDE OIL FUTURES VERSUS THREE INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN THE FOURTH

IN NOVEMBER 1989, A BULLISH BREAKOUT IN OIL SHARES PRECEDED A SIMILAR BREAKOUT

QUARTER OF 1989 AND EARLY 1990. TEXACO APPEARS TO BE TRACKING OIL VERY CLOSELY.

BY OIL PRICES A COUPLE OF WEEKS LATER. AS OIL SPIKED UPWARD IN DECEMBER 1989, OIL

EXXON AND MOBIL TURNED DOWN BEFORE OIL BUT ARE BENEFITTING FROM THE BOUNCE

STOCKS FORMED A "DOUBLE TOP," WARNING OF A POSSIBLE PEAK IN OIL.

IN OIL FUTURES.

Crude Oil Futures

Crude Oil Futures Exxon

Oil Shares (S&P International)

Texaco

Mobil

164 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

SAVINGS AND LOANS VERSUS BONDS 165

FIGURE 9.13
stocks and savings &• loan stocks were ranked at the lower end of the list. Money center banks were ranked 193 out of a possible 197 for the last five months of 1989

THE UPPER CHART COMPARES INTERNATIONAL OIL SHARES TO THE S&P 500 STOCK INDEX

FROM JANUARY 1989 TO JANUARY 1990. THE BOTTOM CHART IS A RELATIVE STRENGTH
and the first month of 1990. Savings & loan shares did a bit better but still came in RATIO OF OIL SHARES DIVIDED BY THE S&P 500 INDEX. THE S&P OIL INDEX OUTPERFORMED
a relatively weak 147 out of 197 groups. Although most commodity stocks ranked in THE MARKET FROM SEPTEMBER 1989 TO JANUARY 1990.

the top 10 percent, most bank stocks ranked in the bottom 25 percent during those six months.

That wasn't the case throughout all of 1989, however. Earlier that year, financial stocks had been the better performers, whereas gold and oil shares languished. What changed toward the end of 1989 was a pickup in inflation pressures and a swing toward higher interest rates. To make matters worse, the dollar and stocks came under heavy downward pressure in the autumn of 1989, fueling inflation fears and a flight from financial stocks to gold and energy shares. The very same forces that helped inflation stocks, rising inflation and rising interest rates, hurt interest-sensitive stocks like savings and loans and money center banks. The sharp drop in interest-sensitive stocks that began in October of 1989 also warned that the broader market might be in some trouble.

Relative Ratio of Oil Shares Divided by the S&P 500

SAVINGS AND LOANS VERSUS THE DOW

Figure 9.14 compares the S&P Savings and Loan Group Index to the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1985 through the beginning of 1990. The tendency of the S&L
group to lead the broad market at tops can be seen both in the second half of 1987
and the last quarter of 1989. The S&L Index formed a major "head and shoulders"

topping pattern throughout 1986 and 1987. As stocks were rallying to new highs in the summer of 1987, the S&Ls were forming a "right shoulder" as part of a topping pattern. That bearish divergence was a warning that the stock market rally might be in danger. To the far right of Figure 9.14, the sharp breakdown in the S&Ls in the last quarter of 1989 again warned of impending weakness in the broad market. Figure 9.15 gives a closer view of the 1989 peak. Even though the Dow Industrials rallied for a challenge of the October peak in December 1989, S&Ls and other interest-sensitive stocks continued to drop sharply, sending a bearish warning that the stock market rally was suspect.

which one will lead, or which one will provide the vital clue. The only way to know SAVINGS AND LOANS. VERSUS BONDS
is to follow both.

Figure 9.13 compares international oil shares to the broad market during 1989.

Figure 9.16 compares the S&L group index to Treasury bonds. The arrows pinpoint The upper chart plots the S&P oil share index versus the S&P 500 stock index. The the turning points in the S&L group relative to bond prices. Notice that bond price bottom chart is a ratio of oil shares divided by stocks. As the bottom chart shows, oil movements have an important influence on S&L share prices. During 1986 and 1987, stocks outperformed the broad market by a wide margin during the fourth quarter of the S&L group was caught in between the upward pull of rising stock prices and 1989 and the first month of 1990. Clearly, the place to be as the old year ended was in the downward pull of a falling bond market. By the time the S&Ls were forming oil stocks (along with precious metals). One place not to be was in interest-sensitive their "right shoulder" peak in the summer of 1987, bonds had already begun their stocks.

collapse. It seems clear that the more bearish bond market (and the accompanying rise in interest rates) hit the interest-sensitive sector before it hit the general market.

The bond market therefore became a leading indicator for the interest-sensitive stocks INTEREST-SENSITIVE STOCKS
which, in turn, became a leading indicator for the stock market as a whole.

On January 31, 1990, Investor's Daily ranked its 197 industry groups for the prior Figure 9.16 shows the bond market rally stalling in the fourth quarter of 1989 and six months. The six best-performing groups were all commodity related: Gold Min-finally turning lower in an apparent "double top." The loss of upward momentum ing (1), Food—Sugar Refining (2), Silver Mining (3), Oil & Gas—Field Services (4), in bonds and the subsequent rise in interest rates contributed to the sharp selloff in Oil & Gas—Offshore Drilling (5), Oil & Gas—International Integrated (6). Four other financial stocks. In this case, however, the actual price slide appears to have begun oil groups ranked in the top 20 on the basis of relative strength. In sharp contrast, bank in the interest-sensitive stocks with bonds following.

SAVINGS AND LOANS VERSUS BONDS 167

FIGURE 9.15

THE S&L STOCKS PEAKED IN OCTOBER 1989 ALONG WITH THE DOW. HOWEVER, THE DECEMBER RALLY IN THE DOW WASN'T CONFIRMED BY THE S&L STOCKS. THIS NEGATIVE Dl-VERGENCE WAS A BEARISH WARNING FOR THE BROAD MARKET.

The Dow versus the S&Ls

168 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

MONEY CENTER BANKS VERSUS THE NYSE COMPOSITE INDEX 169

FIGURE 9.16

FIGURE 9.17

THE S&L STOCKS SHOW A STRONG CORRELATION WITH TREASURY BONDS. THE DOWN-THE S&L INDEX SHOWS A STRONG NEGATIVE CORRELATION WITH THE CRB INDEX FROM

WARD PULL OF BONDS IN 1987 CONTRIBUTED TO THE TOPPING ACTION IN THE S&L IN-1985 TO 1990. THE 1987 TOP IN THE S&Ls MIRRORED A SIMILAR BOTTOM IN THE CRB INDEX.

DEX. IN THE FALL OF 1989, THE RALLY FAILURE IN BONDS HAD A LOT TO DO WITH THE

THE MID-1988 PEAK IN THE CRB HELPED LAUNCH THE S&L RALLY. THE PEAK IN THE S&Ls IN

SUBSEQUENT COLLAPSE IN THE S&Ls.

THE AUTUMN OF 1989 COINCIDED WITH THE BREAKING OF A DOWN TRENIHINE BY THE

CRB INDEX.

S&Ls versus Bonds

S&Ls versus CRB Index

Bonds

CRB Index

SAVINGS AND LOANS VERSUS THE CRB INDEX
year, the S&Ls rallied sharply. In the fall of 1989, it can be seen that the peak in If the bond market trends in the same direction as interest-sensitive stocks, the CRB
the S&L stocks occurred at about the same time that the CRB Index was breaking Index should move inversely to both. Figure 9.17 compares the S&Ls to the CRB Index.

its yearlong down trendline. Since the S&Ls are so closely tied to the bond market, A rising CRB should be bearish for S&Ls; a falling CRB Index should be bullish. And and the bond market moves inversely to the CRB Index, it shouldn't be surprising to this is what Figure 9.17 shows. Figure 9.17 reveals the CRB Index tracing out a "head discover a strong inverse relationship between the S&Ls and the CRB Index.

and shoulders" bottom in 1986 and 1987, whereas the S&Ls are tracing out a "head and shoulders" top. However, the patterns are not synchronous. The "left shoulder" in MONEY CENTER BANKS VERSUS THE NYSE COMPOSITE INDEX
the S&Ls in 1986 coincides with the middle trough (the head) in the CRB Index. The third trough (the "right shoulder") in the CRB Index in the spring of 1987 coincides Another group that suffered from rising interest rates as the 1980s came to a close with the middle peak (the head) in the S&Ls. The "right shoulder" in the S&Ls in was the Money Center banks. Figure 9.18 compares the S&P Money Center Group August of 1987 occurs well after the CRB Index has completed its basing pattern and Index with the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index through 1989 and the is linked to the stock market peak that month. Still, it appears that a lot of the action beginning of 1990. Up until October 1989, Money Center banks had easily kept pace in the S&Ls can be attributed to weakness in bonds and strength in the CRB Index.

with the stock market. Both peaked together in October of that year. However, as the The S&Ls remained under pressure from the summer of 1987 to the summer NYSE Index rallied into early January, the Money Center bank shares continued to of 1988. During that same time, the CRB Index continued to rally. In the summer plummet. Part of the reason for that sharp selloff is the same as for the S&Ls and of 1988, the CRB Index peaked out and began a yearlong descent. During that same other interest-sensitive stocks—falling bond prices (rising interest rates) and firming

SUMMARY 171

170 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

FIGURE 9.18

FIGURE 9.19

THE UPPER CHART COMPARES GOLD STOCKS TO MONEY CENTER STOCKS AS 1989 ENDED.

MONEY CENTER BANKS VERSUS THE NYSE COMPOSITE INDEX. INTEREST-SENSITIVE MONEY

SOME MONEY FLEEING FINANCIAL STOCKS WENT TO GOLD SHARES. THE BOTTOM CHART

CENTER BANKS ALSO DROPPED SHARPLY FROM OCTOBER 1989 INTO JANUARY OF 1990.

IS A RATIO OF THE CRB INDEX DIVIDED BY TREASURY BONDS. THE BASING PATTERN IN THE

FINANCIAL STOCKS FELL UNDER THE WEIGHT OF RISING INTEREST RATES AND FALLING

RATIO SINCE AUGUST OF 1989 AND THE SUBSEQUENT UPSIDE BREAKOUT CONFIRMED THE

BOND PRICES. THIS WEAKNESS HELPED PULL THE MARKET LOWER.

SHIFT TOWARD STRONGER COMMODITIES AND WEAKER BONDS. THIS BENEFITTED INFLATION STOCKS, SUCH AS GOLD AND OIL, AND HURT INTEREST-SENSITIVE STOCKS.

Inflation Versus Disinflation Stocks

As long as the CRB/bond ratio was falling earlier in the year, odds favored the interest-commodity prices (especially oil). The weakness in the Money Center stocks also sensitive stocks. The CRB/bond ratio bottomed in August of 1989 and continued to provided another warning to the stock market technician that the attempt by the stabilize through the fourth quarter. In December, the ratio broke out to the upside and broad stock market averages to recover to new highs was not likely to succeed, at confirmed that a trend change had, in fact, taken place. The pendulum, which had least not until the interest-sensitive stocks started to stabilize.

favored bond prices for a year, now showed commodity prices in the ascendancy. That crucial shift explains the dramatic move away from interest-sensitive stocks toward commodity stocks. And, in doing so, this shift also warned of the uptick in interest GOLD STOCKS VERSUS MONEY CENTER STOCKS
rates which began to push stock prices lower.

Figure 9.19 shows a couple of other ways to monitor the relationship between inflation and disinflation stocks. The upper chart compares the S&P Gold Group Index to the SUMMARY

S&P Money Center Group Index. Up to the fall of 1989, the Money Center banks were outperforming gold stocks by a wide margin. From October of 1989 on, however, This chapter showed the relevance of intermarket comparisons between various fu-that relationship changed abruptly and dramatically. As the Money Center banks tures markets and related stock groups. It discussed how many stock groups are tied to collapsed, gold stocks began to rally sharply. Part of the explanation for this dramatic specific commodity markets (such as oil, gold, silver, copper, aluminum, and sugar).

shift between commodity and interest-sensitive stocks is seen in the bottom chart Since those commodities and their related stopk groups usually trend in the same di-which plots the ratio between the CRB Index and bonds.

rection, their relative performance should be studied and compared. Interest-sensitive

172 STOCK MARKET GROUPS

10

FIGURE 9.20

LONDON COPPER PRICES VERSUS PHELPS DODGE, THE LARGEST COPPER PRODUCER IN THE

UNITED STATES. THE MAJOR "DOUBLE TOP" IN COPPER IN THE AUTUMN OF 1989 AND ITS

SUBSEQUENT COLLAPSE COINCIDED WITH A SHARP DROP IN THE PRICE OF PHELPS DODGE.

THE ARROWS SHOW THAT RALLIES IN THE PRICE OF COPPER HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL TO

PHELPS DODGE SHARE PRICES.

London Copper

The Dow Utilities as a

Leading Indicator of Stocks

Phelps Dodge

Dow Theory is based on the comparison of two Dow Jones averages—the Dow Jones Transportation Average and the Dow Jones Industrial Average. One of the basic tenets of Dow Theory is that these two averages should trend in the same direction. In other words, they should confirm each other's trend. Many analysts pay less attention to the third average published in the daily pages of the Wall Street Journal— the Dow Jones Utility Average. Yet, the Dow Utilities have a respectable record of anticipating turns in the Dow Industrials.

This leading tendency of utility stocks is based on their relatively close ties to the bond market, which also is a leading indicator of stocks. The Dow Utilities provide another link in the intermarket chain between the bond market and the stock market. Because they are so interest-sensitive, utilities usually reflect interest rate changes (as reflected in the bond market) before those changes are reflected in the broader market of stocks. Since they are impacted by the direction of interest stocks, such as savings and loans and money center banks, usually trend in the same rates and inflation, utilities are also affected by such things as the trend of the direction as the bond market and in the opposite direction of commodity markets. By dollar and commodity prices. For these reasons, the Dow Utilities are a part of the monitoring the CRB Index/bond ratio, the intermarket trader is able to tell whether intermarket picture.

money should be placed in inflation (commodity) or disinflation (interest-sensitive) stocks. Because of their close relationship to bonds, interest-sensitive stocks have a DOW UTILITIES VERSUS THE DOW INDUSTRIALS
tendency to lead the stock market at major tops and bottoms.

Not all commodity groups trend in the same direction. Copper and aluminum Before looking at a comparison of the Dow Utilities relative to the Dow Industrials in more recent times, let's consider their relationship over a longer time span. Since shares weakened in the second half of 1989 as copper and aluminum prices fell (along with most industrial prices) (see Figure 9.20). Copper weakness in late 1989 was also 1970, five major turns in the Dow Industrials were preceded by a turn in the Dow tied to stock market weakness as fear of recession intensified. Chapter 13 will discuss Utilities.

the role of copper as an economic forecaster and its relation to the stock market. That chapter will also discuss in more depth the relative performance of commodity and 1. The November 1972 peak in the utilities preceded a similar peak in the Dow interest-sensitive stocks at major cyclical turning points.

Industrials two months later in January of 1973. Both averages dropped into the Another interest-sensitive group mentioned briefly in this chapter is the utilities.

second half of 1974.

In Chapter 10, we'll examine how intermarket analysis affects the Dow Jones Utility 2. In September 1974, a bottom in the utilities preceded a bottom in the industrials Average and the usefulness of the Dow Utilities as a leading indicator of the Dow three months later in December. Both averages rallied for two years.

Jones Industrial Average.

173

174 THE DOW UTILITIES AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS

DOW UTILITIES VERSUS THE DOW INDUSTRIALS 175

3. The utilities hit another peak in January of 1981, preceding a top in the industrials three months later in April. Both averages declined together into 1982.

FIGURE 10.1

4. The utilities bottomed in July of 1982, preceding a major bottom in the industrials A COMPARISON OF THE DOW JONES UTILITY AVERAGE AND THE DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL
one month later in August. Both averages rallied together until 1987.

AVERAGE FROM 1983 THROUGH 1989. GENERALLY, BOTH AVERAGES TREND IN THE SAME

DIRECTION. TREND CHANGES ARE USUALLY SIGNALED WHEN THEY DIVERGE. IN 1987, THE

5. In January of 1987, the utilities hit a major top, leading the peak in the industrials DOW UTILITIES PEAKED SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE THE DOW INDUSTRIALS.

seven months later in August 1987.

Dow Jones Utility Average

During these two decades, the Dow Utilities failed to lead a major turn in the Dow Industrials only three times. In March of 1980, both averages bottomed together In 1970 the industrials bottomed one month before the utilities. In 1977 the industrials peaked about six months before the utilities. Of the eight major turns since 1970
the utilities led the industrials five times, turned at the same time once and lagged only twice. The leading tendency of the Dow Utilities at market tops is especially impressive. *

Research provided by John G. McGinley, Jr. (Technical Trends, P.O Box 792

Wilton, CT 06897) shows that the Dow Utilities have led the Dow Industrials at every peak since 1960 with only one exception-the 1977 peak. During those 30 years the Dow Utilities peaked ahead of the Dow Industrials by an average of three months although the actual lead time varied from ten months to one month Part of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
explanation as to why the utility stocks lead the industrial stocks can be found in the relatively close correlation between the utility stocks and the bond market which will be discussed later. Consider now the more recent record of how the utilities have performed relative to the broad market.

Figures 10.1 and 10.2 compare the relative performance of the Dow Jones Utility Average (upper chart) and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (lower chart) since 1983

As the various charts are examined, a long view will be given. Then a closer view of the more recent action will be given and some other intermarket comparisons will be incorporated to include bonds and commodities. Figure 10.1 shows both averages generally rising and falling together. As long as the two averages are moving in the same direction, they are merely confirming each other's trends. It's when one of them begins to diverge from the other that we begin to take notice. Figure 10 2 provides a closer view of the 1987 top.

The Dow Utilities hit its peak in January of 1987 and started to weaken. (It will be demonstrated later that part of the reason for this weakness in the utilities was tied to similar weakness in the bond market.) The selloff in the Dow Utilities set up a major negative divergence with the Dow Industrials which continued to rally for another industrials would remain healthy as long as the utilities remained strong. Figure 10.3
seven months. As the industrials were hitting their peak in August, the utilities were gives a closer view of market events at the end of 1989.

just forming a "right shoulder" in a "head and shoulders" topping pattern (in the Figure 10.3 compares the Dow Utilities to the Dow Industrials during the previous chapter, we discussed a similar topping pattern in the interest-sensitive fourth quarter of 1989 and the first two months of 1990. Both averages sold off savings and loan stocks). Although the lead time in 1987 was a relatively long seven in mid-October and then rallied together into the beginning of January. Although months, the peak in the Dow Utilities provided plenty of warning that the rally in the two charts are closely related, the utilities did manage to rally to new highs stocks was approaching a dangerous stage and warned stock market technicians to be while the industrials were unable to clear their October peak. On a short-term basis, especially alert to any technical signs of a breakdown in the stock averages.

however, the last rally attempt by the industrials was not confirmed by the utilities.

Both averages rallied together into the second half of 1989. As 1989 ended how-The utilities completed a "double top" and broke down during the first week of 1990.

ever, another divergence developed, except this time, the Dow Utilities rallied to The industrials broke down a week later.

new highs while the Dow Industrials failed to do so. (Both averages were in the Toward the end of January, the utilities also started to stabilize a few days before process of re-challenging their all-time highs that were set in 1987). Given their nor-the industrials. In both instances, the utilities led the industrials by a few days to a mal historical relationship, the rally to new highs in the utilities could be viewed week. The ability of the utilities to stabilize above their October lows was significant.

as a positive development. Many technicians took the view that the outlook for the A violation of those lows by the Dow Utilities would have been viewed by technicians as a particularly bearish development for the stock market as a whole.

176 THE DOW UTILITIES AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS

DOW UTILITIES VERSUS THE DOW INDUSTRIALS 177

FIGURE 10.2

FIGURE 10.3

IN THE FIRST WEEK OF 1990, THE DOW UTILITIES COMPLETED A "DOUBLE TOP" FORMATION

IN AUGUST 1987, AS THE DOW INDUSTRIALS WERE HITTING THEIR MAJOR PEAK, THE

AND BROKE AN UP TRENDLINE, PRECEDING A SIMILAR BREAKDOWN BY THE DOW

UTILITIES (WHICH PEAKED IN JANUARY) WERE FORMING A "RIGHT SHOULDER" IN A INDUSTRIALS A WEEK LATER. AS JANUARY 1990 ENDED, THE UTILITIES STABILIZED A FEW

TOPPING PATTERN, THEREBY CREATING A BEARISH DIVERGENCE. BOTH RALLIED TOGETHER

INTO THE SECOND HALF OF 1989. AS 1989 ENDED, THE UTILITY RALLY WASN'T CONFIRMED

DAYS EARLIER THAN THE INDUSTRIALS.

BY THE INDUSTRIALS.

Dow Jones Utilities

Dow Utilities

Dow Jones Industrials

Dow industrials

BONDS LEAD UTILITIES AT TOP 179

178 THE DOW UTILITIES AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS

BONDS LEAD UTILITIES AT TOP

FIGURE 10.5

THE BREAKDOWN IN BOND FUTURES THE LAST WEEK OF 1989 COINCIDED WITH A BULLISH

As revealed in Figure 10.3, the Dow Utilities peaked in the new year about a week BREAKOUT IN THE COMMODITY RESEARCH BUREAU FUTURES PRICE INDEX (LOWER CHART).

ahead of the Dow Industrials. Expanding the focus, it is evident what intermarket THE RALLY IN THE CRB INDEX FROM LATE SUMMER OF 1989 PREVENTED THE BOND MARKET
forces pulled the Dow Utilities lower. Figure 10.4 compares the Dow Utilities to FROM RESUMING ITS UPTREND.

Treasury bond futures during the same time span. First of all, notice that the rally in the utilities during the fourth quarter of 1989 was not confirmed by the bond market.

March Treasury Bond Futures

As the utilities rallied to new highs, the bond market stayed in a trading range. During the final week of 1989, bonds broke down and hit a two-month low. This breakdown in bonds preceded the breakdown in the utilities by a week. Toward the right side of the chart, the utilities are stabilizing while the bonds are probing for a bottom. The rally in the interest-sensitive utilities appears to be hinting that bonds are also due for a rally.

Widen the intermarket circle now to include commodities. Figure 10.5 shows that the breakdown in bonds during the final week in 1989 (which contributed to the FIGURE 10.4

Commodity Research Bureau Index

DURING THE LAST WEEK IN DECEMBER OF 1989, BOND FUTURES SET A TWO-MONTH LOW, PRECEDING THE BREAKDOWN IN THE UTILITIES A WEEK LATER. BONDS USUALLY LEAD THE

DOW UTILITIES. AS JANUARY 1990 ENDED, THE RALLY IN THE UTILITIES PROVIDED SOME

STABILITY TO THE BOND MARKET.

Dow Jones Utilities
selloff in the utilities a week later) coincided with an upside breakout in the CRB

Index. As the bottom chart shows, the rise in commodity prices (which usually trend March Treasury Bond Futures
in the opposite direction of bonds) was a primary reason that bonds were unable to set new highs during the fourth quarter. The bullish breakout in the CRB Index during the last week of the year finally pushed bond prices into a slide.

Figure 10.6 shows the main culprit that caused the commodity rally and the bond and utilities to tumble. Crude oil prices (sparked by a virtual explosion in heating oil) rallied sharply during December 1989. Probably more than any other factor, the ensuing rally in oil prices sent inflation jitters through the financial markets (and around the world) and contributed to the selloff in bonds. This oil rally hit bonds in another way. Japan imports all of its oil. The jump in oil during December (combined with a weak yen) pushed Japan's inflation rate sharply higher and caused a collapse in Japanese bond prices. As discussed in Chapter 8, downward pressure on global bond markets also pulled U.S. bonds lower. To the far right of both charts in Figure 10.6, the oil market has started to weaken, which is relieving downward pressure on bonds (and the Dow Utilities and, in turn, the Dow Industrials).

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS BONDS AND UTILITIES 181

180 THE DOW UTILITIES AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS

FIGURE 10.6

FIGURE 10.7

THERE IS A STRONG VISUAL CORRELATION BETWEEN THE DOW JONES UTILITY AVERAGE

THE BULLISH BREAKOUT IN CRUDE OIL FUTURES IN MID-DECEMBER 1989 WAS A MAJOR

(SOLID LINE) AND THE DOW JONES 20 BOND AVERAGE (DOTTED LINE). BOTH TURNED

FACTOR IN THE BREAKDOWN IN BONDS. THE OIL RALLY CAUSED GLOBAL BOND MARKETS

DOWN TOGETHER IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1987 AND THEN RALLIED TOGETHER INTO THE

(ESPECIALLY IN JAPAN) TO TUMBLE, WHICH ALSO HELPED PULL U.S. BOND PRICES LOWER.

SECOND HALF OF 1989. AS 1989 ENDED, BOTH WEAKENED.

March Treasury Bond Futures

Bonds versus Utilities

A LONGER VIEW OF UTILITIES AND BONDS

The previous discussion showed the ripple effect that usually occurs among the the utilities.) Both rallied together to the fourth quarter of 1989. At the 1989 top, financial sectors. As 1989 ended, commodities (oil in particular) started to rally; bonds formed a "double top" and failed to confirm the rally to new highs by the bonds started to drop; a week later the interest-sensitive utilities followed bonds utilities (see Figure 10.8).

lower; a week later the broader stock market followed bonds and the utilities lower.

The key to understanding the relationship between the Dow Utilities and the Dow THE CRB INDEX VERSUS BONDS AND UTILITIES

Industrials lies in the recognition of the close relationship between the utilities and bonds. As a general rule, the bond market (which is especially inflation-sensitive) If the Dow Utilities trend in the same direction as bonds, they should trend in the turns first. Utilities, being especially interest-sensitive, turn in the same direction as opposite direction of commodity prices. Figure 10.9 compares Treasury bonds and bonds before the general market does. The general market, as reflected in the Dow utilities (upper chart) to the CRB Index (lower chart). The upper chart shows the Jones Industrial Average, usually is the last to turn.

negative divergence between Treasury bonds and the Dow Utilities in early 1987 and Figures 10.7 and 10.8 compare the Dow Jones 20 Bond Average to the Dow Jones again in late 1989. The bearish action in bonds pulled the utilities lower. However, Utility Average. It can be seen that bonds and utilities are closely correlated. Both the bearish action in both bonds and utilities is closely correlated with rallies in the peaked during the first half of 1987 several months before stocks, which didn't top CRB Index. The final top in the Dow Utilities and the final peak in the bonds in early until August. (Although the Dow Jones 20 Bond Average set new highs in early 1987 coincided with a trough in the CRB Index. The breakdown in the two financial 1987, Treasury bonds failed to do so, thereby forming a negative divergence with markets in the spring of 1987 coincided with an upside breakout in the CRB Index.

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS BONDS AND UTILITIES 183

182 THE DOW UTILITIES AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS

FIGURE 10.8

FIGURE 10.9

WEAKNESS IN TREASURY BONDS AND UTILITIES IN EARLY 1987 AND LATE 1989 (UPPER

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DOW UTILITIES (SOLID LINE) VERSUS THE DOW JONES 20 BOND

CHART) IS LINKED TO STRENGTH IN THE CRB INDEX (BOTTOM CHART). THE RALLY IN

AVERAGE (DOTTED LINE) IN 1989. THE BOND MARKET FAILED TO ESTABLISH A NEW HIGH

TREASURY BONDS AND UTILITIES FROM MID-1988 IS LINKED TO THE PEAK IN THE CRB

DURING THE FOURTH QUARTER, FORMED A "DOUBLE TOP" FORMATION, AND CREATED A INDEX. BOTH FINANCIAL AVERAGES TREND IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION OF THE CRB INDEX.

BEARISH DIVERGENCE WITH THE DOW UTILITY AVERAGE.

TREASURY BONDS FAILED TO CONFIRM THE RALLY TO NEW HIGHS BY THE UTILITIES AT BOTH

THE 1987 AND THE 1989 PEAKS.

Utilities versus Bonds

Dow Utilities versus Bond Futures

184 THE DOW UTILITIES AS A LEADING INDICATOR OF STOCKS

SUMMARY 185

The CRB peak in mid-1988 helped launch the rallies in bonds and utilities that and that both bonds and utilities usually lead turns in the broader market. The 1987
lasted for a year. Finally, the CRB bottom in the autumn of 1989 began the topping peaks provide an excellent example of that interplay. The Dow Jones Utility Average process in bonds and utilities. We've established that utilities are positively linked to has become a part of the intermarket analysis and takes its place in the analysis of bonds, and that bonds are negatively linked to commodities. It follows, then, that the the U.S. dollar, commodity prices, bonds, and stocks. Its proper place lies between Dow Utilities are also negatively linked to commodities. Any significant rally in the bonds and the industrial stock' market averages. Utilities provide another vehicle for commodity markets will push interest rates higher and bond prices lower, which is determining the impact inflation and interest rate trends are having on the stock bearish for the utilities. Downtrending commodity markets will be bullish for bonds market as a whole. Analysis of the utilities also provides another way to measure and eventually for utilities as well.

interest-sensitive stock groups, a topic discussed in Chapter 9.

BONDS, UTILITIES, AND THE DOW INDUSTRIALS

SUMMARY

The final comparison links bonds, the Dow Utilities, and the Dow Industrials. Fig-The Dow Jones Utility Average (which includes 15 utility stocks) is the most ure 10.10 shows all three markets over the last five years. The upper chart overlays widely-watched utility index. Because utility stocks are so interest rate-sensitive, they Treasury bonds and the Dow Jones Utility Average. The bottom chart plots the Dow usually are impacted by interest rate changes before the general market. As a result, Jones Industrial Average. The chart shows that the utilities are closely linked to bonds, utilities usually follow the lead of bond prices and, in turn, usually lead the Dow Industrials at important turns. With one exception, (1977), the Dow Utilities have peaked ahead of the Dow Industrials every time since 1960 with an average lead time of three months. The Dow Utilities have more of an impact on the industrials FIGURE 10.10
during times when stocks are especially sensitive to interest rates. The reasons the BONDS AND UTILITIES (UPPER CHART) USUALLY LEAD THE STOCK MARKET (BOTTOM CHART) utilities are so interest-sensitive are because of their heavy borrowing needs and AT IMPORTANT TURNING POINTS. IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1987, BONDS AND UTILITIES
their relatively high dividends (which compete directly with yields in money market TURNED DOWN AND PROVIDED A WARNING THAT THE STOCK MARKET RALLY HAD
funds and certificates of deposit). The defensive qualities of utilities make them REACHED A DANGEROUS STAGE.

especially attractive during economic downturns and also explain their relatively strong performance at stock market bottoms.

Utilities versus Bond Futures

Although most of the 15 stocks are electric utilities (which are more interest-sensitive), some gas companies are included, which can be influenced by changes in natural gas prices. At market peaks, in particular, natural gas companies have a tendency to lag behind the electric utility stocks. The explosion in energy prices toward the end of 1989, and the relatively strong performance of gas companies during that fourth quarter, may partially explain why the Dow Utility Average set new highs as 1989 ended.

Because of their strong link to bonds and their tendency to lead the stock market, the utility stocks fit into the growing intermarket arsenal. The stock market is influenced by the utility stocks, which are influenced by the bond market and interest rates. Bonds and interest rates are influenced by commodity trends which, in turn, are affected by the trend of the U.S. dollar. Given their impressive record as a leading Dow Jones Industrial Average
indicator of the Dow Industrials, I suspect that if Charles Dow were alive today, he'd make the Dow Utilities an integral part of his Dow Theory.

11

RELATIVE-STRENGTH RATIOS 187
we'll be looking at (with the exception of gasoline). There are several ways commodity traders can employ relative-strength analysis to facilitate trade selection. To begin, a group selection approach will be used.

GROUP ANALYSIS

Utilizing the seven commodity sub-indices provided by the Commodity Research Bureau, we'll determine which groups have turned in the best performance on a relative-strength basis. The use of group analysis simplifies the trade selection process Relative-Strength Analysis
and helps commodity traders determine which commodity sectors are turning in the strongest or the weakest performances. Buying should be concentrated in the strongest sectors and selling in the weakest. After isolating the best group candidates, the of Commodities
relative-strength comparisons within those groups will be considered. The relative performance between the two leading groups will also be compared to see which is the best bet. Group analysis doesn't always tell the whole story, however.

INDIVIDUAL RANKINGS

Individual market comparisons can also help isolate which markets are turning in the best relative-strength performance. In this section the individual markets will be In stock market work, relative-strength analysis is very common. Portfolio managers ranked by relative performance over two time periods to see which ones qualify as move their money into those stock groups they believe will lead the next stock market the best buying or selling candidates. The reason for using two time periods is to see advance or, in a down market, will decline less than the other groups. In other words, if a market's relative ranking is improving or deteriorating. Suggestions will be made they're looking for those stock groups or stocks that will outperform the general market about how traders might incorporate this information into their overall trading plans.

on a relative basis. The group rotation process is scrutinized to determine which stock groups are leaders and which are laggards. Stock groups and individual stocks are RATIO ANALYSIS
compared to some objective benchmark, usually the Standard and Poor's 500 stock index. A ratio is calculated by dividing the stock group or the individual stock by Ratio analysis is generally employed in relative-strength analysis. (Relative-strength the S&P 500 index. If the relative-strength (RS) line is rising, the other entity is analysis in this context refers to the comparison of two entities, utilitizing price ratios, outperforming the general market. If the relative-strength (RS) line is declining, the and is not to be confused with the Relative Strength Index, which is an oscillator stock group or stock is underperforming the market.

developed by Welles Wilder.) Ratio charts allow comparisons between any two entities There are two major advantages to the use of relative-strength analysis as a tech-regardless of how they are priced. Some commodities are priced in cents per bushel, nical trading tool. First, another confirming technical indicator is created on the price dollars per ounce, or cents per pound. The CRB Index is priced in points. Ratio chart. If technical traders see a breakout on their price chart or some technical evi-analysis allows for universal comparisons. The ability to compare any two entities is dence that an item is beginning a move, they can look to the relative-strength line for especially important when making comparisons between different financial sectors, added confirmation. Bullish action on the price chart should be confirmed by a rising such as the CRB Index (commodities), foreign currencies, Treasury bonds, and stock relative-strength line. Divergence can play a role as well. A price move on the chart index futures, a subject that will be discussed in Chapter 12. However, there's still that is not confirmed by the RS line can create a divergence with the price action and something else needed.

warn of a possible trend change.

The second advantage lies in the ability to rank various items according to relative RELATIVE-STRENGTH RATIOS
strength. By normalizing the relative-strength numbers in some fashion, traders can rank the various groups or individual items from the strongest to the weakest. This When one entity is divided by another, a value or quotient is the result. These values will enable them to focus their attention on those items with the greatest relative can be plotted on a chart and compared with other values or ratio lines. However, the strength (if they're looking to buy) or the lowest relative strength (if they're looking to actual value will be influenced by the price of the numerator. Assuming a constant sell). In this chapter, the same principles of relative-strength analysis will be applied denominator, if the commodity in the numerator has a higher value than another to the commodity markets. Since the chapter will be dealing with commodity markets commodity, the resulting quotient will also be higher. Therefore, a more objective instead of stocks, the Commodity Research Bureau Futures Index will be employed.

method is required in order to compare the ratio values. A relative ratio does two All that is required for relative-strength analysis is the availability of some objec-things. First, it creates a ratio by dividing one entity (such as a commodity) by another tive benchmark that commodity groups and individual commodities can be measured entity (such as the CRB Index). It then creates an index with a starting value of 100, against. The logical choice is the CRB Index, which includes all of the commodities which begins at any time interval chosen by the trader.

186

188 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

COMMODITY GROUP RATIO CHARTS 189

This study will be using time spans of 25 and 100 trading days in the examples, FIGURE 11.1
although any period could have been chosen. The computer will give each ratio a THE UPPER CHART SHOWS THE CRB ENERGY GROUP INDEX OVER 100 DAYS. THE LOWER
starting value of 100 for any time period chosen. By doing so, it is possible to compare CHART IS A RELATIVE RATIO Of THE ENERGY GROUP INDEX DIVIDED BY THE CRB INDEX.

relative values. For example, one ratio may show a value of 110 over the selected time RATIO LINES CAN BE COMPARED TO THE ACTUAL INDEX FOR SIGNS OF DIVERGENCE. TREND-span. Another may show a ratio of 90. This means that the ratio of 110 increased by LINES CAN BE EMPLOYED ON THE RATIO ITSELF. AFTER BEING THE BEST-PERFORMING COM-10 percent during the time span chosen. The ratio of 90 declined by 10 percent during MODITY GROUP IN LATE 1989, ENERGY FUTURES LOST GROUND IN EARLY 1990.

the same period. The market with a ratio of 110 outperformed the market with 90
and will have a higher relative-strength ranking. The relative ratio lines will look the Commodity Research Bureau Energy Group lndex-100 Days same as ordinary ratio lines on the chart. The major advantage of the relative ratio is the ability to compare the actual ratio values on an objective basis and then to rank them according to relative performance.

GROUP COMPARISON

Compare the relative performance of the seven CRB Group Indexes in the 100 days spanning October 1989 to mid-February 1990. By using a relative ratio and choosing a 100 day time period, it is possible to determine a relative ranking of the seven groups over the latest five-month period.*

1. Energy (104.46)

2. Precious Metals (104.38)

3. Livestock & Meats (102.82)

4. Imported (97.03)

5. Industrials (95.97)

6. Oilseeds (95.54)

7. Grains (95.39)

Before even looking at a chart, some useful information is available. It is known that, during the previous 100 trading days, the energy and precious metal groups turned in the best relative performance, whereas the grains were the weakest. (Gold and energy stocks were also the two best performing stock market groups during this same time period.) The premise of relative-strength analysis is similar to that of trend analysis—that trends persist. The basic assumption is that if one is looking for markets with bullish potential, a logical place to start is with those markets that have demonstrated superior relative performance. There's no guarantee that superior performance will continue, but it provides a place to start. The next step is to analyze the ratio charts themselves.

COMMODITY GROUP RATIO CHARTS

Figures 11.1 through 11.3 plot the two leading groups (energy and precious metals) and the weakest group (the grains). Each Figure shows the actual commodity group index in the upper chart and the relative ratio line in the lower chart. The time span on all the charts is 100 trading days. The relative ratio simply divides the group index in question by the CRB Index. Chart analysis can then be applied to the group index itself and the ratio line. As a rule, they should trend in the same direction.

'See Chapter 7 for an explanation of the CRB Group Indexes.

190 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

COMMODITY GROUP RATIO CHARTS 191

FIGURE 11.2

FIGURE 11.3

A COMPARISON OF THE CRB PRECIOUS METALS CROUP INDEX (UPPER CHART) AND A REL-THE CRB GRAIN GROUP INDEX (UPPER CHART) IS COMPARED TO A RELATIVE RATIO OF

ATIVE RATIO OF THE PRECIOUS METALS INDEX (LOWER CHART) DIVIDED BY THE CRB INDEX

THE GRAIN INDEX DIVIDED BY THE CRB INDEX (BOTTOM CHART) OVER 100 DAYS. GRAINS

OVER 100 DAYS. PRECIOUS METALS WERE THE SECOND STRONGEST COMMODITY GROUP IN

WERE THE WEAKEST COMMODITY GROUP AS 1990 BEGAN BUT ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF

THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989. THE BREAKING OF THE UP TRENDLINE IN LATE DECEMBER

STABILIZING. IN LATE 1989, THE RATIO TURNED DOWN BEFORE THE ACTUAL CRB GRAIN

SIGNALED THAT THE PRECIOUS METALS' RELATIVE STRENGTH WAS SLIPPING.

INDEX.

Commodity Research Bureau Precious Metals Group lndex-100 Days Commodity Research Bureau Grain Group lndex-100 Days Relative Ratio of CRB Precious Metals Index Divided by CRB lndex-100 Days Relative Ratio of CRB Grain Index Divided by CRB lndex-100 Days

192 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

ENERGY GROUP ANALYSIS 193

ENERGY GROUP ANALYSIS

FIGURE 11.5

Having identified the two strongest groups, the trader should look within each group UNLEADED GASOLINE FUTURES (UPPER CHART) COMPARED TO A GASOLINE/CRB INDEX RA-for the best performing individual commodities. Figures 11.4 through 11.6 plot the TIO (LOWER CHART). BOTH CHARTS ARE SIMILAR. ANY VIOLATION OF THE LOWER TRADING

BANDS WOULD BE BEARISH FOR GASOLINE. GASOLINE FUTURES OUTPERFORMED THE CRB
relative performance of the three energy markets: crude oil, unleaded gasoline, and INDEX BY 11 PERCENT IN THE PREVIOUS 100 DAYS BUT LOST 10 PERCENT FROM THEIR JAN-heating oil. The energy group turned in the best performance, with a 100-day relative UARY PEAK RELATIVE TO THE CRB INDEX.

ratio of 104.46. This means the group as a whole gained 4.46 percent during the previous 100 days relative to the CRB Index. The rankings among the three energy April 1990 Unleaded Gasoline Futures Contract-100 Days markets are:

1. Crude oil (112.24)

2. Gasoline (111.39)

3. Heating oil (103.11)

These rankings would suggest that long positions be placed with crude oil as opposed to the products, assuming that the trader is bullish on the group. If the trader is bearish on energy prices, the products would qualify as better short-sale candidates.

FIGURE 11.4

Relative Ratio of Gasoline Divided by CRB lndex-100 Days CRUDE OIL FUTURES (UPPER CHART) COMPARED TO A CRUDE OIL/CRB INDEX RATIO (BOTTOM CHART) OVER 100 DAYS. THE BULLISH BREAKOUT IN CRUDE OIL IN LATE NOVEMBER

OF 1989 WAS CONFIRMED BY SIMILAR BULLISH ACTION IN THE OIL/CRB RATIO. BOTH ARE

TESTING UP TRENDLINES.

April 1990 Crude Oil Futures Contract-100 Days

Relative Ratio of April Crude Oil Divided by the CRB lndex-100 Days

194 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

PRECIOUS METALS GROUP ANALYSIS 195

FIGURE 11.6

FIGURE 11.7

HEATING OIL FUTURES (UPPER CHART) COMPARED TO A HEATING OIL/CRB INDEX RATIO

GOLD FUTURES (UPPER CHART) COMPARED TO A GOLD/CRB INDEX RATIO (BOTTOM CHART).

(BOTTOM CHART). HEATING OIL HAS BEEN THE WEAKEST OF THE ENERGY MARKETS DUR-GOLD HAS OUTPERFORMED THE CRB INDEX BY 9 PERCENT DURING THE PREVIOUS 100 DAYS

ING THE LAST 100 TRADING DAYS. IF THE ENERGY MARKETS BREAK DOWN, HEATING OIL

BUT IS LOSING MOMENTUM. THE RATIO LINE HAS ALREADY BROKEN A MINOR SUPPORT

MAY BE THE BEST SHORT-SELLING CANDIDATE BECAUSE OF ITS WEAK RELATIVE-STRENGTH

LEVEL AND MAY BE SIGNALING IMPENDING WEAKNESS IN GOLD.

RANKING.

April 1990 Cold Futures Contract-100 Days

April 1990 Heating Oil Futures Contract-100 Days Relative Ratio of April Gold Divided by the CRB lndex-100 Days Relative Ratio of Heating Oil Divided by CRB lndex-100 Days put on the long side of gold and platinum, if the trader is bullish on the group. If the PRECIOUS METALS GROUP ANALYSIS
trader is bearish on precious metals, silver would be the best short sale.

Ratio analysis within a group can also be helpful in finding the one or two Figures 11.7 through 11.9 plot the three precious metals (gold, platinum, and silver) commodities that are most likely to outperform the others. Ratio analysis will be in order of their own performance relative to the CRB Index. Over the past 100 days, applied to the precious metals markets to see what conclusions might be found.

these are the relative rankings of the three precious metals: Figure 11.10 is a platinum/gold ratio during the 100 days from October 1989 to mid-February 1990. This is the same time horizon being used for all the examples. The 1. Gold (109.20)

chart on the top and the relative ratio along the bottom both show that gold has 2. Platinum (105.40)

outperformed platinum over the past few months. Although both have been moving 3. Silver (95.92)

upward, gold has been the better relative performer. However, as the ratio chart on the bottom of Figure 11.10 shows, this may be changing. On a relative strength basis, the The relative ratio for gold appreciated by 9.2 percent over the past 100 days, and platinum/gold ratio has broken a down trendline and is breaking out to the upside.

platinum by 5.4 percent. The silver ratio actually lost 4.08 percent. These rankings This relative action would suggest that traders in the precious metals should begin suggest that of the three, gold is the strongest, platinum is the second strongest, and switching some capital out of gold into platinum on the assumption that platinum silver, a weak third. This technique would suggest that primary emphasis should be will now be the stronger of the two.

196 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

PRECIOUS METALS GROUP ANALYSIS 197

FIGURE 11.8

FIGURE 11.9

PLATINUM FUTURES (UPPER CHART) COMPARED TO A PLATINUM/CRB INDEX RATIO (BOT-SILVER FUTURES (UPPER CHART) COMPARED TO A SILVER/CRB INDEX RATIO (BOTTOM CHART).

TOM CHART). ALTHOUGH BOTH CHARTS ARE SIMILAR, THE RATIO LINE IS LAGGING BEHIND

SILVER HAS BEEN THE WEAKEST OF THE PRECIOUS METALS AND UNDERPERFORMED THE CRB

PLATINUM FUTURES. THIS MINOR BEARISH DIVERGENCE MAY BE HINTING THAT THE PLAT-INDEX BY 4 PERCENT IN THE PRIOR 100 TRADING DAYS. UPSIDE BREAKOUTS IN SILVER FU-INUM RALLY WILL BEGIN TO WEAKEN.

TURES AND THE SILVER/CRB RATIO ARE NEEDED TO TURN THE CHART PICTURE BULLISH.

April 1990 Platinum Futures Contract

March 1990 Silver Futures Contract

Relative Ratio of Platinum Divided by CRB Index Relative Ratio of March Silver Divided by the CRB Index

198 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

GOLD/SILVER RATIO 199

GOLD/SILVER RATIO

FIGURE 11.10

GOLD AND PLATINUM FUTURES (UPPER CHART) ARE COMPARED TO A PLATINUM/GOLD RA-Figure 11.11 shows the gold/silver ratio over the same 100 days. Since the ratio line TIO (BOTTOM CHART). ALTHOUGH GOLD WAS STRONGER DURING THE FOURTH QUARTER
has been rising, we can see that gold has outperformed silver by a wide margin.

OF 1989, THE BREAKING OF THE DOWN TRENDLINE BY THE RATIO IN JANUARY 1990 SUG-However, the up trendline drawn from the November lows has been broken. If the GESTS THAT PLATINUM IS NOW THE STRONGER. BULLISH TRADERS WOULD BUY PLATINUM.

ratio starts to weaken further, this would suggest that silver is undervalued relative BEARISH TRADERS WOULD SHORT COLD.

to gold and implies that silver merits consideration as a buying candidate. The upper chart compares the actual performance of gold versus silver. While gold is Gold versus Platinum
stalled at overhead resistance, silver has yet to rise above its potential basing area.

An upside breakout by silver, if accompanied by a falling gold/silver ratio, would suggest that silver is the better candidate for a long position of the two precious metals.

FIGURE 11.11

GOLD AND SILVER FUTURES (UPPER CHART) COMPARED TO A GOLD/SILVER RATIO (BOTTOM

CHART). GOLD HAS OUTPERFORMED SILVER BY 14 PERCENT OVER THE PREVIOUS 100 DAYS.

THE BREAKING OF THE RATIO UP TRENDLINE IS SUGGESTING THAT SILVER MAY NOW BE

THE STRONGER. HOWEVER, SILVER STILL NEEDS AN UPSIDE BREAKOUT ON ITS CHART TO

JUSTIFY TURNING BULLISH.

Cold versus Silver

200 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

RANKING INDIVIDUAL COMMODITIES 201

GOLD VERSUS OIL
will be done for two separate time periods—100 days and 25 days. By using two different time periods, it can be determined if the relative rankings of the commodities It's also useful to compare performance between two different groups of commodities are changing.

such as metals and energy. The top chart in Figure 11.12 compares gold and crude oil futures. The bottom chart plots a gold/oil ratio. When the ratio is rising (as happened

Ranking Ranking
during October and November 1989), gold is the better performer. Since the beginning

Commodity (last 25 days) Commodity (last 100 days)

of December, however, oil has been the better performer (since the gold/oil ratio is Lumber 105.70* Orange juice 144.34
dropping). Considering that both gold and oil turned in strong performances during Orange juice 105.62 Crude oil 112.24
the fourth quarter of 1989, money could have been made on the long side of both Platinum 105.59* Gasoline 111.39
markets. Relative-strength comparisons between those two strong markets, however, Crude oil 105.36 Hogs 109.41
would have given the technical trader an added edge—the ability to direct more Sugar 104.52* Gold 109.20
money into the stronger performing commodity.

Coffee 104.40* Platinum 105.40

Gold 103.27 Lumber 104.40

RANKING INDIVIDUAL COMMODITIES

Cattle 103.04* Sugar 104.34

Cocoa 102.03* Heating oil 103.11

Another way to rank relative commodity performance is simply to bypass the groups Corn 101.61* Cattle 102.79
and list the individual markets by their relative ratios. During this discussion, this Cotton 101.23* Porkbellies 99.59

Gasoline 100.59 Corn 99.13

FIGURE 11.12

Soy. oil 100.40* Coffee 97.71

GOLD AND CRUDE OIL FUTURES (UPPER CHART) COMPARED TO A GOLD/CRUDE OIL RATIO

Silver 100.28* Wheat 96.81

(BOTTOM CHART). THROUGH NOVEMBER OF 1989, GOLD OUTPERFORMED OIL AND WAS

Heating oil 98.29 Silver 95.92

THE BETTER PURCHASE. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF DECEMBER, OIL DID BETTER. TRADERS

Hogs 98.12 Soy. oil 93.91

CAN USE RATIOS TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BULLISH ALTERNATIVES.

Soybeans 97.24 Soybeans 91.16

Wheat 96.12 Oats 90.07

Gold versus Crude Oil

Oats 93.54 Soy. meal 89.04

Meal 93.04 Cotton 88.81

Copper 90.88* Cocoa 87.28

Bellies 89.76 Copper 82.77

In the preceding table, two columns of relative-strength rankings are shown. The second column from the left shows the relative ratio (individual commodity divided by the CRB Index) over the past 25 trading days. Column 4 uses a longer span of 100 days. While the longer time span might be more useful for studying longer-range trends, the shorter time interval can alert the trader to shorter-term shifts in relative strength. Column 4 shows that the six best performing markets during the previous five months were orange juice, crude oil, gasoline, hogs, gold, and platinum. Trend Cold/Crude Oil Relative Ratio
followers might want to concentrate on those markets that have been the strongest.

Contrarians might focus on those near the bottom of the list such as copper, cocoa, cotton, the soybean complex, and silver on the theory that their downtrends are overdone.

The asterisks alongside some commodities in column 2 mark those that improved their ranking over the previous five months. Those markets with asterisks that have gained ground in the previous 25 days include, in order of strength: lumber, platinum, sugar, coffee, cattle, cocoa, corn, cotton, soybean oil, silver, and copper. Since those markets are showing improved rankings, a trader looking for new long trades might want to use this list as a starting point in his search. Special emphasis would be placed on those candidates higher up on the list.

* Those commodities that moved up in the rankings

202 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

SUMMARY 203

By using two different time spans (such as 100 and 25 days) the trader is able to FIGURE 11.14
study not only the rankings, but any shifts taking place in those rankings. Relative-THE SUGAR/CRB RATIO (UPPER CHART) LOOKS BULLISH BUT NEEDS AN UPSIDE BREAKOUT
strength numbers alone can be misleading. A market may have a relatively high TO RESUME ITS UPTREND. THE COFFEE/CRB RATIO (BOTTOM CHART) HAS JUST COMPLETED
ranking, but that ranking may be weakening. A market with a lower ranking may be A BULLISH BREAKOUT. ALTHOUGH SUGAR HAS A HIGHER RATIO VALUE (104 FOR SUGAR
strengthening. While the relative rankings are important, the trend of the rankings VERSUS 97 FOR COFFEE), COFFEE HAS A BETTER TECHNICAL PATTERN. BOTH MARKETS ARE
is more important. The final decision depends on the chart pattern of the ratio line.

INCLUDED IN THE CRB IMPORTED CROUP INDEX AND ARE RALLYING TOGETHER.

As in standard chart analysis, the trader wants to be a buyer in an early uptrend in Sugar/CRB Index Relative Ratio-100 Days
the ratio line. Signs of a topping pattern in the ratio line (such as the breaking of an up trendline) would suggest a possible short sale. Figures 11.13 through 11.15 show relative ratios of six selected commodities in the 100 days from September 1989 to mid-February 1990.

SELECTED COMMODITIES

Figure 11.13 shows the lumber/CRB ratio in the upper box; the orange juice/CRB ratio is shown in the lower chart. These markets rank one and two over the past 25 days.

FIGURE 11.13

TWO STRONG PERFORMERS IN LATE 1989-EARLY 1990. THE TOP CHART SHOWS A LUM-Coffee/CRB Index Ratio-100 Days

BER/CRB INDEX RATIO. THE BOTTOM CHART USES A 40-DAY MOVING AVERAGE ON THE ORANGE JUICE/CRB RATIO. BOTH MARKETS HAVE BEEN STRONG BUT LOOK OVEREXTENDED.

MARKETS WITH HIGH RELATIVE-STRENGTH RANKINGS ARE SOMETIMES TOO OVERBOUGHT

TO BUY.

Lumber/CRB Index Relative Ratio-100 Days

(Orange juice ranked first over the previous 100 days, and lumber ranked seventh).

Figure 11.14 shows the ratios for sugar (upper box) and coffee (lower). Although sugar Orange Juice/CRB Index Relative Ratio-100 Days
has the higher.ranking over the previous month, coffee has the better-looking chart.

Figure 11.15 shows a couple of weaker performers that are showing some signs of bottoming action. The cotton ratio (upper box) and the soybean oil (lower chart) have just broken down trendlines and may be just starting a move to the upside. Figure 11.16 uses copper as an example of a market near the bottom of the relative strength ranking that is just beginning to turn up.

SUMMARY

This chapter applied relative-strength analysis to the commodity markets by using ratios of the individual commodities and commodity groups divided by the CRB Index. By using relative ratios, it is also possible to compare relative-strength numbers for purposes of ranking commodity groups and markets. The purpose of relative-strength analysis is to concentrate long positions in the strongest commodity markets

204 RELATIVE-STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF COMMODITIES

SUMMARY 205

FIGURE 11.15

FIGURE 11.16

EXAMPLES OF TWO RATIOS THAT ARE JUST BEGINNING TO TURN UP IN THE FIRST QUARTER

AN EXAMPLE OF A DEEPLY OVERSOLD MARKET. COPPER HAD THE LOWEST RELATIVE-OF 1990. THE COTTON/CRB INDEX RATIO (UPPER CHART) AND THE SOYBEAN OIL/CRB IN-STRENGTH RANKING DURING THE PREVIOUS 100 TRADING DAYS. A LOW RANKING, COM-DEX (BOTTOM CHART) HAVE BROKEN DOWN TRENDLINES. SOYBEAN OIL HAS THE BETTER

BINED WITH AN UPTURN IN THE RATIO, USUALLY SIGNALS AN OVERSOLD MARKET THAT

PATTERN AND HIGHER RELATIVE RATIO THAN COTTON.

IS READY TO RALLY. CONTRARIANS CAN FIND BUYING CANDIDATES NEAR THE BOTTOM

OF THE RELATIVE-STRENGTH RANKINGS AND SELLING CANDIDATES NEAR THE TOP OF THE

Cotton/CRB Index Relative Ratio-100 Days

RANKINGS.

CRB Index versus Copper-100 days

Soybean Oil/CRB Index Relative Ratio-100 Days

Relative Ratio of Copper Divided by CRB Index
within the strongest commodity groups. One way to accomplish this is to isolate the strongest groups and then to concentrate on the strongest commodities within By applying relative-strength analysis to the commodity markets, technical traders those groups. A second way is to rank the commodities individually. Short-selling are using intermarket principles as an adjunct to standard technical analysis. In addi-candidates would be concentrated in the weakest commodities in the weakest groups.

tion to analyzing the chart action of individual markets, commodity traders are using The trend of the relative ratio is crucial. The best way to determine this trend is to data from related commodity markets to aid them in their trade selection. Another apply standard chart analysis to the ratio itself. The ratio line should also be compared dimension has been added to the trading process. As in all intermarket work, traders to the group or commodity for signs of confirmation or divergence. A second way is to are turning their focus outward instead of inward. They are learning that nothing compare the rankings over different time spans to see if those rankings are improving happens in isolation and that all commodity markets are related in some fashion or weakening. The trend of the ratio is more important than its ranking. One caveat to other commodity markets. They are now using those interrelationships as part of to the use of rankings is that those markets near the top of the list may be overbought their technical trading strategy.

and those near the bottom, oversold.

While this chapter dealt with relative action within the commodity world, relative-Ratio analysis enables traders to choose between markets that are giving simul-strength analysis has important implications for all financial sectors, including bonds taneous buy signals or simultaneous sell signals. Traders could buy the strongest of and stocks. Ratio analysis can be used to compare the various financial sectors for the bullish markets and sell the weakest of the bearish markets. Used in this fashion, purposes of analysis and can be a useful tool in tactical asset allocation. Chapter ratio analysis becomes a useful supplement to traditional chart analysis. Ratio analy-12 will focus on ratio analysis between the financial sectors—commodities, bonds, sis can be used within commodity groups (such as the platinum/gold and gold/silver and stocks—and will also address the role of commodities as an asset class in the ratios) or between related markets (such as the gold/crude oil ratio).

asset allocation process.

12

RATIO ANALYSIS OF THE CRB INDEX VERSUS BONDS 207
those represented in the CRB Index) in the asset allocation process, along with bonds, stocks, and cash, is the most complete and logical application of intermarket analysis.

While addressing this issue, the question of utilizing managed commodity funds as another means for bond and stock portfolio managers to achieve diversification and improve their overall results will also be briefly discussed.

RATIO ANALYSIS OF THE CRB INDEX VERSUS BONDS

This section will begin with a comparison of the CRB Index and Treasury bonds.

Commodities and Asset Allocation

As stated many times before, the inverse relationship of commodity prices to bond prices is the most consistent and the most important link in intermarket analysis. The use of ratio analysis is another useful way to monitor this relationship. Ratio charts provide chartists with another indicator to analyze and are a valuable supplement to overlay charts. Traditional technical analysis, including support and resistance levels, trendlines, moving averages, and the like, can be applied directly to the ratio lines.

These ratio lines will often provide early warnings that the relationship between the two markets in question is changing.

Figures 12.1 to 12.3 compare the CRB Index to Treasury bonds during the five-In the preceding chapter, the concept of relative-strength, or ratio, analysis was ap-year period from the end of 1985 to the beginning of 1990. All of the figures are plied within the commodity markets. This chapter will expand on that application divided into two charts. The upper charts provide an overlay comparison of the CRB
in order to include the relative action between the commodity markets (represented Index to Treasury bonds. The bottom chart in each figure is a relative ratio chart of by the CRB Index) and bonds and stocks. There are two purposes in doing so. One the CRB Index divided by Treasury bond futures prices. As explained in Chapter is simply to introduce another technical tool to demonstrate how closely these three 11, the relative ratio indicator is a ratio of any two entities over a selected period of financial sectors (commodities, bonds, and stocks) are interrelated and to show how time with a starting value of 100. By utilizing a starting value of 100, it is possible to intermarket ratios can yield important clues to market direction. Ratio charts can measure relative percentage performance on a more objective basis.

help warn of impending trend changes and can become an important supplement to Figure 12.1 shows the entire five-year period. The ratio chart on the bottom was traditional chart analysis. A rising CRB Index to bond ratio, for example, is usually a dropping sharply as 1986 began. A disinflationary period such as that of the early warning that inflation pressures are intensifying. In such an environment, commodi-1980s will be characterized by falling commodity prices and rising bond prices.

ties will outperform bonds. A rising CRB/bond ratio also carries bearish implications Hence, the result will be a falling CRB/bond ratio. When the ratio is falling, as was for stocks.

the case until 1986 and again from the middle of 1988 to the middle of 1989, inflation The secondary purpose is to address the feasibility of utilizing commodity maris moderating and bond prices will outperform commodities. When the ratio is rising kets as a separate asset class along with bonds and stocks. Up to this point, inter-

(from the 1986 low to the 1988 peak and again at the end of 1989), inflation pressures market relationships have been used primarily as technical indicators to help trade are building, and commodities will outperform bonds. As a rule, a rising CRB/bond the individual sectors. However, there are much more profound implications having ratio also means higher interest rates.

to do with the potential role of commodities in the asset allocation process. If it can The trendlines applied to the ratio chart in Figure 12.1 show how well this type of be shown, for example, that commodity markets usually do well when bonds and chart lends itself to traditional chart analysis. Trendlines can be used for longer-range stocks are doing badly, why wouldn't a portfolio manager consider holding positions trend analysis (see the down trendline break at the 1986 bottom and the breaking of in commodity futures, both as a diversification tool and as a hedge against inflation?

the two-year up trendline at the start of 1989). Trendline analysis can also be utilized If bonds and stocks are dropping together, especially during a period of rising in-over shorter time periods, such as the up trendline break in the fall of 1987 and the flation, how is diversification achieved by placing most of one's assets in those two breaking of the down trendline in the spring of 1988.

financial areas? Why not have a portion of one's assets in a group of markets that usu-The real message of this chart, however, lies in the simple recognition that there ally does well at such times and that actually benefit from rising inflation—namely, are periods of time when bonds are the better place to be, and there are times when the commodity markets?

commodities are the preferred choice. During the entire five-year period shown in One of the themes that runs throughout this book has to do with the fact that Figure 12.1, bonds outperformed the CRB Index by almost 30 percent. However, from the important role played by commodity markets in the intermarket picture has been 1986 until the middle of 1988, commodities outperformed bonds (solely on a relative largely ignored by financial traders. By linking commodity markets to bonds and price basis) by about 30 percent.

stocks (through the impact of commodities on inflation and interest rates), a break-Figure 12.2 shows the relative action from the mid-1988 peak in the ratio to through has been achieved. The full implication of that breakthrough, however, goes March of 1990. During that year and a half period, bonds outperformed the CRB
beyond utilizing the commodity markets just as a technical indicator for bonds and Index by about 20 percent. However, in the final six months, from August of 1989
stocks. It may very well be that some utilization of commodity markets (such as into March of 1990, the CRB Index outperformed bonds by approximately 12 percent.

206

208 COMMODITIES AND ASSET ALLOCATION

RATIO ANALYSIS OF THE CRB INDEX VERSUS BONDS 209

FIGURE 12.1

FIGURE 12.2

A COMPARISON OF THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BONDS FROM THE END OF 1985 TO

AN OVERLAY CHART OF THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BONDS (UPPER CHART) AND A RATIO

EARLY 1990. THE UPPER CHART IS AN OVERLAY COMPARISON. THE BOTTOM CHART IS A CHART OF THE CRB INDEX DIVIDED BY BONDS (LOWER CHART) FROM EARLY 1988 TO EARLY

RELATIVE RATIO CHART OF THE CRB INDEX DIVIDED BY BOND FUTURES. A RISING RATIO

1990. THE FALLING RATIO FROM MID-1988 TO MID-1989 WAS BULLISH FOR BONDS. IN THE

FAVORS COMMODITIES, WHEREAS A FALLING RATIO FAVORS BONDS. FROM 1986 TO MID-SEVEN MONTHS SINCE AUGUST OF 1989, THE CRB INDEX OUTPERFORMED BOND FUTURES

1988, COMMODITY PRICES OUTPERFORMED BONDS BY ABOUT 30 PERCENT. TRENDLINES

BY ABOUT 12 PERCENT.

HELP PINPOINT TURNS IN THE RATIO.

CRB Index versus Treasury Bonds

CRB Index versus Treasury Bonds

Relative Ratio of CRB Index Divided by Treasury Bonds Relative Ratio of CRB Index Divided by Treasury Bonds This chart also shows that the breakdown in the ratio in the spring of 1989 reflected a spectacular rally in the bond market and a collapse in commodities.

Figure 12.3 shows a closer picture of the rally in the CRB/bond ratio that began in the summer of 1989. This figure shows that the bottom in the ratio in August 1989

(bottom chart) coincided with a peak in the bond market and a bottom in the CRB

Index (upper chart). Inflation pressures that began to build during the fourth quarter of 1989 began from precisely that point. And very few people noticed. The upside breakout in the ratio in Figure 12.3 near the end of December 1989 indicated that inflation pressures were getting more serious. This put upward pressure on interest rates and increased bearish pressure on bonds.

There are two lessons to be learned from these charts. The first is that turning points in the ratio line can be pinpointed with reasonable accuracy with trendlines and some basic chart analysis. The second is that traders now have a more useful

210 COMMODITIES AND ASSET ALLOCATION

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS STOCKS 211
tool to enable them to shift funds between the two sectors. When the ratio line is FIGURE 12.3
rising, buy commodities; when the ratio is falling, buy bonds. The direction of the THE CRB INDEX VERSUS TREASURY BOND FUTURES FROM FEBRUARY 1989 TO MARCH 1990.

CRB Index/bond ratio also says something about the health of the stock market.

IN AUGUST OF 1989, THE CRB/BOND RATIO HIT BOTTOM. IN DECEMBER, THE RATIO BROKE

OUT TO THE UPSIDE, SIGNALING HIGHER COMMODITIES AND WEAKER BONDS. A RISING

RATIO MEANS HIGHER INTEREST RATES.

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS STOCKS

Figures 12.4 through 12-.6 use the same relative-strength format that was employed in CRB Index versus Treasury Bonds
the previous figures, except this time the CRB index is divided by the S&P 500 stock index. The time period is the same five years, from the end of 1985 to the first quarter of 1990. The bottom chart in Figure 12.4 shows that the S&P 500 outperformed the CRB Index by almost 50 percent (on a relative price basis) over the entire five years.

There were only two periods when commodities outperformed stocks. The first was in the period from the summer of 1987 to the summer of 1988. Not surprisingly, this period encompassed the stock market crash in the second half of 1987 and the FIGURE 12.4

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS THE S&P 500 STOCK INDEX FROM LATE 1985 TO EARLY 1990. THE

CRB/S&P RATIO (BOTTOM CHART) SHOWS THAT ALTHOUGH STOCKS HAVE OUTPERFORMED

COMMODITIES DURING THOSE FIVE YEARS, COMMODITIES OUTPERFORMED STOCKS FROM

MID-1987 TO MID-1988 AND AGAIN AS 1989 ENDED. COMMODITIES TEND TO DO BETTER

WHEN STOCKS FALTER.

CRB Index versus S&P 500

surge in commodity prices during the first half of 1988 owing to the midwest drought.

FIGURE 12.6

During these 12 months, the CRB Index outperformed the S&P 500 stock index by THE CRB INDEX VERSUS THE S&P 500 FROM MID-1989 TO MARCH OF 1990. THE CRB/S&P RA-about 25 percent. The second period began in the fourth quarter of 1989 and carried into early 1990.

TIO (BOTTOM CHART) TROUGHED IN OCTOBER OF 1989 AND JANUARY OF 1990 AS STOCKS

WEAKENED. IN THE FIVE MONTHS SINCE THAT OCTOBER, THE CRB INDEX OUTPERFORMED

Figure 12.5 shows a significant up trendline break in the CRB/stock ratio during THE S&P 500 BY ABOUT 14 PERCENT. DURING STOCK MARKET WEAKNESS, COMMODITIES
the summer of 1988 and the completion of a "double top" in the ratio as 1989 began.

USUALLY DO RELATIVELY BETTER.

This breakdown in the ratio confirmed that the pendulum had swung away from commodities and back to equities. In October of 1989, however, the pendulum began CRB Index versus S&P 500
to swing back to commodities.

In mid-October of 1989, the U.S. stock market suffered a severe selloff as shown in the upper portion of Figure 12.6. A second peak was formed during the first week of January 1990. Stocks then dropped sharply again. The upper portion of Figure 12.6
also shows that commodity prices were rising while stocks were dropping. The lower portion of this chart shows two prominent troughs in the CRB/S&P ratio in October and January and a gradual uptrend in the ratio. From October 1989 to the end of February 1990, the CRB Index outperformed the S&P 500 by about 14 percent.

FIGURE 12.5

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS THE S&P 500 FROM 1987 TO EARLY 1990. THE DOUBLE TOP IN THE

CRB/S&P RATIO (BOTTOM CHART) DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1988 SIGNALED A SHIFT

AWAY FROM COMMODITIES TO EQUITIES. IN THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989, COMMODITIES GAINED RELATIVE TO STOCKS.

CRB Index versus S&P 500

One clear message that emerges from a study of these charts is this. While stocks have been the better overall performer during the most recent five years, commodities tend to do better when the stock market begins to falter. There's no question that during a roaring bull market in stocks, commodities appear to add little advantage.

However, it is precisely when stocks begin to tumble that commodities often rally.

This being the case, having some funds in commodities would seem to lessen the impact of stock market falls and would provide some protection from inflation.

Another way of saying the same thing is that stocks and commodities usually do best at different times. Commodities usually do best in a high inflation environment (such as during the 1970s), which is usually bearish for stocks. A low inflation environment (when commodities don't do as well) is bullish for stocks. Relative-, strength analysis between commodities and stocks can warn commodity and stock market traders that existing trends may be changing. A falling ratio would be supportive to stocks and suggests less emphasis on commodity markets. A rising commodity/stock ratio would suggest less stock market exposure and more emphasis on inflation hedges, which would include some commodities.

214 COMMODITIES AND ASSET ALLOCATION

THE CRB INDEX VERSUS STOCKS 215

Bonds and stocks are closely linked. One of the major factors impacting on the that limiting one's assets to bonds and stocks at such times does not really provide price of bonds is inflation. It follows, therefore, that a period of accelerating inflation adequate protection against inflation and also falls short of achieving proper diversi-

(rising commodity prices) is usually bearish for bonds and will, in time, be bearish for fication. Diversification is achieved by holding assets in areas that are either poorly stocks. Declining inflation (falling commodity prices) is usually beneficial for bonds correlated or negatively correlated. In a high inflation environment, commodities fill and stocks. It should come as no surprise then, that there is a positive correlation both roles.

between the CRB Index/bond ratio and the CRB Index/S&P 500 ratio. Figure 12.7

Figure 12.8 compares the commodity/bond ratio (upper chart) and the com-compares the CRB/bond ratio (upper chart) and the CRB/S&P 500 ratio (lower chart) modity/stock ratio (lower chart) from 1988 to early 1990. To the upper left, it can from 1985 into early 1990.

be seen that both ratios turned down at about the same time during the summer of Figure 12.7 shows a general similarity between the two ratios. Four separate 1988. These downtrends accelerated during the spring of 1989. However, both ra-trends can be seen in the two ratios. First, both declined during the early 1980s into tios bottomed out together during the summer of 1989 and rose together into March the 1986-1987 period. Second, both rose into the middle of 1988. Third, both fell of 1990. Once again, the similar performance of the two ratios demonstrates the from mid-1988 to the third quarter of 1989. Fourth, both rallied as the 1980s ended.

relatively close linkage between bonds and stocks and the negative correlation of The charts suggest that periods of strong commodity price action (rising inflation) commodities to both financial sectors. Traders who attempt to diversify their funds usually have an adverse effect on both bonds and stocks.

and, at the same time protect against inflation by switching between stocks and bonds, During periods of high inflation (characterized by rising CRB Index/bond-stock ratios), commodities usually outperform both bonds and stocks. This would suggest FIGURE 12.8

FIGURE 12.7

A COMPARISON OF THE CRB/BOND RATIO (UPPER CHART) AND THE CRB/S&P RATIO (BOTTOM CHART) FROM EARLY 1988 TO EARLY 1990. BOTH RATIOS PEAKED AT ABOUT THE SAME

A COMPARISON OF THE CRB/BOND RATIO (UPPER CHART) AND THE CRB/S&P 500 RATIO

TIME IN MID-1988 AND BOTTOMED DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1989. SINCE BOTH RA-

(LOWER CHART) IN THE FIVE YEARS SINCE 1985. THERE IS A SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE TWO

TIOS OFTEN DECLINE AT THE SAME TIME, NEITHER BONDS NOR STOCKS APPEAR TO PROVIDE

RATIOS. RISING COMMODITY PRICES USUALLY HAVE A BEARISH IMPACT ON BOTH BONDS

AND STOCKS, ALTHOUGH THE IMPACT ON BONDS IS MORE IMMEDIATE.

AN ADEQUATE HEDGE AGAINST INFLATION.

CRB Index/Treasury Bond ratio

CRB Index/Treasury Bond Ratio

CRB Index/S&P 500 Ratio

CRB Index/S&P 500 ratio

CAN FUTURES PLAY A ROLE IN ASSET ALLOCATION? 217

216 COMMODITIES AND ASSET ALLOCATION
are actually achieving little of each. At times when both bonds and stocks are begin-FIGURE 12.9
ning to weaken, the only area that seems to offer not only protection, but real profit A COMPARISON OF THE S&P 500 STOCK INDEX (UPPER CHART) AND A CRB/TREASURY BOND
potential, lies in the commodity markets represented by the CRB Index.

RATIO (LOWER CHART) SINCE 1986. A RISING CRB/BOND RATIO IS USUALLY BEARISH FOR

STOCKS. A FALLING RATIO IS BULLISH FOR EQUITIES. A RISING RATIO DURING 1987 WARNED

OF THE IMPENDING MARKET CRASH IN THE FALL OF THAT YEAR. A FALLING RATIO FROM

THE CRB/BOND RATIO LEADS THE CRB/STOCK RATIO

MID-1988 TO MID-1989 HELPED SUPPORT A STRONG UPMOVE IN THE STOCK MARKET.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from studying these two ratios shown in Figure S&P 500 Stock Index

12.7 and 12.8 is that the CRB Index/bond ratio usually leads the CRB Index/S&P

500 ratio. This is easily explained. The bond market is more sensitive to inflation pressures and is more closely tied to the CRB Index. The negative impact of rising inflation on stocks is more delayed and not as strong. Therefore, it would seem logical to expect the commodity/bond ratio to turn first. Used in this fashion, the CRB/bond ratio can be used as a leading indicator for stocks. The CRB/bond ratio started to rally strongly in the spring of 1987 while the CRB/stock ratio was still falling (Figure 12.7).

The result was the October 1987 stock market crash. The CRB/bond ratio bottomed out in August of 1989 and preceded the final bottom in the CRB/stock ratio two months later in October. In both instances, turning points in the CRB/stock ratio were anticipated by turns in the CRB Index/bond ratio. Figure 12.9 provides another way to study the effect of the commodity/bond ratio on stocks.

Figure 12.9 compares the commodity/bond ratio (bottom chart) with the action in the S&P 500 Index over the five years since 1986. By studying the areas marked off by the arrows, it can be seen that a rising CRB Index/bond ratio has usually been followed by or accompanied by weak stock prices. The two most striking examples occurred during 1987 and late 1989. The rising ratio during the first half of 1988
didn't actually push stock prices lower but prevented equities from advancing. The major advance in stock prices during 1988 didn't really begin until the CRB/bond ratio peaked out that summer and started to drop.

A falling ratio has usually been accompanied by firm or rising stock prices. The most notable examples of the bullish impact of a falling ratio on stocks in Figure 12.9 can be seen from the fourth quarter of 1986 to the first quarter of 1987 and the period from the summer of 1988 to the summer of 1989. A falling ratio during the early 1980s also provided a bullish environment for stocks (not shown here). The study of the CRB Index/bond ratio tells a lot about which way the inflation winds are blowing, which of these two markets is in the ascendancy at the moment, and sheds light on prospects for the stock market. A falling CRB/bond ratio is bullish for stocks. A sharply rising ratio is a bearish warning.

are represented in the futures markets—commodities, currencies, interest rates, and equities. Futures contracts exist on the Japanese and British bond and stock markets CAN FUTURES PLAY A ROLE IN ASSET ALLOCATION?

as well as on several other overseas financial markets.

With the development of financial futures over the past twenty years, futures traders Futures traders, therefore, have a lot to choose from. In many ways, the futures can now participate in all financial sectors. Individual commodities, representing the markets provide an excellent asset allocation forum. Futures traders can easily swing oldest sector of the futures world, can be traded on various exchanges. Metals and money among the four sectors to take advantage of both short- and long-term market energy markets are traded in New York, whereas most agricultural commodities are trends. They can emphasize long positions in bond and stock index futures when traded in Chicago. CRB Index futures provide a way to use a basket approach to the these financial markets are outperforming the commodity markets, and reverse the commodity markets.

process just as easily when the financial markets start to slip and commodities begin Interest-rate futures provide exposure to Treasury bills, notes, and bonds as well to outperform. During periods of rising inflation, they can supplement long positions as the short-term Eurodollar market. Stock index futures offer a basket approach to in commodity markets with long positions in foreign currencies (such as the Deutsche trading general trends in the stock market. Foreign currency futures and the U.S.-Dollar mark), which usually rise along with American commodities (during periods of dollar Index provide vehicles for participation in foreign exchange trends. All four sectors weakness).

218 COMMODITIES AND ASSET ALLOCATION

THE VALUE OF MANAGED FUTURES ACCOUNTS 219

A GLIMPSE OF THE FOUR FUTURES SECTORS

The two charts to the right of Figure 12.10 (NYSE stock index futures on the upper Figure 12.10 provides a glimpse at the four sectors of the futures markets during the right and Treasury bond futures on the lower right) have been dropping for essentially 100 days from November of 1989 to the first week of March 1990. The two charts the same reasons that commodities and foreign currencies have been rising—namely, on the left (the Deutsche mark on the upper left and the CRB Index on the bottom a falling U.S. dollar and renewed inflation pressures. Futures traders could have cho-left) have been rising for several months. Both areas benefited from a sharp drop in sen to liquidate long positions in bonds and stock index futures during that period the U.S. dollar (not shown) during that time, which boosted inflation pressures in and concentrate long positions in commodities and currencies. Or they could have the states. At such times, traders can buy individual commodity markets (such as benefited from declining financial markets by initiating short positions in interest rate gold and oil) or the CRB Index as a hedge against inflation. Or they can buy foreign and stock index futures.

currency futures, which also rise as the U.S. dollar falls. If they prefer the short side By selling short, a trader actually makes money in falling markets. The nature of of the market, they can sell the U.S. Dollar Index short and benefit directly from a futures trading makes short selling as easy as buying. As a result, futures professionals declining American currency.

have no bullish or bearish preference. They can buy a rising market or sell a falling market short. The upshot of all of this is an amazing number of choices available to futures traders. They can participate in all market sectors, and trade from both the long and the short side.-They can benefit from periods of inflation and periods of FIGURE 12.10
disinflation. The futures markets provide an excellent environment for the application A COMPARISON OF THE FOUR FINANCIAL SECTORS REPRESENTED BY THE FUTURES MARKETS
of tactical asset allocation, which refers to the switching of funds among various asset AS 1989 ENDED AND 1990 BEGAN: CURRENCIES (UPPER LEFT), COMMODITIES (LOWER LEFT), classes to achieve superior performance. The fact that futures contracts trade on only BONDS (LOWER RIGHT), AND STOCKS (UPPER RIGHT). BY INCLUDING ALL FOUR SECTORS, 10 percent margin also makes that process quicker and cheaper. Given these facts, FUTURES MARKETS PROVIDE A BUILT-IN ASSET ALLOCATION FORUM. FOREIGN CURRENCIES
professionally managed futures funds would seem to be an ideal place for portfolio AND COMMODITIES WILL USUALLY RISE DURING DOWNTURNS IN THE BOND AND STOCK
managers to seek diversification and protection from inflation.

MARKETS.

Deutsche Mark Futures NYSE Stock Index Futures

THE VALUE OF MANAGED FUTURES ACCOUNTS

Over the past few years, money managers have begun to consider the potential benefits of allocating a portion of their assets to managed futures accounts to achieve diversification and some protection against inflation. Attention started to focus on this area with the work of Professor John Lintner of Harvard University. In the spring of 1983, Lintner presented a paper at the annual conference of the Financial Analysts Federation in Toronto, Canada.

The paper entitled "The Proposed Role of Managed Commodity-Financial Futures Accounts (and/or Funds) In Portfolios of Stocks and Bonds" drew attention to the idea of including managed futures accounts as a portion of the traditional portfolio of bonds and stocks. Since then, other researchers have updated Lintner's results with similar conclusions. Those conclusions show that futures portfolios have higher returns and higher risks. However, since returns on futures portfolios tend to CRB Index

Treasury Bond Futures
be poorly correlated with returns on bonds and stocks, significant improvements in reward/risk ratios can be achieved by some inclusion of managed futures. Lintner's paper contained the following statement:

Indeed, the improvements from holding efficiently selected portfolios of managed accounts or funds are so large—and the correlations between the returns on the futures-portfolios and those on the stock and bond portfolios are so surprisingly low (sometimes even negative)—that the return/risk tradeoffs provided by augmented portfolios, consisting partly of funds invested with appropriate groups of futures managers (or funds) combined with funds invested in portfolios of stocks alone (or in mixed portfolios of stocks and bonds), clearly dominate the tradeoffs available from portfolios of stocks alone (or from portfolios of stocks and bonds). . . . The combined portfolios of stocks (or stocks and bonds) after including judicious investments in appropriately selected . . . managed futures accounts (or funds) show substantially less risk at every possible level of expected return than portfolios of stocks (or stocks and bonds) alone.

COMMODITIES AND ASSET ALLOCATION

WHAT ABOUT RISK? 221

WHY ARE FUTURES PORTFOLIOS POORLY

Long-Term High-Grade Corporate Bond Index. Government bonds use an approximate CORRELATED WITH STOCKS AND BONDS?

maturity of 20 years. The commodity portion is represented by a return on the CRB

There are two major reasons why futures funds are poorly correlated with bonds and Index plus 90 percent of the return on Treasury Bills (since a CRB Index futures stocks. The first lies in the diversity of the futures markets. Futures fund managers position only requires a 10 percent margin deposit). Table 12.1 summarizes some of deal in all sectors of the futures markets. Their trading results are not dependent the results.

on just bonds and stocks. Most futures fund managers are trend-followers. During Over the entire 30-year period, U.S. stocks were the best overall performer financial bull markets, they buy interest rate and stock index futures and benefit (1428.41) whereas the CRB Index came in second (1175.26). In the two periods be-accordingly. During downturns in bonds and stocks, however, their losses in the ginning in 1965 and 1970 to 1988, the CRB Index was the best performer (974.70
financial area will be largely offset by profits in commodities and foreign currencies and 787.97, respectively), while U.S. stocks took second place (766.78 and 650.69, which tend to rise at such times. They have built in diversification by participating respectively). Those two periods include the inflationary 1970s when commodities in four different sectors which are usually negatively correlated.

experienced enormous bull markets. In the fifteen years since 1975, stocks regained The second reason has to do with short selling. Futures managers are not tied first place (555.69) while corporate bonds took second place (338.23). The CRB In-to the long side of any markets. They can benefit from bear markets in bonds and dex slipped to third place (336.47). Since 1980, corporate bonds turned in the best stocks by shorting futures in these two areas. In such an environment, they can hold returns (300.58), with stocks and government bonds just about even in second place.

short positions m the financial markets and long positions in commodities In this The CRB Index, reflecting the low inflation environment of the 1980s, slipped to last.

way, they can do very well during periods when financial markets are experiencing During the final period, from 1985 to 1988, stocks were again the best place to be, downturns, especially if inflation is the major culprit. And this is precisely when with bonds second. Commodities turned in the worst performance in the final four traditional bond and stock market portfolio managers need the most help.

years.

The late Dr. Lintner's research and that of other researchers is based on the track Although financial assets (bonds and stocks) were clearly the favored investments records of Commodity Trading Advisors and publicly-traded futures mutual funds during the 1980s, commodities outperformed bonds by a wide margin over the entire winch are monitored and published by Managed Account Reports (5513 Twin Knolls 30-year span and were the best performers of the three classes during the most recent Road, Columbia, MD 21045). The purpose in mentioning it here is simply to alert the 20- and 25-year spans. The rotating leadership suggests that each asset class has "its reader to work being done in this area and to suggest that the benefits of intermarket day in the sun," and argues against taking too short a view of the relative performance trading, which is more commonly practised in the futures markets, may someday between the three sectors.

become more widely recognized and utilized in the investment community.

Let's narrow the focus and concentrate on one portion of the futures portfolio -

WHAT ABOUT RISK?

the traditional commodity markets. This book has focused on this group's importance as a hedge against inflation and its interrelationships with the other three sectors-Total returns are only part of the story. Risk must also be considered. Higher returns currencies, bonds, and stocks. The availability of the widely-watched Commodity are usually associated with higher risk, which is just what the study shows. During Research Bureau Futures Price Index and the existence of a futures contract on that the 30 years under study, stock market returns showed an average standard deviation index have allowed the use of one commodity index for intermarket comparisons of 3.93, the largest of all the asset classes. (Standard deviation measures portfolio vari-Utilizing an index to represent all commodity markets has made it possible to look ance and is a measure of risk. The higher the number, the greater the risk.) The CRB
at the commodity markets as a whole instead of several small and unrelated parts Index had the second highest with 2.83. Government and corporate bonds showed Serious work in intermarket analysis (linking commodity markets to the financial markets) began with the introduction of CRB Index futures in 1986 as traders began to study that index more closely on a day-to-day basis.

TABLE 12.1

Why not carry the use of the CRB Index a step further and examine whether or YEARLY RETURNS: BONDS, EQUITIES, AND COMMODI-not its components qualify as a separate asset class and, if so, whether any benefits TIES (ASSUMING A $100 INVESTMENT IN EACH CLASS
can be achieved by incorporating a basket approach to commodity trading into the DURING EACH TIME PERIOD)

more traditional investment philosophy? To explore this avenue further, I'm going to rely on statistics compiled by Powers Research Associates, L.P. (30 Montgomery Govt.

Corp.

U.S.

CRB

Street, Jersey City, NJ 07306) and published by the New York Futures Exchange in a Bonds

Bonds

Stocks

Index
work entitled "Commodity Futures as an Asset Class" (January 1990).

1960-1988

442.52

580.21

1428.41

1175.26

1965-1988

423.21

481.04

766.78

974.70

COMMODITY FUTURES AS AN ASSET CLASS

1970-1988

423.58

452.70

650.69

787.97

1975-1988

314.16

338.23

555.69

336.47

The study first compares the returns of the four categories (government bonds, corpo-1980-1988

288.87

300.58

289.27

153.68
rate bonds, U.S. stocks, and the CRB Index) from 1961 through 1988. US stocks are 1985-1988

132.79

132.32

145.62

128.13
represented by the S&P 500 Index and U.S. corporate bonds by the Salomon Brothers

COMMODITIES AND ASSET ALLOCATION

SUMMARY 223
the lowest relative risk, with standard deviations of 2.44 and 2.42, respectively It may come as a surprise to some that a portfolio of stocks included in the S&P 500

FIGURE 12.11

THE EFFICIENT FRONTIERS Of FOUR DIFFERENT PORTFOLIOS. THE LINE TO THE FAR RIGHT

Index carries greater risk that an unleveraged portfolio of commodities included in the CRB Index.

INCLUDES JUST BONDS AND STOCKS. THE LiNES SHIFT UPWARD AND TO THE LEFT AS COMMODITIES ARE ADDED IN INCREMENTS OF 10 PERCENT, 20 PERCENT, AND 30 PERCENT. THE

Other statistics provided in the study have an important bearing on the potential EFFICIENT FRONTIER PLOTS PORTFOLIO RISK (STANDARD DEVIATION) ON THE HORIZONTAL
role of commodities as an appropriate diversification tool and as a hedge against AXIS AND EXPECTED RETURN ON THE VERTICAL AXIS. (SOURCE: "COMMODITY FUTURES AS
inflation. Over the entire 30 years, the CRB index showed negative correlations of AN ASSET CLASS," PREPARED BY POWERS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, L.P., PUBLISHED BY THE

-0.1237 and -0.1206 with government and corporate bonds, respectively, and a NEW YORK FUTURES EXCHANGE, JANUARY 1990.)

small positive correlation of 0.0156 with the S&P 500. The fact that commodities show a slight negative correlation to bonds and a positive correlation to stocks that Domestic Assets Efficient Frontier (1961-1988)

is close to zero would seem to support the argument that commodities would qualify as an excellent way to diversify portfolio risk.

A comparison of the CRB Index to three popular inflation gauges-the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the Producer Price Index (PPI), and the implicit GNP
deflator—over the 30-year period shows that commodity prices were highly correlated to all three inflation measures, with correlations above 90 percent in all cases That strong positive correlation between the CRB Index and those three popular inflation measures supports the value of utilizing commodity markets as a hedge against inflation.

PUSHING THE EFFICIENT FRONTIER

The efficient frontier is a curve on a graph that plots portfolio risk (standard deviation) on the horizontal axis and expected return on the vertical axis. The efficient frontier slopes upward and to the right, reflecting the higher risk associated with higher returns. Powers Research first developed a set of optimized portfolios utilizing only stocks and bonds. By solving for the highest expected return for each level of risk, an efficient frontier was created. After determining optimal portfolios using only bonds and stocks, commodity futures were added at three different levels of commitment. The result was four portfolios-one with no commodities, and three other portfolios with commodity commitments of 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent.

SUMMARY

Figure 12.11 shows the effects of introducing the CRB Index at those three levels of This chapter has utilized ratio analysis to better monitor the relationship between involvement.

commodities (the CRB Index) and bonds and stocks. Ratio analysis provides a useful Four lines are shown in Figure 12.11. The one to the far right is the efficient technical tool for spotting trend changes in these intermarket relationships. Trendline frontier for a portfolio of just stocks and bonds. Moving to the left, the second line analysis can be applied directly to the ratio lines themselves. A rising CRB/bond ratio has a CRB exposure of 10 percent. The third line to the left commits 20 percent to suggests that commodities should be bought instead of bonds. A falling CRB/bond commodities, whereas the line to the far left places 30 percent of its portfolio in the ratio favors long commitments in bonds. A rising CRB/bond ratio is also bearish for CRB Index. The chart demonstrates that increasing the level of funds committed to equities. Rising commodities have an adverse impact on both bonds and stocks. The the CRB Index has the beneficial effect of moving the efficient frontier upward and to CRB/bond ratio usually leads turns in the CRB/S&P 500 ratio and can be used as a the left, meaning that the portfolio manager faces less risk for a given level of return leading indicator for stocks.

when a basket of commodities is added to the asset mix. Statistics are also presented The commodities included in the CRB Index should qualify as an asset class that measure the change in the reward to risk ratios that take place as the result of along with bonds and stocks. Because commodity markets are negatively correlated including commodities along with bonds and stocks. To quote directly from page 8
to bonds and show little correlation to stocks, an unleveraged commodity portfolio of the report:

(with 10 percent committed to a commodity position and 90 percent in Treasury bills) could be used to diversify a portfolio of stocks and bonds. The risks usually as-Note in all cases, the addition of commodity futures to the portfolio increased the sociated with commodity trading are the result of low margin requirements (around ratio, i.e., lowered risk and increased return. The increase grows as more commod-10 percent) and the resulting high leverage. By using a conservative (unleveraged) ity futures replace other domestic assets...the more of your portfolio allocated to approach of keeping the unused 90 percent of the futures funds in Treasury bills, commodity futures (up to 30 percent) the better off you are.

much of the risk associated with commodity trading are reduced and its use by

224 COMMODITIES AND ASSET ALLOCATION

13
portfolio managers becomes more realistic. The high correlation of the CRB index to inflation gauges qualify commodities as a reliable inflation hedge.

Futures markets—including commodities, currencies, bonds, and stock index futures—provide a built-in forum for asset allocation. Because their returns are poorly correlated with bond and stock market returns, professionally managed futures funds may qualify as a legitimate diversification instrument for portfolio managers. There are two separate approaches involved in the potential use of futures markets by portfolio managers. One has to do with the use of professionally managed futures accounts, which invest in all four sectors of the futures markets—commodities, currencies, bond, and stock index futures. In this sense, the futures portfolio is treated as a sep-Intermarket Analysis
arate entity. The term futures refers to all futures markets, of which commodities are only one portion. The second approach treats the commodity portion of the futures markets as a separate asset class and utilizes a basket approach to trading those 21
and the Business Cycle
commodities included in the CRB Index.

Over the past two centuries, the American economy has gone through repeated boom and bust cycles. Sometimes these cycles have been dramatic (such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the runaway inflationary spiral of the 1970s). At other times, their impact has been so muted that their occurrence has gone virtually un-noticed. Most of these cycles fit somewhere in between those two extremes and have left a trail of fairly reliable business cycle patterns that have averaged about four years in length. Approximately every four years the economy experiences a period of expansion which is followed by an inevitable contraction or slowdown.

The contraction phase often turns into a recession, which is a period of negative growth in the economy. The recession, or slowdown, inevitably leads to the next period of expansion. During an unusually long economic expansion (such as the 8-year period beginning in 1982), when no recession takes place, the economy usually undergoes a slowdown, which allows the economy to 'catch its breath' before resuming its next growth phase. Since 1948, the American economy has experienced eight recessions, the most recent one lasting from July 1981 to November 1982. The economic expansions averaged 45 months and the contractions, 11 months.

The business cycle has an important bearing on the financial markets. These periods of expansion and contraction provide an economic framework that helps explain the linkages that exist between the bond, stock, and the commodity markets.

In addition, the business cycle explains the chronological sequence that develops among these three financial sectors. A trader's interest in the business cycle lies not in economic forecasting but in obtaining a better understanding as to why these three financial sectors interact the way they do, when they do.

For example, during the early stages of a new expansion (while a recession or slowdown is still in progress), bonds will turn up ahead of stocks and commodities.

At the end of an expansion, commodities are usually the last to turn down. A better understanding of the business cycle sheds light on the intermarket process, and reveals that what is seen on the price charts makes sense from an economic perspective.

Although it's not the primary intention, intermarket analysis could be used to help determine where we are in the business cycle.

225

226 INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

GOLD LEADS OTHER COMMODITIES 227
pansion and a falling line, contraction. The horizontal line is the equilibrium level Some understanding of the business cycle (together with intermarket analysis of bonds, stocks, and commodities) impacts on the asset allocation process, which was that separates positive and negative economic growth. When the curving line is above the horizontal line but declining, the economy is slowing. When it dips below discussed in chapter 12. Different phases of the business cycle favor different asset the horizontal line, the economy has slipped into recession. The arrows represent classes. The beginning of an economic expansion favors financial assets (bonds and stocks), while the latter part of an expansion favors commodities (or inflation hedges the direction of the three financial markets-B for bonds, S for stocks, and C for such as gold and oil stocks). Periods of economic expansion favor stocks, whereas commodities.

periods of economic contraction favor bonds.

The diagram shows that as the expansion matures, bonds are the first of the group to turn down. This is due to increased inflation pressures and resulting upward In this chapter, the business cycle will be used to help explain the chronological pressure on interest rates. In time, higher interest rates will put downward pressure rotation that normally takes place between bonds, stocks and commodities. Although on stocks which turn down second. Since inflation pressures are strongest near the I'll continue to utilize the CRB Futures Price Index for the commodity portion, the end of the expansion, commodities are the last to turn down. Usually by this time, relative merits of using a couple of more industrial-based commodity averages will be the economy has started to slow and is on the verge of slipping into recession. A discussed such as the Spot Raw Industrials Index of the Journal of Commerce Index.

slowdown in the economy reduces demand for commodities and money. Inflation Since copper is one of the most widely followed of the industrial commodities, its pressures begin to ease. Commodity prices start to drop (usually led by gold). At this predictive role in the economy and some possible links between copper and the stock market will be considered. Since many asset allocators use gold as their commodity point, all three markets are dropping.

As interest rates begin to soften as well (usually in the early stages of a recession), proxy, I'll show where the yellow metal fits into the picture. Because the bond market bonds begin to rally. Within a few months, stocks will begin to turn up (usually after plays a key role in the business cycle and the the intermarket rotation process, the the mid-point of a recession). Only after bonds and stocks have been rallying for bond market's value as a leading indicator of the economy will be considered.

awhile, and the economy has started to expand, will inflation pressures start to build contributing to an upturn in gold and other commodities. At this point, all three THE CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCES OF BONDS,
markets are rising. Of the three markets, bonds seem to be the focal point.

STOCKS, AND COMMODITIES

Bonds have a tendency to peak about midway through an expansion, and bottom about midway through a contraction. The peak in the bond market during an Figure 13.1 (courtesy of the Asset Allocation Review, written by Martin J. Pring, pub-economic expansion is a signal that a period of healthy noninflationary growth has lished by the International Institute for Economic Research, P.O. Box 329, Washington turned into an unhealthy period of inflationary growth. This is usually the point Depot, CT 06794) shows an idealized diagram of how the three financial sectors in-where commodity markets are starting to accelerate on the upside and the bull mar-teract with each other during a typical business cycle. The curving line shows the path of the economy during expansion and contraction. A rising line indicates ex-ket in stocks is living on borrowed time.

GOLD LEADS OTHER COMMODITIES

Although gold is often used as a proxy for the commodity markets, it should be FICURE 13.1
remembered that gold usually leads other commodity markets at tops and bottoms.

AN IDEALIZED DIAGRAM OF HOW BONDS (B), STOCKS (S), AND COMMODITIES (C) INTERACT

Chapter 7 discussed gold's history as a leading indicator of the CRB Index. It's possible DURING A TYPICAL BUSINESS CYCLE. (SOURCE: ASSET ALLOCATION REVIEW BY MARTIN J.

during the early stages of an expansion to have bonds, stocks, and gold in bull markets PRING, PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, P.O. BOX

329, WASHINGTON DEPOT, CT 06794.)

at the same time. This is exactly what happened in 1982 and again in 1985. During 1984 the bull markets in bonds and stocks were stalled. Gold had resumed its major downtrend from an early 1983 peak. Bonds turned up in July of 1984 followed by stocks a month later. Gold hit bottom in February of 1985, about half a year later. For the next 12 months (into the first quarter of 1986), all three markets rallied together.

However, the CRB Index didn't actually hit bottom until the summer of 1986.

This distinction between gold and the general commodity price level may help clear up some confusion about the interaction of the commodity markets with bonds.

In previous chapters, we've concentrated on the inverse relationship between the CRB

Index and the bond market. The peak in bonds in mid-1986 coincided with a bottom in the CRB Index. In the spring of 1987, an upside breakout in the CRB Index helped cause a collapse in the bond market. A rising gold market can coexist with a rising bond market, but it is an early warning that inflation pressures are starting to build.

A rising CRB Index usually marks the end of the bull market in bonds. Conversely, a falling CRB Index during the early stages of a recession (or economic slowdown) usually coincides with the bottom in bonds. It's unlikely that all three groups will be rising or falling together for long if the CRB index is used in place of the gold market.

228 INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

THE ROLE OF BONDS IN ECONOMIC FORECASTING 229

ARE COMMODITIES FIRST OR LAST TO TURN?

The implications of the above sequence for asset allocators should be fairly obvious. As inflation and interest" rates begin to drop during a slowdown (Stage 1), bonds The diagram in Figure 13.1 shows that bonds turn down first, stocks second, and are the place to be (or interest-sensitive stocks). After bonds have bottomed, and as commodities last. As the economy bottoms, bonds turn up first, followed by stocks, the recession begins to take hold on the economy (Stage 2), stocks become attrac-and then commodities. In reality, it's difficult to determine which is first and which tive. As the economy begins to expand again (Stage 3), gold and gold-related assets is last since all three markets are part of a never-ending cycle. Bonds turn up after should be considered as an early inflation hedge. As inflation pressures begin to pull commodities have turned down. Conversely, the upturn in commodities precedes the other commodity prices higher, and interest rates begin to rise (Stage 4), commodities top in bonds. Viewed in this way, commodities are the first market to turn instead of or other inflation hedges should be emphasized. Bonds and interest-sensitive stocks the last. Stocks hit an important peak in 1987. Bonds peaked in 1986. Gold started should be de-emphasized. As stocks begin a topping process (Stage 5), more assets to rally in 1985 and the CRB Index in 1986. It could be argued that the rally in gold should be funneled into commodities or other inflation-hedges such as gold and oil (and the CRB Index) signaled a renewal of inflation, which contributed to the top in shares. When all three asset groups are falling (Stage 6), cash is king.

bonds which contributed to the top in stocks. It's just a matter of where the observer The chronological sequence described in the preceding paragraphs does not im-chooses to start counting.

ply that bonds, stocks, and commodities a/ways follow that sequence exactly. Life isn't that simple. There have been times when the markets have peaked or troughed THE SIX STAGES OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE
out of sequence. The diagram describes the ideal rotational sequence that usually takes place between the three markets, and gives us a useful roadmap to follow. When In his Asset Allocation Review, Martin Pring divides the business cycle into six stages the markets are following the ideal pattern, the analyst knows what to expect next.

(Figure 13.2). Stage one begins as the economy is slipping into a recession and ends When the markets are diverging from their normal rotation, the analyst is alerted to with stage six, where the economic expansion has just about run its course. Each the fact that something is amiss and is warned to be more careful. While the analyst stage is characterized by a turn in one of the three asset classes—bonds, stocks, or may not always understand exactly what the markets are doing, it can be helpful to commodities. The following table summarizes Pring's conclusions: know what they're supposed to be doing. Figure 13.3 shows how commodity prices behaved in the four recessions between 1970 and 1982.

Stage 1... Bonds turn up (stocks and commodities falling) Stage 2... Stocks turn up (bonds rising, commodities falling) THE ROLE OF BONDS IN ECONOMIC FORECASTING

Stage 3 ... Commodities turn up (all three markets rising)

-Stage 4 ... Bonds turn down (stocks and commodities rising) The bond market plays a key role in intermarket analysis. It is the fulcrum that connects the commodity and stock markets. The direction of interest rates tells a lot Stage 5 ... Stocks turn down (bonds dropping, commodities rising) about inflation and the health of the stock market. Interest rate direction also tells Stage 6... Commodities turn down (all three markets dropping) a lot about the current state of the business cycle and the strength of the economy.

Toward the end of an economic expansion, the demand for money increases, resulting in higher interest rates. Central bankers use the lever of higher interest rates to rein FIGURE 13.2
in inflation, which is usually accelerating.

THE SIX STAGES OF A TYPICAL BUSINESS CYCLE THROUGH RECESSION AND RECOVERY. EACH

At some point, the jump in interest rates stifles the economic expansion and is a STAGE IS CHARACTERIZED BY A TURN IN ONE OF THE THREE SECTORS-BONDS, STOCKS, major cause of an economic contraction. The event that signals that the end is in sight AND COMMODITIES. (SOURCE: ASSET ALLOCATION REVIEW BY MARTIN J. PRING.) is usually a significant peak in the bond market. At that point, an early warning is being given that the economy has entered a dangerous inflationary environment. This signal is usually given around the midway point in the expansion. After the bond market peaks, stocks and commodities can continue to rally for sometime, but stock investors should start becoming more cautious. Economists also should take heed.

During an economic contraction, demand for money decreases along with inflation pressures. Interest rates start to drop along with commodities. The combined effect of falling interest rates and falling commodity prices causes the bond market to bottom. This usually occurs in the early stages of the slowdown (or recession). Stocks and commodities can continue to decline for awhile, but stock market investors are given an early warning that the time to begin accumulating stocks is fast approaching.

Economists have an early indication that the end may be in sight for the economic contraction. The bond market fulfills two important roles which are sometimes hard to separate. One is its role as a leading indicator of stocks (and commodities). The other is its role as a leading indicator of the economy.

Bond prices have turned in an impressive record as a leading indicator of the economy, although the lead time at peaks and troughs can be quite long. In his book,

230 INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

LONG- AND SHORT-LEADING INDEXES 231
than the current list of eleven leading indicators published monthly by the U.S.

FIGURE 13.3

Department of Commerce in the Business Conditions Digest. The long-leading index, A MONTHLY CHART OF THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX THROUGH THE LAST FOUR BUSINESS
comprised of four indicators (the Dow Jones 20 Bond Average, the ratio of price to CYCLE RECESSIONS (MARKED BY SHADED AREAS). COMMODITY PRICES USUALLY WEAKEN

DURING A RECESSION AND BEGIN TO RECOVER AFTER THE RECESSION HAS ENDED. THE
unit labor cost in manufacturing, new housing permits, and M2 money supply), has 1980 PEAK IN THE CRB INDEX OCCURRED AFTER THE 1980 RECESSION ENDED BUT BEFORE
led business cycle turns by 11 months on average.

THE 1981-1982 RECESSION BEGAN. (SOURCE: 1964 COMMODITY YEAR BOOK, COMMODITY

Moore also recommends adoption of a new "short-leading index" of 11 indi-RESEARCH BUREAU, INC.)

cators. The short-leading index has led business cycle turns by an average of five months, slightly shorter than the six-month lead of the current leading indicator CRB Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) Futures Price Index (1967=100) index. (Figure 13.4 shows the CIBCR long- and short-leading indexes in the eight recessions since 1948.) Moore suggests changing the number of leading indicators from 11 to 15 and using his long- and short-leading indexes in place of the current leading index of 11 indicators. Both the current leading index and Moore's short-leading index include two components of particular interest to analysts—stock and commodity prices.

FIGURE 13.4

THE LONG- AND SHORT-LEADING INDEXES DEVELOPED BY GEOFFREY H. MOORE AND COL-UMBIA UNIVERSITY'S CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLE RESEARCH (CIBCR).

BOND PRICES (DOW JONES BOND AVERAGE) ARE PART OF THE LONG-LEADING INDEX, WHEREAS STOCKS (S&P 500) AND COMMODITIES (JOURNAL OF COMMERCE INDEX) ARE

PART OF THE SHORT-LEADING INDEX. (SOURCE: BUSINESS CONDITIONS DIGEST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, FEBRUARY 1990.) SHADED

AREAS MARK RECESSIONS.

CIBCR Composite Indexes of Leading Indicators

Leading Indicators for the 1990s (Dow Jones-Irwin, 1990), Geoffrey Moore, one the nation's most highly regarded authorities on the business cycle, details the history of bonds as a long-leading indicator of business cycle peaks and troughs. Since 1948, the U.S. economy has experienced eight business cycles. The Dow Jones 20 Bond Average led each of the 8 business cycle peaks by an average of 27 months. At the 8
business cycle troughs, the bond lead was a shorter 7 months on average. Bond prices led all business cycle turns combined since 1948 by an average of seventeen months.

LONG- AND SHORT-LEADING INDEXES

Dr. Moore, head of the Center for International Business Cycle Research at Columbia University in New York City, suggests utilizing bond prices as part of a "long-leading index," which would provide earlier warnings of business cycle peaks and troughs

STOCKS AND COMMODITIES AS LEADING INDICATORS 233

232 INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

One is that technical analysis of bonds, stocks, and commodities can play a STOCKS AND COMMODITIES AS LEADING INDICATORS
role in economic analysis. Another is that the rotational nature of the three markets, Stocks and commodities also qualify as leading indicators of the business cycle, as pictured in Figure 13.1, is confirmed. Bonds turn first (17 months in advance), although their warnings are much snorter than those of bonds. Research provided stocks second (seven months in advance), and commodities third (six months in by Dr. Moore (in collaboration with Victor Zarnowitz and John P. Cullity) in the advance). That rotational sequence of bonds, stocks, and commodities turning in order previously-cited work on "Leading Indicators for the 1990s" provides us with lead is maintained at both peaks and troughs. In all three markets, the lead at peaks is much and lag times for all three sectors—bonds, stocks, and commodities—relative to turns longer than at troughs. The lead time given at peaks by bonds can be extremely long in the business cycle, supporting the rotational process described in Figure 13.1.

(27 months on average) while commodities provide a very short warning at troughs In the eight business cycles since 1948, the S&P 500 stock index led turns by an (two months on average). The lead time for commodities may vary depending on the average of seven months, with a nine-month lead at peaks and five months at troughs.

commodity or commodity index used. Moore favors the Journal of Commerce Index Commodity prices (represented by the Journal of Commerce Index) led business cycle which he helped create. (Figures 13.5 through 13.8 demonstrate the rotational nature turns by an average of six months, with an eight-month lead at peaks and two months of bonds, stocks, and commodities from 1986 to early 1990.) at troughs. Several conclusions can be drawn from these numbers.

FIGURE 13.6

A COMPARISON OF THE DOW JONES BOND AVERAGE, THE DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVER-FIGURE 13.5

AGE, AND THE CRB FUTURES PRICE INDEX DURING 1987 AND 1988. THREE MAJOR PEAKS

A COMPARISON OF THE DOW JONES BOND AVERAGE, THE DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVER-CAN BE SEEN IN THE NORMAL ROTATIONAL SEQUENCE-BONDS FIRST, STOCKS SECOND, AGE, AND GOLD DURING 1987. THE THREE MARKETS PEAKED DURING 1987 IN THE CORRECT

AND COMMODITIES LAST. ALTHOUGH THE CRB INDEX DIDN'T PEAK UNTIL MID-1988, GOLD

ROTATION-BONDS FIRST (DURING THE SPRING), STOCKS SECOND (DURING THE SUMMER), TOPPED OUT SIX MONTHS EARLIER AND PLAYED ITS USUAL ROLE AS A LEADING INDICATOR

AND GOLD LAST (IN DECEMBER). GOLD CAN RALLY FOR A TIME ALONG WITH BONDS AND

STOCKS BUT PROVIDES AN EARLY WARNING OF RENEWED INFLATION PRESSURES.

OF COMMODITIES.

Dow Jones Bond Averages versus Dow Stocks versus Commodities Dow Jones Bond Average versus Dow Stocks versus Gold

234 INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

COPPER AS AN ECONOMIC INDICATOR 235

FIGURE 13.7

FIGURE 13.8

THE UPPER CHART COMPARES TREASURY BOND FUTURES PRICES WITH THE DOW JONES

THE UPPER CHART COMPARES TREASURY BOND FUTURES PRICES WITH THE DOW JONES

INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE FROM 1986 THROUGH THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1990. THE BOTTOM

INDUSTRIALS DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1989 AND THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1990. THE

CHART SHOWS THE CRB INDEX DURING THE SAME PERIOD. THE CRB INDEX RALLY IN

BOTTOM CHART SHOWS THE CRB FUTURES INDEX DURING THE SAME PERIOD. THE NORMAL

EARLY 1987 COINCIDED WITH THE PEAK IN BONDS, WHICH PRECEDED THE STOCK MARKET

ROTATIONAL SEQUENCE BETWEEN THE THREE MARKETS CAN BE SEEN. THE COMMODITY

PEAK. THE COMMODITY PEAK IN MID-1988 LAUNCHED A NEW UPCYCLE FOR THE FINAN-TROUGH DURING THE SUMMER OF 1989 CONTRIBUTED TO THE DOWNTURN IN BONDS, CIAL MARKETS. IN LATE 1989, THE COMMODITY RALLY PRECEDED DOWNTURNS IN BONDS

WHICH EVENTUALLY PULLED STOCKS LOWER.

AND STOCKS. NOTICE THE ORDER OF TOPS IN 1986 (BONDS), 1987 (STOCKS), AND 1988

(COMMODITIES).

the CRB Futures index because of my belief that food is a part of the inflation picture and can't be ignored. It's up to the reader to decide which of the many commodity Chapter 7 includes a discussion of the various commodity indexes, including indexes to employ. Since none of the commodity indexes are perfect, it's probably a the CRB Futures Price Index, the CRB Spot Index, the CRB Spot Raw Industrials good idea to keep an eye on all of them.

Index, the CRB Spot Foodstuffs Index, and the Journal of Commerce Index of 18 key raw industrials. Readers unfamiliar with the composition of the indexes might want to refer back to Chapter 7, which also includes a discussion of the relative merits COPPER AS AN ECONOMIC INDICATOR
of commodity indexes. Moore and some economists prefer commodity indexes that Copper is a key industrial commodity. It's importance is underlined by the fact that it utilize only industrial prices on the premise that they are better predictors of inflation is included in every major commodity index. This is not true of some other important and are more sensitive to movements in the economy.

commodities. No precious metals are included in the Journal of Commerce Index or Martin Pring in the previously-cited work, the .Asset Allocation Review, prefers the Spot Raw Industrials Index. Crude oil is included in the Journal of Commerce the CRB Spot Raw Industrials Index. Pring and many economists believe that the Index but not in the Raw Industrials Index. The only other industrial commodity CRB Futures Price Index, which includes food along with industrial prices, is often that is included in every major commodity index is the cotton market. (All of the influenced more by weather than by economic activity. I've expressed a preference for previously-mentioned commodities are included in the CRB'Futures Index.)

236 INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

COPPER AND THE STOCK MARKET 237

Because copper is used in the automotive, housing and electronics industries, FIGURE 13.10
a lot can be learned about the strength of the economy by studying the strength COPPER FUTURES COMPARED TO THE DOW INDUSTRIALS FROM MID-1989 THROUGH THE
of the copper market. During periods of economic strength, demand from the three FIRST QUARTER OF 1990. BOTH MARKETS SHOWED A STRONG POSITIVE CORRELATION
industries just cited will keep copper prices firm. When the economy is beginning DURING THOSE NINE MONTHS BECAUSE BOTH WERE REACTING TO SIGNS OF ECONOMIC
to show signs of weakness, demand for copper from these industries will drop off, STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS. BOTH PEAKED TOGETHER IN OCTOBER OF 1989 AND THEN
resulting in a declining trend in the price of copper. In the four recessions since TROUGHED TOGETHER DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1990.

1970, the economic peaks and troughs have coincided fairly closely with the peaks and troughs in the copper market.

Copper Futures

Copper hit a major top at the end of 1988 and dropped sharply throughout most of 1989 (Figure 13.9). Weakness in copper futures suggested that the economy was slowing and raised fears of an impending recession. At the beginning of 1990, however, copper prices stabilized and started to rally sharply. Many observers breathed a sigh of re-lief at the copper rally (and that of other industrial commodities) and interpreted the price recovery as a sign that the economy had avoided recession (Figure 13.10).

FIGURE 13.9

A COMPARISON OF COPPER FUTURES PRICES (UPPER CHART) WITH THE DOW INDUSTRIALS

(LOWER CHART) FROM 1987 TO THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1989. COPPER PEAKED AFTER

STOCKS IN LATE 1987, BEFORE BOTH RESUMED THEIR UPTRENDS. THE COLLAPSE IN COPPER

DURING 1989 RAISED FEARS OF RECESSION, WHICH BEGAN TO HAVE A BEARISH INFLUENCE

ON STOCK PRICES. COPPER HAS A PRETTY GOOD TRACK RECORD AS A BAROMETER OF

ECONOMIC STRENGTH.

Copper Futures

COPPER AND THE STOCK MARKET

Recession fears played on the minds of equity investors as 1989 ended. During the nine months from July 1989 to March of 1990, the correlation between the copper market and the stock market was unusually strong (Figure 13.10). It almost seemed that both markets were feeding off one another. The stock market selloff that started in October of 1989 coincided with a peak in the copper market. The strong rally that began in American equities during the first week of February 1990 began a week after the copper market hit a bottom and also started to rally sharply. Although the link between the stock market and copper is not usually that strong on a day-to-day basis, there are times (such as the period just cited) when their destinies are closely tied together. Stocks are considered to be a leading indicator of the economy. Copper is probably better classified as a coincident indicator. Turns in the stock market usually lead turns in copper. However, both are responding to (or anticipating) the health of the economy. As a result, their fortunes are tied together. (Figure 13.11 compares copper prices to automobile stocks.)

238 INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

SUMMARY 239

FIGURE 13.11

FIGURE 13.12

COPPER FUTURES (UPPER CHART) ALSO SHOWED A STRONG CORRELATION WITH AUTO-WEAKNESS IN COPPER PRICES (UPPER CHART) AND THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE INDEX OF

MOBILE STOCKS (BOTTOM CHART) IN THE NINE MONTHS FROM MID-1989 THROUGH THE

18 INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS (BOTTOM CHART) DURING 1989 RAISED FEARS OF RECESSION.

FIRST QUARTER OF 1990. THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY IS ONE OF THE HEAVIEST USERS OF

HOWEVER, AS INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES RECOVERED IN EARLY 1990, MANY TOOK THIS

COPPER, AND THEIR FORTUNES ARE OFTEN TIED TOGETHER.

AS A SIGN THAT A RECESSION HAD BEEN POSTPONED. ECONOMISTS PAY CLOSE ATTENTION

TO INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES.

Copper Futures

Copper Futures

Automobile Stocks

Journal of Commerce Index

A strong copper market implies that the economic recovery is still on sound footing and is a positive influence on the stock market. A falling copper market turn first at peaks and troughs, stocks second, and commodities third. The turn in the implies that an economic slowdown (or recession) may be in progress and is a negative bond market is usually activated by a turn in the commodity markets in the opposite influence on the stock market. One of the advantages of using the copper market as a direction. Gold usually leads the general commodity price level and can be used as barometer of the economy (and the stock market) is that copper prices are available on an early warning of inflation pressures.

a daily basis at the Commodity Exchange in New York (as well as the London Metal The chronological rotation of the three sectors has important implications for the Exchange). Copper also lends itself very well to technical analysis. (Figure 13.12
asset allocation process. The early stages of recovery favor financial assets, whereas shows copper and other industrial prices rallying in early-1990 after falling in late the latter part of the expansion favors commodity prices or other inflation hedges.

1989.)

Bonds play a dual role as a leader of stocks and commodities and also as a long-leading economic indicator. Copper also provides clues to the strength of the economy and, at times, will track the stock market very closely.

SUMMARY

The 4-year business cycle provides an economic framework for intermarket analysis and explains the chronological sequence that is usually seen between the bond, stock, and commodity markets. Although not a rigid formula, the peaks and troughs that take place in these three asset classes usually follow a repetitive pattern where bonds

14

WHAT CAUSES PROGRAM TRADING? 241

The same story, which used arbitrage selling to explain the drop in Tokyo, began its explanation of a rally in the London stock market with the following sentence: London stocks notched gains amid sketchy trading as futures-related buying and a bullish buy recommendation... pulled prices higher.

(Wall Street Journal, 3/8/90)

A reader of the financial press can't help but notice how often "program trading"

is used to explain moves in the stock market. Even on an intra-day basis, a morning's The Myth of Program Trading
selloff will be attributed to rounds of "program selling" only to be followed by an afternoon rally attributed to rounds of "program buying." After a while, "program trading" takes on a life of its own and is treated as an independent, market-moving force. A reader could be forgiven for wondering what moved the stock market on a day-to-day basis before "program trading" captured the imagination of the financial media. A reader could also be forgiven for starting to believe the printed reports that One recent Friday morning, one of New York's leading newspapers used the following

"program trading" really is the dominant force behind stock market moves. In this combination of headlines and lead-ins to describe the previous day's events in the chapter, the myth of "program trading" as a market-moving force will be explored.

financial markets:

An attempt will be made to demonstrate that market forces that are usually blamed on "program trading" are nothing more than intermarket linkages at work.

Cocoa futures surged to seven-month highs...

The dollar dropped sharply...

PROGRAM TRADING- AN EFFECT, NOT A CAUSE

Prices of Treasury securities plummeted...

Tokyo stocks off sharply

It's easy to see why most observers mistakenly treat program trading as a cause of stock market trends. It provides an easy explanation and eliminates the need to dig Program sales hurt stocks; Dow off 15.99
deeper for more adequate reasons. Consider how program trading looks to the casual (New York Times, 3/30/90)

observer. As stock index futures rise sharply, arbitrage activity leads traders to buy Despite the fact that all of the first four stories were bearish for stocks, "program a basket of stocks and sell stock index futures in order to bring the futures and cash sales" were used to explain the weakness in the Dow. The next day, the same paper prices of a stock index back into line. A strong upsurge in stock index futures causes carried these two headlines:

"buy programs" to kick in and is considered bullish for stocks. A sharp drop in stock index futures has the opposite effect. When the drop in stock index futures Prices of Treasury Issues Still Falling
goes too far, traders sell a basket of stocks and buy the stock index futures. The Dow Off 20.49 After "Buy" Programs End resulting "sell programs" pull stock prices lower and are considered to be bearish (New KM* Times, 3/31/90)

for stocks.

It appears on the surface (and is usually reported) that the stock market rose (or This time, the culprit wasn't "sell" programs, but the absence of "buy" programs. The fell) because of the program buying (or selling). As is so often the case, however, the real explanation (the drop in Treasury issues) was mentioned briefly in paragraph five quick and easy answer is seldom the right answer. Unfortunately, market observers see of the stock market story. Earlier that same week, two other financial papers explained

"program trading" impacting on the stock market and treat it as an isolated, market-a stock market rally with these headlines:

moving force. What they fail to realize is that the moves in stock index futures, which activate the program trading in the first place, are themselves usually caused by moves Dow Up 29 as Programs Spark Advance
in related markets—the bond market, the dollar, and commodities. And this is where (Investor's Daily, 3/28/90)

the real story lies.

Industrials Advance 29.28 Points on Arbitrage Buying (Wall Street Journal, 3/28/90)

WHAT CAUSES PROGRAM TRADING?

The international markets are not immune to this type of reporting. A couple of weeks Instead of treating program trading as the cause of a stock market move and ending earlier, one of the papers carried the following headline in a story on the international the story there, the more pertinent question to be asked is "what caused the program stock markets:

trading in the first place?" Suppose S&P 500 stock index futures surge higher at 10:00

A.M. on a trading day. The rally in stock index futures is enough to push the futures Tokyo Stocks Drop Sharply on Arbitrage Selling by Foreign Brokers...

price too far above the S&P 500 cash value, and "program buying" is activated. How (Wall Street Journal, 3/8/90)

would that story be treated? Most often, the resulting rally in the stock market would 240

242 THE MYTH OF PROGRAM TRADING

AN EXAMPLE FROM ONE DAY'S TRADING 243
be attributed to "program buying." But what caused the program buying? What caused market. The intermarket picture in Japan as 1990 began looked very ominous for the the stock index futures to rally in the first place?

Japanese market (and was not unlike the situation in the United States during 1987

The program buying didn't get activated until the S&P stock index futures rallied with a falling dollar, rising commodity prices, and a falling bond market). However, it far enough above the S&P 500 cash index to place them temporarily "out of line." The wasn't until the stock market plunge in Japan took on more serious proportions that program trading didn't cause the rally in the stock index futures— the program buying market observers began to look beyond the "program trading" mirage for the more reacted to the rally in stock index futures. It was the rally in stock index futures that serious problems facing that country.

started the ball rolling. What caused the rally to begin in stock index futures, which Chapter 2 described the events leading up to the stock market crash in the Amer-led to the program buying? If observers are willing to ask that question, they will ican stock market in 1987. Preceding the stock market crash, the dollar had been begin to see how often the sharp rally or drop in stock index futures is the direct dropping sharply, commodity prices had broken out of a basing pattern and were result of a corresponding sharp rise or drop in the bond market, the dollar, or maybe rallying sharply higher, and the bond market had collapsed. Textbook intermarket the oil market.

analysis would categorize this intermarket picture as bearish for stocks. Yet, stocks Viewed in this fashion, it can be seen that the real cause of a sudden stock market continued to rally into the summer and fall of 1987, and no one seemed concerned.

move is often a sharp move in the bond market or crude oil. However, the ripple When the bubble finally burst in October of 1987, "program trading" was most often effect that starts in a related financial market (such as the bond market) doesn't hit cited as the reason for the collapse. Many observers at the time claimed that no other the stock market directly. The intermarket effect flows through stock index futures reasons could explain the sudden stock market plunge. They said the same thing in first, which then impact on the stock market. In other words, the program trading Japan in 1990.

phenomenon (which is nothing more than an adjustment between stock index futures The events in the United States in 1987 and Japan in 1990 illustrate how the and an underlying cash index) is the last link in an intermarket chain that usually preoccupation with program trading often masks more serious issues. Program trading begins in the other financial markets. Program trading, then, can be seen as an effect, is the conduit through which the bearish (or bullish) influence of intermarket forces not a cause.

is carried to the stock market. The stock market is usually the last sector to react. As awareness of these intermarket linkages described in the preceding chapters grows, market observers should become more aware of the ripple effect that flows through PROGRAM TRADING AS SCAPEGOAT
all the markets, even on an intra-day basis.

The problem with using program trading as the main culprit, particularly during Program trading has no bullish or bearish bias. In itself, it is inherently neu-stock market drops, is that it masks the real causes and provides an easy scapegoat.

tral. It simply reacts to outside forces. Unfortunately, it also speeds up and usu-Outcries against index arbitrage really began after the stock market crash of 1987
ally exaggerates the impact of these forces. Program trading is more often the "mes-and again during the mini-crash two years later in October of 1989. Critics argued senger" bearing bad (or good) news than the cause of that news. Up to now, too that index arbitrage was a destabilizing influence on the stock market and should much focus has been placed on the messenger and not enough on the message being be banned. These critics ignored some pertinent facts, however. The introduction of brought.

stock index futures in 1982 coincided with the beginning of the greatest bull market in U.S. history. If stock index futures were destabilizing, how does one explain the enormous stock market gains of the 1980s?

AN EXAMPLE FROM ONE DAY'S TRADING

A second, often-overlooked factor pertaining to the 1987 crash was the fact that One way to demonstrate the lightning-quick impact of these intermarket linkages and the stock market collapse was global in scope. No world stock market escaped un-their role in program trading is to study the events of one trading day. The day under scathed. Some world markets dropped much more than ours. Yet, index arbitrage discussion is Friday, April 6,1990. We're going to study the intra-day activity that took didn't exist in these other markets. How then do we explain their collapse? If index place that morning in the financial markets following the release of an unemployment arbitrage caused the collapse in New York, what caused the collapse in the other report, and how those events were reported by a leading news service.

markets around the globe?

At 8:30 A.M. (New York time), the March unemployment report was released and A dramatic example of the dangers of using program trading to mask the real looked to be much weaker than expected. U.S. non-farm payroll jobs in March were events behind a stock market drop was seen during the first quarter of 1990 in Japan.

up 26,000—a much smaller figure than economists expected. Since the report sig-During the early stages of the plunge in the Japanese stock market, index arbitrage was naled economic weakness, the bond market rallied sharply while the dollar slumped.

frequently cited as the main culprit. At first, the stock market plunge wasn't taken too The weak dollar boosted gold. Stocks benefitted from the strong opening in bonds.

seriously. However, a deeper analysis revealed a very dangerous intermarket situation Some of the morning's headlines produced by Knight-Ridder Financial News read as (as described in Chapter 8). The Japanese yen had started to drop dramatically, and follows:

Japanese inflation had turned sharply higher. Japanese bonds were in a freefall. These bearish factors were ignored, at least initially, in deference to cries for the banning of index arbitrage.

—8:57 A.M.... Dollar softens on unexpectedly weak jobs data By the end of the first quarter of 1990, the Japanese stock market had lost about

—9:08 A.M.... Bonds surge 16/32 on weak March jobs data 32 percent. Two major contributing factors to that debacle were a nine percent loss

— 10:26 A.M.... Jun gold up 3.2 dollars...

in the Japanese yen versus the U.S. dollar and a 13 percent loss in the Japanese bond

— 10:27 A.M.... US Stock Index Opening: Move higher, follow bonds...

244 THE MYTH OF PROGRAM TRADING

A VISUAL LOOK AT THE MORNING'S TRADING 245

-11:07 A . M . . . . CBT Jun T-bonds break to 92 18/32...

FIGURE 14.1

—11:07 A.M— US stock index futures slide as T-bonds drop...

AN INTRA-DAY COMPARISON OF STANDARD & POOR'S 500 STOCK INDEX FUTURES (TOP

— 11:10 A.M— Dow down 19 at 2701 amid sell programs, extends loss CHART) AND U.S. DOLLAR INDEX FUTURES (BOTTOM CHART) ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 6, 1990. BOTH MARKETS FELL TOGETHER JUST AFTER 10:00 IN THE MORNING AND BOTTOMED

—11:32 A.M— W. German Credit Review: Bonds plunge...

TOGETHER ABOUT AN HOUR LATER. STOCK MARKET MOVES ON A MINUTE-BY-MINUTE BASIS

-11:33 A.M.... CBT/IMM Rates: Bonds plunge; Bundesbank report cited CAN OFTEN BE EXPLAINED BY WATCHING MOVEMENTS IN THE DOLLAR.

— 11:44 A.M.... NY Stocks: Dow off 15; extends loss on sell-programs June S&P 500 Futures

The intermarket linkages among the four market sectors can be seen in the morning's trading. The dollar weakened and gold rallied. Bonds rallied initially and pulled stocks higher. Bonds then tumbled, pulling stock index futures down with them. The resulting selloff in stock index futures activated sell programs, which helped pull the Dow lower. As the headlines at 11:32 and 11:33 state, one of the reasons for the plunge in bonds at mid-morning was a plunge in the German bond market. The stock market plunge was the result of a plunge in the U.S. bond market, which in turn was partially caused by a sharp selloff in the German bond market. A selloff in the dollar around mid-morning was also a bearish factor.

The two headlines at 11:10 and 11:44 cite "sell programs" as the Dow was falling.

These two headlines are misleading if they are read out of context. They seem to indicate that the sell-programs were causing the stock market selloff when the sharp slide in the bond market was the main reason why the stock rally faltered. Fortunately, the Knight-Ridder Financial News service provided plenty of other information to allow the reader to understand what was really happening and the reasons why it was happening. Not all financial reports are as thorough.

Sometimes the financial media, under pressure to give quick answers, picks up the "sell-program" headlines and ignores the rest. It's easy to see how someone scan-ning the headlines can focus on the sell-programs and not understand everything else that is happening. There is also a disturbing tendency in some sectors of the financial media to focus on sell programs when the Dow is falling, while forgetting to mention buy programs when the Dow is rising.

A VISUAL LOOK AT THE MORNING'S TRADING

Figures 14.1 and 14.2 show the price activity in the dollar, bonds, and stocks during the same morning and provide a picture of the events that have just been described.

Figure 14.1 compares the June Dollar Index (bottom chart) to the June S&P 500 futures index from 8:30 A.M. (New York time) to noon. Notice how closely they track each understand why the stock market suddenly dropped at 10:00 on the morning of April other during the morning. After selling off initially, the dollar rallied until about 6 and then bottomed at 11:00, the trader had to be aware of what was happening in 10:00 before rolling over to the downside again. The June S&P contract weakened at the bond market and the dollar (not to mention gold and the other commodities).

about the same time. Both markets bottomed together after 11:00.

Those who didn't bother to monitor the bond and dollar futures that morning couldn't Figure 14.2 compares the June bond contract (upper chart) to the June S&P 500
have possibly understood what was happening. (Figures 14.3 and 14.4 show stock futures contract (bottom chart). The bond market had already peaked before the stock index trading during the entire day of April 6. Figure 14.5 shows the entire week's index futures started trading (9:30 A.M., New York time). Bonds started to bounce trading.)

again around 9:30 and rallied to just after 10:00. Bond and stock index futures started Those who choose not to educate themselves in these lightning-fast intermarket to weaken around 10:15. Both markets also bottomed together just after 11:00 (along linkages are doomed to fall back on artificial reasons such as sell-programs and pro-with the dollar). The plunge in the bond market around 11:00 was partially caused gram trading, instead of the real reasons having to do with activity in the surrounding by the collapse in the German bond market (not shown).

markets. Those whose job it is to report on the activity in the financial markets on The moral of the preceding exercise was to demonstrate how closely the financial a daily basis owe it to their clients to dig for the real reasons why the stock market markets are linked on a minute-by-minute basis. The stock market is heavily influ-moves up and down and to stop going for the quick and easy answers (see Figures enced by events in surrounding markets, most notably the dollar and bonds. To fully 14.6 through 14.8).

A VISUAL LOOK AT THE MORNING'S TRADING 247

246 THE MYTH OF PROGRAM TRADING

FIGURE 14.3

FIGURE 14.2

A COMPARISON OF S&P 500 FUTURES (TOP CHART) AND THE DOW INDUSTRIALS ON APRIL

AN INTRA-DAY COMPARISON OF S&P 500 STOCK INDEX FUTURES (BOTTOM CHART) AND

6, 1990. BOTH INDEXES BOTTOMED AROUND 11:00 (ALONG WITH THE BOND MARKET) TREASURY BOND FUTURES (TOP CHART) DURING THE SAME MORNING (APRIL 6). MOMEN-AND RALLIED THROUGH THE BALANCE OF THE DAY. ALTHOUGH BOTH INDEXES TREND

TARY SHIFTS IN STOCK INDEX FUTURES (WHICH AFFECT THE STOCK MARKET) ARE HEAVILY

TOGETHER, STOCK INDEX FUTURES USUALLY LEAD THE DOW BY A FEW SECONDS AND ARE

INFLUENCED BY ACTIVITY IN THE BOND MARKET. NOTICE THE PLUNGE IN BOTH MARKETS

QUICKER TO REACT TO INTERMARKET FORCES.

AROUND 11:00 A.M. SUDDEN STOCK MARKET MOVES THAT ARE BLAMED ON PROGRAM

TRADING CAN USUALLY BE EXPLAINED BY INTERMARKET LINKAGES.

S&P 500 Futures-One Day's Trading

June Treasury Bond Futures

Dow Industrials

June S&P 500 Futures

FIGURE 14.4

FIGURE 14.5

A COMPARISON OF S&P 500 FUTURES (TOP CHART) AND THE S&P 500 CASH INDEX (BOTTOM

A COMPARISON OF S&P 500 FUTURES (UPPER LINE) AND THE S&P 500 CASH INDEX (BOTTOM

CHART) ON APRIL 6. ALTHOUGH THE FUTURES CONTRACT SHOWS MORE VOLATILITY, THE

LINE) DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL 1990. NOTICE HOW SIMILAR THE TWO LINES LOOK.

PEAKS AND TROUGHS ARE SIMILAR. PROGRAM TRADING IS ACTIVATED WHEN THE FUTURES

ARBITRAGE ACTIVITY (PROGRAM TRADING) KEEPS THE TWO LINES FROM MOVING TOO FAR

AND CASH INDEX MOVE TOO FAR OUT OF LINE.(STOCK INDEX FUTURES TRADE 15 MINUTES

AWAY FROM EACH OTHER. PROGRAM TRADING DOESN'T ALTER THE EXISTING TREND BUT

LONGER THAN THE CASH INDEX.)

MAY EXAGGERATE IT.

S&P 500 Futures-One Day's Trading

250 THE MYTH OF PROGRAM TRADING

SUMMARY 251

FIGURE 14.6

FIGURE 14.7

A COMPARISON OF THE FOUR MARKET SECTORS- THE CRB INDEX (BOTTOM LEFT), TREA-THE COLLAPSE IN THE JAPANESE STOCK MARKET DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1990

SURY BONDS (UPPER LEFT), THE U.S. DOLLAR (UPPER RIGHT), AND THE DOW INDUSTRIALS

WAS INITIALLY BLAMED ON PROGRAM SELLING. MORE CONVINCING REASONS WERE THE

(LOWER RIGHT) DURING ONE TRADING DAY (MARCH 29, 1990). ONE LEADING NEWSPAPER

COLLAPSE IN THE JAPANESE YEN AND THE JAPANESE BOND MARKET. BLAMING PROGRAM

ATTRIBUTED THE SELLOFF IN THE STOCK MARKET TO PROGRAM TRADING. THE MORE LIKELY

TRADING FOR STOCK MARKET DECLINES USUALLY MASKS THE REAL REASONS.

REASONS WERE THE SHARP SELLOFF IN THE DOLLAR AND BONDS AND THE SHARP RALLY

IN COMMODITIES. INTERMARKET LINKAGES CAN BE SEEN EVEN ON INTRA-DAY CHARTS.

Japanese Yen Nikkei 225 Index

Treasury Bond Futures Intra-Day Tic Chart U.S. Dollar Index Futures Japanese Bonds

CRB Index

Dow Industrials

SUMMARY

This chapter discusses the myth of program trading as the primary cause of stock market trends on a day-to-day and minute-by-minute basis, and shows that what is often attributed to program trading is usually a manifestation of intermarket linkages at work. This discussion is not meant as a defense of program trading. Nor is it meant to ignore the role program trading can play in exaggerating stock market declines once they start. There are many legitimate concerns surrounding the practice of program trading which need to be addressed and corrected if necessary. However, a lot of misunderstanding exists concerning the role of program trading on a day-to-day basis. Whenever the stock market rallies, it is almost a certainty that program buying is present. It is equally certain that program selling usually takes place during a stock market selloff. Telling us that program trading is present at such times is similar to telling us that there is more buying than selling during rallies or more selling than

252 THE MYTH OF PROGRAM TRADING

15

FIGURE 14.8

THE FOUR SECTORS OF THE AMERICAN MARKETS DURING 1987. THE INTERMARKET PICTURE

GOING INTO THE SECOND HALF OF 1987 WAS BEARISH FOR EQUITIES-A FALLING DOLLAR, RISING COMMODITIES, AND A COLLAPSING BOND MARKET. MANY OBSERVERS MISTAKENLY

BLAMED THE STOCK MARKET CRASH ON PROGRAM TRADING.

U.S. Dollar Treasury Bonds

A New Direction

CRB Index

Dow Industrials

Having examined the various intermarket relationships in isolation, let's put them all back together again. This chapter will also review some of the general principles and guidelines of intermarket analysis. Although the scope of intermarket comparisons can seem intimidating at times, a firm grasp of a few basic principles can go a long way in helping to comprehend so many market forces continually interacting with each other. The main purpose in this chapter will be to summarize what intermarket analysis is and to show why this type of analysis represents a new and necessary direction in technical work.

INTERMARKET TECHNICAL ANALYSIS-

A MORE OUTWARD FOCUS

As stated at the outset of the book, technical analysis has always had an inward focus.

Primary emphasis has always been placed on the market being traded, whether that market was equities, Treasury bonds, or gold. Technicians 'tried not to be influenced By outside events so as not to cloud their chart interpretation. Hopefully, the previous buying during declines. In other words, telling us that program trading is present tells pages have shown why that attitude is no longer sufficient.

us nothing. It states the obvious.

No market trades in isolation. The stock market, for example, is heavily influ-What's worse, reporting on program trading as a primary market moving force enced by the bond market. In a very real sense, activity in the bond market acts as a masks the real reasons behind a stock market trend. It also gives the false impres-leading indicator for stocks. It's hard to imagine stock traders not taking bond market sion that program trading actually causes the move when, in reality, program trading activity into consideration in their technical analysis of the stock market. Intermarket is usually a reaction to intermarket pressures. A better understanding of how the analysis utilizes price activity in one market, such as Treasury bonds, as a techni-financial markets are constantly interacting may help dispel some of the paranoia cal indication of the likely direction prices will trend in another market such as the concerning program trading. It may also prove helpful in regulatory attempts to cor-stock market. This approach redefines the meaning of a technical indicator. Instead rect any abuses in the practice.

of just looking at internal technical indicators for a given market, the intermarket analyst looks to the price action of related markets for directional clues. Intermarket work expands the scope and the definition of technical analysis and gives it a more outward focus.

The bond market is heavily influenced by commodities. It has been shown why it's dangerous to analyze the bond market without keeping an eye on commodities.

253

254 A NEW DIRECTION

COMMODITIES AS THE MISSING LINK 255

During the latter part of 1989 and early 1990, many traders were looking for lower KEY INTERMARKET PRINCIPLES AND RELATIONSHIPS
interest rates. They failed to consider the rising CRB Index which was signaling higher Some of the key intermarket principles and relationships that we've covered in the interest rates and lower bond prices. The collapse in bond prices during the first half preceding chapters are:

of 1990 was a surprise only to those who weren't watching the commodity markets.

The tumble in bond prices in the spring of that year also put downward pressure

• All markets are interrelated.

on stock prices. Since commodities and bonds are so closely linked, analysis of the commodity markets is almost a requirement for a thorough analysis of the bond

• No market moves in isolation.

market.

• Chart action in related markets should be taken into consideration.

Finally, there is the U.S. dollar. The inflation problem that surfaced in early 1990

• Technical analysis is the preferred vehicle for intermarket work.

as commodity prices rose was the direction result of a collapse in the U.S. dollar

• Intermarket analysis adds a new dimension to technical analysis.

during the fourth quarter of 1989. Weakness in the U.S. currency reawakened inflation pressures as 1989 ended, pushing commodity prices higher. Interest rates rose along

• The four key sectors are currencies, commodities, bonds, and stocks.

with commodities, putting downward pressure on the bond market. Falling bond

• The U.S. dollar usually trends in the opposite direction of the gold market.

prices put downward pressure on U.S. stocks. Technical analysis of the U.S. dollar

• The U.S. dollar usually trends in the opposite direction of the CRB Index.

(currencies), the CRB Index (commodities), Treasury bonds (interest rates), and stocks must always be combined.

• Gold leads turns in the CRB Index in the same direction.

• The CRB Index normally trends in the opposite direction of the bond market.

THE EFFECT OF GLOBAL TRENDS

• Bonds normally trend in the same direction as the stock market.

• Bonds lead turns in the stock market.

Global forces were also at work as the new decade began. Global interest rates were

• The Dow Utilities follow the bond market and lead stocks.

trending higher, putting overseas bond markets under pressure. Falling bond markets began to take their toll on the Japanese and British equities markets. During the first

• The U.S. bond and stock markets are linked to global markets.

quarter of 1990, the Japanese stock market lost almost a third of its value, owing to a

• Some stock groups (such as oil, gold mining, copper, and interest-sensitive stocks) collapsing yen and falling Japanese bond prices—an example of classic intermarket are influenced by related futures markets.

analysis. Falling bond prices (owing to rising inflation fears) also pushed British stock prices lower. Bearish global forces in bonds and stocks were just beginning to impact INTERMARKET ANALYSIS AND THE FUTURES MARKETS
on the American stock market in the spring of 1990. Surging oil prices during the second half of 1990 pushed global bond and stock markets into more serious bear Heavy emphasis has been placed on the futures markets throughout the book. This is market declines.

mainly due to the fact that the evolution of the futures markets during the 1970s and 1980s has played a major role in intermarket awareness. Whereas the stock market world has remained relatively static during the past two decades, the futures markets TECHNICAL ANALYSTS AND INTERMARKET FORCES
have expanded to include virtually every financial sector—currencies, commodities, What it all means is that technical analysts have to understand how these intermarket interest rate, and stock index futures. Global futures markets have grown dramatically.

linkages work. What does a falling dollar mean for commodities? What does a rising The price discovery mechanism provided by instant quotations in the futures markets dollar mean for U.S. bonds and stocks? What are the implications of the dollar for all over the world and the quickness with which they interact with each other have the gold market? What does a rising or a falling gold market mean for the CRB Index provided a fertile proving ground for intermarket work.

and the inflation outlook? What do rising or falling commodities mean for bonds and Those readers unfamiliar with the specific workings of the futures markets need stocks? And what is the impact of rising or falling Japanese and British bond and not be concerned. Cash markets exist in every sector studied in this book. As an stock markets on their American counterparts? These are the types of questions tech-illustration, bond futures and stock index futures trend in the same direction as their nical analysts must begin to ask themselves.

respective cash markets (sometimes with a slight lead time). The futures markets To ignore these interrelationships is to cheat oneself of enormously valuable used in this book can be viewed simply as proxies for their respective cash markets.

price information. What's worse, it leaves technical analysts in the position of not The use of futures markets in the various examples doesn't in any way diminish the understanding the external technical forces that are moving the market they are trad-usefulness and relevance of intermarket analysis in the respective cash markets.

ing. The days of following only one market are long gone. Technical analysts have to know what's happening in all market sectors, and must understand the impact COMMODITIES AS THE MISSING LINK
of trends in related markets all over the globe. For this purpose, technical analysis is uniquely suited because of its reliance on price action. For the same reason, it Another theme running throughout the book has been the important role played by seems only logical that technical analysts should be at the forefront of intermarket the commodity markets in the intermarket picture. This is due to the belief that analysis.

commodities have been the least understood and the least appreciated of the four

256 A NEW DIRECTION

INTERMARKET ANALYSIS-A NEW DIRECTION 257
sectors. The biggest breakthrough in intermarket analysis lies in the recognition of There is probably a self-fulfilling prophecy at work in intermarket analysis. Years the close linkage between commodity markets, measured by the Commodity Research ago, traders weren't as aware of the linkages between the various markets. Now, as Bureau (CRB) Index, interest rates, and bond prices.

these markets are freely traded, with quotes and pictures so readily available on By establishing this link, commodity prices also becomes linked with activity in terminal screens all over the globe, traders react much more quickly to changing the currency and stock markets. It's not possible to analyze the other three sectors from market events. A selloff in Tokyo can cause a selloff in London, which will influence an intermarket perspective without considering the key role play by commodities be-the opening on Wall Street. A sudden selloff in the German bond market can cause a cause of the link between commodity price action and inflation. Greater appreciation similar selloff in Chicago Treasury bond futures within seconds (which may impact of the role played by commodities and their generally negative correlation to the three on the stock market in New York a few seconds later). Trading activity in the United other financial sectors may encourage the view of commodities as an asset class and States sets the tone for overnight trading overseas. It seems incredible to think that as a potential vehicle for tactical asset allocation.

the British stock market started dropping almost a year before the American stock Admittedly, most of the emphasis in these pages has centered on the past twenty market in 1929, and either no one in the States noticed, or hardly anyone seemed to years. This raises the inevitable question as to whether or not these studies have care. Today, such a selloff in London would have more immediate repercussions.

reached back far enough in time. It also raises the question of whether these linkages There will be those who will want to go back further in time to study intermarket are a new phenomenon and whether they are likely to continue. How far back in linkages. My belief, however, is that the growing evidence of intermarket linkages par-history can or should the markets be researched for intermarket comparisons? This allels the evolution of the futures markets since the 1970s and our enhanced ability book's focus on the past two decades is due largely to reliance on the futures markets, to track them. It seems safe to say that with newer markets and instant communica-most of which were introduced during that period, and the belief that a lot has tions, the world's markets have truly changed and so has our ability to react to those changed during the past twenty years in the way we view the world markets. Let's changes. For these reasons, comparisons before that time may not be very helpful.

consider some of those changes.

The more pertinent question isn't whether intermarket linkages were as obvious forty Prior to 1970, the world had fixed exchange rates. Trends in the U.S. dollar and years ago, but whether they will still be obvious forty years from now. My guess is foreign currencies simply didn't exist. Given the important role played by the currency that they will.

markets today, it's impossible to measure their possible impact prior to 1970. Gold was set at a fixed price and couldn't be owned by Americans until the mid-1970s.

INTERMARKET ANALYSIS-A NEW DIRECTION

Gold's relationship with the dollar and its role as a leading indicator of inflation was impossible to measure prior to that time since its price didn't fluctuate. The price of Technical analysis appears to be going through an evolutionary phase. As its pop-oil was regulated until the early 1970s. All of these parts of the intermarket puzzle ularity grows, so has the recognition that technical analysis has many applications weren't available before 1970.

beyond the traditional study of isolated charts and internal technical indicators. Inter-Gold futures were introduced in 1974 and oil futures in 1983. Currency futures market analysis represents another step in the evolution of technical theory. With the were started in 1972. Their impact on each other could only be measured from those growing recognition that all markets are linked—financial and non-financial, domes-points in time. Futures contracts in Treasury bonds, Treasury Bills, and Eurodollars tic and international—traders will be taking these linkages into consideration more were developed later in the 1970s. Futures markets in stock index futures, the U.S.

and more in their analysis. Because of its flexibility and its universal application to dollar, and the CRB Index weren't introduced until the 1980s. When one considers all markets, technical analysis is uniquely suited to perform this type of analysis.

how important each of these markets is to the intermarket picture, it can be seen why Intermarket analysis simply adds another step to the process and provides a more it's so hard to study intermarket analysis prior to 1970. In most cases, the data simply useful framework for understanding analysis of the individual sectors. For the past isn't available. Where the data is available, it's only in bits and pieces.

century, technical analysis has had an inward focus. My guess is the next century will witness a broader application of technical principles in the areas of financial and economic forecasting. Even the Federal Reserve Board has been known to peek at COMPUTERIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION
charts of the financial markets on occasion. The principles presented in this text are The trends toward computerization and globalization in the past two decades have admittedly only the first- steps in a new direction for technical analysis. However, I also made a major contribution to expanding our global perspective. Thanks to these believe that as technical analysis continues to grow in popularity and respectability, two trends, the world seems much smaller and much more interdependent. Most intermarket analysis will play an increasingly important role in its future.

people didn't watch the overseas markets ten years ago and didn't care what they were doing. Now many begin the day with quotes from Tokyo and London. The entrance of computers enabled traders to view these markets on terminal screens and watch them trade off each other on a minute-by-minute basis. Financial futures contracts now exist all over the globe, and their price action is reported instantaneously on quote machines and video screens to every other part of the globe. To put it mildly, much has changed in the financial markets in the past two decades and in the observer's ability to monitor them.

APPENDIX

As the reader has probably detected from the computer-generated charts in the preceding chapters, this book was written over a span of several months. In each chapter, the most recent market data was utilized. Naturally, each succeeding chapter included more recent price data. Instead of going back to update the earlier charts and edit market observations with the benefit of hindsight, the decision was made to leave the earlier chapters alone and to include the more recent data as the book progressed. As a result, the material has a dynamic quality to it as I assimilated new market data into the intermarket equation.

The purpose of this Appendix is to update the most important intermarket relationships through the third quarter of 1990 as we go to press. Some relationships have performed better than others in the past year, but, as I hope you'll agree, most have held up quite well. It's gratifying, for example, to see how well the markets followed the intermarket script even during the hectic days of the Mideast crisis that gripped the global financial markets during the summer of 1990. Chart examples utilized in any book quickly become outdated. The important point to remember is that even though the chart data is constantly changing, the basic principles of intermarket technical analysis stay the same.

259

260 APPENDIX

APPENDIX 261

FIGURE A.1

FIGURE A.2

CHARTS OF THE FOUR SECTORS-THE DOLLAR, CRB INDEX, STOCKS, AND BONDS-A COMPARISON OF THE CRB INDEX AND TREASURY BONDS FROM LATE 1989 THROUGH THE

THROUGH THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1990. A WEAK DOLLAR DURING MOST OF 1990 HELPED

THIRD QUARTER OF 1990. DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1990, COMMODITIES RALLIED WHILE

SUPPORT COMMODITY PRICES AND PUT DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON BONDS AND STOCKS.

BONDS WEAKENED. THE BOND BOTTOMS IN EARLY MAY AND LATE AUGUST (SEE ARROWS) WERE ACCOMPANIED BY PEAKS IN COMMODITY PRICES.

Dollar Index-One Year Dow Industrials-One Year

CRB Index-One Year

CRB Index

Treasury Bonds

Treasury Bonds

262 APPENDIX

APPENDIX 263

FIGURE A.3

FIGURE A.4

STOCKS VERSUS BONDS FROM LATE 1989 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1990. AFTER FALLING

A COMPARISON OF THE DOW INDUSTRIALS, DOW UTILITIES, AND TREASURY BONDS

THROUGH THE EARLY PORTION OF 1990, THE BOND TROUGH IN EARLY MAY HELPED

FROM AUTUMN OF 1989 THROUGH THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1990. RELATIVE WEAKNESS

SUPPORT THE STOCK RALLY. BONDS FAILED TO CONFIRM THE DOW'S MOVE TO NEW HIGHS

IN THE DOW UTILITIES FROM THE BEGINNING OF 1990 PROVIDED AN EARLY BEARISH

DURING THE SUMMER. BOTH MARKETS THEN TUMBLED TOGETHER.

WARNING FOR THE DOW INDUSTRIALS. NOTICE THE CLOSE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE

DOW UTILITIES AND TREASURY BONDS.

Dow Industrials-One Year

Dow Industrials Treasury Bonds

Dow Utilities

264 APPENDIX

APPENDIX 265

FIGURE A.5

FIGURE A.6

A COMPARISON OF THE CRB INDEX TO THE U.S. DOLLAR FROM LATE 1989 TO SEPTEMBER

THE U.S. DOLLAR VERSUS GOLD FROM LATE 1989 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1990. THE

1990. THE FALLING DOLLAR, WHICH IS INFLATIONARY, HELPED COMMODITY PRICES

DECLINING DOLLAR DURING MOST OF 1990 WASN'T ENOUGH TO TURN THE GOLD TREND

ADVANCE DURING 1990. A BOUNCE IN THE DOLLAR DURING MAY CONTRIBUTED TO THE

HIGHER. HOWEVER, THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP CAN STILL BE SEEN, ESPECIALLY DURING

CRB PEAK THAT MONTH. COMMODITIES FIRMED AGAIN DURING THE SUMMER AS THE

THE DOLLAR SELLOFFS IN LATE 1989 AND JUNE 1990, WHEN GOLD RALLIED. THE INTERIM

DOLLAR PROPPED TO NEW LOWS.

BOTTOM IN THE DOLLAR IN FEBRUARY 1990 WAS ENOUGH TO PUSH GOLD PRICES LOWER.

CRB Index

U.S. Dollar Index

Dollar Index

Gold

266 APPENDIX

APPENDIX 267

FIGURE A.7

FIGURE A.8

GOLD VERSUS THE DOW INDUSTRIALS FROM THE SUMMER OF 1989 TO THE AUTUMN OF

A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND JAPANESE STOCK MARKETS IN THE 18-MONTH

1990. THE GOLD RALLY IN THE FALL OF 1989 COINCIDED WITH STOCK MARKET WEAKNESS.

PERIOD ENDING IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1990. ALL THREE MARKETS DROPPED SHARPLY

THE FEBRUARY 1990 PEAK IN GOLD COINCIDED WITH A RALLY IN STOCKS. GOLD ROSE

AT THE BEGINNING OF 1990 AND THEN RALLIED IN THE SPRING. NEITHER OF THE FOREIGN

DURING THE SUMMER OF 1990 AS STOCKS WEAKENED. THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD SHOWN, MARKETS CONFIRMED THE AMERICAN RALLY TO NEW HIGHS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1990.

GOLD DID BEST WHEN THE STOCK MARKET FALTERED.

THE "TRIPLE TOP" IN BRITAIN AND THE COLLAPSE IN JAPAN HELD BEARISH IMPLICATIONS

FOR AMERICAN EQUITIES. GLOBAL MARKETS THEN COLLAPSED TOGETHER.

Dow Industrials

Dow lndustrials-75 Weeks FT-100

Cold

Nikkei 225

268 APPENDIX

APPENDIX 269

FIGURE A.9

FIGURE A.10

AMERICAN VERSUS JAPANESE STOCK MARKETS FROM SEPTEMBER 1989 TO SEPTEMBER

A COMPARISON OF THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, GERMAN, AND JAPANESE BOND MARKETS

1990. BOTH MARKETS TURNED DOWN IN JANUARY. ALTHOUGH THE AMERICAN MARKET

DURING THE SUMMER OF 1990. GLOBAL BOND MARKETS TUMBLED AS OIL PRICES SURGED

APPEARED TO SHRUG OFF THE JAPANESE COLLAPSE DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1990, FOLLOWING IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT ON AUGUST 2,1990. JAPANESE BONDS TURNED

THE SECOND FALL IN JAPAN DURING THE SUMMER TOOK ITS TOLL ON ALL GLOBAL

IN THE WORST PERFORMANCE (OWING TO JAPAN'S GREATER DEPENDENCE ON OIL), NOT

MARKETS. THE JAPANESE RALLY FROM MAY INTO JULY HELPED STABILIZE THE AMERICAN

ONLY LEADING GLOBAL BOND PRICES LOWER BUT ALSO ACCOUNTING FOR THE COLLAPSE

MARKET. HOWEVER, THE AMERICAN RALLY TO NEW HIGHS WASN'T CONFIRMED BY THE

OF JAPANESE EQUITIES.

JAPANESE MARKET, WHICH BARELY RETRACED HALF OF ITS PREVIOUS LOSSES.

American versus Japanese Stocks

270 APPENDIX

APPENDIX 271

FIGURE A.11

FIGURE A.12

DOW INDUSTRIALS VERSUS CRUDE OIL DURING THE SUMMER OF 1990. THE INFLATIONARY

CRUDE OIL VERSUS OIL STOCKS DURING 1990. OIL STOCKS HAD SPENT THE FIRST HALF

IMPACT OF SURGING OIL PRICES DURING THE SUMMER OF 1990 TOOK A BEARISH TOLL ON

OF 1990 IN A HOLDING PATTERN WHILE OIL PRICES WEAKENED. OIL STOCKS EXPLODED TO

EQUITY PRICES EVERYWHERE ON THE GLOBE. OIL BECAME THE DOMINANT COMMODITY

NEW HIGHS IN EARLY JULY WHEN OIL BOTTOMED. AS THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1990 ENDED, DURING 1990 AND DEMONSTRATED HOW SENSITIVE BOND AND STOCK MARKETS ARE TO

HOWEVER, FALLING OIL SHARES HAVE SET UP A "NEGATIVE DIVERGENCE" WITH THE PRICE

ACTION IN THE COMMODITY SECTOR.

OF OIL, WHICH IS TESTING ITS ALL-TIME HIGH AT $40.

Stocks versus Oil

Crude Oil versus Oil Stocks

GLOSSARY

Advance/Decline Line: One of the most widely-
down to the right below price troughs. Prices will used indicators to measure the breadth of a stock often meet resistance at rising channel lines and market advance or decline. Each day (or week) the support at falling channel lines.

number of advancing issues is compared to the num-Confirmation: Having as many technical factors
ber of declining issues. If advances outnumber de-as possible agreeing with one another. For exam-clines, the net total is added to the previous cu-ple, if prices and volume are rising together, vol-mulative total. If declines outnumber advances, the ume is confirming the price action. The opposite net difference is subtracted from the previous cu-of confirmation is divergence.

mulative total. The advance/decline line is usually compared to a popular stock average such as the Continuation Patterns: Price formations that im-Dow Jones Industrial Average. They should trend ply a pause or consolidation in the prevailing
in the same direction. When the advance/decline trend, after which the prior trend is resumed. The line begins to diverge from the stock average, an early most common types are triangles, flags, and pen-indication is given of a possible trend reversal.

nants.

Arms Index: Also called Trin, this contrary indi-Descending Triangle: A sideways price pattern
cator is the average volume of declining stocks di-between two converging trendlines, in which the vided by the average volume of advancing stocks. A upper line is declining while the lower line is flat.

reading below 1.0 indicates more volume in rising This is generally a bearish pattern.

stocks. A reading above 1.0 reflects more volume in Divergence: A situation where two indicators are declining issues. However, an extreme high reading not confirming each other. For example, in oscilla-suggests an oversold market and an extreme low
tor analysis, prices trend higher while an oscillator reading, an overbought market.

starts to drop. Divergence usually warns of a trend Ascending Triangle: A sideways price pattern be-reversal.

tween two converging trendlines, in which the

Double Top: This price pattern displays two
lower line is rising while the upper line is flat.

prominent peaks. The reversal is complete when

This is generally a bullish pattern.

the middle trough is broken. The double bottom is Bar Chart: The most common type of price chart
a mirror image of the top.

used by market technicians. On a daily bar chart, Down Trendline: A straight line drawn down and
each bar represents one day's activity. The verti-to the right above successive rally peaks in a down-cal bar is drawn from the day's highest price to the trend. A violation of the down trendline usually day's lowest price (the range). A tic to the left of the signals a change in the trend.

bar marks the opening price, whereas a tic to the Dow Theory: One of the oldest and most highly
right of the bar marks the closing price. Bar charts regarded of technical theories. A Dow Theory buy can be constructed for any time period, including signal is given when the Dow Industrial and Dow monthly, weekly, hourly, and selected minute pe-Transportation Averages close above a prior rally riods.

peak. A sell signal is given when both averages Breakaway Gap: A price gap that forms on the
close below a prior reaction low.

completion of an important price pattern. A breakaway gap usually signals the beginning of an im-Elliott Wave Analysis: An approach to market
portant price move.

analysis that is based on repetitive wave patterns and the Fibonacci number sequence. An ideal El-Bullish Consensus: Weekly numbers based on a
liott Wave pattern shows a five-wave advance fol-poll of newsletter writers published by Hadady
lowed by a three-wave decline. The Fibonacci num-Publications in Pasadena, California. When 80 per-ber sequence (1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144
cent of newsletter writers are bullish on a market,

...) is constructed by adding the first two num-that market is considered to be overbought and vul-bers to arrive at the third. The ratio of any number nerable to a price decline. Readings below 30 per-to the next larger number is 62 percent, which is cent are indicative of an oversold market and are a popular Fibonacci retracement number. The in-considered bullish.

verse of 62 percent, which is 38 percent, is also Channel Line: Straight lines drawn parallel to the used as a Fibonacci retracement number. The ra-basic trendline. In an uptrend, the channel line tio of any number to the next smaller number is slants up to the right and is drawn above rally 1.62 percent, which is used to arrive at Fibonacci peaks: in a downtrend, the channel line is drawn price targets. Elliott Wave Analysis incorporates

274

GLOSSARY

275

GLOSSARY
the three elements of pattern (wave identification), resembles a small symmetrical triangle. Like the then close below the previous day's closing price.

percent retracement. Minimum and maximum re-
ratio (Fibonacci ratios and projections), and time.

flag, the pennant usually lasts from one to three In a downtrend, prices open lower and then close tracements are normally one-third and two-thirds, Fibonacci time targets are arrived at by counting Fi-weeks and is typically followed by a resumption higher. The wider the price range on the key rever-respectively. Elliott Wave Theory uses Fibonacci bonacci days, weeks, months, or years from promi-sal day and the heavier the volume, the greater the of the prior trend.

retracements of 38 percent and 62 percent.

nent peaks and troughs.

odds that a reversal is taking place.

% Investment Advisors Bullish: This measure

Reversal Patterns: Price patterns on a price chart Exhaustion Gap: A price gap that occurs at the
of stock market bullish sentiment is published

Line Charts: Price charts that connect the closing that usually indicate that a trend reversal is taking end of an important trend and signals that the trend weekly by Investor's Intelligence in New Rochelle, prices of a given market over a span of time. The place. The best known of the reversal patterns are is ending.

New York. When only 35 percent of profession-
result is a curving line on the chart. This type of the head and shoulders and double and triple tops als are bullish, the market is considered oversold.

and bottoms.

Exponential Smoothing: A moving average that
chart is most useful with overlay or comparison A reading of 55 percent is considered to be over-uses all data points, but gives greater weight to charts that are commonly employed in intermarket Runaway Gap: A price gap that usually occurs
more recent price data.

analysis.

bought.

around the midpoint of an important market trend.

Price Patterns: Patterns that appear on price

For this reason, it is also called a measuring gap.

Flag: A continuation price pattern, generally last-Momentum: A technique used to construct an
charts that have predictive value. Patterns are di-Saucer: A price reversal pattern that represents a ing less than three weeks, which resembles a par-overbought/oversold oscillator. Momentum mea-vided into reversal patterns and continuation pat-very slow and gradual shift in trend direction.

allelogram that slopes against the prevailing trend.

sures price differences over a selected span of time.

To construct a 10-day momentum line, the closing terns.

The flag represents a minor pause in a dynamic Sentiment Indicators: Psychological indicators
price trend.

price 10 days earlier is subtracted from the latest Put/Call Ratio: The ratio of volume in put options that attempt to measure the degree of bullishness price. The resulting positive or negative value is divided by the volume of call options is used as a or bearishness in the stock market or in individ-Fundamental Analysis: The opposite of technical plotted above or below a zero line.

contrary indicator. When put buying gets too high ual markets. These are contrary indicators and are analysis. Fundamental analysis relies on economic relative to call buying (a high put/call ratio), the Moving Average: A trend-following indicator that used in much the same fashion as overbought or
supply/demand information as opposed to market
market is oversold. A low put/call ratio represents works best in a trending environment. Moving av-oversold oscillators. Their greatest value is when activity.

an overbought market condition.

erages smooth out price action but operate with they reach upper or lower extremes.

Gaps: Gaps are spaces left on the bar chart where a time lag. A simple 10-day moving average of a Rate of Change: A technique used to construct an Simple Average: A moving average that gives
no trading has taken place. An up gap is formed stock, for example, adds up the last 10 days' clos-overbought/oversold oscillator. Rate of change em-equal weight to each day's price data.

when the lowest price on a trading day is higher ing prices and divides the total by 10. This pro-ploys a price ratio over a selected span of time. To Stochastics: An overbought/oversold oscillator
than the highest high of the previous day. A down cedure is repeated each day. Any number of mov-construct a ten-day Rate of Change oscillator, the that is based on the principle that as prices ad-gap is formed when the highest price on a day is ing averages can be employed, with different time last closing price is divided by the close price ten vance, the closing price moves to the upper end of lower than the lowest price of the prior day. An up spans, to generate buy and sell signals. When only days earlier. The resulting value is plotted above its range. In a downtrend, closing prices usually ap-gap is usually a sign of market strength, whereas one average is employed, a buy signal is given
or below a value of 100.

pear near the bottom of their recent range. Time pe-a down gap is a sign of market weakness. Three
when the price closes above the average. When two Ratio Analysis: The use of a ratio to compare the riods of 9 and 14 days are usually employed in its types of gaps are breakaway, runaway (also called averages are employed, a buy signal is given when relative strength between two entities. An individ-construction. Stochastics uses two lines—%K and measuring), and exhaustion gaps.

the shorter average crosses above the longer aver-ual stock or industry group divided by the S&P 500
its 3-day moving average, %D. These two lines fluc-Head and Shoulders: The best known of the re-
age. Technicians use three types: simple, weighted, index can determine whether that stock or indus-tuate in a vertical range between 0 and 100. Read-versal price patterns. At a market top, three promi-and exponentially smoothed averages.

try group is outperforming or underperforming the ings above 80 are overbought, while readings below nent peaks are formed with the middle peak (or

Open Interest: The number of options or futures stock market as a whole. Ratio analysis can be used 20 are oversold. When the faster %K line crosses head) slightly higher than the two other peaks
contracts that are still unliquidated at the end of a to compare any two entities. A rising ratio indicates above the slower %D line and the lines are below shoulders). When the trendline (neckline) contrading day. A rise or fall in open interest shows that the numerator in the ratio is outperforming 20, a buy signal is given. When the %K crosses be-necting the two intervening troughs is broken, the that money is flowing into or out of a futures
the denominator. Ratio analysis can also be used low the %D line and the lines are over 80, a sell pattern is complete. A bottom pattern is a mirror contract or option, respectively. Open interest also to compare market sectors such as the bond mar-signal is given. There are two stochastics versions: image of a top and is called an inverse head and measures liquidity.

ket to the stock market or commodities to bonds.

fast stochastics and slow stochastics. Most traders shoulders.

Technical analysis can be applied to the ratio line Oscillators: Technical indicators that are utilized use the slower version because of its smoother

Intermarket Analysis: An additional aspect of
itself to determine important turning points.

to determine when a market is in an overbought look and more reliable signals. The formula for fasf technical analysis that takes into consideration the and oversold condition. Oscillators are plotted at Relative-Strength Index (RSI): A popular oscilla-stochastics is:

price action of related market sectors. The four the bottom of a price chart. When the oscillator developed by Welles Wilder, Jr., and described sectors are currencies, commodities, bonds, and tor reaches an upper extreme, the market is overin his 1978 book, New Concepts in Technical Trad-stocks. International markets are also included.

bought. When the oscillator line reaches a lower ing Systems. RSI is plotted on a vertical scale from This approach is based on the premise that all mar-extreme, the market is oversold. Two types of os-0 to 100. Values above 75 are considered to be over-kets are interrelated and impact on one another.

cillators use momentum and rates of change.

bought and values below 25, oversold. When prices Island Reversal: A combination of an exhaustion are over 75 or below 25 and diverge from price ac-Overbought: A term usually used in reference to In the formula, n usually refers to the number of gap in one direction and a breakaway gap in the tion, a warning is given of a possible trend reversal.

an oscillator. When an oscillator reaches an upper days, but can also mean months, weeks, or hours.

other direction within a few days. Toward the end RSI usually employs time spans of 9 or 14 days.

extreme, it is believed that a market has risen too The formula for stow stochastics is:

of an uptrend, for example, prices gap upward and far and is vulnerable to a selloff.

Resistance: The opposite of support. Resistance then downward within a few days. The result is
is marked by a previous price peak and provides Oversold: A term usually used in reference to an slow %K = fast %D
usually two or three trading days standing alone enough of a barrier above the market to halt a price oscillator. When an oscillator reaches a lower ex-with gaps on either side. The island reversal usu-slow %D = 3 day average of fast %D.

treme, it is believed that market has dropped too advance.

ally signals a trend reversal.

far and is due for a bounce.

Retracements: Prices normally retrace the prior Key Reversal Day: In an uptrend, this one-day
trend by a percentage amount before resuming the Support: A price, or price zone, beneath the cur-Pennant: This continuation price pattern is sim-pattern occurs when prices open in new highs and original trend. The best known example is the 50
ilar to the flag, except that it is more horizontal and rent market price, where buying power is sufficient

276

GLOSSARY
to halt a price decline. A previous reaction low current trend. The breaking of a trendline usually usually forms a support level.

signals a trend change.

Symmetrical Triangle: A sideways price pattern

Triangles: Sideways price patterns in which
between two converging trendlines in which the
prices fluctuate within converging trendlines. The upper trendline is declining and lower trendline three types of triangles are the symmetrical, the as-is rising. This pattern represents an even balance cending, and the descending.

between buyers and sellers, although the prior

Triple Top: A price pattern with three prominent trend is usually resumed. The breakout through
peaks, similar to the head and shoulders top, ex-either trendline signals the direction of the price cept that all three peaks occur at about the same trend.

level. The triple bottom is a mirror image of the Technical Analysis: The study of market action, top.

Index
usually with price charts, which also includes vol-Up Trendline: A straight line drawn upward and
ume and open interest patterns.

to the right below reaction lows in an uptrend. The Trend: Refers to the direction of prices. Ris-longer the up trendline has been in effect and the ing peaks and troughs constitute an uptrend; more times it has been tested, the more significant falling peaks and troughs constitute a downtrend.

it becomes. Violation of the trendline usually sig-A trading range is characterized by horizontal nals that the uptrend may be changing direction.

peaks and troughs. Trends are generally classified Volume: The level of trading activity in a stock, into major (longer than six months), intermedi-option, or futures contract. Expanding volume in ate (one to six months), or minor (less than a
the direction of the current price trend confirms Advance/decline line, 3, 273

Bullish consensus, 273
month).

the price trend.

Aluminum shares, 171, 172

Business Conditions Digest, 231

Trendlines: Straight lines drawn on a chart below Weighted Average: A moving average that uses a

Angell, Wayne, 116, 117, 146

Business cycle, 11, 19, 225-239
reaction lows in an uptrend, or above rally peaks selected time span but gives greater weight to more Arms Index, 273
bonds and, 54, 229-230
in a downtrend, that determine the steepness of the recent price data.

Ascending triangle, 273, 276
chronological sequences of bonds, stocks,

Asset allocation, 11, 226
and commodities in, 226—227
role of commodities in, 206, 207,
commodities in, 228

220-221, 223-224
long- and short-leading indexes, 230-231
role of futures in, 216-217
six stages of, 228-229

Asset Allocation Review, 226, 228, 234
stocks and commodities as leading
indicators of, 232-235

Baker, James, 116

Bank stocks, 149, 164

Canada, 142

Bar chart, 41, 42, 273

Center for International Business Cycle

Bond(s):

Research (CIBCR), 99, 230
and commodities, 9, 10, 13, 24, 28

Channel line, 273
and the CRB Index, 24-30

Chernobyl accident, 14
and the dollar, 54, 58, 59

Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 7
in economic forecasting, 229-230

Closing prices, 274
global, 141-143

Commodities:

as a leading indicator of stocks, 43-51
basket approach to, 220, 222, 224
prices vs. yields, 21, 24, 139
bonds and, 9, 10, 13
vs. savings and loan stocks, 165-168
and the dollar, 9, 56-57, 75
vs. stocks, 9, 15, 40-55, 262
and Federal Reserve policy, 116-117
and utilities, 178-181
and interest rates, 13, 22, 38

Bond market(s):

as the missing link in intermarket
bottom of 1981, 41-43
analysis, 255-256
collapse of, 13, 14-17, 24
ranking individual, 200-203
comparison of, 140, 273
vs. stocks, 90-91
short-term interest rates and, 52

Commodity-bond link:

Bond-stock link:

and the dollar, 75
financial markets on the defensive, 40-41
economic background of, 22
long lead times, 51
how technical analysts use, 30-34, 229
role of business cycle in, 54
importance of T-bill action, 36-38

Breakaway gap, 273, 274
inflation as the key to, 20-21

277

278

279

INDEX

INDEX
market history in the 1980s, 22-24

Commodity Research Bureau {CRB} Spot
bonds, utilities, and, 184-185, 263
foreign currencies and, 66-68
relative-strength analysis in, 35, 200-203,

Index, 95, 98-99, 234
vs. crude oil, 270
vs. gold mining shares, 150-157, 158

205

Computerization, 53, 256-257

Dow Jones Transportation Average, 173, 273
as a key to vital intermarket links, 38, 93
since 1987, 24-30

Confirmation, 31, 43, 147, 161, 186, 204,

Dow Jones 20 Bond Average, 180, 230
as a leading indicator of the CRB Index,
role of short-term rates, 35-36

273

Dow Jones Utility Average, 10, 19, 172, 180,

68-70, 227, 233
vs. stocks, 90-91

Consumer Price Index (CPI), 9, 20, 35, 96,

185
as a leading indicator of inflation, 91-92,
technical analysis of, 34-35

117-120, 121, 222
vs. the Dow Jones Industrial Average,

93, 94, 98, 150

Commodity futures, as an asset class, 11,

Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage

173-177
and oil, 114-115, 200

220-221, 223, 224

Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W),

Down gap, 274
and the stock market, 91-92, 152

Commodity groups, 9, 97-98, 188-191

117

Downtrend, 23, 184, 215, 227, 276

Gold mining shares, 93, 147, 149, 195, 198

Commodity indexes, 95-121

Continuation patterns, 14, 273, 275

Down trendline, 273
vs. gold, 9, 150-157, 158
energy vs. metals markets, 113-114

Contraction, 10, 225, 226, 229

Dow Theory, 14, 173, 185, 273
vs. money center stocks, 170-171
grains, metals, and oils, 98

Copper, 171, 172, 226

Drought, market effects of, 24, 25, 38, 98,

Gold mutual funds, 152, 153
industrials vs. foodstuffs, 99, 100-101,
as an economic indicator, 235—237

212

Gold/silver ratio, 199

102
and the stock market, 237-238, 239

Grain markets, 8, 38, 98, 110, 111, 188 :

interest rates vs., 106-108

CRB Index, see Commodity Research Bureau

Great Britain, 2, 7, 10, 66, 124, 125, 126,
intermarket roles of gold and oil, 114—115

Futures Price Index

Economic forces, 3

127, 128-132, 145, 267
metals and energy futures vs. interest

CRB Index Futures Reference Guide, 39, Economic forecasting, 229-230

Group analysis, 110-113, 187, 188
rates, 115-116

97

Economist Commodity Price Index, 144,
visual comparisons of, 100

CRB Index White Paper, 38, 118

145-146, 147

Commodity markets, 8

Cullity, John P., 232

Efficient frontier, 222-223

Head and shoulders, 13, 106, 165, 166, 174,

Commodity prices, 12, 24, 27, 56-57, 96

Elliott wave analysis, 6, 273-274, 275

274,275
compared to bond prices, 207

Energy markets, 8, 9, 95, 98, 110, 112,

Hedging, 206, 213, 220, 222
as a key to inflation, 3, 20-21, 57-59, 60

Depression, 48, 225

113-114, 116, 147, 149. See also Oil

Heller, Robert, 116

Commodity Research Bureau, 22, 95

Descending triangle, 33, 34, 273, 276
markets

Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) Futures

Deutsche mark, 66, 69, 70, 71, 217
group analysis, 188, 192-194

Group Indexes, 95, 109-110, 188

Discount rate, 52

Eurodollars, 35, 36, 38, 52

Index arbitrage, 242

Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) Futures

Disinflation, 21, 23

Exchange rate, 93, 256

Individual rankings, 187, 200-202

Price Index, 4-5, 7, 8, 12, 20, 95

Divergence, 15, 32, 43, 45, 51, 67, 69, 147,

Exhaustion gap, 274

Inflation, 13, 40, 56, 72-73, 86, 96
applications of, 186, 220, 226

161, 164, 167, 180, 186, 204, 273

Expansion, 10, 22, 54, 225, 226, 229
commodity price trends as a key to,
a balanced picture of, 108-109

Diversification, 215, 222

Exponential smoothing, 274

3, 20-21, 57-59, 60
and the bond market, 5, 9, 13, 24-30,

Dollar, U.S.: .

global, 141-143

216
and commodity prices, 56-57, 75
gold and, 91-92, 93, 94, 98, 150
vs. bonds and utilities, 181-184
vs. the CRB Index, 59-62, 70-72, 264

Fast stochastics, 275

Interest-rate differentials, 93
construction of, 22, 96-97
foreign currencies and, 66

Federal Reserve Board, 9, 35, 47, 48, 52, 75,

Interest rates:

vs. the CRB spot index, 98-99, 103, 121
gold market and, 60, 63-65, 73, 256, 265

76, 79, 87, 146
bonds and, 3
descending triangle in, 33, 34
and inflation, 40, 54, 56, 72-73
commodities and policy of, 96, 116-117
and commodities, 13, 22, 106-108
dollar and, 59-62, 70-72, 264
and interest rates, 9, 19, 74, 75-79, 94

Fibonacci number, 273
vs. the CRB, PPI, and CPI, 120
and the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
in intermarket analysis, 54

Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100
and the dollar, 9, 19, 74, 75-79, 86, 94

233
lead time and, 63, 70, 90
share index, 129, 138
global, 139-141
gold and, 68-70, 71, 265
sequence of in market turns, 90

Flags, 273, 274, 275
and inflation, 20, 86
vs. grains, metals, and energy groups, 9,
vs. the stock ma!rket, 54, 86-89

Flight to quality, 152
long-term, 12, 75, 79-82

110-113
and the stock market crash of 1987,

Flight to safety, 24, 47, 76, 87, 153
metals and energy futures vs., 115-116
group correlation studies of, 97-98

17-18, 19, 88, 243

Foreign currency markets, 60, 66—68

Short-term, 35-36, 52, 75-82
and interest rates, 120
vs. Treasury bill futures, 83-86

Franc, Swiss, 66
and the stock market crash, 16, 17
vs. the Journal of Commerce (JOC) Index,
and Treasury bonds, 57-59, 77, 78, 79,

France, 142
and stocks, 40, 52-53

104-106, 121

82-83

Fundamental analysis, 7, 274

Interest-sensitive stocks, 147, 150, 164-165,
vs. the Producer Price Index and

Double bottom, 65, 67, 69, 71, 129, 133,

Futures markets, 7-8, 53, 95, 216-217, 255

172, 229

Consumer Price Index, 117-120

152, 273, 275

Intermarket analysis:

vs. savings and loans, 168-169

Double top, 43, 45, 62, 89, 160, 161, 162,
as background information, 5, 6
vs. stocks, 5, 211-216, 217

165, 172, 175, 177, 181, 182, 212, 273,

Gaps, 274
basic principles and relationships in, 5,
and Treasury bills, 35, 36-38

275

Globalization, 11, 53, 256-257

255
and Treasury bonds, 10, 13, 21, 22-30,

Dow Jones Industrial Average, 17, 18, 22,

Gold, 53
and the business cycle, 225-239

31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 38-39, 107, 109, 150,

41, 42, 43, 86,« 87, 129, 152, 165, 173,
and the dollar, 60, 63-65, 70-72, 73, 265
commodities as the missing link in,

207-211, 261

266, 273
vs. the Dow Jones Industrials, 232, 266

255-256

280

281

INDEX

INDEX
computerization and globalization,

Measuring gap, 274, 275
as a scapegoat, 242-243

Stock market:

256-257

Momentum, 274
a visual look at the morning's trading,
bottom of 1982, 42-43
defined, 1, 274

Money center banks, 149, 165, 170-171

244-251

British and U.S. compared, 2, 124, 125,
futures market and, 5, 7-8, 255
vs. the NYSE Composite Index, 169-170

126, 127, 128-132, 267
on a global scale, 144-145, 147

Money market prices, 144-145
on a global scale, 148, 254
historical perspective on, 53-54

Moore, Geoffrey, 230-231

Rate(s) of change, 274, 275
gold and, 91-92, 152
implications for technical analysis, 2-3,

Moving average, 6, 8, 145, 274

Ratio analysis, 10, 35, 187, 206, 223

Japanese and U.S. compared, 2, 124, 125,

5, 254
defined, 275

126, 127, 132-139, 142, 267, 268
key market relationships, 9
of the CRB Index vs. bonds, 207-211

Stock market crash of 1987, 76, 152. See
need for, 2, 34-35
also Program trading

Negative divergence, 15, 32, 51, 167, 180

Recession, 22, 47, 48, 54, 172, 225, 227,
new directions in, 257
bond market collapse as a precursor of, 9,

Negative yield curve, 79

236, 237
outward focus of, 5, 6-7, 253-254

14-17, 43, 47

New York Futures Exchange, 117

Relative ratio, 187, 204, 207
related markets, 151
environment prior to, 12-14, 58

New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)

Relative strength, 39, 152, 275
role of commodity markets in, 8
global impact of, 1, 2, 12, 124-127, 242

Composite Index, 39, 169-170
analysis, 10, 35, 186-187, 202, 206, 213
starting point for, 19, 74
interest rates and, 16, 17

Nikkei 225 Stock Average, 132, 133, 134,
ratios, 187-188
of stock groups, 150
reasons for, 12, 242

136

Relative-Strength Index, 187, 275
updates on, 259-271

Resistance, 8, 33-34, 275
role of the dollar in, 17-18, 19, 88, 243

Intermarket indexes, global, 144-145, 147

Retracements, 275

Stock market mini-crash of 1989, 127, 153,

International markets, see Overseas

157

Oil market, 14, 38, 98

Reversal patterns, 19, 43, 44, 129, 275
markets

Right shoulder, 165, 168, 174, 176

Stocks:

crude prices, 14, 118, 134, 138-139, 159,

Inverse head and shoulders, 274
vs. bonds, 9, 15, 40-55, 262

160, 179, 270

Ripple effect, 5, 86, 180, 242, 243

Inverted yield curve, 52
and commodities, 90-91
and gold, 114-115, 200

Rising bottom, 67, 69

Island reversal, 274

Risk, 219, 221-222, 223
compared to Treasury bonds, 44
vs. Oil stocks, 158-161, 162-164, 271

Isolation, 1, 2, 5, 253

CRB Index vs., 211-216
price regulation, 53

Runaway gap, 275

Italy, 142
and the dollar, 54, 86-89

Open interest, 274
and futures activity, 10

Oscillators, 6, 8, 15, 31, 32, 42, 274
interest rates and, 52-53

Overbought condition, 34, 274

Salomon Brothers Long-Term High-Grade

Japari, 2, 10, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127,

Support, 275-276

Overseas markets, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19, 53, 68,

Corporate Bond Index, 220-221

132-139, 142, 145, 242-243, 251,

Symmetrical triangle, 13, 14, 160, 275, 276

93

Saucer, 275

267, 268
world stock markets, 122-124

Savings and loan stocks, 149, 174

Johnson, Manuel, 116, 146

Oversold condition, 34, 205, 274
vs. bonds, 165-168

Journal of Commerce (JOC) Index, 9,
vs. CRB Index, 168-169

Technical analysis, 2-3, 5, 6, 8, 34-35, 254,

99-100, 108, 121, 226, 235, 239

Sentiment indicators, 275

257, 276
vs. the CRB Futures Index, 104-106

Three-steps-and-a-stumble rule, 52-53, 135

Pennants, 273, 274-275

Short-leading index, 231

Trading range, 276

% Investment Advisors Bullish, 275

Short-term interest rates, 35-36, 52, 75-82

Treasury bills, 36-38, 52, 75-79, 83-86

Platinum stocks, 195, 196, 198

Silver mining stocks, 164, 171, 194, 197,

Key reversal day, 274

Treasury bonds, 10, 13, 21, 22-30, 32, 35,

Portfolio insurance, 12

199

36, 37, 44, 261

Positive divergence, 43, 67, 69

Simple average, 275

Trend, 276

Positive yield curve, 52

Slow stochastics, 275

Trendlines, 6, 8, 14, 32, 169, 207, 208,

Leading Indicators of the 1990s, 230, 232

Pound sterling, British, 66

Spot Foodstuffs Index, 96, 99, 100-101,

Left shoulder, 13, 14, 168

276

Precious metals markets, 8, 9, 22, 95, 98,

102, 108, 234

Line charts, 274

Triangles, 273, 276

110, 113-114, 115

Spot prices, 95, 98

Lintner, John, 219

Trin, 273
group analysis, 188, 194-198

Spot Raw Industrials Index, 9, 96, 99,

Long-leading index, 230-231

Triple bottoms, 275, 276

Price differences, 274

100-101, 102, 226, 234, 235

Long-term interest rates, 12, 75, 79-82

Triple tops, 275, 276

Price patterns, 8, 275

Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 stock index, Pring, Martin, 226, 228, 234

164, 186, 220, 241, 245, 246, 250, 275

Producer Price Index (PPI), 9, 20, 35, 96,

Standard & Poor's (S&P) Savings and Loan McGinley, Jr., John G., 174

117-120, 121, 138, 222

Group Index, 165

US. Dollar, see Dollar, U.S.

Managed futures accounts, 219, 224

Program trading, 5, 11, 12, 124
vs. the CRB Index, 168-169

U.S. Dollar Index, 7, 62, 71, 216, 218

Managed Account Reports, 220
causes of, 241-242
vs. the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 165

Up gap, 274

Market analysis, 5
as an effect, 241

Standard deviation, 221-222

Uptrend, 32, 46, 152, 276

Market sectors, 3, 4-5, 7, 9, 12, 74, 94, 122,
an example from one day's trading,

Stochastics, 31, 32, 42, 275

Up trendline, 276

134, 138, 217, 218-219, 250, 252, 256,

242-244

Stock groups, 9, 149-172

Utilities, 172, 178-181, 185. See also Dow 260
media treatment of, 241-242
and related commodities, 149-150

Jones Utilities Average

282

INDEX

Volume, 6, 276

World Short Rates, 144

World Stock Index, 144

Wave identification, 274

Yen, Japanese, 66, 135, 242-243, 251

Weighted average, 276

Yield curve, 52, 79, 82, 117

West Germany, 142, 244, 257

Wilder, Jr., Welles, 275

Zarnowitz, Victor, 232