Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey: New Essays
Author: Robert Kolker
Date: 2006-02-24 05:00:00+00:00
Description: Almost all students have seen 2001 , but virtually none understand its inheritance, its complexities, and certainly not its ironies. The essays in this collection, commissioned from a wide variety of scholars, examine in detail various possible readings of the film and its historical context. They also examine the film as a genre piece--as the summa of science fiction that simultaneously looks back on the science fiction conventions of the past (Kubrick began thinking of making a science fiction film during the genre's heyday in the fifties), rethinks the convention in light of the time of the
Publisher: Oxford University Press

STANLEY

KUBRICK’S

2001: A SPACE

ODYSSEY

This page intentionally left blank

EDITED BY ROBERT KOLKER

STANLEY

KUBRICK’S

2001: A SPACE

ODYSSEYNEW ESSAYS

3

2006

3

Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence
in research, scholarship, and education.

Oxford New

York

Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala

Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico

City Nairobi

New

Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offi
ces in

Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech

Republic France Greece

Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South

Korea Switzerland Th
ailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Copyright © 2006 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.

198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
www.oup.com

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: a space odyssey : new essays /

[edited by] Robert Kolker.

p.

cm.

ISBN-13 978-0-19-517452-6; 978-0-19-517453-3 (pbk.)

ISBN 0-19-517452-6; 0-19-517453-4 (pbk.)

1. 2001, a space odyssey (Motion picture) I. Kolker, Robert Phillip.

PN1997.T86S73 2006

791.43'72—dc22 2005016290

Chapter 9: Excerpt from Th
e Following Story, copyright © 1991 by Cees Nooteboom, English translation © Harvill 1994, reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Inc.

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

Th
anks to everyone at OUP: copyeditor Merryl Sloane,
production editor Stacey Hamilton, Abby Russell,
and Elissa Morris, a wonderful and gracious editor.

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

Introduction 3
robert
kolker

1 2001: Th e Critical Reception and the Generation Gap 13

r. barton palmer

2 Auteur with a Capital A 29
james
gilbert

3 Th e Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey 43

j. p. telotte

4 Kubrick in Space 55
stephen
mamber

5 Of Men and Monoliths: Science Fiction, Gender,
and 2001: A Space Odyssey 69

barry keith grant

6 Th e Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 87
marcia
landy

7 Reading HAL: Representation and Artifi
cial

Intelligence 105
michael
mateas

8 Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows 127
susan
white

9 Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 147
george
toles

Notes on Contributors 177

Production

Details 179

Index 181

Photo gallery follows p. 104
viii CONTENTS

STANLEY

KUBRICK’S

2001: A SPACE

ODYSSEY

This page intentionally left blank

Introduction

ROBERT KOLKER

I fi rst saw 2001 in 1968, on a gigantic Cinerama screen in a London theater. I was overwhelmed by the images and only somewhat impressed by what the images were trying to tell me. I left frankly questioning what all the fuss was about. On subsequent viewings, in slightly more intimate surroundings, on smaller screens back home in New York, the fi lm began to grow and grow on each successive screening. Each viewing opened up more questions and more answers—and even more admiration. 2001 became one of the touchstones for my love of fi lm and a major factor in my desire to make the study of fi lm part of my intellectual life. I realized, as I would with all subsequent Kubrick fi lms, that it is a kind of double, triple, quadruple play, revealing more meanings on each viewing—and more mysteries.

On its initial release, 2001 was advertised as “Th e Ultimate Trip,” a smart
appeal to the counterculture of the 1960s. It was played for its spectacle and the psychedelic quality of the images that make up the “Stargate” sequence near its conclusion. But it was, of course, another fi lm entirely, a deeply serious, richly textured, enigmatic, meditative spectacle of a fi lm, so complex and so unyielding in its answers that its cowriter, science fi ction author Arthur C.

Clarke, wrote “novelizations” to try and explain it. Kubrick himself, with the 3
exception of a few tightly controlled interviews, remained silent. Control was the way Kubrick survived as a completely independent fi lmmaker. He continued to edit 2001 in the projection booth before its New York premiere. He was concerned that it was too long. At one point during its fi rst New York run, a sheet of paper was handed out (I cannot recall if it was signed by Kubrick) to the people on line that explained that Bowman’s reentry into the vacuum of the ship’s airlock was scientifi cally accurate. Kubrick was very keen on 2001’s scientifi c accuracy. But by and large, the important matters of the fi lm—the validity of extraterrestrial life, the willingness of humans to devoid themselves of feeling, the relationship of men to machines—he left to the fi lm itself and to an audience that he trusted would stay with it, understand it, even if it provided no fi nal answers to the questions it posed.

I was not the only one who responded to the fi lm with growing enthusiasm and with the experience of seeing something new every time I watched it. 2001 was enormously popular at the time of its release and is now generally regarded as one of the most important fi lms ever made. Signifi cantly, it continues to reveal meaning. Objects and ideas, movements, gestures, and words, invisible once, suddenly become obvious, even though “obvious” in a fi lm like this does not make them any more comprehensible. Even though its prophetic year has passed, it still speaks to us about our past and future, our relationship to the unknowns of the universe, and cautions us about the ways in which we deal with the technologies we invent.

2001: A Space Odyssey is a fi lm that shows and hides, gives and takes away, promises to reveal great secrets of the universe and then reneges. Th is is a fi lm
of spectacular images developed slowly, contemplatively, even elegiacally. It has little dialogue; it shows more than it tells, and what it shows is not always what we think we see. Kubrick is not being perverse; he was very consciously making a diffi
cult fi lm, which itself is something of a contradiction in terms, since we do not usually equate diffi
culty with watching a movie. We expect to
be given a clear plot and obvious emotion, not confronted with complex ideas and insoluble problems.

In order to understand some of this, it will be helpful to put the fi lm in context, two contexts in fact. One is the cinematic and cultural history that surrounds it; the other is the body of Kubrick’s work—and with the fi lmmaker’s death in 1999 aft er the completion of Eyes Wide Shut, that body of work is complete. Stanley Kubrick is a director to whom the term auteur can be applied with little hesitation. He created and managed every aspect of his fi lms, from inception through advertising and distribution. He oft en depended on writers to initiate the words of a project, but he created a fi nal shooting script that was to his liking. Th
e shooting itself (during which he
would sometimes operate the camera or direct from a distance a second unit, who might be in another country making background shots), the visual design of the fi lm, the actors’ performances, every detail was under his control. Th
e result is an amazing uniformity of production. Despite the diff erences in each of his fi lms, they carry forward visual designs and narrative and 4

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
thematic movements that make all of them cohere as Kubrick fi lms. We need to understand 2001 in this light.

Let’s examine briefl y a general history of the fi lms that, in important ways, made the creation and reception of Kubrick’s fi lm possible. 2001 appeared in a decade of intense cinematic experimentation, mostly from abroad. Th ere was,
earlier, Italian neorealism. Th
eir country in ruins aft er World War II, Italian
fi lmmakers turned to fi lming in the streets with nonprofessional actors, capturing a desolate world and a desperate people in ways that fi lm had never done before. Neorealism infl uenced, in turn, the French New Wave, a group of fi lm lovers and critics who discovered in American fi lm a vitality and a sense of authorship that they took to heart when it came time to make their own fi lms. Th
ese fi lms, like those of the neorealists, were shot on location, and at the same time they grabbed hold of American fi lm genres and turned them inside out. At one time or another during the late 1950s and 1960s, many New Wave directors, especially Jean-Luc Godard and François Truff aut, made gangster fi lms—or at least their version of gangster fi lms, like Godard’s Breathless (1959).

Kubrick, who started his career in the United States before moving to Eng-land in the early 1960s, had already made two gangster fi lms, Killer’s Kiss (1955) and Th
e Killing (1956). Th
is was a popular genre in the United States, which is one of the reasons the French New Wave took it on. Kubrick’s versions of the gangster fi lm, especially Th
e Killing, looked forward to the kinds of existential gangster movies that the New Wave would create. Later, in America, under the direct infl uence of the New Wave, other experimental fi lmmakers emerged in Hollywood. Arthur Penn’s Bonnie and Clyde (1967)—a gangster fi lm—set a new style for fi lms of violence; in 1972, Martin Scorsese made Mean Streets, another gangster fi lm, one that turned fi lmmaking upside down for almost two decades. It became a model for almost every young fi lmmaker to follow in his or her fi rst movie. With M.A.S.H. (1970), a war fi lm, Robert Altman began an unprecedented string of fi lms that went counter to Hollywood tradition in narrative structure. Many others followed.

2001 was part of this explosion of fi lm, part of a culture in which fi lmmaker and audience alike took part in experimentation, in a reexamination and rediscovery of cinematic language. But Kubrick was ahead of the game before this. Th
e Killing, with its exterior shooting and maddeningly complex time scheme, was a big infl uence on future directors of gangster movies; we can still see traces of it in the fi lms of Quentin Tarantino. With Th e Killing—
and the two fi lms that preceded it, Fear and Desire (1953) and Killer’s Kiss (1955)—he began what was to become a lifelong experiment in narrative and visual construction. He created what was to become, in eff ect, one long fi lm about the ways that people attempt to impose themselves on their worlds, erecting enormous barriers, schemes, structures, and technologies to which they yield their power, lose their agency in the world, and via which are eventually destroyed.

Kubrick from the start experimented with the limits of fi lm, intent upon using it to examine complex ideas with an unyielding intensity, always focus-Introduction 5
ing on the ways in which people diminish their capacities in the world and, in 2001, the universe. From his fi rst fi lm, Fear and Desire, through Eyes Wide Shut (1999), men in Kubrick’s fi lms act against their own best interests, or are driven by political forces they can’t control (driven so far in Dr. Strangelove

[1964] that they destroy the planet), or put themselves in situations where they are guaranteed to be undone by their own demons (think of Jack in Th e

Shining [1980]). Kubrick saw all of this with a clarity of vision that was at the same time richly textured and deeply ironic. A Clockwork Orange (1971), for example, was condemned when it appeared for exalting violent behavior, and indeed the fi lm does at fi rst seem to condone Alex because he alone seems to have free will and vitality in an exhausted world. But look again. We are had by this fi lm. Alex is indeed the only energetic presence and voice in his world.

We are given no alternatives, and neither is he. He can be a thug and rapist, choreographing his energies on the stage of a world in ruin, or his violent ways can be taken away by the state, given back when it is in the state’s interest to use it. Brainwashed, restored, violent, barely controlled, “I was cured alright,” cries Alex at the end of the fi lm, chillingly echoing Dr. Strangelove’s cry, “Mein Führer, I can walk,” when he rises from his wheelchair and the world explodes. Kubrick’s fi lms tend to end with overt or inverted violence, with a character and his universe either exploding or collapsing in.

Kubrick’s characters almost always think they are in charge, masters of the bright, fl uorescent worlds they inhabit. But they are never in control and not really characters at all, in the traditional movie sense. Kubrick’s characters are ideas given human form, acting out their own processes of destruction. Th ey
are, in eff ect, part of the spaces that defi ne them. In a Kubrick fi lm, the mise-en-scène, the totality of the cinematic space created on the screen, is part of a usually destructive pattern the characters follow. Character and pattern, place and the fi gure inhabiting it are refl ections of one another. Jack may “always”

have been the caretaker of the Overlook Hotel, but the hotel and its “ghosts”

also open the spaces of Jack’s own growing madness. Th e painterly compositions of Barry Lyndon (1975) trap the characters in an illusion of civility and order that fi nally crushes them. Kubrick’s images confi ne his characters and point to their breakdown. Within the spaces of these images, his characters always act out the same pattern—against their own best interests. Th ey are
rarely what they say, but always how they are seen. In 2001, there is a startling image—one of many. Heywood Floyd calls his daughter from the space station. Th
e Earth rotates behind him. Floyd pays absolutely no attention to it.

He is the man of the future, with no emotions, oblivious to a universe he takes for granted and which, therefore, not taking him for granted, will swallow him up (fi gure 17).

Once we understand the coherent patterns in Kubrick’s work, the complex articulations of human activity, which ironically undoes itself as it struggles without insight to become more than it is, the job of understanding 2001: A Space Odyssey becomes a bit easier. You will certainly not fi nd unanimity among the various interpretations off ered in this book, but even the divergent 6

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
views of the contributors become clearer when set in the context of the work of an artist whose ironic perceptions of the limits of human agency changed only in the ways they are represented from fi lm to fi lm.

We can also understand 2001 a little better when we put it in the context of its genre, the science fi ction fi lm, a mainstay of 1950s Hollywood production, and, like the war fi lm, a favorite of Kubrick’s. Science fi ction fi lms of the 1950s were made mainly on the cheap and were most oft en used as covert, allegorical political statements that gave voice to the big fear foisted on the culture: that aliens—of the communist variety—would infi ltrate and subvert “our way of life.” In science fi ction fi lms, like the none too subtly named Red Planet Mars (Harry Horner, 1952), I Married a Monster from Outer Space (Gene Fowler, Jr., 1958), or the notorious Invasion of the Body Snatchers (Don Siegal, 1956), “communists” were transformed into personality-robbing monsters from outer space. Th
ere were, to be sure, a few bigger budget, somewhat more speculative fi lms, such as Destination Moon (Irving Pichel and George Pal, 1950) and Forbidden Planet (Fred Wilcox, 1956), that explored more interesting ideas. Destination Moon and George Pal and Byron Haskin’s Conquest of Space (1955) nourished Kubrick’s imagination of space as much as the mind-robbing monsters of alien invasion fi lms (fi gures 1 and 2).

With Dr. Strangelove; or, How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Bomb, Kubrick made another kind of Cold War science fi ction fi lm. Here, the monsters are government and military offi
cials, all of them half or fully mad,
hell-bent on destroying the “enemy,” which, of course, is themselves. Strangelove is a hilarious and hair-raising satire about the United States and the USSR
gone mad with fear and vengeance, which results, inevitably, in their both blowing up the world. As Kubrick was making his science fi ction fi lm about space travel, the genre had already gone into a recessive mode. Few science fi ction fi lms were made aft er the 1950s (although one of the French New Wave directors, Jean-Luc Godard, made a parody of the genre, Alphaville, in 1965), and aft er 2001, which appeared in 1968, it took almost another ten years for Kubrick’s fi lm to get absorbed and revive the genre, which happened with George Lucas’s Star Wars in 1977. Th
e genre hasn’t fl agged since, and almost
every science fi ction fi lm now made bears a debt to 2001. Kubrick made a number of decisions that changed the genre for good. He strove for scientifi c accuracy, calling in NASA and computer scientists to advise him. Th e texture
of his fi lm—the sets, the models, the very movements of the people—were more detailed and more imaginatively constructed than the fl ying saucers and mutant aliens in aluminum foil or rubber costumes that fi gured in most 1950s science fi ction. In place of the anticommunist hogwash of the previous decade, and even though the fi lm does contain some mockery of Cold War attitudes, he introduced a large measure of complexity, inquisitiveness, and ambiguity, which places his fi lm closer to the best fi ction literature than it is to science fi ction cinema. 1

Th
at’s why 2001 can be called a speculative, even a meditative fi lm, a fi lm that demands attention and a willingness to wonder. It asks us to do a number Introduction 7
of things at once: to join its meditative pace, to be amazed at its spectacular images, and to go along with that rarest of all things, a fi lm that poses a multitude of problems with no easy answers. In short, to use a word that has occurred oft en in analyses of 2001, it is a complex fi lm. As Annette Michelson says in her groundbreaking essay, written when the fi lm fi rst appeared, it elevates “doubt to an [a]esthetic principle” and demands “a kind of critical, apperceptive athleticism” in the act of interpretation. 2 Doubt and aesthetics—the last involving a concentrated gaze at an imaginative object of some intellectual and emotional complexity—are a bit out of style at this moment, when easy answers are demanded no matter how diffi
cult and complex the
questions may be and when art itself, along with all of the demands it puts on our time, attention, and critical faculties, is somewhat out of fashion itself, especially in fi lm.

Th
e great paradox of Kubrick’s fi lms is that they are intellectually rigorous and demanding; they are indisputably works of a creative, artistic imagination and they are also spectacular to watch, entertaining, as well as profoundly ironic, and always playing jokes on us. Despite the fact that many critics use the word “cold” when talking of his fi lms, they are in fact on fi re with ideas, prophecies of the way we live and what will become of us if we continue on our path, and a deep comprehension of the diffi
culties into which we get our-
selves. Th
ey are funny, angry, jokey, not compassionate, rarely if ever off ering redemption to their characters, but always showing us more than we have ever seen before and showing us with the passion of a fi lmmaker who sees, feels, and expresses his art deeply.

Th
at is the main reason for this collection of essays: to reignite the passion of 2001: A Space Odyssey, to rethink and reexamine its complexities, and, hopefully, to make the fi lm accessible—though never completely comprehensible—to a new generation of viewers. It is time to reopen the fi lm, resee it, attempt again to understand what it’s doing. 2001 has had much written about it, but given its richness, its history, and the changes in its audience since its fi rst release, more is ready to be said. Like the narratives of Kubrick’s fi lms, the critical responses they call forth move in a kind of eternal return, coming back again and again to reconsider, reinterpret, and even recreate their meanings.

In order to get fresh perspectives, I have looked to fi lm scholars with broad areas of interest and, in two instances, to scholars who work in areas other than fi lm—a historian and a computer scientist. I wanted to present new points of view and bring new methodologies of thinking and writing about fi lms in general and about this fi lm in particular.

Although they wrote their essays independently of one another, it is not surprising that almost all of the authors touch upon the fi lm’s major enigmas: the monoliths, which may or may not be artifacts of alien intelligence; the fi nal sequences in which astronaut Dave Bowman is transported to an imaginary realm “beyond the infi nite” and then mutated into a fetus circling the Earth; and 2001’s most interesting character, HAL, the computer with more than human qualities. Each writer has come up with diff erent perspectives to 8

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
similar questions. Are the monoliths—those mysterious structures that seem to spur the movement of human progress whenever they appear—indeed extraterrestrial visitations, or are they symbolic representations of obstacles that must be overcome for the progression from ape to human to some kind of rebirth of a superhuman? Th
is is a central question in a fi lm that depends on
an almost tactile sense of the visually real. Th
ings are so strikingly present in
such detail that, like the apes that fi rst encounter the monoliths and Dr. Floyd, who reaches out to it when he sees it on the moon, we too want to touch it and know its meaning (fi gures 19 and 20). We see the monoliths, as do the characters in the fi lm, but are they “real”? Of course not. Th ey are images in a
cinematic fantasy. But even within that fantasy, or fairy tale, as George Toles considers it, they may well be the visible projections of the human imagination’s need to think beyond where it is currently stuck.

But, then, why does the overcoming of obstacles always involve violence? Th
e ape sees the monolith and learns to use tools as weapons to kill.

Th
e discovery of the monolith found on the moon leads to HAL murdering the hibernating crewmen, Dave Bowman lobotomizing HAL, and Bowman’s harrowing trip to another imaginative realm, where he is transformed. What exactly is the meaning of the fi lm’s last image? Bowman, passing from youth to old age in front of his own eyes in the timeless space of an alien though eerily familiar, dreamlike motel room, seems to pass through the monolith and become an encapsulated fetus circling the Earth (fi gures 23 and 35). Is this a rebirth into a new human race, or simply the entrapment of humanity gazing in fear and wonder in a way that none of the other characters in the fi lm ever did?

With the monoliths and the mysteries of the Jupiter room, HAL is 2001’s great enigma: a machine with intelligence and consciousness. A machine with feelings—in fact more feelings than any of the human characters inhabiting the fi lm. A machine that kills. A machine whose lobotomy causes more emotions in the viewer (and itself) than anything that happens to the fi lm’s human characters. HAL is the overriding intelligence of this fi lm’s imaginary realm, the patriarch, the holder of knowledge and feeling, and, like the apes long before him, he is a killer.

Stephen Mamber, in his chapter on the spatial realms of 2001, points out that the fi rst time we see astronaut Dave Bowman is as a refl ection in HAL’s eye (fi gure 13). It is almost as if the worlds of the fi lm take place in HAL’s brain. Marcia Landy picks up on this idea and, working from the discipline of brain science and the work of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, speaks of the fi lm as an odyssey through the brain, a “cerebral journey,” a kind of cinematic history of intelligence and consciousness. Th is is expanded by Michael

Mateas’s essay on HAL and artifi cial intelligence. Mateas is a computer scientist, a humanist, and a proponent of what he terms “expressive” (as opposed to

“artifi cial”) intelligence. He reads HAL through the history of AI and the ways that Kubrick responded to and prophesied the various episodes and issues in the computer discipline of artifi cial intelligence.

Introduction 9

We begin with Barton Palmer’s investigation of the early reception of 2001: A Space Odyssey. He points out that, on its release, the reviewers had more diffi
culty with the fi lm’s slow pace and open questions than did its audience.

Contemporary viewers, especially younger ones, moved freely within its enigmatic images. But, while some fi lm reviewers scoff ed and dismissed it, other, more thoughtful critics began to examine it, and what they began to discover, Palmer points out, laid the fi eld for the various critical interpretations that followed.

All interpretations proceed from the fact that Kubrick was the embodiment of the fi lm auteur, in control of all facets of his work from inception through distribution. Auteurism is a seminal theory of fi lm that speaks of the director as the driving, creative force of a fi lm. James Gilbert, a historian who has written on various aspects of science and fi lm, expands on this idea. His chapter provides a history of this particular director’s restructuring and rethinking of the science fi ction genre, in which Kubrick was interested for many years. Dr.

Strangelove, as we noted, is a kind of satirical, political fantasy/science fi ction, which points a direction toward 2001. Even its fi nal images of the B-52 fl ying toward its destination in Russia are similar to the strange trip through alien landscapes at the end of 2001. Gilbert’s chapter examines the fi lm as the work of a guiding cinematic intelligence (not at all extraterrestrial), fully in control not only of his fi lm but of the history and science that make it up.

Th
roughout this introduction, I’ve been stressing the seriousness of 2001, which has a depth of speculation and thought not usually found in fi lm. Jay Telotte addresses this “gravity” in both senses of the word. 2001: A Space Odyssey shows us what it might be like to defy gravity and the known spatial coordinates that gravity makes possible. Kubrick takes great visual pleasure in the spectacle of antigravity activities—from walking, to eating, to going to the bathroom. Telotte expands upon this to examine the concept of trajectory in the fi lm and its spatial movements of regeneration and birth. He plays upon the other meaning of “gravity”: seriousness, weightiness, as opposed to weightlessness. Gravitas. Profundity.

Th
ere is a good connection between Jay Telotte’s essay and Stephen Mamber’s on Kubrick’s use of space. Mamber categorizes the various spaces of the fi lm, from the “realistic” to the imaginative, indicating how Kubrick creates boundaries and then makes them porous. Mamber also connects the spaces delineated in 2001 with those in other Kubrick’s fi lms, further indicating that, unique as it is, 2001 is still part of the fabric, the spatial density, of Kubrick’s entire imaginative output.

Barry Grant’s “Of Men and Monoliths” takes a slightly diff erent turn to address the issues and spaces of gender in the fi lm, from the dominance of men and the absence of women to the phallic nature of the space ships and the monoliths themselves. He understands this as part of a broader view of a male-dominated Earth and universe. But Grant recognizes that, fi nally, Kubrick goes beyond the usual gender boundaries. Th
e end of the fi lm off ers

10

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
an opportunity for a diff erent way of being and understanding than the usual dichotomies of gender allow.

It is important to note that, as Kubrick’s work matured, he questioned gender stereotypes more and more. Th
e Shining, cowritten by a woman, Diane

Johnson, is literally about the collapse of patriarchy and the end of woman hating. Full Metal Jacket (1987) turns the tables on marine machismo when a female sniper brings down the platoon. Kubrick’s last fi lm, Eyes Wide Shut, is a profound examination of domesticity and the enormous eff ect on a male’s ego when he discovers that a woman has her own sexual fantasies and desires.

Moving from the universal in the early part of his career to the microcosm of marriage at the end, Kubrick continued throughout to see the cycles of awareness and defeat, of male ego leading to some variety of emasculation, if not downright self-destruction. Gender was always on Kubrick’s mind, coming more and more to consciousness as he and his work matured. But even as early as 2001, Kubrick understood that maleness was an earthbound concept.

Freed of the spatial constraints binding it to the Earth and its culture of male dominance, “man” becomes unmanned in an odyssey that releases consciousness and the body that contains it into spaces of imagination.

Marcia Landy’s and Michael Mateas’s chapters continue to explore the movements of intelligence and consciousness as they are fi gured in Kubrick’s fi lm. Th
ey come to it from diff erent perspectives while expanding the spatial metaphors developed in the previous essays. Landy, as noted, examines the fi lm through the discipline of brain science, seeing it as an imaginary journey through the brain itself. Mateas examines the fi lm, and HAL in particular, through the work of computer science, specifi cally artifi cial intelligence.

Th
e latter was, of course, an abiding interest of Kubrick’s, so much so that he planned a fi lm called AI, which he was unable to make, but which Steven Spielberg took over aft er his death. Intelligence, natural or artifi cial, is part of the reigning paradox of all of Kubrick’s fi lms: human intelligence inevitably creates something that will ultimately turn on its owner and undo him. We see it in the fantastic robbery plot in Th
e Killing, in the Doomsday Machine in Dr. Strangelove, in the Ludovico technique in A Clockwork Orange, in the mechanism of the aristocracy in Barry Lyndon, and so on throughout the fi lms.

Th
e pivot point in 2001 is HAL, a perfect machine that thinks and feels.

Mateas puts this fantasy computer in the context of the real research being done on artifi cial intelligence—research that Kubrick himself used in creating HAL—and then extrapolates his own computational-based fantasy into the future of AI. He speculates on what would happen if HAL were lift ed as a character from the narrative fi ction of the fi lm into another fi ction: the interactive game. Considering the fact that HAL and the astronauts are engaged in a life-and-death game within the fi ction of 2001, this extrapolation is not extreme.

Susan White’s chapter picks up a number of threads woven by the other contributors. She continues an exploration of gender in Kubrick’s work, and Introduction 11
she contextualizes 2001 within the body of that work. As all of the chapters demonstrate, Kubrick’s fi lms construct a coherent view of the world and the work of undoing performed by all of his characters. White examines 2001 as one among Kubrick’s thirteen feature-length fi lms. In so doing, it becomes somewhat diff erent and a little clearer than when it is viewed in isolation.

Some of its enigmas are less enigmatic, and its apparent, if mysterious, optimism at the chances of human rebirth begin to appear as somewhat less than optimistic. White follows a particular concern that is manifested throughout the fi lms: the surge of violence and disorder that lurks beneath and oft en bursts out of their cold, distanced surfaces and impeccable, formal beauty.

She calls this the “obscene shadow,” the dark, hidden chaos that lies beneath the light. With this in mind, she pulls all of Kubrick’s fi lms together around 2001: A Space Odyssey and, with this gathering, provides a space for a clear understanding.

Finally, George Toles comes to the fi lm from a novel and satisfying perspective, viewing it as a fairy tale fi lled with riddles, trials, genies, and shape shift ers. He sees it as a fantastic voyage and a fi lm about seeing, memory, and meditation. Perhaps this take answers no more of the questions that the fi lm continually poses, but it goes some way in helping us to ask better questions.

In the end, none of the chapters adds up to a conclusion. And this is very important. Th
e power of 2001 lies in the fact that it can have no conclusion. It is the perpetual generator of the imagination, taking us on its journey every time we join it, stimulating with its imagination the imagination of others, making meaning, making us continually want to fi nd meaning, and eluding us every time.

Notes

1. For a fuller discussion of the context of Kubrick’s fi lms, see Robert Kolker, A Cinema of Loneliness: Penn, Stone, Kubrick, Scorsese, Spielberg, Altman, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 97–174. Further exploration of the science fi ction context is in Kolker, “2001: A Space Odyssey,” in Film Analysis: Norton Film Reader, ed. Jeff rey Geiger and R. L. Rutsky (New York: Norton, 2005), 602–21.

2. Annette Michelson, “Bodies in Space: Films as ‘Carnal Knowledge,’” in Th e Making of 2001: A Space Odyssey, ed. Stephanie Schwam (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 203, 204. Originally published in Artforum 7, no. 6 (February 1969).

12

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

1

2001

The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap

R. BARTON PALMER

Pauline Kael, the era’s most infl uential critic and tastemaker, observed that the largely unforeseen success that Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey achieved at the box offi
ce was due to the younger viewers who crowded that
nation’s theaters to see it, turning the fi lm’s exhibition into one of the signal cultural events of the decade. And yet the enthusiasm of the fi ft een- to twenty-fi ve-year-olds for the fi lm, so Kael opined, was not to be explained on purely cinematic grounds. Instead, 2001’s appeal to the young was to be traced to the “new tribalism” that had emerged by the end of the 1960s.1 Kael suggested that what most commentators at the time termed the “counterculture” had also responded enthusiastically earlier in the decade to European art fi lms that were characterized by ostentatious visual and aural styliza-tions, which were indisputably prominent elements of Kubrick’s new release as well.

Young people, however, had been drawn to Juliet of the Spirits or 8½ (Federico Fellini, 1965, 1963) not because the art fi lm form intrigued them, but because they were interested in “using the movie to turn on,” or so Kael maintained. 2001 supposedly followed in this tradition, quickly developing, upon 13
its release in 1968, the similar reputation that “the movie will stone you—
which is meant to be a recommendation.” 2 Outraged by the success the fi lm achieved despite her negative assessment and those of the critical establishment in general, Kael was prompted to take an especially jaundiced view of the more culturally adventurous among the baby boomer generation. 3

Th
e “new tribalism” explanation for the box offi
ce success of 2001 may
have some (if undoubtedly limited) merit. At some theaters where the fi lm became a cult attraction, recreational drug use in the auditorium was commonly reported. In any case, one obvious result of the fi lm’s surprising popularity with teenagers and young adults was an unintended promotion that quickly outstripped the more conventional advertising campaign plotted out by MGM. Prior to its release, the studio had been convinced it was not marketing a cult fi lm, but yet another spectacular epic in the vein of Lawrence of Arabia and How the West Was Won, blockbusters with serious themes that had proven popular with older cinema goers earlier in the decade. Kael is correct in pointing out that the word on Kubrick’s science fi ction epic did not go out (at least initially) through newspaper or magazine spreads. 4

What some considered to be the fi lm’s attractive qualities, including its visceral appeals, were not generally promoted by prominent reviewers, many of whom, like Kael, panned the production, at least initially (some recanted upon a second viewing once 2001’s popularity became too widespread to dep-recate). She scornfully observed, “‘Th
e tribes’ tune in so fast that college stu-
dents thousands of miles apart ‘have heard’ what a great trip 2001 is before it has even reached their city” (100). Kael left no doubt about how she felt about the reception accorded the fi lm by this class of viewers: “Using movies to go on a trip has about as much connection with the art of the fi lm as using one of those Doris Day–Rock Hudson jobs for ideas on how to redecorate your home—an earlier way of stoning yourself.” Poor fi lms like 2001, she thought, can perhaps be used more easily than good ones “for such non-aesthetic purposes as shopping guides or aids to tripping” (101).

To be sure, the popularity of 2001 with the young in general and the counterculture in particular likely went far beyond the purview of what might be properly called the aesthetic. Yet the evidence suggests that many in those fi rst, predominantly youthful audiences found more than an easy high. For the generation that came of age in the late 1960s, seeing the fi lm (oft en numerous times) became a rite de passage thought to be the source of a special knowledge that distinguished them from their parents and “square”

adults in general. Many reported undergoing religious conversions, rather than experiencing altered states, during the fi lm’s famous twenty-four-minute, dialogue-free fi nal sequence: astronaut Bowman’s rapid journey through the immensities of time and space, which ends with his transformation into a newborn “star child,” whose glance back from space toward the Earth could be understood as foretelling some kind of renewal (see fi gure 35). If Bowman were freed from the familiar (including his own physical being), so might the 14

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
human race, hitherto trapped by the linearity of historical unfolding and the destructive, iron laws of technological “progress,” with its inextricable connection to violence.

Th
e substantial appeal of the fi lm to young adults proved quite enduring, but it was by no means intentional. A rerelease in 1974 was rather profi table, with those under twenty-fi ve constituting once again a large percentage of the enthusiastic audiences. To be sure, the acceptance by young people of their parents’ favored form of mass entertainment contributed more than a little to 2001’s excellent box offi
ce. Many baby boomers, especially the college edu-
cated, had gotten hooked on the movies even though both the studio system and the fi lmmaking style that had created it for more than four decades were in the process of decay and reconfi guration. Th
e crisis in the industry coin-
cided with the changing demographics of the cinema-going public, prompting the production of fi lms designed to appeal to the young. Yet this was a series to which 2001 was not designed to belong.

Th
e youth-oriented fi lms that set box offi
ce records at the end of the 1960s

(notably Mike Nichols’s Th
e Graduate, also 1968, and Dennis Hopper’s Easy Rider, 1969), were predictably Oedipal, staging compromised rebellions, in the tradition of J. D. Salinger, against middle-class values and institutions (marriage, settling down, productive employment, “responsibility”) in the name of an ever-elusive personal freedom, a quest that could be shaped into either a comic or tragic conclusion. Th
ese youth fi lms lent visual and narra-
tive form to the many-sided confl ict between the young and their parents that—along with a host of other social and political issues—became known as the “generation gap.” In contrast, 2001 was written and directed by men in the never-to-be-trusted over-thirty group (the fi lm’s author, Arthur C. Clarke, and Stanley Kubrick belonged to an earlier generation, though this was typical of the period; the youth movement among Hollywood directors did not truly emerge until the 1970s).

Of course, 2001 is critical of the patriarchal establishment, broadly speaking. Th
e fi lm mercilessly debunks the then-current myth of the triumphant technocrat, whose claim to advance the frontiers of knowledge had found its most publicly celebrated refl ex in the American victory over the Russians in the space race, ratifi ed the year aft er the fi lm’s release by the fi rst lunar landing. Kubrick’s fi lm off ered a quite diff erent view. In 2001, arrogant scientists fail to understand and master the monolith that seems to announce the presence of a superior and powerful intelligence of some kind, giving an ironic twist to the vaunted concept of “mission control.”

But there is more here than revolt and debunking. Kubrick was less invested either in mounting an assault on those supposedly in charge of society in the manner of his critically acclaimed Dr. Strangelove (1964) or in satirizing conventional pieties, as he does so eff ectively in Lolita (1962). Unlike any fi lm ever released by Hollywood, 2001 off ers a sweeping if provocatively reductive and ultimately ambiguous representation of human history that is deeply Spengle-2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap 15
rian in its faulting of Enlightenment values, such as progress, humanism, and even civilization. It is hard to imagine, in fact, how Kubrick could have further undermined the ideological presuppositions of Hollywood storytelling, with its narrative driven by and centered on character, its embodiment of political or social questions in valued individual destinies capable of neat resolution, its conventional deployment of admirable protagonists and despicable antagonists, its devotion to arousing the sympathy and pathos necessary for the proverbial happy ending, and, perhaps most important, its confection of a closure that masked contradiction with a perfect knowledge of character and event. Such a sweeping rejection of those structures and themes so customary in the American commercial cinema certainly challenged the analytical and critical acumen of journalists and reviewers at the time.

2001 goes far beyond the single-minded Oedipality of adolescent revolt in order to raise, if not to defi nitively answer, the most vexing of metaphysical questions, including the debatable value of the emergence of hominids from purely instinctual behavior to tool making, murder, and eventually the transmissible culture that endows Homo sapiens, alone among creatures, with a history. Th
at history, as the fi lm makes manifest, stimulates man to entertain a curiosity about his origins and purpose, even as it provides him with the technological power to pursue the “truth” of his situation, which becomes the goal of the odyssey that Kubrick’s narrative traces. In fact, a number of infl uential young viewers, as we shall see, were especially attracted to the teleology developed by Clarke and Kubrick, which was so diff erent from both Christian eschatology and the gradual meliorism of traditional science, even as it similarly promised forms of redemption and renewal. Indeed, it seems that, contra Kael, the popularity of 2001 with the young had much to do with the fi lm’s themes (and the way these were advanced by an unfamiliar narrative strategy) and not only with the supposedly hallucinogenic eff ects of its visual and aural programs, however strikingly original and deeply aff ecting. Here was a fi lm in which spectacle arguably dominated a seemingly deliberately banal, even meager, script. But it was also true that 2001 had something diff erent to say, in the largest sense of that term, and had found a diff erent way to say it.

Th
e establishment critics, for the most part, were simply not attuned to this message. But the fi lm-going public evidently was. 2001 earned the third-best box offi
ce gross in 1968, fi nishing behind only the spectacularly successful Th
e Graduate and Funny Girl and easily making the list of the then top-twenty grossing fi lms of all time. With its initial and subsequent releases, domestic and worldwide, Kubrick’s arty, intellectual fi lm earned nearly $138 million, which was, at that time, an astounding fi gure. 5

Kael’s comments are contained in an essay provocatively entitled “Trash, Art, and the Movies,” whose premise is that the movies are the “sullen art of displaced persons.” Th
e appeal of this “sullen art” resides in their being “slick, reasonably inventive, well-craft ed,” conforming to an aesthetic endorsed not only by those in the industry, but by most critics as well (87, 92). In Kael’s view, 16

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
fi lms such as 2001 reject this aesthetic because they aspire to be art rather than entertainment but, paradoxically, “may be no more than trash in the latest, up-to-the-minute guises, using ‘artistic techniques’ to give trash the look of art.”

Th
ey are dangerous because they may make us forget that “most of the movies we enjoy are not works of art” (117, 89). To put this another way, Kael thinks that movies are what we enjoy “and what we enjoy has little to do with what we think of as art” (102). Th
is is a debatable point at best, perhaps little more than a sophomoric rejection of offi
cial culture in the name of old-fashioned,
just-plain-folks enjoyment. Th
e dominant view in American culture, which
she endorses, is that “[a]rt is still what teachers and ladies and foundations believe in, it’s civilized and refi ned, cultivated and serious, cultural, beautiful, European, Oriental: it’s what America isn’t” (105). Kubrick went wrong, in other words, not only by making a movie that could be enjoyed by the brain-less young, but also by making a fi lm with artistic pretensions.

Kael’s dismissal of the fi lm, and the musings that serve as the underpinnings of that judgment, point toward the challenge that 2001 posed upon its initial release to long-dominant notions of movie value. Her analysis, while hostile, is also complex and perspicacious largely because it is unintentionally revelatory of the contradictory values at the center of the era’s American fi lm culture. 2001 deconstructs the usual opposition of high to low culture (art to trash), providing a subaesthetic form of enjoyment for some and advertising itself as having the same seriousness of theme and structure as the latest Fellini or Kurosawa release (although this intellectual content is nothing more, in her view, than “inspirational banality”) (123). Th
at a fi lm made more or less
within the mainstream commercial system could manage genuine visceral and intellectual appeal would become a commonplace judgment just a few years later, during that fl ourishing of popular American art cinema usually called the Hollywood Renaissance. Th
e making of 2001, and its controversial
reception, are likely the fi rst signs that such a revolution in cinema culture was in the offi
ng.

In any event, the popularity of 2001 proved diffi cult to analyze and appreciate for most journalists and critics, who were accustomed in 1968, like Kael, to think of art fi lm as serious, edifying rather than enjoyable, and European (or, at least, foreign). Celluloid entertainment was what Hollywood provided. It is indeed notable that the most articulate initial defense of Kubrick’s achievement appeared in the Harvard Crimson, penned by youthful critics who were not so much under the spell of the “classic Hollywood text” as were Kael and company and who, perhaps for that reason, looked beyond the unfamiliarity of the director’s structural innovations to fi nd the fi lm not only an excellent example of a standard Hollywood genre, the science fi ction fi lm, but also “huge and provocative” in its engagement with questions about “progress—physical, social, and technological. ”6 Th us the generation gap not only
explained the fi lm’s box offi
ce success, but to an important degree its critical
reception as well. 7

2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap 17

Establishment Views

Unlike Kael, Stanley Kauff mann found the enthusiasm of the hip young for the fi lm less a cause for dismay than the director’s supposed failure to adhere to the customary canons of cinematic correctness. His comments show that he was in implicit agreement with her judgment that Hollywood fi lms should be “slick, reasonably inventive, well-craft ed.” But, again unlike Kael, he identifi es and disparages precisely those aspects of the narrative structure that later critics were to consider central to Kubrick’s substantial (and, arguably, never equaled) achievement. Kauff mann admitted that the fi ve years of production and $10 million of funding (an amazing sum at the time) could be seen on the screen, a testimony to the director’s strong visual sense and maniacal attention to detail, but he expressed puzzlement about how Kubrick was able to

“concentrate on his ingenuity and ignore his talent.” 8 Th e fi lm goes wrong,
he thinks, in “the fi rst 30 seconds,” presumably when, unlike the usual Hollywood product, it did not provide enough in the way of customary structural elements (particularly a main character to focus the story). Viewers like Kauff mann could not immediately orient themselves by identifying the fi lm’s genre and presumed narrative trajectory.

As did other critics at the time, Kauff mann found part of the problem to be what he called “sheer distention,” the fact that, as originally released, the fi lm ran 160 minutes, a full three hours including intermission (19 minutes were excised by Kubrick early in the initial release in an attempt to blunt this criticism). Th
is objection, however, turns out to be something of a red herring.

2001 was hardly distinguished by excessive length. Since the early 1950s, Hollywood had been producing blockbusters whose claim to special status was, in part, established by their running longer than the 90- to 120-minute format that had been established as a standard by the early studio period. In 1960, Kubrick had himself contributed to the blockbuster series with Spartacus, a fi lm he was called in to complete, which was 196 minutes long. Th ough the
fi lm ran nearly four hours with orchestral overture and intermission, Spartacus did not provoke complaints about “sheer distention,” presumably because it did not otherwise ignore or violate established industry conventions.

Kauff mann, it becomes evident, was actually more displeased by the story that Kubrick and Clarke had fabricated than by the fi lm’s supposedly unjustifi ed length. Th
e fi lm is divided into three sections whose connections, though many and subtle, deviate from the Aristotelian causality that had for decades lent the usual studio project such energetic forward motion. Kubrick’s narration, particularly its leisurely pacing and omission of signifi cant story information, was also a startling deviation from standard practice. Somewhat typically, Jeremy Bernstein, writing in the New Yorker, observed that “aft er reading the book, I realized that I really hadn’t ‘understood’ the fi lm, and I had especially not understood the ending.” 9 Such a judgment presumes that

“understanding” (that is, the kind of mastery of story and character that the 18

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Hollywood fi lm had traditionally provided) is what Kubrick wanted the fi lm’s viewers to carry away with them. Like Bernstein, Kauff mann did not see that the director was obviously aiming for an entirely diff erent eff ect. He suggests that Clarke’s short story (“Th
e Sentinel”) had “been amplifi ed and padded to
make it bear the weight of this three hour fi lm,” but, though he evidently read it, Kauff mann failed to note that the story the fi lm tells, much transformed in the process of its “novelization,” had also been reduced to its barest elements.

Th
ere is but a minimal provision of information-laden dialogue and a near total absence of revealing title cards or clarifying voice-over.

In any case, Kauff mann suggests that the most obvious evidence of this

“padding” is to be found in the confl ict between the astronauts and the HAL computer, which, in his view, Kubrick “devised” in order to “fi ll in this lengthy trip with some sort of action.” Th
e real problem, however, has more
to do with coherence than distention: “None of this man-versus-machine rivalry has anything to do with the main story, but it goes on so long that by the time we return to the main story, the ending feels appended” (41). And thus the presumed point of the whole picture is “sloughed off ,” though Kauff -
mann interestingly declines to identify what that point might be considered to be. 10 Even when the action is coherent, however, the fi lm is “so dull, it even dulls our interest in the technical ingenuity for the sake of which Kubrick has allowed it to become dull” (41). Kauff mann presumably felt that Kubrick,

“ignoring his talent,” had proven either unable or unwilling to provide the fi lm with a causally linked plot leading to an exciting, last-minute conclusion. In Kauff mann’s view, the parts of the fi lm do not connect readily to one another. Hollywood movies, Kauff mann judges, must build up to some point that is made with unmistakable clarity, which 2001 declines to do. Kubrick fails to produce a fi lm that is “slick.” 2001 winds up being “dull,” the very opposite.

Writing in the New York Times, Renata Adler agrees, fi nding the fi lm “just plain boring.” 11 Like Kauff mann, Adler singles out for detailed attention only the confl ict between Bowman and HAL. Signifi cantly, this is the one section of the fi lm that is handled in more or less traditional Hollywood fashion, with a suspenseful agon between characters, who are styled pretty much as good and evil, that is resolved aft er a lengthy struggle, which is more physical than psychological and climaxes in a violence that is as poignant as it is righteous.

Expecting the rest of the fi lm to fi t this same pattern, Adler attributes its loose connections, lack of backstory, and fi nal ambiguity to a failure of artistry: “It is as though Kubrick himself had become so rapt in the details of his fantasy that he lost track of, or interest in, the point of it all” (L 1).

Interestingly, Adler here glimpses an alternative interpretation of these formal features: that Kubrick is not, fi nally, interested in telling what is, in conventional terms, a “human” drama that might be summed up in some kind of message. Similarly, Kauff mann remarks on a central thematic contradiction of the fi lm, that it shows space, on the one hand, as “thrillingly immense” but, on the other hand, as a place where men are “imprisoned, have less space than 2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap 19
on earth.” Controlled by the environment, the characters in the fi lm are thus

“dehumanized” (41), as they are in many Kubrick fi lms.12 Adler goes more to the heart of the matter, identifying what makes this fi lm so diff erent from the earlier ones made by the director: “One of the things that Kubrick has left out of his movie to a truly astonishing extent is people. It is about a half hour before anything but marvelous apes, tapirs, landscapes, and about an hour before the main human characters arrive” (26). Like Kauff mann, however, Adler fails to identify the thematic and narrative strategy of which this startling absence is the most signifi cant example.

Understanding Kubrick’s antihumanist perspective on human history proved diffi
cult for many. Aft er his fi rst viewing of the fi lm, Joseph Gelmis wrote that “because its characters are standardized, bland, depersonalized near-automatons who have surrendered their humanity to computers, the fi lm is antidramatic and thus self-defeating.” 13 When he saw it a second time, Gelmis became convinced that this was a fi lm of “such extraordinary original-ity” that it upset “the members of the critical establishment because it exists outside their framework of apprehending and describing movies” (266). Yet he still declared, “Kubrick’s depersonalized human beings are antidramatic and that is cinematically self-defeating. Th
e pace is so leisurely and the char-
acters so uninteresting that you may become impatient to get on with the plot.” Th
us, for him, “the fi lm failed as drama [on] the fi rst viewing because it did not keep me spellbound.” Now he had come to see that “the tedium was the message” (267).

Among those fi rst audiences, however, there were those who did not agree with this McLuhanesque conclusion that Kubrick’s only aim was to deconstruct the desire of spectators for an engaging narrative that centered on sympathetic characters and was motored by a conventional plot.

A Youthful Perspective

Acknowledging his own initial failure to appreciate Kubrick’s achievement, Gelmis observed that the establishment critics were “threatened” by the fi lm

“because the conventional standards don’t apply.” What was needed instead was “an innocent eye, an unconditioned refl ex, and a fl exible vocabulary”

(266). 2001 found its most articulate champions in three Harvard students, who recognized it not only as a “superb science-fi ction genre fi lm” but also as “an attempt at metaphysical philosophy.” Hunter, Kaplan, and Jaszi recognized that Kubrick’s double desire to off er audiences an entertaining fi lm that off ered the conventional pleasures of genre and to make an intellectual statement might well be a “sure-fi re audience baffl
er guaranteed to empty any the-
ater of ten percent of its audience.” Th
at 10 percent, they might have gone on
to say, would likely include the majority of the older generation of critics. If, as they affi
rm, Kubrick did his best work in the fi lm with “plotless slow-paced 20

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
material,” whose purpose was to underline the “ritualistic behavior of apes, men, and machines with whom we are totally unfamiliar,” then it was likely that many viewers would be unable to perceive an important, if never explicitly stated theme of the fi lm, which is “the constantly shift ing balance between man and his tools” (216–17).

Th
is preoccupation with technology, broadly speaking, is, of course, the core theme of science fi ction, whose signal quality as a genre is that it postulates another, imagined order of existence in which the rules of science, broadly speaking, can be plausibly made to apply. It is this concern with a plausibility established by an extended appeal, always logical and consonant with larger scientifi c truths, to the reader’s sense of the physical and historical real that marks off science fi ction like 2001 from superfi cially similar fantasies like Star Wars (1977). What distinguishes Kubrick’s fi lm as science fi ction, so the Harvard Crimson reviewers accurately observe, is that he is able to achieve, “in terms of fi lm technique and directorial approach . . . the audience’s almost immediate acceptance of special eff ects as reality: aft er we have seen a stewardess walk up a wall and across the ceiling early in the fi lm, we no longer question similar amazements and accept Kubrick’s new world without question.” Once the “credibility of the special eff ects” has been established, “we can suspend disbelief . . . and revel in the beauty and imagination of Kubrick/Clarke’s space” (217).

Th
e remainder of the review is devoted to a reading of the “challenging substance of the excellent screenplay,” which is ably demonstrated to be much more than “inspirational banality” where “tedium” might be the only message.

A brief summary will make this clear. In the “Dawn of Man” sequence, we witness the coupling of progress and destruction, as the fi rst use of a tool by the primitive australopithecine hominid is to kill an opponent of a rival band and take possession of the water hole. Before this evolutionary leap, however, the black, rectangular monolith makes its fi rst appearance, and this is the precise moment when the moon and sun are in orbital conjunction. Th us, “a theme
of murder runs through simultaneously with that of progress.” Th ousands of
years of human history are then elided by the cut from the bone to the spacecraft , an example of Bazinian associative montage that serves as “an eff ective, if simplistic, method of bypassing history” (218) (see fi gures 3 and 4).

Th
e fi lm’s second section is set at the beginning of the new millennium, when space travel and exploration are much advanced. On the moon, scientists have discovered a monolith identical to the one that appeared to the apes (once again the moon and sun are in conjunctive orbit). Th e scientists
are baffl
ed by the monolith, but they do soon discover that it is emitting a powerful radio signal toward Jupiter. Th
e conclusion is that some form of life
on Jupiter might be responsible for the appearance of the monolith and it is to Jupiter that an expedition is sent some fourteen months later. Th us, the
monolith “begins to represent something of a deity,” inspiring “apes and man to make the crucial advance,” fi rst toward tool making and violence and then later toward traveling to Jupiter.

2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap 21

On that journey, the confl ict between the HAL 9000 and the astronauts provides yet another meditation on the relationship between humans and their tools. In the opinion of the reviewers, the script development is, again, linear, as “the accepted relationship of man using machines is presented . . .

then discarded in favor of an equal balance between the two.” Th e irony is
that HAL “proves [to be] a greater murderer than any of the men” as the fi lm turns again “to the theme of inherent destruction in social and technological progress” (219). Ingeniously using his tools for purposes other than those for which they were intended, Bowman manages to “kill” the computer, in a “complex act [that] parallels that of the Australopithecus.” Th is act is salvational, freeing Bowman from an excessive and dehumanizing dependence on tools; through it, he becomes “an archetypal new being: one worthy of the transcendental experience that follows” (220). Th
is reading is perhaps a bit
simplistic. Despite his defeat of the renegade computer, Bowman remains a tool of the monolith—although he does pass through it—and is imprisoned in his fetal sack as he circles the Earth.

Aft er dismantling HAL, Bowman follows the monolith, which he spies fl oating in space, and enters some kind of time/space warp where he undergoes the startling and ultimately ambiguous remaking that turns him into a

“star child” or some species of mutant. Kubrick, as the reviewers recognized however, is not interested in providing a clear message: “the intrinsic suggestiveness of the fi nal image is such that any consistent theory about the nature of 2001 can be extended to apply to the last shot: there are no clear answers”

(222). Perhaps the most remarkable fact about the Harvard Crimson review is not the sympathy and appreciation it shows for Kubrick’s fi lm, which is claimed to be a “superb” example, in its “dazzling technical perfection,” of an unusual genre, that of “great philosophical-metaphysical fi lms about human progress and man’s relationship to the cosmos” (222). What is most remarkable is that it is the only major contemporary review to provide a close reading of the fi lm’s narrative and themes.

Last Words

Pauline Kael is certainly correct in suggesting that what was most interesting at the time about the success of Th
e Graduate was not cinematic but “socio-
logical.” Sociology, as she sees it in this instance, confi rms a time-honored truth: the more things change, the more they stay the same. It is remarkable, Kael observes, “how emotionally accessible modern youth is to the same old manipulation. Th
e recurrence of certain themes in movies suggests that each generation wants romance restated in slightly new terms” (127). No doubt.

Older viewers, in contrast, who are comfortable but also bored with the same formulas, are in the process of giving up the movies—because “they’ve seen it before.” And this ennui aff ects critics of a certain age as well, and “this is why 22

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
so many of the best movie critics quit.” In what is probably not intended to be an autobiographical observation, she declares, “some become too tired, too frozen in fatigue, to respond to what is new” (127).

It may well be true, in part, that younger people do not truly know what is new because they do not have the experience to be properly comparative, a sine qua non of the critical task. We might argue that another element of that task should be a certain openness to innovation, as she herself observes:

“One’s moviegoing tastes and habits change.” But then the cinema changes too.

And yet Kael seems to ignore that simple truth. She presents as an unalterable fact the dictum that “[i]f we’ve grown up at the movies we know that good work is continuous not with the academic, respectable tradition but with the glimpses of something good in trash” (127). Th
e younger generation, however,
as the Harvard Crimson reviewers exemplify, was pleased to fi nd that “the academic, respectable tradition,” hitherto the more or less exclusive province of the international art cinema, had found itself a home in a Hollywood studio–fi nanced and –distributed epic fi lm. Of course, 2001 is in only a limited sense a Hollywood fi lm in the tradition of that “trash” for which Pauline Kael affi
rms such aff ection.

An essential aspect of 2001’s conception and production, in fact, is that Kubrick and the creative team he assembled worked outside the studio system, on the other side of the world, in a somewhat dismal place called Boreham Wood, north of London. What Kubrick regarded as the disastrous experience of directing Spartacus (aft er Kirk Douglas hired him aft er fi ring Anthony Mann) had soured him on Hollywood, and the changing nature of the industry, in which the studios that had once dominated production were reduced, as in this instance, to little more than banks, made workable both his desire for independence and his more or less permanent relocation outside of the United States. In a history that has been fully documented by others, especially Robert Kolker, the altered conditions of production and the evolving tastes of a younger audience led to a diff erent kind of American fi lm: visually sophisticated, intellectually engaging, intriguingly (dis)connected to genre, and unmindful, as appropriate, of the conventions that had for more than four decades determined the shape of the American commercial product. 14 2001 is the fi rst, or one of the fi rst, fi lms of this new tradition to make an impact on the marketplace. With the perfect hindsight that the passage of more than three decades provides, we can now clearly see that, contra Kael, the younger generation was not simply “mooning away in fi xation on themselves and thinking this fi xation had suddenly become an art” (127). As the Harvard Crimson reviewers eloquently demonstrate, 2001 was undoubtedly

“art” in the tradition of the international art cinema. Although most within the older, established critical generation did not agree, here was a fi lm that could sustain a careful and detailed reading even as it impressed with its technical sophistication and thematic richness. But a youthful enthusiasm for sophisticated science fi ction and striking cinematic eff ects only identifi es one kind of appreciative reading that Kubrick’s enigmatic text might sustain, as 2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap 23
the fi lm’s subsequent critical history, including the diverse perspectives collected in this volume, amply attests.

At the time of its initial release, there was a lone but signifi cant indication of the substantial infl uence that 2001 was soon to exert on cinema studies, then in the process of fi nding a second home in the academy. Annette Michelson, one of the pioneers of serious fi lm study in this country, devoted a long appreciative essay to 2001, the only analysis from the period of the fi lm’s initial release that today holds more than an archaeological interest. Michelson acknowledges the groundbreaking nature of the director’s accomplishment, which is to be seen in its unusual melding of form and content: “Kubrick’s fi lm has assumed the disquieting function of Epiphany . . . a disturbing structure, emitting, in its intensity of presence and perfection of surface, sets of signals.” 15

But these are not indecipherable. Kubrick, unlike Homer, is not to be imagined as nodding, nor, in Michelson’s view, can he be accused of purvey-ing meaninglessness as a theme, thus deconstructing the mainstream cinema’s preoccupation with having a “point.” Instead, the fi lm propounds profound ideas about the human experience, the nature of art, and the history of the medium itself; its message is not defi ned entirely by the high seriousness of its engagement with genre. Like the enigmatic monolith that sets into motion the events of human history that the fi lm traces, 2001 is “endlessly suggestive, projects a syncretic heritage of myths, fantasies, cosmologies and aspirations”

(56). In stark contrast to both establishment critics and youthful fans, Michelson fi nds that “everything about it is interesting,” but especially the fact that its form and substance merge inextricably in a “‘formal’ statement on the nature of movement in its space” (56). Th
us Kubrick takes as his subject the notion
of “‘arrival and departure.’ . . . [Th
e fi lm’s] narrative [becomes] a voyage of dis-
covery, a progress toward disembodiment, [and] explores . . . the structural potentialities of haptic disorientation as agent of cognition” (56).

Yet, the richness of Kubrick’s fi lm is not exhausted by its epistemological movement, by its use of the medium to disengage, disorient, and instruct.

Michelson also recognizes that the director’s accomplishment was to insert himself into the mainstream tradition of Hollywood fi lmmaking, whose primal purpose, as the young fans of 2001 instinctively recognized, was always to provide an alternative universe into which the spectator was invited, even impelled. On this level, Kubrick was no less successful than Howard Hawks, Lewis Milestone, and Michael Curtiz, as well as other skilled purveyors of studio-era screen epics: “Th
e fi lm of adventure and of action, of action as adventure is an event . . . and it off ers, of course, the delights and terrors [that] occasions of that sort generally provide, [by] positing a space which, overfl owing screen and fi eld and vision, converts the theatre into a vessel, and its viewers into passengers” (63). And so the knowledge the fi lm off ers is ultimately of the body, or “carnal,” the ultimate special eff ect to which “youth in us, discarding the spectator’s decorum, responds” (63). Michelson too saw clearly that 2001
was, in many senses, the ultimate trip.

24

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Notes

1. Pauline Kael, “Trash, Art, and the Movies,” in Going Steady (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 100. Further references will be noted in the text.

2. Kael’s view about the appeal of 2001’s images was echoed by Jeremy Bernstein, writing in the New Yorker (September 21, 1968): What appears to have happened is that 2001 has uncovered a large public—
especially of young people brought up on the visual stimuli of television—for whom visual beauty is suffi
cient reason for the existence of a fi lm, and who
do not need the prop of a conventional plot with a clearly articulated dénoue-ment. (180)

Television theorists might dispute Bernstein’s point since, conventionally at least, the audio track is considered to dominate the visual in that medium. Evolved from radio, television is “talky” compared to the movies, which fi rst developed without sound and with only printed language. If the younger generation in the 1960s was accepting of a cinema of spectacular images, it seems more likely the result of the interest of Hollywood, aft er 1950, in producing visually striking and color fi lms (oft en shot in widescreen format) in order to compete with television, which was restricted through most of that era to small, ill-defi ned, and black-and-white images.

3. John Russell Taylor also noted a generational gap in the audience for 2001, but drew a diff erent conclusion from that fact. Th
e second time he watched the fi lm, he sat
next to an especially enthusiastic young viewer and observed:

[H]is attention was not functioning in the same sort of way that his parents’

was, and that mine was. He was, that is to say, not in the slightest worried by a nagging need to make connections, or to understand how one moment, one spectacular eff ect, fi tted in with, led up to or led on from another. He was accepting it like, dare one say, an LSD trip, in which a succession of thrilling impressions are fl ashed on to a brain free of the trammels of rational thought.

Here was an audience interested in “a whole new way of assimilating narrative,” not as

“an articulated plot, but [as] a succession of vivid moments.” From the London Times, in Th
e Making of Kubrick’s 2001, ed. Jerome Agel (New York: Signet, 1968), 171–72. Taylor raises an interesting point about how 2001 was probably enjoyed by many. Kubrick’s artful deployment of images and sound may well have infl uenced (perhaps inaugurated) one of the most important and enduring elements of the current cinema, its fascination with something close to “pure” spectacle.

4. An important exception must be made for Albert Rosenfi eld’s ten-page spread (mostly stills from the fi lm) in Life, April 15, 1968, 24–34. Anticipating the judgment of later fi lm scholars, Rosenfi eld observes that the fi lm “dazzles the eyes and gnaws at the mind,” going beyond the “realm of literal science-fi ction into a puzzling, provoking exercise in philosophy” (27).

5. Figures are from “All Time Rental Champs,” Variety, January 7, 1976.

2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap 25

6. Tim Hunter, with Stephen Kaplan and Peter Jaszi, “Th e Harvard Crimson Review
of 2001,” in Agel, Th
e Making of Kubrick’s 2001, 215. Further references will be noted in the text.

7. Th
ere are, as one might expect, notable exceptions to this general rule. West Coast critics were generally more enthusiastic about Kubrick’s accomplishment, notably Gene Youngblood ( Los Angeles Free Press) and Charles Champlin ( Los Angeles Times), both of whom strongly praised the fi lm, while Penelope Gilliatt, writing in the New Yorker (April 13, 1968), though somewhat puzzled by what she had viewed, conceded that 2001 “is some sort of great fi lm, and an unforgettable endeavor” (151).

8. Stanley Kauff mann, “Lost in the Stars,” New Republic, May 4, 1968, 24. Further references will be noted in the text.

9. “Chain Reaction,” in the New Yorker, September 21, 1968, 180. Th omas Allen

Nelson provides a thorough and insightful commentary on the relationship between the fi lm, on the one hand, and the two literary texts (the short story and the novel) produced by Clarke. He observes:

Th
roughout the novel, Clarke combines these evocations of exploration and wandering amid the lonely expanses of space with an elaborate superstructure of explanatory material that ultimately has the eff ect of subordinating “mystery”

to the speculations of science. Th
e fi lm, by contrast, is more open-ended than

Clarke’s novel, perhaps because Kubrick realized that mystery, whether futuristic or historical, becomes trivialized on the screen once it assumes a defi nable, objective shape. . . . Kubrick internally organizes 2001 in ways that likewise combine a minimum of explanatory clarity with a maximum of visual ambiguity.

Kubrick: Inside a Film Artist’s Maze, rev. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 106–8.

10. Other reviewers were also unhappy with or dismayed by the fi lm’s failure to make some obvious point. Robert Hatch, for example, declared that “the ambiguity of these closing scenes is the more disappointing because at least twice in its progress this most ambitious and oft en most thrilling of space fi lms promises some energy of communication.” Nation, June 3, 1968, 74. Variety (April, 3, 1968) agreed, observing that the “fi lm ends on a confused note, never really tackling the ‘other life’ situation and evidently leaving interpretation up to the individual viewer. To many this will smack of indecision or hasty scripting” (6). Th
e perspicacious Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., rhetori-
cally asked: “But what is one to make of the astronaut’s fi nding the image of himself in a French eighteenth-century drawing room, his aging, his death, his rebirth? . . . Th e
concluding statement is too private, too profound, or perhaps too shallow for immediate comprehension.” Vogue, June 1968, 76.

11. I quote here from the second of her two reviews of the fi lm in the New York Times, April 21, 1968, L1. Further references will be noted in the text.

12. As Robert Kolker observes, “Kubrick’s narratives are about the lack of cohesion, center, community, about people caught up in a process that has become so rigid that it can be neither escaped nor mitigated—a stability that destroys.” A Cinema of Loneliness, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 110.

26

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

13. “Space Odyssey Fails Most Gloriously,” Newsday, April 4, 1968, in Agel, Th e Making of Kubrick’s 2001, 264. Further references to this and the other two reviews by Gelmis, also collected in Agel, will be noted in the text.

14. Kolker’s A Cinema of Loneliness is usefully supplemented by James Monaco’s American Film Now, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1984).

15. Annette Michelson, “Bodies in Space: Film as Carnal Knowledge,” Artforum 7

(February 1969): 57. Further references are noted in the text.

2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap 27

This page intentionally left blank

2

Auteur with a Capital A

JAMES GILBERT

Th
e prospect of human venture into space has always raised the disconcerting prospect of discovering either nothing or something. While the loneliness of nihilism has always been possible, it lacks dramatic potential. To fi nd something is a very diff erent story. Since its inception, science fi ction has become the popular medium for portraying that something—the presence in the universe that challenges (or confi rms) the anthropocentric presumptions of the great monotheistic civilizations of Western society. As Stanley Kubrick was fond of noting, the psychologist Carl Jung predicted that any encounter with transcendent intelligence would tear the reins from our hands, “and we would fi nd ourselves without dreams. We would fi nd our intellectual and spiritual aspirations so outmoded as to leave us completely paralyzed.” Quite aptly, therefore, Kubrick said of his fi lm masterpiece, 2001: A Space Odyssey:

“I will say that the God concept is at the heart of 2001—but not any traditional, anthropomorphic image of God. ”1 He recognized that space travel is nothing less than a voyage into time: into the future and into the past, toward end time and back to creation.

Beginning in the nineteenth century, two potent ideas introduced the questions that science fi ction was invented to answer. Th e fi rst centered on

Darwin’s theory of natural selection, raising questions about how, in fact, 29
humans could have developed from a chance roll of the evolutionary dice.

Th
e second engaged Mary Shelley’s classic picture of man as the simultaneous inventor of technology and creator of monsters. Th eologians and, more
broadly, a whole host of imaginative thinkers have struggled with the problem of the human place in a universe that might only incidentally, if at all, be concerned with the fate of mankind. Simultaneously, they have worried over the human tendency to embody ambition, greed, and aggression in technology.

Both of these preoccupations occupy the very center of Kubrick and (science fi ction author) Arthur Clarke’s space travel fi lm. But, unlike a good deal of contemporary science fi ction either in literary or fi lm form, which manages to resolve the plot with a glance at God, or reaffi
rm the limits on human aspi-
ration defi ned by the religious and philosophic traditions of sin, pride, and hubris, 2001 steps into a diff erent sort of beyond. Th is idiosyncratic vision of
man’s encounter with a higher intelligence is accompanied by the suggestion that humans err in presuming to be the anthropomorphic model for God.

Th
e result is a remarkable personal conversation about the implications of decentering man within the universe. In this regard, Arthur Clarke’s offh and
remark about the fi lm rings with unintended truth. “While the fi lm was being made,” he explained, “I made the comment that MGM is making the fi rst ten-million-dollar religious movie, only they don’t know it yet.” 2 Th
e fi lm’s millen-
nial title alone should have suggested a spiritual project to anyone aware of the mathematics of apocalyptic thinking.

Science is the vehicle for Kubrick’s spiritual quest in outer space in much the same way that it energized a huge body of speculative fi ction about “ETs.”

Th
e possibilities that science raises and the certainties that it challenges constitute perennial problems and periodically demand a revision of God images and belief structures. As the director put it during an interview for Rolling Stone magazine, “On the deepest psychological level, the fi lm’s plot symbol-ized the search for God, and it fi nally postulates what is little less than a scientifi c defi nition of God.” 3

In the 1960s, as the Apollo missions swung closer to a moon landing, 2001 spoiled the impact of that landing for us all. More realistic than reality itself, and certainly more dramatic, the fi lm depicted man’s venture into space within a rich mix of mythological allusions. It presented a picture of space in ways that the real astronauts could not. With stunning clarity, it demonstrated weightlessness, imagined the moonscape, and pictured the passage of meteors. At the same time, it interpreted the whole experience within a broader framework of mythological and religious symbolism. It combined science and technology with philosophy, anthropology, and religion in ways that were unthinkable to the more conservatively scripted American moon explorers of 1969. 4

It is noteworthy that almost simultaneously in this period, Protestant evangelical thinkers were constructing a case that used science as the vehicle to speculate upon divine beginnings and endings, to salvage their view of a universe that was purposefully man-centered. In 1962, John Whitcombe and 30

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Henry Morris published their infl uential reformulation of creation science, Th
e Genesis Flood: Th
e Biblical Record and Its Scientifi c Implications. In this challenge to Darwinism and modern astronomy, the engineer and the theologian confronted the huge problem of explaining away evolutionary science.

Quite understandably, they chose to attack the theory of uniformitarianism:

“the belief that existing physical processes, acting essentially as at present, are suffi
cient to account for all past changes and for the present state of the astronomic, geologic, and biologic universe.” A world that operated by the slow and inexorable shift s that Darwin had made central to evolutionary theory could never, they affi
rmed, create an intelligent being such as a man. Evolution could not, on its own, prompted by blind and chance forces, create anything so splendid. It was precisely at this point of radical doubt that Kubrick and Clarke began their famous story of a journey beyond the stars. 5

Th
eir reason for engaging evolution is, curiously, the same as the creation scientists: there is no drama in evolution, however persuasive a theory it might be. Without outside intervention, there is no tale to tell; in other words, there is only the Nothingness that has always remained a possibility in man’s encounter with the Universe. Unlike the preposterous pulp-fi ction worlds of Mars and Venus created by Edgar Rice Burroughs, for example, where an energetic evolutionary force has created an elaborate hierarchy of intelligent beasts and beings, Clarke and Kubrick looked to outside intervention to spur the slow, steady state of terrestrial change. If the only tie to evangelical creation science is this question mark about evolution, it nonetheless reveals the moral and aesthetic problems of a Darwinian explanation that 2001 chose to confront. For the encounter with ETs implies nothing less than a new explanation of the origins of humans and the prediction of their future. Evolution might have remained a driving force in this universe, but, like the explanations of the late Stephen J. Gould, it was a force that operated to the rhythm of “punctuated equilibrium”—or put simply, long periods of slow development interrupted by catastrophic change. 6 2001 is a fi lm that explains such cataclysms.

But punctuated equilibrium and catastrophic change are neither strictly religious nor scientifi c concepts for Clarke and Kubrick. Even if the narrative of the fi lm is the long story of the creation and resurrection of mankind, it is nonetheless true that this is not strictly a religious or scientifi c account. Th at
is what Kubrick meant when he described the theme as an oxymoron—a “scientifi c defi nition of God.” It is why the fi lm encompasses more time than perhaps any other fi lm made, for no less a period could contain such expansive narrative ideas from evolution itself or prophetic religion.

Yet this religious-science emphasis does not begin to exhaust the meanings of the fi lm. Indeed, 2001 is layered with allusions to several of the principal secular and pagan mythologies of Western civilization. As Kubrick noted, it would not reach millions of viewers unless it explored “the universal myths and archetypes of both our shared cultural experience and our collective unconscious. ”7

Auteur with a Capital A 31

Sometimes these mythological allusions are explicit, as in the notion of the Odyssey, which is suggested not only by the fi lm’s title but also by the various names given to characters or locations. If the astronaut Bowman is a latter-day Odysseus and outer space the tempest-tossed Mediterranean, the classical references nevertheless remain intentionally incomplete and unde-veloped. Th
e astronauts do not undergo the variety of adventures that kept the Greek hero and his crew from returning home. So too with other stories that are invoked, such as Nietzsche’s Superman, called forth by the leaping chords of Richard Strauss’s Also Sprach Zarathustra, which is played at the beginning; when ape-men fi rst use the tool/weapon they have been inspired to discover during the fi rst section of the fi lm; and in the birth of the star child at the end.

As Alexander Walker paraphrases this theme, the fi lm is Kubrick’s story of the nature of intelligence: “He roots intelligence in the mythological past, before man has begun to use it, then ends intelligence in the metaphysical future, where man cannot yet grasp its latest transformation.” 8

In addition to such analogies, there is, of course, the theme of man and modern technology run amok. Kubrick makes this point repeatedly, for example, in the aff ectless human reactions of the “Moon Station” sequence, in the robotlike astronauts Poole and Bowman, and fi nally, most dangerously, in the computer HAL, who turns murderer when he believes (wrongly) that the mission to Jupiter is endangered. Th
is too, is a retelling of older
myths—of the sorcerer’s apprentice, of Frankenstein, of course, and of the countless science fi ction fi lms and stories that repeated this warning. From the havoc caused by out-of-control science in H. G. Wells to the cerebral considerations of Isaac Asimov in his brilliant examination of technological control, I Robot (1950), this variety of science fi ction fi ts the description of what Susan Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster” as the defi ning characteristic of the genre. 9

Beyond the obvious references to mythical stories and older literary plots and science fi ction clichés, critics have found symbolic meanings of a diff erent sort in the fi lm. For example, the monolith left by the aliens has been regarded as the God beyond God. Some critics have discovered Freudian symbolism in the rebirth of the fetus aft er a voyage through a womblike tunnel of light, or in the breaking glass as Bowman eats his last supper in the Louis XVI motel/zoo/
observation room. Others have described the monolith as a representation of pure form, or discovered in Jupiter a symbol of the father.10 Th
e possibilities
are legion, and I believe that this is intentionally so.

But why this layered—some might say confused—structure, with bits and pieces of myth cited and partially developed, with suggestive images that cannot quite be unifi ed into a persuasive and coherent whole? Why a story that competes with one of the most fundamental accounts of our civilization, the Bible, in presenting the beginnings and the endings of human existence but that is yet not a truly religious depiction? Why a clearly designated discussion of evolution that, in the end, denies or seriously modifi es Darwin? Th ere
are, I believe, a number of plausible explanations: the pride of the autodi-32

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
dact eager to display his omnivorous reading; the long period of development and incomplete modifi cations to the plot and its execution; the powerful presence of Arthur Clarke, who conceived of the fi lm in somewhat diff erent terms than Kubrick; and the likely possibility that confusion or diverse clues were intentional and that the various and even confl icting possibilities were part of Kubrick’s purpose to promote multiple interpretations of his work.

Th
is is what he meant by calling the fi lm a “mythological documentary.” As Clarke put it, “We set out quite consciously and deliberately—calculatedly if you like—to create a myth, an adventure, but still be totally plausible, realistic, intelligent.” 11 Without, of course, quite saying what it all meant.

In addition to myth and symbol, there were certain related intellectual enthusiasms that Kubrick also wished to interject in the fi lm. First among these was the director’s strong belief in the existence of extraterrestrial beings.

Although Arthur Clarke claims to have saved him from a naïve belief in UFOs and fl ying saucers, Kubrick’s enthusiasm was based upon substantial science or, better, probable scientifi c speculations. As he said in an interview, he was fascinated by the “scientifi c probability that the universe was full of intelligent civilizations and advanced entities.” Allying himself with “most astrono-mers and other scientists interested in the whole question,” he affi rmed that
he too was “strongly convinced that the universe is crawling with life, much of it, since the numbers are so staggering, equal to us in intelligence, or superior, simply because human intelligence has existed for so relatively short a period.” 12

It was also Kubrick’s belief that evolution had worked in a particular fashion: that the human discovery of tools was embedded in the development of warfare. In other words, man’s progress was as much determined by destruction as by advance; the race was truly descended from Cain and Abel. Th is
attitude certainly expressed his ambiguity about technology, whatever his enthusiasms for cryonics and space travel. Like much of the science fi ction from which he hoped to diff erentiate his work, he retained an edge of suspicion about technology and a tendency to emphasize the dark side of mechanical progress. 13

In justifying his allusions to multiple myths, Kubrick sometimes cited Joseph Campbell’s anthropological study of mythologies, Hero with a Th ousand Faces; J. G. Frazier’s Golden Bough; and his own adherence to the psychology of Jung. What links these works is their exploration of the symbolic dimension of culture. In other words, they are about the myth-making genius of human beings and societies as much as they are about specifi c stories. Th is
capacity of the imagination to hold varieties of mythic ideas in a kind of syn-chronous tension justifi es the partial references that intersperse the fi lm. In this sense, even the allusions to Christianity are cast within the larger schema of multiple mythologies. 14

What some critics have treated as confusion and intentional obfusca-tion—and they may partially be right about this—also reveals Kubrick’s purpose of opening up speculation about possible interpretations. Th e director

Auteur with a Capital A 33
purposely chose to convey meaning through visual signs and symbols, aiming at both the conscious and unconscious aspects of the viewer, rather than explication through text. By making what is essentially a silent fi lm, with language used sparingly to convey certain necessary narrative cues or to act as a counterpoint to visual messages, Kubrick made it more diffi cult to determine
precisely what he intended. Because visual metaphor is generally less specifi c or concrete in content than speech, it was tempting because it was possible to layer multiple meanings into the structure of the fi lm. As he put it in an interview with Playboy magazine in 1968:

2001 is a nonverbal experience; out of two hours and 19 minutes of fi lm, there are only a little less than 40 minutes of dialogue. I tried to create a visual experience, one that bypasses verbalized pigeon-hol-ing and directly penetrates the subconscious with an emotional and philosophic content. To convolute McLuhan, in 2001, the message is the medium.15

If true, there exists an interesting paradox. Kubrick and Clarke never stopped talking about possible interpretations of the fi lm, and Clarke’s novel (published aft er the release of the fi lm) carefully explained many of the more obscure meanings and suggested interpretations that would surely have been beyond the consciousness—or unconscious—of the average viewer. For example, that the room in part 4, aft er Bowman passes through the Stargate, was furnished in Louis XVI style, or that these living quarters were actually an observation chamber furnished out of Bowman’s own memories are not obvious without considerable prompting. Kubrick, critics, and the legion of inter-preters writing about the fi lm have added meanings that ordinary viewers, by themselves, would ever see. How, for example, was the viewer to know that Kubrick had, in his own words, fi lmed “a human zoo approximating a hospital” that was constructed out of Bowman’s “dreams and imagination”? For good reason Arthur Clarke seemed unable to let go of the story, rewriting it three more times before his death, in novels entitled 2010: Odyssey Two, 2061: Odyssey Th
ree, and 3001: Th
e Final Odyssey. Indeed, for a fi lm whose meanings were purportedly individual and subconscious, 2001 has been subjected to a remarkable degree of scrutiny and intellectualization, more than making up for the silences of the fi lm itself. Th
e aura of commentary has become as much
a part of the experience of the fi lm as the viewing of it. 16

In the creation, fi lming, and fi nal editing of 2001, Kubrick transformed a relatively concrete, if brief, short story by Arthur Clarke into an increasingly elliptical and suggestive narrative in which speech, on the few occasions it is used, imparts important information or elsewhere reveals, in its banality, the absence of meaningful communication. As Frederick Ordway, NASA astronomer, rocket expert, and technical advisor on the fi lm, noted, Kubrick cut elements of voice-over commentary that explained several of the key scenes of the fi lm. It was thus left to Clarke, Kubrick, and various critics to reintroduce 34

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
those missing elements in interviews and articles on the fi lm—and especially in Clarke’s novelized version. 17 For example, in describing how aliens changed the ape-men, he helpfully explains that the monolith probed their minds and implanted ideas: “It was a slow, tedious business, but the crystal monolith was patient.” 18

Because he demanded so much from visual symbols, Kubrick moved ever closer to the aesthetics of silent fi lm, defi ned by the camera work and montage. Such consequences were surely anticipated. As Kubrick noted, “words are a terrible straitjacket.” By suppressing speech, the director returned the science fi ction movie to its origins in the masterpiece of Georges Méliès, whose 1902 Trip to the Moon fi rst demonstrated the possibilities of using montage as a kind of new language in which the miraculous or extraordinary could be spliced into the narrative through special eff ects (fi gure 16). In 2001, the silence only underscores and calls attention to the signifi cance of the camera work itself. Kubrick’s meticulous care in creating verisimilitude, technological plausibility, and the depiction of space-travel reality equally matches his care in depicting multiple symbols and metaphors. Both interact in the deep silences of space. 19

But, of course, silent fi lms were and are neither completely silent nor always without words. By titling parts of the fi lm “Th e Dawn of Man,” “Jupiter

Mission,” “Jupiter and Beyond the Infi nite,” Kubrick borrowed another tactic from silent fi lms: by dividing the action with titles, he cued the viewer through signs that the scene and action had shift ed through time and space. Doing so granted him, as it allowed silent fi lm masters, the ability to jump from one scene to another, plausibly and without any explanation of how or why. As for silence, before the advent of sound, fi lms may have lacked a soundtrack, but they were oft en accompanied by music that refl ected, anticipated, and enhanced the mood of the scene playing on the screen. Kubrick also uses music in this fashion, as a kind of counterpoint to the action, and his choices have been much noted and oft en discussed. So, for example, he uses Richard Strauss’s Also Sprach Zarathustra to accompany the beginning of man’s evolutionary ascent. Th
e bone/weapon tossed by Moon-Watcher into the air
and then transformed into a shot of an armed space ship circling the Earth is perhaps the most famous cinematic element of the fi lm (fi gures 3 and 4). And this is accompanied by the transition from Strauss to Strauss, from Richard to Johann, Jr., from the rising, majestic chords of the famous tone poem, to the banal oom-pah-pah of Th
e Blue Danube. In the “Dawn of Man” sequence, the music lends mystery, tension, and brilliance to the action; in the second, the waltz reduces the technological miracle of space travel to the ordinary—
which is exactly how the humans in the fi lm react to it. Further on, Kubrick uses the eerie voice and orchestra pieces by György Ligeti ( Th e Requiem, Lux
aeterna, and Atmospheres) with their religious and mystical overtones to suggest the mythical dimensions of the voyage of the Discovery 1.20

Reaching back into the history of cinema is only one way that Kubrick reinforces and highlights the symbolic and metaphoric gravity of the fi lm.

Auteur with a Capital A 35

He also engages in a long-running dialogue with the genre characteristics of science fi ction fi lms, in eff ect, arguing against their conventions in order to distinguish his work from the hugely popular and oft en trite plot lines and conventions of the form. At the same time, he remains within the form in certain key respects, capitalizing on the expectations of an audience that had been well trained in what to expect from other depictions of technology gone berserk or the encounter with ETs.

With the exception of a few science fi ction fi lms that owed their plots to literature (like Fahrenheit 451, War of the Worlds, or even A Clockwork Orange), most of them repeated a clearly identifi able set of characteristics. It can be argued that 2001 is an argument against the conventions of science fi ction as much as it is a representative of that genre. Sometimes Kubrick intentionally introduced extraneous elements into the general format, even as he satirized others as if to call attention to his understanding and contempt for the platitudes of the genre.

Kubrick’s ambiguous relationship to the standard format of science fi ction fi lms can be grouped around four general themes: depicting aliens, scientifi c verisimilitude, the ironic denouement, and humor. Susan Sontag’s famous essay “Th
e Imagination of Disaster,” written in 1965, outlined the principal elements of the genre for her time. Taking the Hollywood monster invasion fi lms as her model, she suggested that audiences responded to “the fantasy of living through one’s own death and more, the death of cities, the destruction of humanity itself.” Dehumanization and the threat of being “taken over” by alien forces of some kind demonstrate, she suggests, “the depersonalizing of modern urban life.” Ambivalence toward science, she continued, is another hallmark of these fi lms. In eff ect, they constitute a record of fears, disappoint-ments, and apprehension about the future, metaphorically reproduced and dramatized through the imagination. Th
ey emerge, she says, from the present
condition of society. Arthur Clarke himself said something similar of ordinary science fi ction literature:

Th
e majority of authors who have called up science and fi ction, with a characteristic lack of imagination have only seen in these monsters (other forms of intelligence in the solar system) a pretext to describe the confl icts and acts of violence just like those that sully the pages of our own history. 21

In other words, science fi ction is the displaced, disguised drama of our own nightmares, set in an alien atmosphere, but like the dreams they resemble, only thinly disguise the disturbingly familiar dread of loss of self-control, invasion, and death.

Kubrick’s 2001 includes many of these generic elements. Th ere is the
director’s much-publicized belief in intelligent aliens, even superior aliens.

Th
ere is his well-known hostility toward technocracy and the destructive eff ects of a technology devoid of any human control or empathy. Th ere is an

36

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
evil monster: HAL, the computer turned murderer. Th ere is the loss of control and personal invasion. Th
ere are aliens. Th
ere is space and time travel.

Indeed, almost all of the principal elements that constitute the classic science fi ction fi lm are in 2001.

At the same time, Kubrick appears to enjoy playing against stereotype and the expected. Compare his work, for example, with Planet of the Apes, also released in 1968 and the fi lm that won the Academy Award that Kubrick thought should be his. Planet of the Apes, like many previous science fi ction fi lms, is a morality play whose ending is an ironic commentary and sudden explanation of everything that has preceded it in the fi lm. Like many other examples of this genre, it employs the distance of science fi ction to depict (and disguise) a contemporary social question—for example, racism. Kubrick certainly includes social commentary in his portrayal of the dangers of technology. And yet the director undercuts the very elements he invokes so seriously, like his distrust of technology. For example, the “monster” HAL, albeit a murderer, dies an almost comic death. When Bowman destroys his intellectual capacity piece by piece, he pathetically sings the chorus from the old song

“A Bicycle Built for Two.”

In what is perhaps their wisest move, Kubrick and Clarke, unlike almost any other sci-fi makers, resisted the temptation to embody the aliens. Instead, geometric monoliths represent them rather than, as Clarke put it, “some pathetic papier-mâché monster.” And the geometric slab, which only symbol-izes the aliens is, itself, suggestive of a variety of other mythic or psychological meanings. While the two creators debated the ending of the fi lm for months, considering all manner of possibilities, such as strange new cities or alien creatures, they chose to picture the death and rebirth of Bowman through the psychedelic sequence, the surrealistic scene set in the Louis XVI room, and the fi nal birth of the star child, contemplating Earth and an unknown future.

In one sense, Kubrick here is playing with the expectations of the audience, who had been trained to expect a fi nal unveiling of the aliens and a specifi c explanation of their motives. 22

Kubrick also confronts three clichés common to many other fi lms, all of them based upon a misapprehension of the dynamics of space travel. His rocket ship makes no noise in the vacuum of space, for example. Th ere is no
visible plume of exhaust. And, when a meteor tumbles perilously near the Discovery 1, in a scene with no other purpose than to demonstrate his technological knowledge, it makes no swoosh.

Together with such obvious moments when he is having fun with the form, the director was meticulous in his research into anthropology for the section on “Th
e Dawn of Man” and in visualizing the various other eff ects of space travel. Scientists like Carl Sagan and Ordway, among others, were consultants, and an original, ten-minute prologue of interviews with scientists and theologians about the possibilities of alien existence was fi lmed, although it was cut from the fi nal version. As David Stork has noted, the depiction of space travel was so accurate that portions of the fi lm were used in training Auteur with a Capital A 37

NASA astronauts. Kubrick also consulted corporations like IBM and Boeing to make sure that he got his hardware and soft ware right. To some observers, this was not necessarily a positive. As physicist Freeman Dyson of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton observed, “When I saw Kubrick at work on Space Odyssey in London, I was immediately struck by the fact that he was interested in gadgetry rather than in the people.” Or as Renate Adler put it in her famous hostile review for the New York Times, “Th e movie
is so completely absorbed in its own problems, its use of color and space, its fanatical devotion to science-detail, that it is somewhere between hypnotic and immensely boring.” 23

Kubrick’s commitment to scientifi c plausibility further diff erentiated his work from most science fi ction fi lms, especially in its conclusion. Th e stock
sci-fi fi lm ordinarily ended with a preposterous but easy to grasp explanation, for example, that radiation had caused a mutant monster, or that man’s aggrandizing soul had ironically tempted him to commit harmful mistakes.

Kubrick had little use for this ironic interplay between human aspiration and failure. Kubrick’s fi lm, rather than returning to the human condition and the comforting status quo ante, self-consciously breaks through to rebirth and regeneration. Th
us it is open-ended and speculative, where most other science fi ction fi lms circle back upon themselves in asserting the moral limitations of humanity. Where most science fi ction returns to a kind of stasis, delivering the audience back to the world of mundane reality, 2001 ends with an opening to the future.

Finally, and perhaps most dramatically, Kubrick challenges the science fi ction genre through the use of humor. Th
is occurs in many guises and sev-
eral places, but perhaps most notably in the initial sequence in part 2, the section dealing with the alien monolith discovered on the moon. Even some of Kubrick’s most perceptive critics, in their undivided attention to the brilliant jump cut from Moon-Watcher’s bone to the encircling nuclear warheads, have missed his follow-up comic gesture. From the orbiting bombs, he segues to the approaching space ship, and fi nally, inside, to Heywood Floyd’s fl oating pen (the same shape as the bone and the rocket ship; fi gure 5). What follows are a number of verbal and visual jokes about eating (bad airline food), airplane bathrooms, and telephones in space, replete with a stewardess in a tacky airline uniform. Th
e end of this sequence is the almost ludicrous and
uninformative briefi ng given by Floyd to scientists working on the moon discovery. And over all of it are the bouncy chords of Th e Blue Danube—one
of the most decidedly non–science fi ction sounds in the universe. Although there are other moments of humor sprinkled throughout the fi lm, none is so pointed or extensive as these. But they all serve to diff erentiate his work from the deadly serious plots of most other science fi ction fi lms.

At the same time, Kubrick raises serious issues that he does not resolve but that other fi lms might have fully engaged. For example, there is a slightly ominous discussion with Russian scientists about the moon slab, which the Americans are keeping a secret under the cover story of a quarantine. Floyd 38

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
pointedly warns that disclosing the existence of the slab might cause panic and fear throughout the world. Yet Kubrick declines any follow-up to these ideas of nuclear competition and worldwide alarm at the discovery of alien intelligence, just raising and dropping them as if to say, “I could have gone in this direction, but I chose not to.”

Perhaps only Kubrick was sure-footed enough to be playful and even mis-leading where other directors feared to break the continuity of mood and verisimilitude. Yet, nothing about these numerous encounters with the platitudes of science fi ction in any way diminishes the serious intent of 2001. Instead, like everything else in the fi lm, these moments call attention to the director, the choices he makes, and his sometimes obscure purposes.

To understand why there is this constant reminder of the mechanics of movie making, we must return to the beginning, to the fundamental question of what sort of story Kubrick is telling. In confronting and combining the two grand narratives of the origin and fate of man in the universe, of creation and evolution, of religion and science, where does he stand, fi nally? Th e
answer, insofar as there is one, is suggested by Kubrick’s incessant depiction of the eye. Th
ere are eyes and cameras everywhere, and HAL’s “seeing” is, in fact, a form of camera work. Whether it be in the guise of the sun rising over the fi rst monolith (like the Masonic symbol on the dollar bill), the eyes of the ape-men, the eyes of the tiger, HAL’s computer camera-eye, or fi nally, the dis-tended eye of the star child, this is a shift ing, signifi cant symbol (fi gures 13, 14, 31–35). 24 Seeing is confl ated with the camera and then, again, with Kubrick’s camera, which is present at every moment. Th
is witness indicates that the
most important presence in the fi lm is fi nally not HAL or Bowman or Moon-Watcher or the star child—not the hero of the Odyssey, but the poet of the drama, like Homer or the singer of the psalms, or the auteur himself. In this respect, the auteur as creator takes on a new meaning. In the end, the only one, fi nally, who knows the meaning of the mythic story in 2001 is Kubrick himself.

And like other great creators of myths about human origins and fate, he has invented a story that is fi lled with possibilities, which he may or may not have intended. Th
us it is left , fi nally, for the viewer to decide whether this new myth is religion or science or some personal combination of the two—and whether it merits a place among the other important stories of origin and fate.

Notes

1. Quoted in Stephanie Schwam, ed., Th
e Making of 2001 (New York: Modern

Library, 2000), 265.

2. Quoted in ibid., 163.

3. Vincent LoBrutto, Stanley Kubrick: A Biography (London: Fine, 1997), 313.

4. Lynn Spigel, “From Domestic Space to Outer Space: Th e 1960s Fantastic Family Sit-Com,” in Close Encounters: Film, Feminism, and Science Fiction, ed. Constance Penley et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 205–35. Spigel notes Auteur with a Capital A 39
that critics deplored the boring, unpoetic, vulgar, “oh boy!” tone of the Apollo 11 mission (229).

5. John C. Whitcombe, Jr., and Henry M. Morris, Th e Genesis Flood: Th
e Biblical

Record and Its Scientifi c Implications (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1962), xx. If this biblical tract shares some generic characteristics with science fi ction (in its use of scientifi c arguments to validate an imaginative narrative), Tim La Haye’s enormously popular Left Behind series goes one step further in imagining the end of the world. Both Genesis Flood and Left Behind exhibit some of the key characteristics of science fi ction typology outlined by Susan Sontag in “Th e Imagination of Disaster,”

in Against Interpretation (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1966), 209–25.

6. See Stephen Jay Gould and N. Eldredge, “Punctuated Equilibria: Th e Tempo and

Mode of Evolution Reconsidered,” Paleobiology 3 (1977): 115–51.

7. Th
omas Allen Nelson, Kubrick: Inside a Film Artist’s Maze (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 5.

8. Alexander Walker, Stanley Kubrick, Director (New York: Norton, 1999), 173. On other possible allegories and myths, see Leonard F. Wheat, Kubrick’s 2001: A Triple Allegory (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2000), 2–10.

9. Sontag, “Imagination of Disaster.”

10. David G. Hock, “Mythic Patterns in 2001: A Space Odyssey,” Journal of Popular Culture 4 (Spring 1991): 961–64; Michael Herr, Kubrick (New York: Grove, 2000), 13; Carolyn Geduld, Filmguide to 2001: A Space Odyssey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 62, 67–68.

11. Gene Youngblood, “Interview with Arthur Clarke,” in Expanded Cinema (New York: Dutton, 1970), 147.

12. Neil McAleer, Odyssey: Th
e Authorized Biography of Arthur C. Clarke (London: Gollancz, 1992), 194; Charles Kohler, “Stanley Kubrick Raps,” East Village Eye, in Schwam, Making of 2001, 246. See also Gene D. Phillips, Rodney Hill, et al., Encyclopedia of Stanley Kubrick (New York: Facts on File, 2002), xx.

13. “Stanley Kubrick: Playboy Interview,” in Schwam, Making of 2001, 275.

14. LoBrutto, Stanley Kubrick, 266; Herr, Kubrick, 13.

15. Schwam, Making of 2001, 272.

16. Norman Kagan, Th
e Cinema of Stanley Kubrick (New York: Continuum, 2000), 146. Since the 1990s, there has been an extraordinary surge of writing about Kubrick and his fi lms, including several biographies. In addition to the other works cited, see John Baxter, Stanley Kubrick: A Biography (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1997); James Howard, Stanley Kubrick Companion (London: Batsford, 1999); David Hughes, Th e

Complete Kubrick (London, Virgin, 2001); Piers Bizony, 2001 : Filming the Future (London: Aurum, 1994); Jerome Agel, Th
e Making of Kubrick’s 2001 (New York: New American Library, 1970); David G. Stork, ed., HAL’s Legacy: 2001’s Computer as Dream and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Gene D. Phillips, Stanley Kubrick Interviews (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 2001); Michel Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey (London: British Film Institute, 2001); Mario Falsetto, Stanley Kubrick: A Narrative and Stylistic Analysis (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001); Michel Ciment, Kubrick (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1987); and Robert Kolker, A Cinema of Loneliness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

40

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

17. Frederick I. Ordway, “Testimonies,” in Schwam, Making of 2001, 126–28; and Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey, 9.

18. Arthur Clarke, 2001: A Space Odyssey (New York: New American Library, 1968), 21, 25. Clarke explained in detail how the aliens transformed the ape-men and why.

19. Th
omas Nelson suggests that Kubrick was infl uenced by V. I. Pudovkin’s concept of fi lms laid out in his book Film Technique (London: Newnes, 1933). See Harry M. Geduld, “Return to Méliès: Refl ections on the Science-Fiction Film,” Humanist 28

(November–December 1968): 23. See also Bizony, 2001: Kubrick, he wrote, “was happy to draw inspiration from the brilliant back-yard magic of George[s] Méliès and his Voyage to the Moon (1902)” (144). Also see McAleer, Odyssey, 217.

20. As Richard Strauss wrote of Zarathustra: “I mean to convey in music an idea of the evolution of the human race from its origin, through the various phases of development, religious as well as scientifi c, up to Nietzsche’s idea of the Ubermensch.” Phillips et al., Encyclopedia, 12.

21. Sontag, “Imagination of Disaster,” 212–13, 216–17, 222–23. Arthur Clarke quoted in F. Hoda, “Éprouvante et Science Fiction dans le Cinéma américain actuel,” Positif 2

(November–December 1954): 16.

22. Clarke, Lost Worlds of 2001 : Science Fiction (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972), 189; Fred Chappell, “Th
e Science Fiction Film Image: A Trip to the Moon to 2001: A Space Odyssey,” in Science Fiction Films, ed. Th omas R. Atkins (New York: Monarch,

1976), 33–45.

23. Geduld, Filmguide to 2001, 33–34; David Stork, “Th e Best-Informed Dream:

HAL and the Vision of 2001,” in Stork, HAL’s Legacy, 133–34, 147.

24. W. R. Robinson and Mary McDermott, “2001 and the Literary Sensibility,”

Georgia Review 26 (Spring 1972): 26.

Auteur with a Capital A 41

This page intentionally left blank

3

The Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey

J. P. TELOTTE

Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey has provided us with one of the most frequently noted transitions in fi lm history, the match cut that takes viewers from “Th
e Dawn of Man,” as the fi lm’s fi rst sequence is titled, to the year 2001

(fi gures 3 and 4). Th
at cut matches a bone cast into the air by a shrieking hominid, one of those on which the opening sequence focuses, to a space station, similarly thrust into space by the modern humans who dominate the succeed-ing sequences. It is a wonderfully ironic piece of editing, suggesting how, for all of our technological advances—advances attested to by the complexity of the space station, the other satellites we glimpse, and the civilized strains of a Strauss waltz that accompany this shift —we have fundamentally progressed very little. We continue to fl ing our bits of technology into the air, higher and faster, of course, but with a similar sort of exultation, of self-conscious pride, as we strive to overcome one of the fundamental laws that weighs us down, governs human life, and constrains our ambitions: gravity. It is on gravity that this chapter focuses, in part because the fi lm itself, perhaps simply with a desire to be faithful to the scientifi c laws governing space travel—which are oft en selectively ignored by earlier science fi ction fi lms—frequently reminds us of its operation and emphasizes how in various ways it impinges on us. But gravity also becomes something more than just a scientifi c context for this 43
narrative; it opens onto a larger gravitas, or seriousness of purpose of 2001, a seriousness that has at times gone unappreciated because of our focus on the fi lm’s painstaking eff orts at scientifi c accuracy.

One hallmark of the initial response to 2001 was precisely an appreciation for its unusually rigorous attention to scientifi c detail, a rigor that had pointedly been missing both from the “space operas” of the serials and early science fi ction television and from the mutation and alien invasion fi lms that had largely dominated the genre during the previous decade. Yet it was an appreciation that curiously suggested very diff erent attitudes toward the fi lm.

On the one hand, critics repeatedly underscored its technical accuracy as the surest sign of the fi lm’s achievement, almost as if that were its point. As one reviewer off ered, “[T]he detail . . . is immense and unimpeachable, I’m sure.

Th
is must be the best-informed dream ever.” 1 And Kubrick’s frequent praise for his “staff of scientifi c advisors,” including Marvin Minsky of MIT, one of the leading authorities on artifi cial intelligence, certainly encouraged this approach. 2 Yet on the other hand, a number of critics complained about that very emphasis. One claimed that the fi lm demonstrates “a kind of fanaticism about . . . authenticity” that results in a story “somewhere between hypnotic and immensely boring.” 3 Prior to 2001’s appearance, the science fi ction narrative had largely become a platform for speculation not so much on how our science and resultant technology might allow us to accomplish things, but on the dramatic and usually fearful consequences of those developments.

Th
e landmark science fi ction fi lms of early cinema, Metropolis (1926) and Th
ings to Come (1936), were both heavily melodramatic and highly stylized dystopic visions, while the fl ood of such fi lms that appeared in the 1950s and early 1960s had become, as Susan Sontag famously noted, a kind of cultural

“imagination of disaster,” one in which our technological developments simply “stand for diff erent values,” as the narrative itself becomes an almost moralistic “allegory. ”4

In marked contrast, 2001, with its careful attention to detail, its scrupulous accounting for the various laws of nature and the physics of space fl ight, and its expert-driven extrapolation from current science and technology, 5
seemed to stake out a diff erent trajectory. As Edward James off ers in his history of the genre, Kubrick’s fi lm, because of its realistic texture and aura of scientifi c authority, “did as much as Apollo to make space fl ight both real and even banal” for audiences of the era. 6 He suggests that its main eff ect was to prepare us for the real thing. And indeed, in some ways, it recalls the near-documentary nature of such rare earlier eff orts as Destination Moon (1950) and Th
e Conquest of Space (1955; fi gures 1 and 2), both of which employed the leading rocket experts of the day as technical consultants in attempts to realistically forecast how mankind would take its fi rst halting steps into space.

However, both of those movies, because of their B-fi lm budgets and B-fi lm imaginations, failed to marshal the sort of special eff ects or dramatic visions that would make their versions of space travel either convincing or compel-44

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
ling. In 2001, though, the real, even in its sometimes banal or mundane forms, is central to the fi lm’s—and the fi lmmaker’s—imagination.

Certainly, one of Kubrick’s strengths, as demonstrated in his previous fi lms, was his scrupulous—if not quite fanatical—attention to detail and especially to scientifi c and historical accuracy. An earlier fi lm, Th e Killing (1956),
with its characters who minutely plot out the elements of a race track heist and their planned escape, points toward the director’s meticulousness, as well as his fascination with human eff orts at fashioning and living by a thoroughly rational world view. As Kubrick noted, his approach to each project he under-took was to “totally immerse” himself in it, reading and researching exhaustively in an eff ort to achieve a level of total verisimilitude.7 Beyond achieving a simple realism, though, that attention to detail consistently served a larger fi lm aesthetic for Kubrick, his belief that fi lmmaking is “dealing in a primarily visual experience, and telling a story through the eyes. ”8 If his painstaking eff orts helped to create the vision of a scientifi cally true and believable experience of space and space travel in 2001, then they also point toward something more, his sense that fi lm conveys its most important messages—“complex concepts and abstractions”—most directly by exploiting the intricate texture of the world we see around us, forcing us to use our eyes to see it clearly and better understand it, and thereby, as he says, “short-circuiting the rigid surface cultural blocks that shackle our consciousness to narrowly limited areas of experience.” 9 In short, the real—including a rigid scientifi c accuracy—was the essential path to increased understanding.

One of those complex concepts is bound up in that famous match cut—
which Annette Michelson has justly termed “the most spectacular ellipsis in cinematic history”10—and particularly in what it realistically visualizes and anticipates. Tossed bones, of course, inevitably fall back down to Earth, thanks to the law of gravity. Good science simply anticipates that something thrown into the sky will eventually arc downward. Yet that hominid’s exu-berant eff ort to defy gravity, an eff ort celebrated by the images of satellites and other space probes that we then glimpse as the narrative bursts through the boundaries of the past and moves to the year 2001, is a signpost for a most momentous development for humankind, which justifi es the narrative’s radical jump in time and space. As Paul Virilio explains, the relatively “recent acquisition of the speed of liberation from gravity” constitutes a feat of “historic importance,” comparable to the development of “the absolute speed of our modern real-time transmission tools,” enabling us “to escape the real space of our planet and so to ‘fall upwards.’” Yet that new trajectory—or dif-ferent sort of “fall”—ultimately means little, he off ers, unless it also spurs us to move beyond a certain way of thinking, the infl uence of “the stability of gravitational space that has always oriented man’s habitual activities” and left him clinging to a stable yet staid, even stultifying mode of thought. 11 It is this subtler, yet ultimately stronger force of stability and complacency which 2001
and its meditations on gravity eventually bring into focus.

The Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey 45

To further tease out that image on which we have initially focused, we might again note that thrown objects never continue along their original vectors for long. Bent by the force of gravitational space, they tend to curve back, in much the same way that human thought, grounded in custom, seeks out a point of stability. Th
omas Kuhn has off ered one of the most noteworthy explanations of this pattern, or what he terms the scientifi c “problem of progress.” 12

As he off ers, the scientifi c breakthrough that powers technological advances also tends to become the confi ning paradigm that stands in the way of further advances; the insight which once eff ectively “transformed the scientifi c imagination,” arcing out beyond the status quo, eventually becomes a way of thinking which patterns all that follows, or what Kuhn labels the “tradition of normal science. ”13 In terms of 2001’s pattern of visual design, we might simply say that the vector warps into a curved shape or, given a bit more force, produces a circular pattern, that described by the typical orbital body, such as a satellite or, more pointedly, the shape and motion of the space station that introduces the second major sequence of 2001.

In fact, it is this space station, itself circular and inducing a spinning motion to the shuttles that want to dock there, that provides us with another sort of paradigm for the narrative that follows. Th
e shuttle carrying Heywood

Floyd to the station, we might note, repeatedly foregrounds the power of gravity, in part by frequently underscoring its absence—through Floyd’s fl oating pen (fi gure 5), retrieved by a passing stewardess; his arms that undulate as he sleeps, as if he were fl oating in water; and the lingering close-up of the stewardess’s special gravity shoes, which allow her to perform normally if rather awkwardly in the zero-gravity conditions of space14 Th
ese details, precisely the
sort upon which most reviewers quickly seized, not only illustrate the weightless state attained on this fl ight, but also point up the human eff ort at countering this state, at constructing gravity where it is not natural. Th us, as the shuttle approaches the circular space station, which is rotating in order to generate its own gravity, it too begins to spin, as if engaged in a dance with the station to the tune of the Strauss waltz on the soundtrack. Th e music and movement
together suggest a kind of harmony here, although they also hark back to an earlier state—to the romantic era and to the gravity of Earth. No longer falling upward, as Virilio puts it, the space travelers on board the station have reconstructed their customary stability, translating the exploratory vector of space fl ight into a stationary circularity and hinting of a larger tendency here, even as humanity moves into the unknown, to compromise exploration, to control or even cover up discoveries, to cling to the ruling paradigms. We might think of it as a kind of fear of falling—upward.

On board the space station too we see underscored the problems of that gravitational and intellectual stability, at least in its cultural manifestations.

Here Heywood Floyd encounters his Soviet counterparts, and their polite banter eventually gives way to pointed questions and even warnings about strained relations between the Russian and American moon colonies. With this encounter, Kubrick suggests that there is to be no falling away from Cold 46

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

War realities, no end in sight to—or hope for progress beyond—the confrontation between East and West that he had so bleakly satirized in his previous fi lm Dr. Strangelove (1964). Th
is potentially destructive stability would
apparently continue far into humanity’s future. At the same time, it inscribes another sort of narrative circularity, by reframing the opening sequence and the hominid confl ict that eventuated in violence, killing, and a bloody bone tossed into the air. Here, of course, a civilized humanity puts a polite cover on its violent potential, its bloody bones, but the veiled threats of the Russians and Floyd’s transparent misrepresentations remind us how, even as we seem ready to break free of the past or fall upward, humanity appears almost gravitationally bound to replicating its earlier, violent history, to continuing along the dominant cultural paradigm. 15

During Floyd’s journey from the space station to the Clavius moon col-ony, we encounter at almost every turn the human diffi culties involved in
functioning in this new, gravity-free environment—diffi culties that help to
underscore Michelson’s precise assessment of 2001 as a “fi lm of dis-orientation.” 16 Eating in zero gravity means sucking liquefi ed food through a straw, and when Heywood Floyd momentarily lets go of his food tray, it quickly begins to fl oat away. Th
e stewardess must awkwardly cope with a constantly
shift ing interior horizon, as we see when she tries to serve the ship’s pilots and seems to walk around the circular wall of the ship and exit upside down (fi gure 6). And in one of the fi lm’s infrequent light moments, we see Floyd in close-up as he stands bemused, staring at the elaborate instructions attached to the “zero gravity toilet,” complete with an ominous caution that “Passengers are advised to read instructions before use” (fi gure 26). Each example reminds us—and in the case of the stewardess’s gravity-defying movements, almost literally—of the fundamental ways in which we rely on that customary pull of gravity and easily become disoriented in its absence. And the visualization of these eff ects only serves to prepare for that far more unsettling eff ect that has instigated Floyd’s trip, his eff ort to investigate and maintain a cover for the discovery at Clavius of the mysterious black monolith, an artifact that, he assures his colleagues, must be kept secret because of its enormous potential “for cultural shock and social disorientation.”

Tellingly, the subsequent sequence, titled “Jupiter Mission—Eighteen Months Later,” quickly returns to this emphasis on disorientation, keyed to the problem of weightlessness. For while it begins with a slow and deliberate tracking shot of the spaceship Discovery—a shot that makes maximum use of the Super Panavision aspect ratio to underscore the ship’s linear trajectory in space17—it leads to a pointedly unsettling image, that of Frank Poole jogging on a seemingly vertical track within the ship. As the camera tracks along with his movement, we recognize that our sense of disorientation, the visual challenge to our normal sense of “up” and “down,” results from the movement of a portion of the ship; the living quarters of Discovery are housed in a centrifuge that rotates in order to produce its own artifi cial gravity, thereby allowing Poole to seemingly run upside down (fi gure 18). To further emphasize The Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey 47
this eff ect, the subsequent scene in which Poole and his fellow crewman Dave Bowman eat and watch a BBC interview is constructed of shots that show the two astronauts seated but place them on a horizontal axis, as if their backs were to the fl oor (fi gure 7). While Alexander Walker has called attention to the repetition of these “bizarre ‘irrational’ angles possible in this ‘squirrel’s cage’

environment,” he passes them off as simply a matter of style, of Kubrick trying

“to pull off some spectacular eff ects.” 18 But more than simply an eff ect, these images link both simple and complex elements of the narrative: the human eff ort to create an artifi cial gravity and the larger consequences of that constructed orientation. Th
ose strange angles do, of course, make the astronauts’

positioning in screen space repeatedly seem awkward and unnatural, in the process hinting of how unready they are for the task of “discovery,” which will ultimately render a conventional, Earth-centered, and gravity-determined orientation irrelevant.

Th
ose same bizarre angles also help to prepare us for the narrative’s eventual trajectory: a movement away from this sort of conventional orientation and from the psychic gravity that has so bound humanity to Earth, to certain modes of Earth-oriented behavior, and to particular paradigms of thought.

For an announcement by the HAL 9000 computer, which keys the principal action in this sequence—that part of the ship’s communication equipment will fail within seventy-two hours—quickly focuses the narrative on issues of stability and orientation. Th
roughout the following scenes, HAL’s red, star-
ing eye becomes an unmoving—and unblinking—presence, representing the electronic intelligence that controls all functions, including life support, on board Discovery and carefully monitoring the behavior of the two astronauts in case they too become in some way unstable and pose a threat to the mission (fi gure 13). In marked contrast, we see Dave and Frank being forced out of their comfort zone, that is, the artifi cial gravity of the centrifuge. First, Dave and Frank, in a section of the ship lacking that gravity, are depicted at an unsettling 90-degree angle from each other as they run a check on HAL’s calculations, and then Frank fl oats in space while replacing the AE35 part that has been predicted to fail. Th
e visual contrast between the constantly oriented
eye and the physically disoriented astronauts—disoriented both in space and in terms of their newfound uncertainty about HAL’s own reliability—fore-shadows the coming confl ict, as HAL returns to the violent ways of the hominids, killing Frank and sending him fl oating off into space,19 and then locking Dave out of the Discovery, and thus out of the artifi cial environment on which he has come to rely.

Suggesting both desperation and a kind of imaginative growth, Dave’s response points to the sort of momentous human development that Virilio has described, to our new ability to “fall upwards.” Shut out of the Discovery and lacking a helmet that might allow him to move around safely in space, Dave essentially gives birth to a new attitude, positioning the pod, as if it were a kind of womb, opposite the emergency entry (a long corridor suggesting the birth canal) and squatting in a fetal position behind the pod’s door, 48

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
which he then blows open, exposing himself briefl y to a most unstable environment—cold, airless, and certainly weightless. Blown out with the door, he does seem to fall upward, and even as he is sucked back toward the pod, to space, and possibly to death, in a sort of inevitable complement to that explosive trajectory, he manages to shut the emergency hatch so that he can begin his new life (fi gure 8). It is one in which we no longer see him in the grip of gravity; rather, he moves at odd angles and even fl oats through portions of the ship as he deactivates HAL: disengaging portions of the computer’s memory which, appropriately, fl oat out from the mainframe, and in the process disengaging himself from the sort of conventional stability and rational limits that HAL and the control section of the Discovery have come to represent (fi gures 14 and 22).

It seems fi tting that only with this move, with the shutting off of the computer (and of conventional logic) and in a completely weightless state, does Dave fi nally confront the problem of “disorientation” and learn of his purpose—to investigate the source of that black monolith whose “origin and purpose [are]

still a total mystery” on Earth. For the subsequent wordless sequence, as Dave emerges from the Discovery to pursue a monolith apparently fl oating among the moons of Jupiter, involves him in a new sort of exploration, one beyond gravity, beyond conventional orientation, in a visionary experience that critics at the time quite rightly described as a kind of “light show.” In the course of this scene, there is no stability, no easy orientation, only the sense of constant movement through space and eventually across a landscape that looks remarkably like that of Earth in the opening sequence, yet outlandishly colored to suggest its diff erent nature, to emphasize that Dave has not simply fallen or followed a circular trajectory back to Earth. Here, it is his eye—in contrast to HAL’s—that becomes the narrative ground, as the fi lm cross-cuts between the landscape over which we rapidly move and close-ups of his eye, blinking and straining to take in these scenes while deprived of the sort of stability and orientation to which earthmen are accustomed (fi gures 33 and 34).

To underscore the importance of these images, we might recall Kubrick’s next eff ort, A Clockwork Orange (1971), in which the protagonist Alex wears a set of cuffl
inks styled like bloody eyeballs (fi gure 9). Given the decaying, crime-ridden, and futureless world that Alex and his “droogs,” or companions, inhabit, those cuffl
inks immediately suggest the violent nature of his
environment, but they also point beyond it, hinting at a way out of a decadent dead end for humanity. What they point to is a new mode of seeing, a vantage that has been literally, even violently ripped from its normal orientation, freed from its common limits, although here mainly to function as decor, as a symbol of the sort of diff erent perspective for which Alex and his companions subliminally long and which their world so sorely needs if it is to pass beyond this manifestly dead cultural end. However, for various reasons—political, cultural, perhaps even genetic—no one here seems able to achieve that new sort of vision, to cut the ties to the violent human past, to progress much beyond the lingering infl uence of those hominid ancestors who, in 2001, toss The Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey 49
the bloody bone/club skyward in a gesture of transcendence. Style notwith-standing, their vision is simply gravitationally bound to an earlier way of life.

But in 2001, seeing in a new way is a key part of what is accomplished: seeing liberated from HAL’s restrictive vantage, from the Discovery’s artifi cial environment, from an earthly perspective.

For Virilio, as we have noted, that new human capacity to fall upward, to escape from the limiting forces and mindset of our world, is simply one sign of a much larger shift in human orientation, as we enter an environment in which speed and movement, as defi ned by “the cosmological constant of the speed of light, ”20 becomes a key dimension of human development. It is in this context that we might read the fi lm’s fi nal sequence, which fi nds Dave Bowman, along with the pod that has transported him, in a mysterious, classically decorated suite, wherein he undergoes a series of transformations—transformations that defy the normal paradigms of human thought and that eff ectively warp our normal sense of space and time. Within this strange environment, described by some as a kind of human zoo, Bowman experiences a series of rapid changes. Starting from his position as an astronaut within his pod, Bowman looks out, and his vantage ultimately produces an image of himself, outside the pod. Each look thereaft er produces not the simple and expected glance-object relationship typical of classical fi lm editing, but rather an image of himself in another position, even at a later age, as if the look itself were now enough to rapidly propel the self through space and time, to give birth to a later version of the self (fi gure 15). Perhaps paradoxically, gravity still operates in this unnatural circumstance, as the falling of a glass from a table underscores. But it is as if it were simply part of the furnishings here, recreated from the storehouse of Bowman’s personal and cultural memory, and something that momentarily catches his attention, as if he were suddenly reminded of how it functions. But it is also readily suspended, as we then see when an aged Bowman, lying in bed, extends his hand and points to a monolith (fi gure 23), now fl oating in front of him, and when, in another reverse angle shot, we see the embryonic star child suspended above the bed in Bowman’s previous position. One of the points implicit in this concluding sequence is that gravity—and even space and time, which, we know, are warped by gravity—fi nally matters very little. It is something to which we are accustomed, a convention of our lives, one of the old laws that bind us to a status quo, that keep us from achieving the sort of escape velocity that, as a species, humanity needs to attain in order to evolve further, to be something other than highly rational and inevitably violent ape-men.

Th
e fi lm’s fi nal scene precisely illustrates this situation, as it off ers us two symmetrical images fl oating as if side by side in space. One is recognizably the Earth, the starting point for the trajectory of the spaceship Discovery as well as the fi lm’s trajectory of discovery. Th
e other is the star child that Dave Bow-
man has become, as he too completes his trajectory and comes back to Earth.

Recalling the bone earlier tossed into the sky, momentarily defying gravity and through a sharp break in narrative time avoiding falling back to Earth and 50

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
instead magically turning into a kind of satellite, Bowman21 as the star child seems suspended in space, free from the physical laws that bind the planet to which he has arced back, but also a companion to and model for that planet, his birth/rebirth the start of a new round of human evolution (fi gure 35). As Virilio off ers, “beyond earth’s pull, there is no space worthy of the name, but only time,” 22 and here time seems ready to produce a transformation every bit as signifi cant as that from hominid to human, from bone to satellite.

In this ultimate ability to defy gravity, we can locate at least a portion of the real gravitas or seriousness of purpose that marks 2001. For this fi nal image emphasizes that humanity will not be bound by the conventional laws of science, by the paradigms that seem to insist on a limited human trajectory, and that once the journey of discovery begins, we need not be drawn back to or fall into a primitive condition. When questioned about that kind of human destiny, about our place in the cosmos, Kubrick has been emphatic on this point. Even with his manifest fascination for scientifi c detail and the careful attention he gives to it in 2001 and elsewhere, he has also professed his skepticism toward the state of scientifi c knowledge and what the scientifi c community oft en regards, despite Kuhn’s caution, as absolutes. As Kubrick has off ered, “I fi nd it diffi
cult to believe that we have penetrated to the ultimate depths of knowledge about the physical laws of the universe. . . . I’m suspicious of dogmatic scientifi c rules; they tend to have a rather short life span. ”23

Th
e result with 2001 is a fi lm that astonishes with its scientifi c accuracy and yet also pulls viewers up short with its profound skepticism about the rational world view from which our science operates.

Of course, as we earlier noted, with its unprecedented focus on scientifi c detail—on the laws that govern us and the technologies we have craft ed in line with those laws— 2001 originally asserted its diff erence from the long tradition of popular science fi ction fi lms and suggested its quite serious intent. Kubrick produced one of the most compelling versions of space travel ever put on fi lm, convincingly described the sort of ships and structures that would be needed to colonize space, and eff ectively suggested our increasing reliance on the computer for the command and control functions of space fl ight. Yet that very texture, as the ruminations on gravity here suggest, also serves to challenge one sort of paradigm. It can help us to consider the role of science and technology in shaping our future and particularly the ways in which a kind of thinking associated with science can both open onto and, if we are not careful, draw us back from, almost gravitationally, the full potential of that future, a future in which we might evolutionally become more than we are. In his study of paradigmatic thought in the sciences, Kuhn off ers a similar caveat, noting that “scientists should behave” in a constantly skeptical way “if their enterprise is to succeed.” 24 While thoroughly scientifi c, Kubrick’s fi lm seems skeptical in very much this way. It off ers us a glimpse of our potential, as it suggests that if the very human “enterprise is to succeed,” if we are ever to “fall” in the right direction, we shall need to overcome the pull of the physical and even cultural gravity that holds us, that stays the ultimate human odyssey.

The Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey 51

Notes

1. Charles Champlin, review of 2001, in Th e Making of Kubrick’s 2001, ed. Jerome

Agel (New York: New American Library, 1970), 213.

2. Jeremy Bernstein, “Profi le: Stanley Kubrick,” in Stanley Kubrick: Interviews, ed.

Gene D. Phillips (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), 36.

3. Renata Adler, “We’ll Get Th
is Info to You Just as Soon as We Work It Out,” in

Agel, Making of Kubrick’s 2001, 208.

4. Susan Sontag, “Th
e Imagination of Disaster,” in her Against Interpretation (New York: Dell, 1966), 218, 226.

5. A noteworthy contribution to that expert-driven attention to detail came from Frederick I. Ordway, one of America’s foremost rocket and space experts. A former member of Wernher von Braun’s rocket team at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center and author of numerous books and articles on rocketry and space fl ight, he served as scientifi c and technical consultant on the fi lm for eighteen months and subsequently off ered a number of postproduction suggestions on the shape of the narrative. For Ordway’s description of his involvement in the fi lm, see his account in Agel’s Making of Kubrick’s 2001, 193–98.

6. Edward James, Science Fiction in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 191.

7. Joseph Gelmis, Th
e Film Director as Superstar (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 298.

8. Ibid., 300.

9. Ibid., 302.

10. Annette Michelson, “Bodies in Space: Film as Carnal Knowledge,” in Th e Making of 2001: A Space Odyssey, ed. Stephanie Schwam (New York: Random House, 2000), 198.

11. Paul Virilio, Open Sky, trans. Julie Rose (London: Verso, 1997), 2.

12. Th
omas Kuhn, Th
e Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions, 3d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 170.

13. Ibid., 6, 144.

14. In an interview with Jeremy Bernstein, Kubrick indicates that even the fl ight-wear for his space stewardesses was designed with gravity in mind: “the hats have padding in them to cushion any collisions with the ceiling that weightlessness might cause.” See his “Profi le: Stanley Kubrick,” 35.

15. We might note how the fi lm links cultural modes of thought with the trope of gravity here, as the polite encounter between Floyd and the Soviet scientists begins with a gravitationally oriented query, about the direction in which each group is heading: “up” or “down.” In space, of course, and even more so within a spinning and orbiting space station, their fi nger pointings in one direction or another are essentially meaningless, what we might term a gravitational anachronism.

16. Michelson, “Bodies in Space,” 208.

17. Super Panavision was a wide-screen format developed by MGM that used 65mm or 70mm fi lm. It allowed for a much higher quality image than was achieved by the most popular widescreen process, CinemaScope, without relying on an anamorphic 52

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
lens. It typically produced an aspect ratio of 2.2:1, although when reprocessed for anamorphic projection, it could be projected in a wider format, simulating the Cinerama process. For a discussion of Super Panavision and its applications, see John Belton’s Widescreen Cinema (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 178, 182.

18. Alexander Walker, with Sybil Taylor and Ulrich Ruchti, Stanley Kubrick, Director (New York: Norton, 1999), 185.

19. Suggesting a link between HAL and the hominids of the narrative’s fi rst sequence is the way that Frank is eff ectively hurled into space by the pod under HAL’s control.

He becomes a sign of that aggressive violence just as did the bone cast into the air by the hominid at the end of the opening sequence.

20. Virilio, Open Sky, 13.

21. Bowman’s name, of course, precisely suggests the human ability to use our rather primitive technology to send things arcing into space, to defy the limiting law of gravity.

22. Virilio, Open Sky, 3.

23. Eric Nordern, “Playboy Interview: Stanley Kubrick,” in Stanley Kubrick: Interviews (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), 59.

24. Kuhn, Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions, 207.

The Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey 53

This page intentionally left blank

4

Kubrick in Space

STEPHEN MAMBER

Th
e pretentiousness of 2001: A Space Odyssey has been a considerable obstacle to appreciating its status as masterpiece. Th
e collaboration with Arthur C.

Clarke and Kubrick’s own statements about the fi lm have obviously obscured how deeply it connects to the rest of his work. Th
e diversion provided by the
fi lm’s technologies that has led to enjoyable but incidental books like HAL’s Legacy makes it too easily the Kubrick movie to talk about by people who don’t know much about movies. 1 Pondering such issues as the meaning of the monolith, whether HAL is really IBM a letter-back-each, or Bowman’s journey to star child has kept 2001 criticism in an interpretive dead end for a long time.

Happily, since the 1990s, we have seen great breakthroughs in Kubrick analysis, putting 2001 in its rightful place in close relation to his other fi lms.

Most particularly, the stellar work by a pair of Michels, Ciment on 2001 and Th
e Shining and Chion on 2001 and Eyes Wide Shut, has convincingly demonstrated how valuable 2001 is as a major manifestation of Kubrick styles and obsessions. 2

Continuing from their inspiration, I want to consider the idea of space in Kubrick. 2001: A Space Odyssey, as its title indicates directly, is a journey through Space, with a capital S, but like all Kubrick fi lms, it explores space 55
in other signifi cant ways. I recognize that this is but one way to consider the fi lm, but I’m very much of the Chion point of view that “a book of a thousand pages could not begin to do justice to all the dimensions of 2001.” 3 So this is no more than an attempt to do partial justice to a great fi lm and to an important aspect of Kubrick’s artistry.

Looking at Space

Some aspects of Kubrick’s space seem almost obvious, and it may appear that we are moving into generally observed aspects of his work by foregrounding this concern, particularly such matters as decor and traveling shots, which have generated much discussion. But around such subjects, an awareness that larger questions of space were lurking has been suggested by others, even if they haven’t followed through on the implications. Alexander Walker, for instance, echoing E. M. Forster on War and Peace, says, “Space is also the lord of Kubrick’s fi lm.” 4 Walker and his collaborators are very good on issues of space, especially about confi nement and tracking shots, and a statement like this is fair justifi cation for considering the subject further. When Ciment considers “the confi ned space which Kubrick’s camera endeavors to pulverize,”

he’s also working along the same lines, as he does when referring to a reverse tracking shot in a narrow corridor as “both mastering the space and convey-ing a sense of confi nement within it. ”5 Chion aptly sums up Kubrick’s work as

“an art of space,” and it is these aspects of space that I will be attempting to clarify and expand upon.6

As space itself overlaps, so shall my areas of exploration—categories with fl uid boundaries but useful as ways to start thinking about Kubrickian space.

Th
ese forms are

1.

institutional-offi
cial space

2.

ritual-game-war
space

3.

parody
space

4.

dream
space

5.

alien
space

6.

geometrical
space

7.

ubiquitous
space

Institutional-Official Space

In 2001, institutional-offi
cial space is best represented by all things manmade.

Th
e space station waiting rooms, the meeting rooms of Dr. Floyd and his colleagues, the working areas of the Discovery—all refl ect a manufactured, sanctioned, government-like space (fi gure 10). Even the Louis XVI–style bed-56

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
room in which Bowman lives and ages before his transformation into the “star child” has been recognized as possibly either a constructed-by-aliens observation zoo-like room, a space of confi nement, or as a dreamlike vision of a regal deathbed. All suggest familiar Kubrick concerns: banality, repressed violence, a stark contrast between the natural and the manmade, and too much regularity and bureaucratic sensibility to refl ect well upon those who constructed these spaces.

Th
is might seem like an extremely unlikely comparison, but the nonfi ction fi lms of Frederick Wiseman, many fi lmed in public institutions, share roughly analogous spatial characteristics (and other qualities as well) with Kubrick’s fi lms. Th
e famous impersonality of the Discovery crew (one of whom, HAL, is oft en identifi ed as the most human fi gure in the fi lm) is partly a function of their being subordinated to their institutional space. Beyond actors dominated by decor and costume, they are integrated into the space which surrounds them to the point of being stripped of most individual identity. Like their hibernating colleagues, Poole and Bowman are contained by their functions, in spaces designed for them to perform as required. We shouldn’t ignore that many Kubrick characters are government employees—soldiers, scientists, social workers, politicians, astronauts—and one could say of Kubrick as well as of Frederick Wiseman that both regularly present quasi-scientifi c, military, and technological environments in which individuals function in their institutional roles. Wiseman’s Primate (1974) and Missile (1987), particularly, are probably most analogous to 2001, but there are also Wiseman’s military fi lms ( Basic Training I [1971], Maneuver [1979], Sinai Field Mission [1978]) which match up nicely to Paths of Glory (1957) and Full Metal Jacket (1987). And High School, released the same year as 2001, shows students engaging in a mock shuttle mission, visible at fi rst only inside their helmeted spacesuits; in both fi lms, they are “bodies doing a job” (fi gure 11).

One aspect of institutional space is the offi
ce, and Kubrick always excelled
at presenting the work space in all of its ironic, oppressive ordinariness.

Ullman’s offi
ce in Th
e Shining (1980), site of Jack’s interview, with its tiny ax clearly visible in his pencil holder, has to be close to the top of this list, but nearly all Kubrick fi lms have some form of getting down to work in spaces which defi ne the enterprise more than the individuals, who are oft en left to perform repetitive, mechanical activities. General Mireau, in Paths of Glory, trudging through the trenches like it’s another day at the offi ce; Kong in the
cockpit of his military B-52; Ripper’s offi
ce at the air base, its bank of com-
puters just outside the front door ( Dr. Strangelove [1964] is entirely made up of institutional spaces); Lady Lyndon, in Barry Lyndon (1975), signing check aft er check like an automaton; all work and no play making Jack a dull boy—
all of these instances point us back to the Discovery crew, mixing work and play in the same spaces. Chess playing with HAL is fi rst a recreational game and then a deadly one, played out in the same space (fi gure 24). Kubrick presents the spaceship as work space, making it more ordinary and more fantastic at the same time.

Kubrick in Space

57

Th
e attention to work decor and offi
ce embellishment becomes a sign of
underlying human traits that are subordinated to (or repressed by) the space which envelops them. People will be dominated, controlled, made to look small by the strongly prevailing institutional environments. Th e house, the
room, the offi
ce will win.

Ritual-Game-War Space

Th
e role of the game, especially chess, has been widely recognized, but perhaps the construction of the game space hasn’t. We can fi nd ample evidence that Kubrick’s fi lms construct this space and that not only is there a game space, there are games of space.

Consider the game aspect to camera movement. Th
e justly famous circu-
lar tracking shots when we fi rst see the interior of the Discovery are game-like on so many levels—they seem a magic trick and an example of the pleasure of technical prowess that recalls Orson Welles’s comment that a fi lm studio was “the biggest electric train set a boy ever had.” Th is is clearly not accomplished by digital eff ects or compositing. Because we go full circle without a cut, we can’t help but wonder how it’s done, and the general elaborateness to Kubrick’s tracking shots induce this wonder of how has he pulled it off ?—as do so many other camera movements throughout his fi lms (recall the opening credit sequence of Th
e Shining when the camera continues into space when we thought we were earthbound). Th
e fi rst level of game space is the game of
movement—rigid yet free, constricted yet brilliantly daring.

Camera movements representing game moves, chesslike and authorial, are a component of Kubrick game space too. Th
e game is in the calculation,
the awareness that the movement is planned, though the characters being fi lmed don’t know it. “Caught in a maze” is a spatial condition and an oft -used description of the plight of Kubrick’s characters, for whom, of course, wrong moves abound.

Game space is repeatable: we can return and play again, perhaps with new contestants or the same ones again. Th
e Shining is the ultimate repeat-
able game space, but the narrative repetition, the circularity, of Kubrick fi lms has always emphasized the sense that playing games, repeating duels, fi ghting battles, is all that people do. Th
e returns of the monolith or the cut from bone
to space station are not just narrative repetitions—they signal that the game is about to start over, just as General Turgidson, in Dr. Strangelove, is planning how to start over as soon as survivors can leave the mine shaft s aft er impending nuclear annihilation.

Chion in his book about Eyes Wide Shut introduces another inviting element to the tracking-shot space, which he says “oft en seems to mean: there is no living space for two men. I appropriate the space I cross: I clear the space before me.” 7 A characteristic Kubrick tracking shot is of a character appearing to play in a violent way or practicing for a bout—the shadowboxing of Poole 58

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
in the fi rst interior tracking shots on the Discovery, for example—and these shots are repeated in some form across most Kubrick fi lms. Shadowboxing can be taken almost literally—mock punching inner demons, past and future selves, and attempting to escape the captivity of the shot by rebelling against it. From Kubrick’s fi rst fi lms about boxing (the early short fi lm Day of the Fight

[1951] and his second feature, Killer’s Kiss [1955]), this punching has been a sign of imprisonment (fi gure 18).

Traveling through space in this manner ritualizes it and creates repetitive cycles—the characters have been there before, or they are replacing those who did the same, or they are giving way to future versions of themselves. (One witty and easily overlooked version of this is our fi rst tracking-shot view of Poole, already horizontal and shown with his three hibernating colleagues.

All four will, of course, soon be dead.) Soldiers in sing-song chants in Full Metal Jacket, gangsters heading to place bets in Th e Killing, Jack pondering his

“all work and no play” novel in Th
e Shining—all move forward through track-
ing-shot space, making these time-traveling movements equivalent to moving through life and into death itself.

Games, of course, turn violent and deadly, but so does game space. Ping-Pong in Lolita (1962) turns to gun play, the Korova Milkbar in A Clockwork Orange is both preparation for violence and later a site of violence itself, as are numerous other resplendent recreational spaces. Th e bar/ballroom of Th
e

Shining, the orgy house of Eyes Wide Shut, the casino/game room/castle spaces of Barry Lyndon are gloriously beautiful and terrifyingly base, tipping from fun to horror at any moment. From recreation to being trapped or engaged in struggle is a small trip, and let’s not forget the War Room in Strangelove (“you can’t fi ght in here, this is the War Room”), which, together with 2001’s Discovery, wins the prize for the most elaborately beautiful space in which to die, with perhaps an escapee or two to survive and replay the scene.

Parody Space

Elements of parody fi gure largely in Kubrick’s work, and that space would be treated in this manner makes sense. Starting with decor again, there is a too-muchness, an obsessiveness, that makes spaces seem extreme, not just beautiful and repellent (though certainly those), but also ironic, comic, and exaggerations of more ordinary spaces. 8 For all of the praise of its realism which 2001 has received over the years, we should recognize its spatial construction goes well beyond anything we might call cinematic “realism.” Some characteristic ways this is expressed are in the overly symmetrical compositions, the somewhat too-smooth camera movements, the overcleanliness of spaces, and one wants to add overspatiality itself, in the sense that awareness of space is hyped up by the sense of there being so much of it, so very visible. We can see space—not just outer space, but the space of a room, the space the camera moves through, the space of space, as it were. In 2001, it is the largeness of Kubrick in Space

59
the universe, the size and emptiness of space, which presents the paradox of parody space—there’s more and less of it at the same time. As Ciment says, despite “a desire to open up his sets as far as possible . . . they nevertheless remain prisons. ”9

Th
ere are many scenes in Kubrick’s fi lms played out in bathrooms ( Full Metal Jacket and Th
e Shining are among the major examples), and 2001 provides written instructions for how one uses a toilet in space (fi gures 26–30).

Here the reference to the toilet plays against the sanitized, antiseptic, white spaces that make up the decor of much of the fi lm. Being too clean as a way to hide the dirty business really going on is a parodic use of space, the contradiction of clean and dirty one of the structured paradoxes (Susan White expands on this in her chapter in this collection). Clean and dirty, bright and dark, the edginess of Poole’s death in the silence of space and HAL’s silent killing of the hibernating astronauts are parts of the same contradiction. Here, what should be loud is quiet, and Kubrick pushes the opposites of sound and space to a parodic extreme. In a similar vein is the exaggerated use of signs, evident in Dr. Strangelove and most obvious in the “Life Functions Terminated” graph, when HAL kills the astronauts, and the “Explosive Bolts” sign, which points to Bowman’s salvation in allowing him to return to the ship to destroy HAL (fi gure 12). Again these act as extreme, almost parodic images that in fact point to serious, even deadly events.

In Tuan’s Space and Place, he says, “Freedom implies space,” and it is this implication which suggests how parody space is constructed in Kubrick—but implies doesn’t mean creates, so the distance between the two becomes an element of parody.10 Th
e implication of freedom not allowed leaves a comic tension. Th
ose who express power by constructing or inhabiting large, ornate, beautiful spaces don’t operate freely within them: they are constrained by everything, including the baseness of their own impulses, the camera movements which entrap them, and technology beyond their control. Th is is both
horrible and funny.

Th
e humor of 2001, oft en lost sight of, is many times a humor of parody space. A circular interior spaceship path that can be traversed in a single shot, space that can be turned upside down, the hugeness and strangeness of the monolith appearances and the portentous manner in which they’re photographed—the bizarre nature of these spaces is a quality of their parodic nature. Even the bone that becomes a space station in the fi lm’s (and cinema’s) most famous edit, is as humorous as it is portentous (fi gures 3 and 4).

Kubrick’s self-references to 2001 in subsequent fi lms are self-parody of a subtle sort. Th
e appearance of the 2001 album cover in A Clockwork Orange is parody enough, but it comes at the conclusion of an elaborate tracking shot of Alex’s entrance to the music store, which has the humorous trademark quality which harks back, fanfare music included, to the movie it is referencing. And the monolith speakers rolled in at the end of the same fi lm, symmetrically placed, are a spatial visual joke and a parodic self-reference.

60

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

As Tuan says, “Th
e world feels spacious and friendly when it accommo-
dates our desires, and cramped when it frustrates them.” 11 Kubrick stretches this notion further by frustrating desires in open spaces and accommodating them in cramped spaces—variations on our earlier take on dirty and clean.

Maybe the parody versions of the Discovery spaceship in fi lms like Alien and Dark Star were made possible because 2001 leaves itself, in its parodic extreme, so ripe for further development, the qualities of being excessive, imitative, and slightly in bad taste ready to be taken a few steps further along.

Dream Space

2001 is literally unworldly and, especially by the time of the “Stargate” sequence, can leave a viewer to wonder how much of the fi lm represents itself as if in a dream. Whether dream or nightmare, the sense of a shift into subjectivity characterizes a construction of space. It is not so important from a narrative sense, I would say, whether certain sequences may be read as dreamlike, as it is signifi cant that a dream space, unlike a “real” or “physical” space, characterizes the Kubrick world. It is also possible to see these as hypothetical or proposed spaces, or spaces as seen by disembodied narrative positions.

My favorite argument that alludes to this is by Chion, who presents a compelling case that Eyes Wide Shut is an “imaginary sequel to 2001” and that the fi lm is a vision of another star child, “the child about to be born at the conclusion of the fi lm.” 12 Th e Shining, from its opening fl y-over credits, also presents this kind of somebody’s-point-of-view-but-whose quality. While we might want to read these weird spatial manipulations as authorial (or third person), they may also be as subjective as Kubrick ever gets. Kubrick is not a director who uses conventional point-of-view shots, therefore, the suggestion of point of view through other means, other eyes, gives the impression of a dream. We see as if we’re participating in some sort of hallucination. Bowman’s return through the airlock is not simply nightmarish as an event—the silence and then the breathing, coupled with just enough visual subjectivity, makes the scene primal, birthlike, and hallucinatory, as of course is the “Stargate” sequence. No more hallucinatory and dreamlike a segment has ever appeared in a mainstream fi lm. 2001’s early reputation as a “trip” movie was not entirely undeserved.

Dream space in Kubrick also extends to the too-slow sense of movement, the disembodied quality of frequent stillness. Th
e hibernating astronauts,
whom HAL will kill, expressionless and never moving, are akin to the frozen death moments of Jack Torrance and Private Pyle—dead but somehow still haunting those living. Jack alive before and dead before, Pyle but one of the earliest dead, will come back again, as a presence in the second half of Full Metal Jacket, like the ghosts of the Overlook Hotel in Th e Shining. Rebirth and
return imply a never-ending frozen dream state—ambiguous time return-Kubrick in Space

61
ing as dream. Alex imagining himself a Roman soldier fl ogging Christ in A Clockwork Orange is analogous to the link between the apes and astronauts in 2001. Chion argues that Bill Harford (Tom Cruise) in Eyes Wide Shut is being pushed out by the spirit of his yet unborn son (whom Chion suggests will be conceived just aft er the movie ends). Th
ere is even a suggestion in Th
e Shin-
ing—at least in a scene cut from the fi lm that shows Danny, aft er Jack’s death, throwing a ball against a wall just as Jack did—that his son will continue in his path.

Substitution and replacement in Kubrick leave a trail of multiple personalities or repeated cycles—the same character reliving experiences or old spirits returning. Bowman seeing himself in the bedroom at the end of 2001 can be read literally, or as a dream, or as another kind of perception. Peter Sellers in Lolita, his multiple manifestations, perhaps all versions of Quilty or all visions of Humbert’s, suggest what Chion calls in 2001 “replacements in space.” 13 Replacements look like dreams, spirits, hallucinations, and although seemingly a realistic fi lmmaker (especially in the war and period fi lms, as well as 2001), Kubrick is far more a fi lmmaker of dream states—paranoia, fear, violent nightmares, and horror. Th
e room of mannequins in Killer’s Kiss is among his fi rst dream spaces (fi gure 36). And the dream of movement through the streets, photographed in negative in that fi lm, has also been noted as fore-shadowing the “Stargate” sequence in 2001—a confusion of the human and the hallucinatory mechanical which extends all the way to the costumed, masked orgy participants in his last fi lm. Identities shift , characters merge, we’re not sure when we’re awake or sleeping, alive or dead. Dark empty space will lead to death and/or rebirth.

Alien Space

Otherworldliness may appear dreamlike, but it can also be taken literally.

Kubrick can make the earth alien or the edges of space routinely banal and earthly. It is particularly the alien landscape, or the earth as planet-like-many-others which he has expressed many times.

Gliding rapidly over barren ground suggests primordial Earth, or Earth without humans, a planet like any other. Flying closely over Colorado at the start of Th
e Shining or closely over Russia at the end of Strangelove, the landscapes are devoid of people, as it was before we were here, or as it might look when we’re done destroying each other. And Randy Rasmussen has suggested that the “reworked terrestrial sequences” of the “Stargate” sequence “convey an alien planet.” 14

Th
e magical alignment which begins 2001 treats the Earth as a planet, as one place among many, no more or less. Th
e beautiful opening vistas of “Th
e

Dawn of Man” section subordinate the appearance of near-humans to the almost Mars-like (or at least non-Earth-like) terror of hostile environments, 62

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
of isolated water pools and still-prehistoric predators. As triumphant as the moment of bone-tool wielding is, marking the signifi cant early moment of the Kubrick chronicles of violence, it also signals the moment that we leave Earth.

Certainly, in relation to humans, Earth is the dominant location. But oft en the connection of Kubrick’s characters is with the solidity of being bound to Earth, whether it’s Jack Torrance in his VW heading for the otherworldly Overlook Hotel, or Kong’s lone plane moving over the Earth for a brief last time before it is destroyed. When we’re told in Barry Lyndon that the battle we’re witnessing was never recorded, the many soldiers about to die do so in a kind of historical silence akin to Poole’s death in space—worlds go on as if they never existed.

In the war fi lms (and, in a sense, most Kubrick fi lms are war fi lms), alien landscapes abound. Looking up the periscope in Paths of Glory, a hostile and empty terrain could as well be any time and most any planet. When snow engulfs the space around the Overlook and Jack freezes (again), it seems as though the world returns to the way it was before humans attempted a foot-hold; and the mushroom cloud coda to Strangelove, however ironic the song over it may be in suggesting cyclical repetition, also signals the return to an uninhabited planet, back to something like where it started. Th e star child
is no less otherworldly and alien. It’s not an Earth child, is it? And it has the promise of rebirth, not the actualization, as does Alice Harford’s fi nal pro-nouncement at the end of Eyes Wide Shut, suggesting that they engage in the activity that will lead to birth. Babies hold promise, but when babies grow up, they become Alex, Johnny Clay, General Ripper, Jack Torrance, etc., etc.—all temporary inhabitants of worlds which will be there when they’re not, worlds populated by their perpetual replacements.

Geometrical Space

Th
e geometry of Kubrick is generally straight lines and right angles—the geometry of the hotel corridor and the labyrinth. Visual symmetry marks off a walled, enclosed space, confi ned and made even more geometrical by the limits of the frame. Chion correctly labels space in Kubrick as centrip-etal, “attracting attention to what is at its center,” rather than centrifugal as in the work of directors like Alfred Hitchcock and Robert Bresson, who direct interest beyond the frame. 15 Th
is force to the center also serves to create geo-
metrical space—space which is laid out in an orderly, arranged fashion. While the occasional hand-held shots, generally during violence (e.g., the Cat Lady scene in A Clockwork Orange), can introduce a bit of nongeometric chaos, these are very much the exceptions. Instead, the perfect straight-line movement out from Alex’s face at the start of Clockwork is itself as regular as clockwork, as geometrical in laying out the space of the Korova Milkbar, the movement and the room matching each other for symmetry. Th e Torrance family’s

Kubrick in Space

63
incredible straight-line walk through the lobby of the Overlook is fi rst of all geometrical in its precise straight movement, and it is reinforced by the geometry of the Indian-infl uenced patterns as they march past.

A labyrinth is as geometrical as a space can be. It exaggerates and complicates the line. Many have suggested that all of Kubrick’s fi lms are labyrinthine in structure, and, in Th
e Shining, he uses a literal labyrinth, exaggerating it further, emphasizing its organization, fi rst by showing us an impossible shot of the Overlook’s labyrinth from Jack’s point of view, and then by trapping Jack himself in its impossible lines.

In 2001, Kubrick makes the circle a straight line through the magic of weightlessness, a circular walk laid out linearly without interruption. Geometrical space is everywhere, to the depths of HAL’s memory core. Kubrick’s beautiful space vehicles are impositions of geometry in space, just as the align-ments of stars, planets, and moons suggest geometry on as grand a scale as there is, a cosmic spatial organization.

Th
ere is a geometry as well to Kubrick’s regular structure of replacement, perhaps a narrative and temporal geometry (like his inclination toward three-part narrative structures) that has a spatial dimension as well as superimposition. Chion points out that Bowman and HAL are superimposed several times, either by refl ecting Bowman’s fi rst appearance in what we come to learn is HAL’s eye, or cutting from one to the other before their big battle (fi gures 13 and 14). 16 In battles of winners and losers, the equality Kubrick off ers is regularly spatial. Th
e amazing epilogue to Barry Lyndon, “they are all equal now,” has visual expression in Kubrick: all are equal in their equivalent visual treatment, photographed the same way, so that one replaces or appears superimposed upon the other.

Th
e symmetrical tracking shot is Kubrick at his (and cinema’s) most geometrical, and the straight line of many of his tracking shots is unique to his spatial vision. Few directors, except perhaps Alain Resnais in Last Year at Marienbad (1961) or Tom Tykwer in Run Lola Run (1998), fi lmmakers who share Kubrick’s serious penchant for movements and geometries of the straight line, can equal this geometric perfection. Kubrick can take tracking literally: movements seem anchored in a direct line, as if there were really a metal track on the fl oor. Maybe we’ll turn a corner or change direction but, like Major Kong’s plane switching targets in Dr. Strangelove, that will mean we are now only on another straight line. Th
e trench and the hallway mark a
movement that is inexorably straight. Unlike Max Ophuls (one of Kubrick’s favorite directors), whose tracking shots are choreographed to look free and unpredictable—though they took great planning—Kubrick determinedly marches toward a likely destination, turning corners at right angles if necessary, and leading you just where you know you will go. Th e geometry is so
stringent because the movement is almost always following a single character, who occupies a constant space in the arrangement of the frame. Danny on his tricycle, soldiers on the march, Johnny Clay at the racetrack, Kong in fl ight—
all have their paths inscribed, the distances they must travel are determined.

64

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Th
e labyrinth is the model most oft en applied to Kubrick’s camera and narrative movements, and anywhere his camera moves is turned into patterned, geometric spatial confi gurations.

Ubiquitous Space

Th
ere is geometrical space, a disembodied space, in Kubrick. When Chion describes HAL as “panoptic and invisible”—all seeing and barely seen—he links this to the multiple parts played by Peter Sellers in Lolita and Strangelove. 17 Calculation and arrangement (and therefore geometry) are behind ubiquity, and seeing the laying out of ubiquitous space as having strong connections to the daring behind multiple roles is an important insight. Multiple roles have long been viewed as a gimmick or parodic element, but Chion provides the key for seeing their function as so much larger and more signifi cant. Th
e multiple roles become another form of rebirth: replacement and linkage. More than just the reappearance of the actor, a “character” returns transformed and occupying usually a seemingly impossible space for the character to occupy. Th
e reappearance needs explanation, and one such
explanation is that the spaces of reappearance are part of the same space: ubiquitous space.

We can use time travel in 2001 as an entry point into the idea of ubiquitous space, especially in the penultimate sequence, in which Bowman sees himself in the bedroom. Th
e actor Keir Dullea here plays multiple roles, his self aging before his eyes, multiplied again as he is mutated into the star child, another version, through rebirth, of the same character. (Bowman views himself from nearly his fi rst appearance, so his multiple versions are at least as prevalent in the fi lm as the superimpositions of Bowman and HAL, mentioned earlier.) Th
is is not just Bowman everywhere at the same time; he is occupying positions impossibly simultaneous; ubiquity is no more conventionally physically possible than to “really” occupy dream space. Ubiquity and dreams collide, just as Kubrick’s multiple uses of spaces can’t be simply sorted out. Bowman looking at himself, transforming into his future self, the multiple spaces he occupies break down the limits of conventional space. Th is is its own kind
of “shining”: being able to reappear in diff erent forms in diff erent places, or simultaneously across time. Does Bowman see his older self (fi gure 15)? When Jack walks into the ballroom in Th
e Shining, full of a ghostly party or laden with the bones of dead guests, it can be read as time travel, or alternatively it can be seen as a ubiquity of space, not just everywhere at the same time, but each place containing all of its own times within it.

We can also see ubiquitous space as reminders of other spaces, either the space we are currently occupying as it was or will be at another time (past or future), or the overlapping of this space with others. Th e jigsaw puzzle of Th
e

Killing, for example, would seem to suggest fragmented space; instead, it is very much ubiquitous space. We understand the space of the racetrack as no Kubrick in Space

65
conventional rendering ever could allow us. Th rough his own kind of time
travel, Kubrick’s overlaps and repetitions perform a dense unpacking of space.

Th
e many things we see repeatedly (the start of the seventh race, money being thrown out a window, etc.) become extensions of conventional space. Going back isn’t just (or quite) going backward in time. Th e direction of time is less
important than the reconstituting of space. Th
e returns signal a kind of go-
anywhere, see-everything or, might we say, panoptic vision. A repeated event invokes an extension of space.

One form of bold space in 2001 is a consequence of its three-part structure and the repeated appearances of the monolith, which become a version of the repeated appearances of characters in diff erent stages of their lives and aft erlives. Is it the same thing back again, or another version “reborn” of the fi rst? Th
is is the same question we ask of Jack Torrance when we learn of Delbert Grady, and see him reappear in a time when he shouldn’t belong. Jack, of course, is Delbert Grady, or Grady is Jack, and when we see Jack in the fi nal photograph on the wall back in Grady’s time, it is like a monolith’s reappearance or another reincarnation of the same character. Kubrick’s visual and narrative daring invites us to see these multiple appearances as a ubiquity of space. Returns of the same character or object break us out of conventional spatial perceptions.

Th
e two fi lms with Peter Sellers— Dr. Strangelove and Lolita—are versions of this same spatial daring. Especially amusing, I would say, are the near-quaint over-the-shoulder shots where a stand-in was used to allow multiple Sellers characters to appear in the same shot. Admirably and boldly, Kubrick doesn’t resort to split-screen pastings together, as other multiple-role fi lms do (even other Sellers fi lms, like Th
e Mouse Th
at Roared [1959], go this route). In

Strangelove, Sellers was to have played Major Kong too, so that he would have been in every narrative space, and one can imagine him not just playing three roles, but many more. Would we say Sellers is “reborn” in these other roles?

We could as well say what we know, that it is the same person transformed and constructed into an “impossible” space where he can see himself.

In Lolita, Sellers’s impersonations are initially read as disguised versions of his fi rst character, Claire Quilty, who is killed through the painting in the opening scene and so is “reborn” in fl ashback in a series of alternate roles.

Even the dapper Quilty at the school dance looks a diff erent character than the toga-wearing, burned-out Quilty at the start. Characters in Kubrick fi lms rarely change much over the course of a fi lm. When they do, they do not so much change as transform, don a new guise (as happens regularly, say, in Barry Lyndon). So we may wonder, which is the “real” character? Lolita’s last appearance as Mrs. Richard Haze is like a jump into a new time frame, and we can never be sure how much of the character Lolita we see throughout the fi lm, like all of Quilty’s roles, are imaginings or dreams of Humbert’s.

Humbert, Bowman, Jack, even Bill Harford in Eyes Wide Shut are all subject to these time-traveling, space-shift ing, dream-aff ected reappearances of multiple selves.

66

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Narrative gaps in Kubrick can also be seen as an overlaying of space—
spaces made extensions of each other through an otherwise drastic break of time. Clearly, the “Dawn of Man” bone-to-spaceship does this—linking prehistoric Earth to future space travel. Another bold cut in a Kubrick fi lm is the break between the two parts of Full Metal Jacket, from death at the training camp to Vietnam. Th
e cut performs a similar function as in 2001: it ties the spaces together and essentially makes them one space; the raw recruits are also reborn as soldiers. In Strangelove, too, we might start by thinking that the three locations—the war room, B-52 bomber, and Burpelson Air Force Base (and the characters contained in each)—are very diff erent, and surely by the end, despite many elliptical cuts between narratives, the equivalencies among the three spaces are far more signifi cant than their diff erences. We might say as well that in Eyes Wide Shut the fantasy/dream space and “real” space by the end of the fi lm are no longer sharply divided.

It is ubiquitous space in 2001 that takes us ever farther from Earth, but, like a Möbius strip, it seems to turn back on itself and return us to where we began. Like HAL recapitulating his beginnings at the moment of his demise, death and rebirth are contained in each other, just as are spaces and characters.

So whether the dead seem to live on, or the living make way for their replacements (as in 2001 and, as Chion suggests, in Eyes Wide Shut), for Kubrick it is the spaces (and Space) that will always be there, asserting their presence as a powerful force unto themselves.

Concluding Space

Kubrick’s conception of space is complex and distinctive. We might start to understand his fi lms by noticing visual characteristics, such as tracking shots and symmetries, but the visual style is only a fi rst indication that deeper ideas are at work. Equivalencies and reappearances of characters, patterns of rebirth, parodies of conventional movie genres, and other by-now familiar Kubrick characteristics also have signifi cant spatial consequences. Michel Ciment, talking about tracking shots, for example, argues that their use “adds further to the sense of implacable logic and an almost mathematical progression, and hopefully we have seen this to be the case. ”18 Th
e most distinctive

Kubrick devices share this trait, for behind them is the force of an implacable logic, with larger consequences than the devices themselves.

One of the great pleasures of 2001 is the inevitability of the struggle between HAL and Bowman, with the very future of humanity seeming to be at stake. Bowman’s determination to wrest power back from HAL is a kind of

“tunnel vision” that seems at odds with HAL’s ability to see and understand everything. But the confl icting visions collapse upon themselves: HAL wasn’t so smart aft er all, and Bowman’s determination to destroy HAL leads to the Infi nite and to rebirth. Even though we love this struggle, its grand designs are Kubrick in Space

67
so beyond a simple winning or losing as to make individual outcomes largely beside the point. Like Dax at the end of Paths of Glory, or virtually the end of any Kubrick fi lm, there is the pattern repeating, the returning to battle, the ending that is the starting over.

Space, in this sense, is also a great reward that one can take from Kubrick.

Th
e spaces he created are stylized, otherworldly, strange, ironic, and oft en terrifying—not just in terms of visual design, but for the ability they have to convey larger feelings and ideas. He created spaces that contain time and its repetitions and that express grand visions of humanity and its movement through that time. Maybe the pretentiousness of 2001: A Space Odyssey isn’t such a bad thing aft er all.

Notes

1. David G. Stork, ed., HAL’s Legacy: 2001 ’s Computer as Dream and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).

2. Michel Ciment, Kubrick: Th
e Defi nitive Edition, trans. Gilbert Adair (New York: Faber and Faber, 1999); Michel Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey, trans. Claudia Gorbman (London: BFI, 2001).

3. Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey, vi.

4. Alexander Walker, Stanley Kubrick, Director (New York: Norton, 1999), 172.

5. Ciment, Kubrick, 75, 114.

6. Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey, 130.

7. Michel Chion, Eyes Wide Shut, trans. Trista Selous (London: BFI, 2002), 66.

8. For more on parody in Kubrick, see Stephen Mamber, “In Search of Radical Metacinema,” in Cinema/Comedy/Th
eory, ed. Andrew Horton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 79–90.

9. Ciment, Kubrick, 75.

10. Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 52.

11. Ibid., 65.

12. Chion, Eyes Wide Shut, 167.

13. Chion, Kubrick’s Cinema Odyssey, 171.

14. Randy Rasmussen, Stanley Kubrick: Seven Films Analyzed (Jeff erson, N.C.: McFarland, 2001), 104.

15. Chion, 78.

16. Ibid., 86.

17. Ibid., 83.

18. Ciment, Kubrick, 136.

68

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

5

Of Men and Monoliths

Science Fiction, Gender, and 2001: A Space Odyssey

BARRY KEITH GRANT

Th
e general impression that viewers tend to bring away from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) is an overall feeling of “coldness,” not just the physical cold of outer space, but of the fi lm’s sense of humanity. As has oft en been observed, the computer HAL seems a more complex character with greater emotional depth than any of the people in the fi lm. And while the computer’s death is a scene of wrenching pathos, the three hibernating scientists expire in what is perhaps the most antiseptic depiction of death in all of cinema, a bland-looking monitor indicating “Life Functions Terminated.”

2001’s relative dearth of dialogue, wooden characters, slow pace, and sleek production design, which depicts the environments of space travel as thoroughly antiseptic and ordinary, all contribute to the fi lm’s cold tone.

Th
ese aspects of 2001 have been much commented upon by other critics, sometimes positively, sometimes not, but what has gone largely unnoticed is how many of the fi lm’s stylistic elements work in relation to one of its primary themes, the gendered implications of space exploration. Th e coldness of the
fi lm’s characters, most of whom are men, is part of the fi lm’s overall view of the 69
relationships among science, technology, violence, and patriarchal masculinity, a view consistent with other Kubrick fi lms. Th is perspective is surprisingly
similar to that of feminist philosophers of science, who have critiqued traditional science as informed by a masculinist bias at least since Francis Bacon employed metaphors of rape and seduction to describe men’s mastery over a feminized Nature. 1 Baconian science, based on rational empiricism, induction, and a masculine culture of objectivity and nonsensuality, is “a science leading to the sovereignty, dominion, and mastery of man over nature, ”2 as

Evelyn Fox Keller puts it. I want to suggest that this sensibility of masculine mastery, as conveyed in popular culture’s representations of space travel, is purposefully undermined by 2001. Th
at is to say, Kubrick’s space epic explores
a discursive space as much as physical space in that it seeks for a stylistic alternative to the science fi ction fi lm’s conventional depiction of space exploration as an act of phallic masculinity, of penetration and possession—or, to borrow the title of one of the fi rst Hollywood movies on the subject, Th e Conquest of

Space (1955; fi gure 1).

2001 makes clear immediately in the opening section, entitled “Th e Dawn
of Man,” that it will explore these issues. Kubrick depicts the landscape here as harsh and hostile, a man’s world where only the fi ttest survive. Warring bands of apes contest with each other and with animals for control of the crucial natural resource, a waterhole; the blanched skeletons of dead apes mingle with the rocks and dust, a reminder of the stakes of survival. Th e balance of power
tips decidedly when one ape (Moon-Watcher in the script) takes the human race’s fi rst technological step by turning a bone into both a tool for killing prey and a weapon for bludgeoning enemies. Only now do the apes seem to walk more upright for, the fi lm suggests, it is the very point when men begin to harness technology for the purposes of extending their inherent aggression that they truly become men. Th
is opening section of 2001 plays out in brief this theme, which preoccupied Kubrick over the course of his career even as it is central to the science fi ction genre.

According to science fi ction writer and critic Damon Knight, the genre’s appeal resides in what he calls “a sense of wonder.” As Knight explains:

[S]ome widening of the mind’s horizons, no matter in what direction—the landscape of another planet, or a corpuscle’s eye-view of an artery, or what it feels like to be in rapport with a cat . . . any new sensory experience, impossible to the reader in his [ sic] own person, is grist for the mill, and what the activity of science fi ction writing is all about.3

Science fi ction off ers us worlds clearly discontinuous from our own, fantastic worlds that inevitably return us to the known world for comparison.4 If
this dynamic of “cognitive estrangement” 5 is central to science fi ction, then theoretically it is an ideal genre for exploring the ideology of gender, for questioning our culture’s rigid, constrained thinking regarding gender. Yet science 70

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
fi ction, both in literature and fi lm, has been overwhelmingly masculine and patriarchal, and truly alternate visions of gender have been few.

Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, published in 1816 and generally considered to be the fi rst true science fi ction novel, off ered a critique of masculine scientifi c presumption in its story of a masturbatory male scientist who chooses to create life on his own rather than with his new bride.6 Yet by the time of Jules Verne fi ft y years later, the genre was taken over and shaped by men, and women writers retreated from the expansive vistas of science fi ction to the more domestic spaces of Gothic melodrama and the novel of manners.

Nathaniel Hawthorne, himself a writer of science fi ction tales in the 1840s, famously dismissed women writers as “d——d female scribblers.” 7 Verne’s popular voyages extraordinaires, such as Journey to the Center of the Earth (1864), From the Earth to the Moon (1865), and 20,000 Leagues under the Sea (1870), are colonialist tales about male explorers going where no man had gone before, adventure stories wherein, in the words of Robert Scholes, “boy-ish men played with new toys created by science. ”8 At the turn of the twentieth century, H. G. Wells became the founder of modern science fi ction with his series of “scientifi c romances” beginning with Th e Time Machine in 1895.

Wells himself was a champion of women’s rights, among other social causes, but his novels are “romances” only in the literary sense—that is, as a fi ctional mode. In fact, Wells’s major science fi ction novels contain no signifi cant female characters, with the one possible exception of Weena, the childlike, helpless woman in the distant future of Th
e Time Machine. But she is less a
rounded character than a tabula rasa on which Wells’s heroic but patriarchal Time Traveller, retreating from the rapid social changes at the dawn of the twentieth century, including the growing independence of women, can reinscribe his Victorian values.

Several decades later, during the so-called golden age of science fi ction literature of the 1930s through the 1950s, the popular pulp magazines assumed a male readership with their typical stories of BEMs (bug-eyed monsters) to be destroyed and BBBs (big-breasted babes) to be enjoyed. Th e promise of both
pleasures oft en was featured prominently in their sensational cover illustra-tions. Th
ese images carried over into science fi ction fi lm in the 1950s, when the abrupt arrival of the atomic era suddenly made the genre one of the most popular. Gog (1954), for example, is atypical only to the degree to which its imagery is embarrassingly explicit in linking masculinity with power, potency, and technology, all coming to a head, so to speak, in the deliriously libidinous climax wherein the scientist hero (the staunchly reassuring Richard Egan) asserts his phallic dominance by destroying rampaging robots that have been sabotaged from a Soviet ship in space. Th
e robots are themselves excessively
phallicized, their defeat by the hero indicating that American science is more potent than that of godless communists. Amply demonstrating his masculine potency, the hero wins the hand (and presumably the body) of the sexualized woman scientist, a damsel in distress dressed in a provocatively tight lab suit and high heels.

Of Men and Monoliths

71

Th
e rationale behind Gog’s typical confl ation of space exploration as masculine potency and Cold War propaganda (the “space race”) is emphatically clear in the scientist’s explanation in Invaders from Mars (1953), another science fi ction movie of the period, for why conquering space is so important:

“If anybody dared attack us, we could push a few buttons and destroy them in a matter of minutes.” Destination Moon (1950), the fi lm that launched the decade’s spate of science fi ction movies, takes the position, as one of the characters explains, that “whoever controls the moon will control the Earth.”

When the astronauts land on the lunar surface, they claim the moon “by the grace of God” and (adeptly anticipating Neil Armstrong) “for the benefi t of mankind” in the name of the United States.

Th
e intertwined issues of technology and patriarchal masculinity are central to stories of space travel, which constitute such a signifi cant part of science fi ction that they have their own subgeneric designation—the space opera (a type, we might note, to which 2001, with its soundtrack of classical music by Johann and Richard Strauss rather than the more typical Th eramin-inspired electronic score, has a special relation). Space stories usually involve an emphasis on technology and gadgetry since both elements are required by the premise of interstellar travel. Outer space, like the frontier in the western genre, is a dangerous place that requires the fortitude of men to traverse it. 9

(It is worth noting that, according to the generic discourse of science fi ction and mirroring the operative distinction in the real sciences, stories of space are deemed, appropriately, “hard” SF, as opposed to stories more concerned with social extrapolation, which are called “soft ” SF.) Space stories have conventionally depicted interstellar travel as the penetration by men of the dark, womblike vastness of space in phallic-shaped rockets. In the standard iconography of the genre, while aliens frequently fl oat in rounded spacecraft (UFOs, fl ying saucers), earthlings tend to take their giant steps for mankind in pro-truding, pointed ships.

Once rocket technology became imaginable in the early twentieth century, science fi ction literature quickly dispensed with such patently impracti-cal means of interstellar travel as Cyrano de Bergerac’s bottles of dew, Poe’s balloon, Verne’s giant gun, and Edgar Rice Burroughs’s astral projection, and seized upon spaceships, which were quickly streamlined and masculinized.

Th
e hyperbolic covers of the pulps typically emphasized the piercing and penetrating power of human spacecraft through such graphic techniques as the exaggerated foreshortening of rocket nose cones. With the aim of settling other worlds, astronauts oft en are depicted as piercing and impregnating the universe, spreading the seed of human civilization. In movies, the phallic power of human spaceships was emphasized with the fi rst science fi ction movie ever made, Une Voyage dans la lune ( A Trip to the Moon, 1902), in which French fi lmmaker Georges Méliès envisioned a giant cannon that discharges a space capsule moonward with an eruptive force powerful enough to achieve escape velocity. As if to demonstrate the masculine triumph of this technology, the cannon ejaculates to the incongruous accompaniment of a group of dancing 72

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
women—in eff ect, the fi rst chorus line of “Rockettes”—in the mise-en-scène literally below the powerful phallus (fi gure 16). Méliès borrowed the idea of a giant space gun from Verne’s From the Earth to the Moon, in which the cannon is erected by the members of the all-male Baltimore Gun Club, and it appears again as late as 1936 in Th
ings to Come, where it sticks out, so to speak, as a strikingly unscientifi c anomaly in H. G. Wells’s tale of the future, which otherwise strives for scientifi c accuracy.

Polish SF writer Stanislaw Lem parodies the phallic discourse of space fi ction in his 1961 novel Solaris (an element entirely missing from both fi lm adaptations). Th
e novel opens with Lem’s narrator, a male scientist named Kelvin, describing his journey through space in a small rocket shell: My body rigid, sealed in its pneumatic envelope, I was knifi ng through space with the impression of standing still in the void, my only distraction the steadily mounting heat. . . . Th
e capsule was shaken by a
sudden jolt, then another. Th
e whole vehicle began to vibrate. Filtered
through the insulating layers of the outer skins, penetrating my pneumatic cocoon, the vibration reached me, and ran through my entire body. Th
e image of the dial shivered and multiplied, and its phospho-rescence spread out in all directions. I felt no fear. I had not under-taken this long voyage only to overshoot my target!

. . . A sharp jolt, and the capsule righted itself. Th rough the porthole, I could see the ocean once more, the waves like crests of glit-tering quicksilver. Th
e hoops of the parachute, their cords snapped,
fl apped furiously over the waves, carried on the wind. Th e capsule
gently descended. . . .

With the clang of steel rebounding against steel, the capsule came to a stop. A hatch opened, and with a long, harsh sigh, the metal shell which imprisoned me reached the end of its voyage.10

Kelvin has traveled through space to investigate a distant planet that is one large sentient ocean. Earth scientists have been studying this ocean planet for generations, producing exhaustive volumes of data and theoretical tomes about it, but thus far have been unsuccessful in the attempt to make contact with it. In his opening description of Kelvin’s space fl ight, Lem establishes his character’s phallic stance toward the universe while, in contrast, the ocean planet represents a kind of feminine mystery, pliant yet impenetrable in its diff erence, seemingly beyond the scientifi c comprehension of men.

While the planet Solaris may never explain itself, in the 1970s feminist voices in science fi ction began to speak, to venture into public space, beginning with the publication of Ursula K. LeGuin’s Th e Left Hand of Darkness
in 1969, just one year aft er 2001. Earlier, a few women writers had ventured into the masculine territory of space fi ction: including Th ea von Harbou,
who wrote the screenplay for her husband, Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927) and Frau im mond ( Woman in the Moon, 1929) , which introduced the concept of Of Men and Monoliths

73
the countdown adapted by NASA; and Kate Wilhelm, whose 1961 story “Th e

Ship Who Sang” is about a physically deformed girl who is hardwired into a spaceship as its computer. But LeGuin’s novel opened the stargates for women to write about space travel. Described by science fi ction critic Carl Freedman as “the book with which sf most decisively lost its innocence on matters of sex and gender,” 11 Th
e Left Hand of Darkness imagines an alien race, the Gethenians, who are normally genderless except during the fertility season, known as kemmer, when they may become either male or female depending partly upon the gender of others near them. Th
e plot isolates a Gethenian
politician and a human male ambassador from the planetary federation on an epic adventure, like Hawkeye and Chingachgook, Ishmael and Queequeg, or Captain Kirk and Mr. Spock. But while the classic American fi ction of Cooper, Melville, and Twain, as Leslie Fiedler and D. H. Lawrence have pointed out, represses the dread of femininity and homoerotic desire within stories of male adventure,12 LeGuin foregrounds these tensions with a character who is at once both genders and neither. As the two protagonists, initially alien to each other, begin to overcome their distrust and become intimate friends on their arduous journey together, the earthman, like the terrestrial reader, is prompted to rethink his rigidly conceived, heterosexist categories of gender and sexuality.

Th
e infl uence of LeGuin’s novel was enormous, and on its heels came a wave of feminist science fi ction from such writers as Joanna Russ, Marge Piercy, Pamela Sargent, Connie Willis, Kit Reed, and Octavia Butler. Sargent’s three anthologies of feminist science fi ction, the Women of Wonder series, published between 1974 and 1978, provided solid evidence of a feminist

“movement” within the genre. Earlier, women science fi ction writers such as C. L. Moore (Catherine Moore), Idis Seabright (Margaret St. Clair), and James Tiptree, Jr. (Alice Sheldon), used masculine or gender-indeterminate noms de plume in order to get published, to “pass” with editors and readers. But by the 1970s, women science fi ction writers could boldly go where few had before, announcing their gender diff erence and writing science fi ction that in various ways challenged the genre’s traditionally masculinist bias.

Novels such as Russ’s Th
e Female Man (1974) and Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) targeted the very language of science fi ction as a masculine discourse, not only by featuring female protagonists, but also by experiment-ing with unconventional narrative structures and multiple points of view in order to provide alternatives to the masculine way of looking at things. Th ese
works provided science fi ction’s sense of wonder, but one consciously rooted in gender diff erence.

To take a particularly relevant example, Tiptree’s story “Th e Women Men

Don’t See” (published in 1973, four years before the author revealed herself as a woman) deconstructs the masculinist assumptions and ideology of male adventure fi ction by undermining the misogynist clichés of the genre’s characteristic hard-boiled style. Th
e story involves a stereotypical macho adven-
turer, Don Fenton, who becomes stranded with two women when the small 74

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
charter plane on which the three are passengers crashes in an isolated, rugged part of Mexico. Fenton promptly takes charge, assuming the responsibility of providing for the women’s survival and seeking a way of making contact with the outside world while, at the same time, the women stumble upon and make contact with aliens who have landed in the seclusion of the jungle for a quick pit stop. In the end, the women decide to leave Earth with the aliens rather than stay with the intolerably sexist Fenton, who would kill the aliens in order to “protect” the women, which he assumes without question is his masculine duty. Th
e narrative is told from Fenton’s decidedly male point of view, and although he uses all of the stereotypical clichés of male adventure fi ction in his narrow attempt to understand the women, Tiptree makes clear that they are more complex people who could never be fi xed by Fenton’s formulaic phrases. Ultimately, the two women are as alien to Fenton as the undulating extraterrestrials he automatically fears, while the women are so alien-ated by Fenton’s patriarchal limitations that they would just as soon pull up terrestrial stakes and, like so many male adventurers before them, light out for the territory. Trying to explain their decision to Fenton, one of the women tells him that Earth is a patriarchal world and that women are like opossums: “What women do,” she says, “is survive. We live by ones and twos in the chinks of your world-machine. ”13 Th
e story’s prose style, which appropriates but sub-
verts the masculine hard-boiled style typical of its genre, is itself an example of a guerrilla aesthetic striking a blow at the patriarchal world machine.

In fi lm, however, the genre has advanced little since the 1950s, when male anxieties about women’s postwar independence were given expression in the form, on the one hand, of monstrous wasp women, she-creatures, and fi ft y-foot-tall dominatrixes, and on the other hand, of passive lab assistants and scientists’ virginal daughters, who must be rescued by men, as in Gog. A few later science fi ction fi lms, such as the Terminator and Lara Croft movies, switch the gender of the traditional male hero, but this is an illusory form of “empower-ment” that simply reinscribes rather than questions the patriarchal values of such narratives. Apart from only two fi lms, Rachel Talaley’s Tank Girl (1995) and Kathryn Bigelow’s Strange Days (1995)—both of which critique masculinity and the pleasures of masculinist representations, and both of which, not coincidentally, were box-offi
ce failures—science fi ction fi lms have held onto
the conventions of cinematic style and representation that have characterized popular cinema generally.

Laura Mulvey and other feminist fi lm scholars have argued that one of the defi ning qualities of mainstream narrative cinema is that the gaze of the camera tends to be gendered as masculine. According to Mulvey, classical fi lm construction positions male characters as subjects, as the bearers of the camera’s gaze, authorizing its look, while women are consequently rendered as objects, possessed and fetishized by the camera. 14 In science fi ction, the patriarchal gaze and objectifi cation of the female body is clearest in campy space operas like Fire Maidens of Outer Space (1955) or Barbarella (made the same year as 2001), but other movies are only slightly more subtle. Alien, for exam-Of Men and Monoliths

75
ple, is progressive in its representation of gender insofar as it shows female characters working alongside men in space and as it makes one of them, Ripley, its hero, in fact, the only crew member of the Nostromo to survive and defeat the eponymous extraterrestrial. Yet precisely when Ripley is at her most heroic, the fi lm stylistically reinscribes a masculine perspective during the climactic battle between Ripley and the creature by displaying her as an erotic sight, the object of masculine desire. Th
e camera’s position and angle empha-
size Ripley’s gender in a provocative “crotch shot,” a shot motivated not by the requirements of the story but by the apparent necessity of reminding viewers of her gender diff erence. 15 Th us, if science fi ction fi lms like Alien present a more active and heroic female protagonist, on the discursive level they tend to remain traditional in their gender politics by containing women within a sexualized and controlling masculine gaze.

Given this generic context, 2001: A Space Odyssey may be seen as especially progressive and innovative in ways far more profound than simply its convincing, then state-of-the-art special eff ects, although these elements of the fi lm certainly contribute to its wider rewriting of the science fi ction genre.

In taking science fi ction in new directions, in truly unexplored territory (to

“Jupiter and beyond the infi nite”), 2001 anticipated the wave of revisionist genre movies that characterized the New Hollywood of the 1970s. Th e way
in which 2001 treats science fi ction’s depiction of space exploration turns the genre on its ear, like Kubrick’s depiction of zero gravity in the fi lm, and aims, as John Cawelti said, to “set the elements of a conventional popular genre in an altered context, thereby making us perceive these traditional forms and images in a new way.” 16 Instead of rewriting the myths of the Western frontier as did fi lms like Little Big Man (1970) and McCabe and Mrs. Miller (1971), 2001
deconstructs the myths of the fi nal frontier.

An avid reader, Stanley Kubrick professed a particular fondness for science fi ction. Th
ree of the director’s thirteen fi lms— Dr. Strangelove (1964), 2001, and A Clockwork Orange (1971)—are generally recognized as important contributions to the genre. Th
e fact that Kubrick made three science fi ction
fi lms in a row indicates the extent to which he was interested in the genre.

(A fourth science fi ction fi lm, A.I. , was begun by Kubrick but completed by Steven Spielberg in, appropriately enough, 2001.) Indeed, Kubrick claimed that by the time he began work on 2001, the middle fi lm of the series, he had seen virtually every science fi ction fi lm ever made. 17 Robert Kolker argues that 2001 diff ers from earlier science fi ction movies by deliberately employing elements of the genre’s conventional streamlined production design, which equates progress with orderliness, neatness, and effi ciency—but not to celebrate these values so much as to question them by showing how such progress “equals emotional and intellectual death” in a world where “perfect order and perfect function decrease the need for human interference.” 18 Th
is is true
enough, but the fi lm also diff ers from most earlier science fi ction fi lms in its focus on masculinity and technology as major themes rather than simply containing these values as unexamined or naturalized ideology.

76

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Kubrick was drawn to science fi ction for the same reason he was attracted by the war fi lm: both genres are fundamentally concerned with these themes, which were prominent in the director’s work. Masculinity and violence are central to Th
e Shining (1980), which chronicles the descent of a family patriarch into violent madness. In Dr. Strangelove, the nuclear apocalypse is initi-ated when General Jack D. Ripper (Sterling Hayden), satirizing the Cold War paranoia of the previous decade’s science fi ction fi lms, overcompensates for his sexual impotence by talking loudly and carrying several big sticks: a cigar clamped in the side of his mouth, a machine gun at his hip, and a wing of nuclear bombers, which he unleashes on the Soviet Union to prevent the communists from sapping his “precious bodily fl uids.” Th e marine recruits in Full

Metal Jacket (1987) are trained to think of their weapons as synonymous with their penises. One of the platoon’s marching mantras, as they parade holding their rifl es in one hand and their genitals in the other, is “this is my rifl e, this is my gun / this is for fi ghting, this is for fun.” Grammatically, the antecedents of the couplet’s pronouns are ambiguous, so it’s unclear which tool is for which job. Th
e fi lm’s very title, slang for a rifl e’s loaded magazine, also evokes the image of the male body armed and armored against the world.

Th
e aggressive power of the phallus in Kubrick’s world is made literal when Major Kong (Slim Pickens) straddles the nuclear bomb he drops on a Russian target in Dr. Strangelove, and in A Clockwork Orange when droogie Alex (Malcolm McDowell) attacks the Cat Lady with a sculpture of a giant penis. Kubrick’s adaptation of Anthony Burgess’s novel about urban life in the near future shows that sexual aggression is an essential part of masculine identity because when Alex is conditioned to be sickened by violence, he becomes a whimpering, helpless victim of the violence infl icted on him by other men. Women in Kubrick’s fi lms tend to be dominated within a patriarchal world, as metaphorically visualized by the tables in the shape of nude women in the Korova Milkbar in A Clockwork Orange, or living in the cracks of the male world machine, like the female sniper in Full Metal Jacket. Th e
masculine world machine in Dr. Strangelove is ultimately the Doomsday Machine, which at the fi lm’s end destroys all life on Earth. In 2001, Kubrick’s view of the destructive, phallic nature of technology is expressed beautifully in the celebrated cut from the ape’s bone, at once man’s fi rst tool and fi rst weapon, to a space station: in this one magnifi cent edit, Kubrick summarizes 4 million years of human history as a continuation of phallic territoriality and conquest (fi gures 3 and 4). Th
is is perhaps the fi lm’s most memorable
moment, but other aspects of 2001 also may be understood in relation to this critique of traditional masculinity.

Most obvious perhaps is the fi lm’s casting and detached treatment of its characters, to which I alluded at the outset. Accounts of classical fi lm narrative argue that the reliance on heroic and virtuous characters with whom spectators can easily identify is the central device for involving viewers in the cinematic story.19 But 2001 denies viewers any such easy fi gure of identifi cation. William Sylvester gives a low-key performance as Dr. Heywood Floyd, Of Men and Monoliths

77
who serves as the audience’s escort to the moon and then disappears from the narrative except for the recorded message that plays when the Discovery 1
ship reaches Jupiter. Both Gary Lockwood and Keir Dullea, who play astronauts Frank Poole and Dave Bowman, are inexpressive actors cast in similarly inexpressive roles. Lockwood had only a few undistinguished roles before 2001—perhaps his most notable being, ironically, his appearance on the Star Trek episode “Where No Man Has Gone Before” in 1966, in which some crew members of the Enterprise develop powers of ESP when they journey to the edge of the galaxy. Dullea’s previous credits included David and Lisa (1962), his debut, and Bunny Lake Is Missing (1965), two fi lms in which he played psychologically disturbed characters repressing their real feelings.

Vivian Sobchack has noted that in science fi ction movies the combination of rationality and strength needed to “conquer” space means that emotion and sexuality are displaced onto the iconography of space technology.

Almost always at the helm, in control, are men, astronauts who are typically cool, rational, even sexless. In Sobchack’s words, “whether named Buzz or Armstrong, Buck, Flash or Bowman,” they are typically “as libidinally interesting as a Ken doll; like Barbie’s companion, they are all jaw and no genitals.” 20

Kubrick’s astronauts in 2001 are perhaps the most sexless and undemonstrative of the lot, their libidinous impulses completely sublimated by the technology that envelops them. Th
e images of the semi-nude yet laconic Lockwood
supine on his tanning bed have nothing of the corporeal, eroticized charge of Sigourney Weaver in her improbably fl imsy space underwear in Alien. Aft er the star-studded casts of Paths of Glory (1957), Lolita (1962), and Dr. Strangelove, the avoidance of big-name actors in a blockbuster production like 2001
seems a deliberate attempt to avoid the larger-than-life quality of movie stars in deference to the grandness of the celestial stars. If 2001 has a “hero,” it is, as in Olaf Stapledon’s novel Last and First Men (1930) or Wells’s Th ings to Come,
other science fi ction narratives with similarly epic scope, the human race itself, not a particular individual.

David Bordwell describes the classical narrative style as “an excessively obvious cinema” because it always aims at orientation, which he refers to as

“a larger principle of ‘perspective’”: “not the adherence to a particular spatial composition but a general ‘placing’ of the spectator in an ideal position of intelligibility. ”21 Yet 2001 consistently works to thwart or make problematic such a privileged spectatorial position. For example, the fi lm’s motif of spiraling imagery denotes the weightlessness and absence of directional orientation in space, but also refuses to orient spectators with fi xed reference points, unlike classic narrative construction. Such images appear, for example, in the cockpit console of the shuttle to the Clavius moonbase, with its spinning telemetry; when the fl ight attendant on the shuttle turns “upside down” to enter the cockpit with refreshments (fi gure 6); and in the spinning cylindri-cal drum that Poole and Bowman enter before leaving the Discovery 1 to repair the AE35 unit. When Dr. Floyd is in the Bell photophone booth at the 78

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
space station talking to his daughter, through the window we see the Earth seeming to spin around outside the porthole (“Daddy’s traveling,” Floyd says tellingly to his daughter), a sight repeated during his discussion with the Russian scientists (fi gure 17). Although this use of sustained rotating imagery has since been absorbed into the mainstream, appearing, for example, in Star Trek: Th
e Motion Picture (1979) and more recently in Brian de Palma’s Mission to Mars (2000), the technique was radical when Kubrick introduced it in 2001. Further, 2001 employs this imagery in more complex ways than these other fi lms, playing off spectators’ perceived spatial orientation with seemingly contradictory movement within the frame. So, for example, when Bowman is tumbling and spinning toward the Discovery 1 from the repair pod—at the point, that is, when he is fi nally taking action, being most

“heroic”—he looks upside down in the image. Back in the ship, as Bowman descends a ladder, he seems to be moving sideways within the frame, given the camera’s position in relation to him. And when he proceeds with determination to disconnect HAL, Bowman goes up a ladder although in the shot it looks as if he is going down head fi rst. A similar trompe l’oeil eff ect occurs while Bowman fl oats in HAL’s memory logic center. Th e famous fi rst shot
inside the Discovery 1 shows Frank Poole jogging in the rotating centrifuge, which immediately challenges our spatial orientation in the ship. As this is the fi rst shot inside the Discovery 1, it is an ironic “establishing” shot because it establishes only our disorientation, an eff ect entirely apposite in the context of a journey into the unknown (fi gure 18).

According to Bordwell, classical mise-en-scène relies on balanced compositions and the centering of protagonists in individual shots. 22 But in 2001, emphasizing the vastness of space and humanity’s relatively humble place within it, Kubrick’s characters are oft en depicted as tiny creatures in big widescreen images, oft en placed off to the side of the frame, as when Poole spins off into the void. Th
e fi lm’s long takes use time to convey the immensity of space, as do the periods of silence on the soundtrack (“In space no one can hear you scream,” as the advertising tag-line for Alien put it). While Dr. Floyd may be utterly certain of his central place in the universe (“moon/American/

Floyd” is the way he identifi es himself at the computerized security check), Kubrick’s mise-en-scène in the space sequences undermines conventional ways of regarding the universe and our place in it.

Th
e spatially disorienting images are echoed by the ambiguities Kubrick builds into the fi lm even at the level of the soundtrack. Every time we see a monolith, it is accompanied on the soundtrack by the choral music of György Ligeti. But while Ligeti’s music may sound, in the words of Norman Kagan,

“like a frantic collage of all the religious themes in the world,” 23 its diegetic status, hence its meaning, is unclear. Th
e apes do not seem to respond to the
music, and the scientists looking at the monolith in the Tycho moon crater respond to its signal, not to the music. How, then, are we to understand the music? Are Ligeti’s voices emanating from the monolith, the music of the Of Men and Monoliths

79
spheres that modern man is incapable of hearing? Or is the music the stylistic embellishment of a fi lmmaker who is known for the careful and striking choices of music in his fi lms?

Unlike classical fi lm narrative, 2001 is excessively opaque rather than excessively obvious. Just as Stanislaw Lem wisely never reveals the motives or meanings for the humanoid manifestations created by the entity Solaris, so 2001 contains numerous enigmas that remain unresolved at the fi lm’s end. It is never clear, for example, whether the monoliths represent alien technology, a supernatural force, or the presence of God. Nor is it clear whether the monoliths actually determine human evolution and history, or merely inspire, or just observe us. And the fi lm never explains what happens to Bowman once the Discovery 1 reaches its destination and the fi nal “Jupiter and Beyond the Infi -
nite” sequence begins. Alexander Walker notes that when Bowman listens to Dr. Floyd’s recorded message aft er disconnecting HAL—when, that is, the fi lm is almost over—Floyd’s comments are at once “the fi rst audible and unmistakable clue to the audience of what the fi lm is narratively ‘about’” and, amazingly,

“also the last utterance in the fi lm.” 24 And Floyd’s brief briefi ng, which does not really explain very much (he notes in his recorded message that only HAL
knows the details of their mission), is itself somewhat ambiguous. Is its play-back, as would appear to be the case, pretimed to begin when the Discovery reaches Jupiter? Does the recorded message engage automatically when Bowman disconnects HAL? Or does HAL initialize it as his dying gesture? In the end, the fi lm’s story seems to remain a “total mystery,” like the monoliths as described by Dr. Floyd in his recorded message. Just as we should not master the universe, we are unable to master this fi lm’s narrative.

What slim narrative 2001 possesses falls away completely when Bowman enters the Stargate where, along with the astronaut, we are showered with an awesome display of distorted landscapes and abstract, swirling colors, more like a nonrepresentational experimental fi lm than a mainstream movie. Th e
very length of the sequence seems motivated by a desire to immerse us in a visual experience rather than to convey narrative information and advance the story, the primary goal of classical narration. Aft er the Stargate, Bowman appears in a room that looks at once old and new, a confusing combination of Louis XVI and modern styles, where the astronaut confusingly watches himself age and die (fi gure 15). It is never clear whether what we are seeing is a trip through outer space or the inner space of the astronaut’s mind. In a detailed formalist analysis of this sequence, Mario Falsetto has shown how Kubrick’s editing consistently subverts the viewer’s understanding of narrative space and time by violating such normally inviolable techniques as the conventional shot/reaction shot in order to convey a sense of Bowman’s transcendent experience.25 Each time Bowman sees another, more-aged version of himself, we fi rst see the new yet older Bowman from the physical point of view of the older but younger Bowman; but then the next shot reveals that the earlier Bowman is no longer there. Th
us these apparent point-of-view shots cease to
be point-of-view shots, and their perspective—and ours as viewers—becomes 80

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

“disembodied,” just as Bowman will lose his male body when he transforms into the star child.

As we travel through the Stargate, Kubrick inserts periodic close-ups of a human eye, presumably Bowman’s, which each time it blinks changes to the same hues that color the Stargate images (fi gure 34). Whatever these images might “mean,” we see them through Bowman’s eyes, which begin to merge with what he beholds. Th
is sense of extreme sensitivity to the point of merging with nature rather than conquering its secrets is what Evelyn Fox Keller describes as “a feeling for the organism” demonstrated by, for example, the intimate and empathic relationship that geneticist Barbara McClintock established with the maize seedlings with which she was working. 26

In Kubrick’s cinema, eyes fi gure prominently as images of vision and perception, or the lack of it. A Clockwork Orange features numerous close-ups of Alex’s eye, fi rst in his droogie garb with eye make-up and the eyeball cuffl inks

(fi gure 9), and later when his eyes are propped open during the Ludovico treatment. Kubrick’s last fi lm, completed just before his death, shows people blinded by the quotidian world, entrapped within the confi nes of their individual egos and living with their “eyes wide shut.” But 2001 suggests that we learn to be more open to nature, to perceive beyond the armored confi nes of traditional masculinity. Signifi cantly, the star child at the end of 2001 is not only naked, ungirded, vulnerable to the universe, but its eyes are already wide open, not shut. Orbiting the Earth in the fi lm’s last shot, the star child can see beyond our terrestrial limitations, perceiving with a new, widened consciousness even while still encapsulated within the enclosed but transparent cosmic womb (fi gure 35).

Twice we see close-ups of Bowman’s face as he experiences the Stargate, bright colors refl ecting off the glass visor of his helmet almost as if they were radiating from within. Th
ese shots recall the famous moment in experimen-
tal fi lmmaker Stan Brakhage’s Refl ections on Black (1955), in which Brakhage scratched the emulsion off the image of a man’s eyes to suggest his metaphorical blindness. But where Brakhage’s blindness is represented as a gap-ing absence within the image, Kubrick’s astronaut experiences a transcendent vision which seems to fl ood his eyes with a riot of color. Brakhage was a fi lmmaker whose great subject was vision and the possibilities of expanding perception. He once challenged spectators to free their vision from the blinkered constraints of culture:

Imagine an eye unruled by man-made laws of perspective, an eye unprejudiced by compositional logic, an eye which does not respond to the name of everything but which must know each object encountered in life through an adventure in perception. 27

In 2001 Kubrick similarly asks us to look at the world out there in just this way, as an adventure in perception, as experience rather than expropriation.

Kubrick himself refused to explain the ending of 2001, saying that “its mean-Of Men and Monoliths

81
ing has to be found on a sort of visceral, psychological level rather than in a specifi c literal explanation. ”28

Arthur C. Clarke’s initial script for 2001 was based largely on his 1948 short story “Th
e Sentinel,” which concerns the future discovery of an alien artifact on the moon. Th
e artifact, a crystal pyramid, acts as a beacon, presumably signaling its makers that the human race had, in Clarke’s words, “proved our fi tness to survive—by crossing space and escaping from the Earth, our cradle.” 29

Although the conclusion of the story seems carefully constructed to avoid using any masculine terms, such as “mankind,” aft er working with Kubrick on 2001 Clarke said that from the outset the director “had a very clear idea of his ultimate goal. . . . He wanted to make a movie about Man’s relation to the universe.” 30 His words are well chosen, for Kubrick was talking about exploring a perceptual space that has been left largely uncharted by men.

In Kubrick’s 1960 epic, Spartacus, there is a telling scene in which Kirk Douglas as the rebellious slave, inspired by his sudden freedom, tells his love, Virinia (Jean Simmons), of the new horizons he envisions. Spartacus crouches on the ground, just as Kubrick’s man-apes would do several years later in 2001, and says he wants to know everything (including, signifi cantly, where the sun goes at night and why the moon changes shape). When he concludes that as yet he knows nothing, Virinia responds by reminding him, and the audience, that in fact he knows important things, things that cannot be taught, deeper truths than mere scientifi c facts. Spartacus is a true hero for Kubrick because he seeks a higher wisdom, to understand without possessing, the very opposite of the decadent Romans in the fi lm, who know only material wealth and power. Ina Rae Hark argues that in searching for a subjectivity other than the two choices off ered to Spartacus, animal or Roman, Spartacus asks the question: “Is there a non-phallic human subjectivity? ”31 Within the context of science fi ction rather than the biblical epic, 2001 asks the same question. In the fi lm’s fi nal shots, the star child’s gender is indeterminate: the fi rst glimpse of it is a quick long shot which shows no visible genitalia, while subsequent shots do not show it below the chest. Th e
star child is a new human who, in its openness to creation, has transcended patriarchy’s characteristic binary thinking about gender. If Bowman begins his journey to Jupiter and beyond the infi nite in a spermlike ship, one more astronaut out to conquer and impregnate the universe, he comes to possess nothing from his previous being but the spherical, womblike repair pod before he is reborn, the aspiring sire becoming the sired.

Kolker suggests that instead of regarding the monoliths as literal artifacts of a higher alien intelligence, they be read as metaphorical “markers of humanity’s evolution,” perhaps a symbolic “obstacle, a perceptual block that must be transcended. ”32 Th
is obstacle, I would suggest, is phallic masculin-
ity. Th
e monoliths have a fi rm and solid presence and are seemingly everywhere, like the Law of the Father. In “Th
e Dawn of Man” section, when the
fi rst monolith appears, the apes gather around it, touching it provocatively, at once wary and worshipful. At the end of the fi lm, the aged, dying Bowman 82

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
also reaches for it, but his gesture, like so much else in the fi lm, is ambiguous: is he reaching out, like Moon-Watcher in the opening sequence, to touch the monolith, or is he raising his arm in a gesture of farewell as he completes the process of dying to an old consciousness and being reborn into a new (fi gure 23)? Th
e ending would seem to suggest the latter, for, as I have argued, 2001
seeks to restore to us a sense of wonder that modern man has forgotten in embracing a masculine quest for scientifi c mastery.

Of course, it might be argued that 2001’s reliance on special eff ects is itself a fetishization of cinematic technology and a betrayal of its theme. Given the resources available for the fi lm’s production, one is reminded of the young Orson Welles’s remark upon fi nding RKO’s studio resources available to him for making Citizen Kane (1941), that he felt like a boy with the world’s largest train set. Filmed in Super Panavision and presented during its fi rst run in Cinerama, with state-of-the-art special eff ects costing more than half of the fi lm’s total budget of $10.5 million and all supervised or created personally by Kubrick, 2001 is a convincing display of technological mastery by a master director entirely in charge of his production. Th
at majestic cut from the bone
to the space station not only cuts to the bone of cinema’s unique ability to conquer time and space through editing, 33 but also points to the pervasive and potent presence of the author.

Th
ere is no escaping the fact that the cinema is an inherently technological medium, and 2001 marshals cinema’s technological possibilities to invite us to experience the world rather than to master it—not unlike Bowman, who needs technology to reach Jupiter, but who then abandons it to journey beyond the infi nite. If the fi lm’s astronauts initially privilege the values of reason and control, in the end Bowman must turn off his ship’s computer in order to let the Force be with him. But this is not to suggest that George Lucas’s space opera is anything like 2001, for the Star Wars saga is a juvenile Oedipal drama that embraces the very patriarchal myths of space adventure fi ction (“I am your father,” in the immortal words of Darth Vader) that Kubrick seeks to go beyond. Where Luke must grow up and take his place within the patriarchal order, Bowman grows into a new being with a new perspective.

2001: A Space Odyssey ends with the star child back in the view of Earth, not only looking at the Earth in a diff erent way, but also rotating to face the camera, returning our gaze as spectators as if challenging us to meet it, that is, to see better, to attain its higher plane of being. Here Kubrick, usually regarded, and rightly so, as a pessimist and determinist, off ers us a remarkable gesture of hope and faith for an artist who elsewhere sees violence and death. Th
e kind of sensual, open spectators whom Kubrick’s fi lm encourages us to be recalls Stapledon’s description of the sexual nature of the next human order in his similarly visionary Last and First Men: Around the ancient core of delight in physical and mental contact with the opposite sex there now appeared a kind of innately sublimated and no less poignant, appreciation of the unique physical and Of Men and Monoliths

83
mental forms of all kinds of live things. It is diffi cult for less ample
natures to imagine this expansion of the innate sexual interest; for to them it is not apparent that the lusty admiration which at fi rst directs itself solely on the opposite sex is the appropriate attitude to all the beauties of fl esh and spirit in beast and bird and plant. 34

Simultaneously one of the most scientifi c of science fi ction fi lms and an anti–science fi ction fi lm, 2001 suggests that with such an open, nonmas-culinist perspective, we can leave the cradle and truly take a giant step for humankind.

Notes

1. See, for example, Evelyn Fox Keller, Refl ections on Gender and Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985); Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (New York: Routledge, 1991); Judith Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); and Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack Nelson, eds., Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1996).

2. Fox Keller, Refl ections on Gender and Science, 34.

3. Damon Knight, In Search of Wonder: Essays on Modern Science Fiction, rev. ed.

(Chicago: Advent, 1967), 13.

4. Robert Scholes explains the special dynamic of such fi ction this way: “In the worlds of SF, we are made to see the stoniness of a stone by watching it move and change in an accelerated time-scale, or by encountering an anti-stone with properties so unstony that we are forced to reinvestigate the true quality of stoniness.” Structural Fabulation: An Essay on Fiction of the Future (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 46.

5. See Darko Suvin, Metamorphosis of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), chap. 1.

6. For an overview of feminist criticism of Frankenstein, see Catherine Gallagher and Elizabeth Young, “Feminism and Frankenstein: A Short History of American Feminist Criticism,” Journal of Contemporary Th
ought 1, no. 1 (1991): 97–109.

7. For a discussion of Hawthorne’s science fi ction, see H. Bruce Franklin, Future Perfect: American Science Fiction of the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 3–64.

8. Scholes, Structural Fabulation, 15.

9. Hence the number of westerns that have been adapted as science fi ction. For more on this, see Barry Keith Grant, “Strange Days: Gender and Ideology in New Genre Films,” in Ladies and Gentlemen, Boys and Girls: Gender in Film at the End of the Twentieth Century, ed. Murray Pomerance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 186–88.

10. Stanislaw Lem, Solaris (New York: Berkley, 1971), 8–10.

84

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

11. Carl Freedman, “Science Fiction and the Triumph of Feminism: Barr’s Future Females, the Next Generation,” Science Fiction Studies, no. 81 (2000): 278.

12. Leslie Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel (New York: Delta, 1967); D. H. Lawrence, “Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Novels,” in Studies in Classic American Literature (New York: Penguin, 1977), 40–51.

13. James Tiptree, Jr., “Th
e Women Men Don’t See,” in Th
e New Women of Wonder:

Recent Science Fiction Stories by Women about Women, ed. Pamela Sargent (New York: Vintage, 1977), 205.

14. Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Screen 16, no. 3 (1975): 6–18.

15. James Cameron’s True Lies (1994) off ers a more egregious example in the overlapping genre of the action fi lm. While on the one hand the fi lm allows the wife of the spy to become a partner in espionage, it includes a lengthy scene, again entirely gra-tuitous in relation to the plot, where the husband (Arnold Schwarzenegger) arranges for his wife (Jamie Lee Curtis) to perform a seductive striptease in a hotel room for a stranger. She remains unaware that the man watching in the shadows is in fact her husband, whose anonymous voyeurism in the dark becomes emblematic of the male spectator, for whom the camera obligingly emphasizes Curtis’s curvaceous body.

16. John Cawelti, “Chinatown and Generic Transformation in Recent American Films,” in Film Genre Reader III, ed. Barry Keith Grant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 251. Th
e only fi lm Cawelti discusses that pre-dates 2001 is Arthur Penn’s Bonnie and Clyde (1967).

17. James Howard, Stanley Kubrick Companion (London: Batsford, 1999), 107.

18. Robert Kolker, A Cinema of Loneliness: Penn, Stone, Kubrick, Scorsese, Spielberg, Altman, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 135.

19. David Bordwell, “Story Causality and Motivation,” in Th e Classic Hollywood

Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960, ed. David Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and Kristin Th
ompson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), chap. 2.

20. Vivian Sobchack, “Th
e Virginity of Astronauts: Sex and the Science Fiction Film,” in Alien Zone: Cultural Th
eory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema, ed.

Annette Kuhn (New York: Verso, 1990), 107.

21. Bordwell, “Space in the Classical Film,” Classic Hollywood Cinema, 54.

22. Ibid., chap. 5.

23. Norman Kagan, Th
e Cinema of Stanley Kubrick (New York: Grove, 1972), 150.

24. Alexander Walker, Stanley Kubrick Directs, rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 259.

25. Mario Falsetto, Stanley Kubrick: A Narrative and Stylistic Analysis (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1984), 115–28.

26. Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism (New York: Freeman, 1983). See also Nancy Tuana, “Revaluing Science: Starting from the Practices of Women,” in Nelson and Nelson, Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science, 22–31.

27. Stan Brakhage, “Metaphors on Vision,” Film Culture, no. 30 (Fall 1963): n.p.

28. Stanley Kubrick, quoted in Howard, Stanley Kubrick Companion, 112.

29. Arthur C. Clarke, “Th
e Sentinel,” in Jerome Agel, ed., Th
e Making of Kubrick’s

2001 (New York: New American Library, 1970), 22.

Of Men and Monoliths

85

30. Clarke quoted in Howard, Stanley Kubrick Companion, 104.

31. Ina Rae Hark, “Animals or Romans: Looking at Masculinity in Spartacus,” in Screening the Male: Exploring Masculinities in Hollywood Cinema, ed. Steven Cohan and Ina Rae Hark (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), 163.

32. Kolker, A Cinema of Loneliness, 136–37.

33. H. G. Wells noted this distinctive ability of the new medium of cinema in his fi rst novel, Th
e Time Machine, published in 1895, the same year as the fi rst public fi lm screening, where he describes the experience of time traveling as being like watching a speeded-up fi lm.

34. Olaf Stapledon, Last and First Men: A Story of the Near and Far Future (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987), 134. In his preface, Stapledon writes, “To romance of the far future, then, is to attempt to see the human race in its cosmic setting, and to mould our hearts to entertain new values” (11).

86

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

6

The Cinematographic Brain
in 2001: A Space Odyssey

MARCIA LANDY

Th
ere is as much thought in the body as there is shock and violence in the brain. Th
ere is an equal amount of feeling in both of them.

Th
e brain gives orders to the body which is just an outgrowth of it, but the body also gives orders to the brain which is just a part of it.

gilles deleuze, Cinema 2: Th
e Time-Image

2001: A Space Odyssey is an allegory of the evolution of human intelligence, deliberately appropriating the cinematic apparatus to embark on its philosophic journey, which is realized in its conception of the “cinematographic”

brain. Th
e fi lm has a subversive agenda and a design on the spectator. Critical to its own journey, the Odyssey probes conceptions of the human brain: is it the rational center for and seat of knowledge about a constant and determined world, the embodiment of intelligence whose evolution began with the tool-wielding ape and culminated in the computer that never errs? Or is there more to understand about the history and trajectory of evolution? And how does the technology of space in conjunction with the cinematic apparatus enter into the fi lm’s allegory of perception, aff ect, and intelligence?

87

Stanley Kubrick pursues the enigma of intelligence by turning the Cartesian brain-body dualism on its head by invoking images of faces, eyes, interiority, and exteriority that place spectators outside the traditional anthropocentric context. He inverts and distorts the potential of the brain to “give orders to the body” and the body’s ability “to give orders to the brain.” As in Kubrick’s other fi lms, the intellectual journey is reliant on the meticulous fi guration and questioning of bodies, images, sounds, and verbal language. Th e
identity between the world and the brain involves a rethinking of the relations between mind and body, aff ect and thought, sight and sound. Describing the fi lms of Stanley Kubrick as an “intellectual cinema,” Gilles Deleuze wrote: If we look at Kubrick’s work, we see the degree to which it is the brain, which is the mis[e] en scène. Attitudes of body achieve a maximum level of violence, but they depend on the brain. For in Kubrick, the world itself is a brain, there is identity of brain and world, as in the great circular and luminous table in Dr. Strangelove, the giant computer in 2001: A Space Odyssey, the Overlook Hotel in Th e Shining. Th
e
black stone of 2001 presides over cosmic states and cerebral states: it is the soul of the three bodies, earth, sun, and moon. But also the seed of the three brains, animal, human, machine. Kubrick is renewing the theme of the initiatory journey because every journey in the world is an exploration of the brain.1

Th
e challenge posed by Deleuze’s comments on Kubrick’s work is to think through the “identity of brain and world” in 2001. Th e allegory that limns
and unfolds this identity is not seamless, linear, and progressive in a conventional sense; it is discontinuous and fortuitous, dependent on fl ashes of selective memory: it creates unsettling associations between past and present. Th
e fi lm’s allegory is an exploration of an “acentered system.” 2 It explores the destructive consequences of a reductive and obsessive commitment to the primacy of either subjectivity or objectivity, body or mind. Th e fi lm turns its
investigation of consciousness into a simultaneous investigation of the history and character of cinema, a medium that has the potential to explore unexamined connections between forms of intelligence and representations of the world. Moreover, while some of the images in the fi lm may seem dated to some critics, 3 the questions that the fi lm raises about simulation, space, and time are timely given the astronomical growth of television, video, and computer technology and their relation to the technology of the cinema.

Th
e worlds of 2001 are neither a celebration of the tools of technology nor their denigration. To interpret the allegory as moral parable, a commentary on the evils or blessings of technology, is to skew the work of the fi lm as fi lm and reduce it to a statement. Th
e characters (apes, scientists, robotic HAL,
and astronauts) are portrayed as automatons, sleepers and sleepwalkers, subject to forces that appear to emerge from outside themselves yet determine their interior states. Th
e spectator becomes a seer or visionary who, instead 88

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
of being placed in the familiar and repetitive position of having to “recall or reconsider the past,” is invited to invent the future.4 Th
e fi lm’s refl exivity about
its status as fi lm enhances its investigation of the cinematographic brain, a brain that has the potential to generate incorporeal images of thought not present to the senses and productive of diff erent and hitherto unperceived relations of time and hence existence.

Following Deleuze’s provocative comments about an identity between world and brain, this chapter treats the fi lm as an allegory that proff ers a critical and historical treatment of intelligence that raises disturbing questions about the future and about human survival as well. At the core of the fi lm is the unanswered question about the “purpose and meaning of human existence.” 5 Th
is allegory of the cinematographic brain implicates the spectator in the fi lm through the fi lm’s investigation of “what is thinking?” Th is chapter
tracks diff erent confi gurations of the brain—animal, human, computer, and cinematographic—and probes the fi lm’s tactics for creating an experimental and philosophical narrative based primarily on visual and aural images with a minimum of verbal language.

The Animal Brain

Th
e initial episode of the fi lm, “Th
e Dawn of Man,” is proleptic, that is, antici-
patory of events to come in the subsequent three episodes. Day and night herald the diff erent temporal phases of the transformation of the man-apes from omnivores to carnivores and from cringing and threatened beasts to aggressive hunters. Th
e visual and aural themes involve the accenting of sound in the animals’ grunts and screaming and in the György Ligeti and Richard Strauss music associated with the appearance of a mysterious black object referred to in the novel as a monolith. Th
is enigmatic object, which appears four times in
the fi lm, produces alterations in those who respond to its presence. However, the monolith remains a puzzle. Is it benevolent, malevolent, or neutral? How does its presence serve to alter the behavior of the ape-men and the subsequent direction of human life?

“Th
e Dawn of Man” episode highlights the primacy of gesture. Th e mysterious (chance? predetermined?) arrival of the black object transforms the apes (and the viewer’s) sense of movement and action. Th e random movements of the animals become focused as the apes’ attention becomes directed toward the monolith. Th
is unusual object with its impact on the ape-men
projects the animal brain as connected to the body and to terrestrial space.

Th
e animal brain is sensory and physical; communication and decision making are expressed through the body, which conveys aff ects relating to fear, pain, threat, pleasure, and aggression. Th
e animal brain constitutes one form
of intelligence that is oft en regarded as inferior in comparison with the human brain. Yet 2001 does not fall prey to this judgment.

The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 89

Initially, the perspective in this episode is that of the objective gaze of the camera, off ering a perspective (alternating middle- and long-distance shots) on the static and barren landscape and on the monotonous and threatening world of the apes whose existence is devoted to foraging, survival, and defending their territory. Close-ups, especially of Moon-Watcher (the name in the script for the alpha male played by Daniel Richter), precede the apes’

approach to the monolith. Aft er the arrival of the monolith, the camera work and editing change, fi nally becoming expansive in relation to outer space. Th e
apes’ movement toward the monolith is accompanied by Ligeti’s otherworldly music. Th
e music increases in volume and in complexity as the apes approach and retreat from but fi nally return to the alien object. Th e suggestion of the
ape-men’s increasing mobility in this episode is enhanced by the passage of time, from night to day, from darkness to light, and from retreat and hiding to aggressive attack (fi gure 19).

Th
e editing now consists of lengthier shots, now involving more agitated movement on the part of the apes that culminates in the touching of the monolith. Moon-Watcher’s at fi rst tentative, then more assured, wielding of the bone is accompanied by the renewed and jubilant sounds of Richard Strauss’s Th
us Spake Zarathustra. Further, the appearance of the image of the sun fl aring at the top of the monolith enlarges the spectator’s sense of space, as if signaling that the constraints of the apes’ earlier existence in the African veldt has been overcome and anticipating the journey to outer space. From a tight framing of the landscape, which suggests the impossibility of visually contemplating the out-of-fi eld, the episode has expanded its cinematic horizon. Th
e odyssey to consciousness has begun. Th
e movement climaxes in the
spectacle of Moon-Watcher’s exultant and victorious throwing of the bone into the air and the bone’s transformation into a space ship that resembles the shape of the bone (fi gures 3 and 4). Th
e Strauss music dramatically and
eff ectively marks a transformation in the apes, producing a shocking caesura.

Visually and aurally, this moment is characteristic of the fi lm’s allegorical treatment predicated on its dramatic yoking of an image from the past with one from the present.

Th
is episode also is indicative of the fi lm’s mode of allegorizing by way of introducing a connection between vision and thought. Th e episode is remarkable for its emphasis on gesture. It becomes an investigation of gesture as a form of consciousness that recalls how the early, silent cinema was an instrument of perception and not merely a storytelling medium. Kubrick’s insistence on the importance of aff ect is clearly conveyed in the focused and sensory-motor behavior of the apes, evident in their awakening as expressed in their killing of game and establishing their territorial dominance by means of the bone. If the early cinema was supreme in focusing on situation and action and relating them to modes of perception, these early moments of 2001 are for the spectator an invocation of the “dark dreams of the past” not as linear, immutable, and absolutely true but as exposing diff erent presents and relations to the past, a past threatening ever to return.

90

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Th
e behavior of the ape-men is exemplary of what Giorgio Agamben has described as the politics of the gestural, the potential of the body for communicability as something other than a means to cultural, economic, and political control. Th
is potential for communicability is what he describes as a means without end. Relying on music, dance, and display, the body communicates the power of the gesture, returning, in Agamben’s language, “images back to the homeland of gesture,” where life can once again become decipherable, breaking “with the false alternative between means and ends that paralyzes morality and presents.” 6 In producing the gesture, “the duty of the director,” Agamben further writes, is “to introduce into this dream the element of awakening”7 and, if anything, to explore the potential of cinema to jar the spectator into wakefulness. In allegorical and proleptic fashion, the episode invites speculation on the question of technology as a problematic prosthesis, a means of survival at great intellectual and aff ective expense, but also a tool to think diff erently from prevailing conceptions of rationality and consciousness.

In heralding the transformation of the apes to “the status of a sapient subject,” 8 the fi lm has not only posed the problem of knowledge and its eff ects but has confronted the viewer with the cinematic medium as a visual and auditory instrument for this cerebral examination. Th
e dramatic visual transformation
in the landscape and in the portrait of the ape-men connects the prehistory of humankind to the present of the spectator, but the episode has also off ered a meditation on the history of cinema as more than a mere recording but as a medium capable of refl ecting on its own uses of the technology of images in the sparse dialogue, valorization of music, and “abandonment of narration, emphasizing the sense of sight at the expense of language.” 9 Th
e technique in
addition suggests an early form of fi lmmaking, where perception was communicated through sensory experience, gesture, and aff ect.

The Human Brain of the Scientist

As the ship, a craft that resembles the bone thrown in the air by the ape, fl oats through space in the next (untitled) episode to the music of Th e Blue Danube

Waltz, the spectator is given a diff erent perspective on the brain. Th e transition from the terrestrial world to that of space

[i]nvolves a passage from a shot that has a certain subjective force, since the bone has been thrown by the ape and there is a relationship of contiguity between them, to a shot that is utterly external in its presentation. Th
e view of the spaceship does not belong to any character and cannot be attributed to any contiguous person; and the following dance to “Th
e Blue Danube Waltz” is meant to be enjoyed as a spectacle, not as the presentation of anybody’s perception or subjectivity. 10

The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 91

If “Th
e Dawn of Man” episode highlighted the solidity of the terrestrial terrain, the apes’ physical proximity to each other, and the bodily movements of the proto-men in relation to the emergence of decision making, what is evident in this untitled segment is a loss of contact with the landscape and with the body expressed in the unsteady movement of humans and the restraints on communicability (particularly in the banality and duplicity of the verbal language that has replaced the vocalization of the apes).

Dr. Heywood Floyd (William Sylvester), on his way to investigate the presence of a disturbing object on the moon, is Moon-Watcher’s replacement.

Yet he appears only aft er an elaborate series of shots in space, highlighting the Hilton Space Station, the vehicle seeking entry to it, and views of the ship’s controls and computer monitors as the ship is brought to a precise landing.

Th
e image of the pilots is impersonal; they are shot from the rear minus dialogue, and the fi rst encounter with the scientist Floyd reveals him to be immobile as he sleeps and not in complete control of the milieu. A moving object, resembling a miniature spaceship (his pen), fl oats until seized by the fl ight attendant, who plants it in his pocket, her movements unsteady in her “grip shoes” (fi gures 5 and 6).

Aft er landing at the space station, Floyd is greeted by the mission controller (Frank Miller). Th
e interior is predominantly white with the exception of the pink-clothed attendants and the startlingly red modernistic chairs seemingly designed for appearance rather than comfort. Finally, the fi lm provides dialogue in the banal and clichéd greetings of the mission controller and Floyd; in Floyd’s telephone conversation to Earth with his daughter, Squirt, played by Vivian Kubrick, the director’s daughter (fi gure 17); and in his interchange with the Russian scientists. Floyd is the antithesis of the ostensibly malevolent scientist of conventional science fi ction who is passionately consumed with the quest for knowledge to eff ect the transformation of humanity into godlike or demonic creatures. Floyd as scientist is without aff ect, a sleepwalker, a transmitter of clichés, un-self-consciously imbued with a sense of superiority.

His gaze is belligerently opaque in his brief but low-key “fi ght” with Smyslov (Leonard Rossiter). Floyd is “consistently casual, aff able, and bored, wearing the same pleasant managerial mask whether it confronts an actual stranger’s face, the video image of his daughter’s face, or that synthetic sandwich. ”11

He is formed in the image of the mechanistic world he inhabits. Th ough identifi ed with space travel, he is indiff erent, if not inured, to the mysteries of outer apace. His affi
nity with the apes seems obscure. He is not a predator for food, and his territoriality is expressed through his reductive use of language to conceal his military objectives. He appears to be a creature of verbal language rather than of vocalization, but his use of words suggests, in Th omas Allen

Nelson’s terms, “an archaic and earthbound verbal baggage. Language has not kept pace with a technological entry into a universe far beyond the boundaries of Earth. ”12 Floyd’s speech and behavior are dissonant with the continuity, openness, and vastness of space.

92

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Despite the elaborateness of the technology and the sophistication of the instrumentation, this episode shares with the postmonolith apes a preoccupation with territoriality (defending a claim to an occupied area), an assumption of the superiority of nation, science, and technology. If the apes do not communicate via words, ironically neither does Floyd. Th e episode with him
portrays the brain of the scientist as consecrated to state power and hence to paranoia, secrecy, and deception. Language is his tool to mystify and conceal; briefi ngs are cryptic and authoritarian; the conversation with the Russians is similarly aggressive and withholding: “language conspires with politics and a primitive social hierarchy to conceal the discovery of the monolith. ”13

Conspicuously, his limited and controlled body movements, verbal impoverishment, and confi ned sensory-motor capacity locate him in a world where intelligence is focused on suspicion, where the brain appears detached from the body, and where knowledge implies secrecy. In this episode, the body disappears; it does not make decisions. Th
e brain gives orders; it is in command
but, as portrayed through Floyd, the human brain has become specialized, capable of purposeful thinking in terms of means and ends, but woefully defi -
cient in imagination, feeling, empathy, and creative activity.

Th
e confrontation of Floyd and the other men with the monolith, which parallels that of the apes, obscures the men’s bodies, giving them the impression of aliens, looking like the insectlike or robotic fi gures familiar in popular science fi ction fi lms. Th
e doctor and his colleagues are helmeted and com-
pletely sheathed in their suits of synthetic material as they move toward the monolith and slowly surround it while the Ligeti music rises in intensity. Like Moon-Watcher, Floyd touches the black object, and the camera lingers on his hand in close-up as he runs it along the edge (fi gure 20). Attention is focused on the man with the camera, who organizes the others into a group in front of the monolith (incongruously like a tourist shot), but then something diff erent occurs than had happened with the apes. Instead of the triumphant Richard Strauss music, the audience hears the Ligeti music culminating in an aversive screeching crescendo and ending in a squeal as the men, apparently in pain, raise their hands to their ears, which are covered by their space helmets, and the scene fades to black.

Th
e distinction between the earlier, prehistorical episode and this cerebral journey resides in the human loss of bodily, sensory-motor connections to the world. What is operative here is the transformation from the actual to the virtual, from the real to its simulacrum. Th
e cinematographic brain is
reduced to images on a monitor: the sumo wrestling observed on the TV by the attendant, the information shown on the screen that enables the pilots to land the spacecraft , and even window shots of the Earth and moon that are like cinematic stills from the interior of the ship. Th e disturbing shriek emanating from the monolith can be construed as a massive reproach to the indif-ferent men who surround it, taking its picture and robbing it of its power and magic. Perhaps this is the fi lm’s conception of popular cinematic technology where the visual images appear to have no links to the outside world, where The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 93
the alienated brain has no connection to an exterior world: it is disjoined from the body, which is an encumbrance rather than a source of knowledge.

Th
is episode is an investigation of vision. Th
e viewer is everywhere con-
fronted with instruments of visual technology: the information on the video monitors, the telephone-video image, and the surveillance technology that separates friend from foe. Th
is visual cornucopia invokes, as in Dr. Strange-
love, a world where vision does not equate with seeing and critical comprehension. Visual and verbal information are exchanged among the men, but it is very clear (as in the encounters among the scientists) that knowledge is withheld. Th
e understated style of these encounters, the implied stylistic dif-ferences between this fi lm and popular cinema suggest that the fi lm is also an exploration of spectatorship and a critique of conventional forms of cinema technology (e.g., the genres of science fi ction).

Perhaps the last moment of this episode with its discordant sound is further a major strategy for jarring the spectator into wakefulness. Th e sound
disrupts and possibly diverts the spectator from the forgetfulness engendered by conventional cinematic forms. Th
e satiric allegory can be compared to the
exploration of language and silence and their relation to scientifi c conditioning dramatized in A Clockwork Orange (1971). In its critique of the scientifi c brain, 2001 has trod the path of other science fi ction narratives. However, in its allegorical treatment, its daring tampering with narrativity, its eschewing of dialogue, character, and psychology, its introduction of critical questions derived from social science and fi lm theory, the fi lm has challenged the clichés about the brain and consciousness dominating the literature, science, and popular writings on the brain.

The Computer Brain

Th
e action now shift s to the spaceship Discovery where three characters—two astronauts, Dave Bowman (Keir Dullea) and Frank Poole (Gary Lockwood), and the computer, HAL (given a human voice by Douglas Rain)—become melodramatically involved in a life-and-death struggle. Th e satiric dimensions
of the previous episodes become elegiac (reinforced by the music of Aram Khatchaturian): “Th
e mood now becomes deeply melancholy—a pair identi-
cal and yet dissociated, like a man and his refl ection—eat and sleep and exercise in absolute apartness, both from one another and from all humankind. ”14

Th
e astronauts’ passive reliance on and complacency about the computer’s brain turn into suspicion and alarm aft er HAL’s expression of concern about

“extremely odd things about the mission” that are linked to the strange story of “something being dug up on the moon” and the “melodramatic touches”

of bringing on board three men in hibernation. Indeed, the struggle between man and computer begins to unfold when HAL characterizes his own unease as “silly” moments before reporting a prospective failure in his AE35 unit.

94

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Th
e Discovery episode contrasts with other science fi ction fi lms in its uses of melodrama, its injection of the politics of sexuality in a cybernetic milieu, its refl exive focus on vision, and its transforming of the usually grotesque alien fi gurations of the extraterrestrial regime into men and their technology. Th
e helmets of Bowman and Poole with their shimmering surfaces are shot at a distance or from above, concealing the astronauts’ faces and making them appear alien. Further, the spaceship appears to have anthropomorphic features, specifi cally heads with prominent eyes (fi gure 21).

Th
e body seems to be most oft en reduced to an image of the head. Elements of the human face are prominent in images of the shuttles with their glowing eyes. Similarly, the cockpits of the ships appear as faces as does “the shape of the Discovery with its elongated round head.” 15 Th
e emphasis on images of the
head underscores the fi lm’s investigation of the specialization of the brain—
now, the computer brain—emphasizing disengagements between body and brain, feeling and rationality, childhood and adulthood. Th e episode’s evok-ing of the imagery of birth and of phallic sexuality and its decidedly anthropomorphic presentation of technology reinforce the allegorical character of the fi lmic text as an exploration of “displaced eroticism and a mystifi cation of modern technology” 16 that obscures distinctions between the human and the technological, the actual and the virtual. Kubrick’s computer brain reproduces the customary tendency to think of technology in terms of received categories of human perception that rely on reason and aff ect in contrast to the latter-day technology of electronic images, which “are the object of a perpetual reorganization” and “no longer seem to refer to the human posture.” 17

HAL’s portrait seems to rely on a conception of technological power based on a mythology of decision making in the interests of establishing control from a central source. Power over others is legitimated by a long-standing myth about human progress: the possibility of producing a robotic intelligence, a machine free from miscalculation, blunders, and lapses.

HAL, the “personifi cation” of the computer brain, is the latest model of the “9000 series,” has never made a computational error and is described by his creators as being virtually incapable of error. As befi tting the fi lm’s resistance to conventional science fi ction imagery, HAL is not a formed robot.

Rather, HAL’s ubiquitous presence is conveyed through his voice, the recurrent image of his Cyclopean eye, and the memory modules stored in the brain room. Th
ough ostensibly the “brain and nervous system of the ship,” HAL
has charisma and his candor exceeds that of the astronauts. Th us, the fi lm
raises the enigma of what goes wrong when HAL diagnoses an error in the AE35 radar unit with tragic eff ect. What accounts for HAL’s rampage against the humans, for the struggle between the computer and the astronauts, and, fi nally, for Bowman’s elimination of HAL’s cerebral functions?

Cybernetic technology is implicated in knowledge and power, and HAL’s brain is a “visually beautiful evocation of institutional order, in keeping with the sounds of HAL’s voice, but at odds with his erratic behavior and the content of his speech.” 18 Th
e confl ict between the human and the computer brains The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 95
in this episode entails human emotion—anxiety, suspicion, rage, shock, and abjection. Th
e agonistic encounter between HAL and the astronauts is not the conventional struggle between man and machine. It is the struggle of man against his own capacity for deceit.

Th
e allegory does not lead in the direction of nostalgia for a prior state of primal innocence and a valorizing of physical life in the body. Rather, the allegory highlights the fi lm’s insistent critical concern with the human capacity for secrecy and deception in defense of territory, power, and position that ultimately leads to murderous aggression and death. Th e fi nal termination
involves Bowman’s forceful reentry into HAL’s body and the dramatic and speedy lobotomizing of HAL’s computer brain (fi gure 22).

Th
e character of HAL has understandably been the focus of much critical attention. HAL’s programming to express emotions in order to facilitate communication is so successful that some writers fi nd HAL’s character more human than the depersonalized astronauts and the crew members in their hibernating chambers. Other critics fi nd HAL sinister, identifi ed with con-spiracy and with the “machine mind” as being “more human than human, and thus doubly doomed to kill and be killed.” 19 HAL’s is a “queer voice” in the fi lm, the carrier of the “odd, the uncanny, the undecidable.” 20 Th
e narra-
tive further suggests a connection between paranoia and cinema linked to Kubrick’s “queer musings on the future of sexuality.” 21 Repressed desire can be read into the portrait of HAL, emblematized in ghostly voices and functioning “as a destabilizing force in the narrative”22 capable of murdering four characters in his charge—the three hibernating men (appropriately identifi ed as undergoing “life termination”) and Frank (whose death is rationalized by HAL as an unfortunate “bad decision”)—and attempting to murder a fi ft h.

HAL’s role as a malevolent instigator of violence certainly speaks to the

“human” character of his make-up. Ultimately, HAL’s actions mime human limitations in relation to thinking and decision making. His vulnerability to emotion in his expression of anxiety about the “strangeness of the mission”

or his expression of fear in the face of his “death” qualifi es him to be regarded as human as does his ability to kill mechanically, to rationalize his actions, and, when apprehended, to express remorse and promise to make “better decisions” in the future. Th
us, HAL is not a fl awless expression of a new and
higher form of thinking but a reminder of humans’ evolutionary limitations in relation to thinking and action. Once again and with greater detail and complexity, the fi lm probes the unresolved tensions between the actual and the virtual.

Th
is melodrama is enhanced by vivid contrasts between sound and silence—the silence of space and the eroticized sounds of the astronauts breathing in their spacesuits—through understatement, the dearth of verbal language, HAL’s disembodied voice, and the reiterated images of the computer’s eye. Indeed, Poole’s death becomes melodramatic not through gory images of an imploded corpse or infl ated aff ective language, but through nuanced images of the receding spacesuit, and the hibernating astronauts’

96

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
deaths are recorded on monitors in machine-generated words while otherwise passing in silence.

Th
e critical moment in this melodrama is Dave’s systematic dismantling of HAL’s memory modules, rendering the aff ective part of the computer brain defunct. HAL’s “demise” is conveyed through the fi lm’s tampering with conventional cinematic language, not in vivid and excessive images of mutilation, but in the lowering of HAL’s voice’s pitch and speed as Dave systematically dismantles HAL’s functional memory and ability to perform independent behavior. Dave’s “surgery” or HAL’s “lobotomy” is, in the context of the allegory of the brain, a shocking action, but the event eschews a binary between good and evil. Dave’s “neutralizing” of HAL would seem motivated by Dave’s reasonable assumption that HAL poses a continuing threat, but the precipitousness of Dave’s action suggests that his motives are tinged with vengefulness. Th e computer brain may be superior to the human brain in its speed of computation, accuracy, and logical thinking, but HAL’s coexistence with human beings also made him vulnerable to human error. What is presented is not a simplistic binary vision of the war of man against the machine but a profound interrogation of man’s wisdom in dominating the computer brain.

HAL’s earlier assessment of the failure of the AE35 radar unit introduces a philosophic and political issue, namely, the human (and melodramatic) tendency to attribute aggression and violence reductively to an “error,” to “bad decisions” stemming from faulty calculations, to fi nd a psychological explanation for one’s “mistakes,” and hence to confess and expect absolution. However, fi nally, the central critical dilemma is not error but the character of the human creators of a machine that is made in their image and is at war with their bodies: “the men become (at least in fantasy) like HAL in that they no longer seem to require a body, sex, life support, or contact with earth.” 23

Th
e disembodiment of the humans is further developed in the fi lm’s treatment of femininity. While portrayals of women are minimal throughout the fi lm (they appear as hostesses and conventional maternal fi gures), conceptions of femininity are not absent but invoked in the somewhat eff eminate voice of HAL and in his “maternal” care-taking of the astronauts (his atten-tiveness to their needs, playing chess, validating Dave’s creativity, and sharing his feelings). Like children, Poole and Bowman are similarly dependent for their life functions on HAL. Th
e two astronauts are infantilized; the hiber-
nating men sleep like babies, their life systems sustained completely by HAL.

Th
e absence of women underscores poignantly the fantasy of a male universe, controlled technologically by thinking machines that can also feel, as personifi ed by HAL, and by humans who are stunted in their aff ect. Yet both the men and the computer are compelled to respond with secrecy, deceit, and aggression to their paranoia about threats to their privilege, dominance, and domain. Ultimately the alienation of the men from their bodies reinforces the contiguity not the diff erence between the humans and the machines they have created. In contrast to celebratory versions of computer technology, the fi lm’s perspective appears to be a morose and critical treatment of humans, who can The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 97
only create a computer brain that mirrors their aggressiveness and territorial ambition. However, are there other ways to understand Kubrick’s treatment of cinema and technology and their relation to the history of thought in fi lm?

The Cinematographic Brain

HAL’s computer brain would seem to be cross-linked at several points to Kubrick’s “cinematic brain.” HAL’s red eye with its yellow pupil is reminiscent of a camera lens, and his ubiquitous presence, monitoring, recording, and controlling the movements of men, elevates HAL to directorial status (fi gure 13). His studio/body is the Discovery itself, and the battle between HAL and the men for dominance turns on HAL’s ability to see them even when they think they have escaped his surveillance. Th
e agonistic encounter between
men and machine, leading to the deaths of four men, the rape-like destruction of the sexually and aff ectively indeterminate computer brain, and Dave’s survival present a critical “history of consciousness. ”24 In the words of Gilles Deleuze: “Our lived relationship with the brain becomes increasingly fragile, less and less ‘Euclidean’ and goes through little cerebral deaths. Th e brain
becomes our problem or our illness, our passion, rather than our mastery, our solution or decision.” 25 Th
us, Kubrick’s treatment of the brain constitutes
a formal strategy for the representation of the fi lm’s thematic and diegetic material.

Th
e cinematographic brain is the fi lm, underscored in the Space Odyssey’s last episode, “Jupiter and Beyond the Infi nite.” Here, the Odyssey’s confrontation with radically diff erent conceptions of the brain reaches its apotheo-sis. Instead of the animal brain advancing inexorably toward domination, the human brain moving relentlessly toward deception, and HAL, the computer made in the likeness of man, dramatizing the failure of both animal and human strategies—unable to command human life without destroying it—the cinematic brain is the creation of media that have the potential to create a diff erent and critical sense of reality.

“Jupiter and Beyond the Infi nite” begins with psychedelic images of the astronaut’s rush through space, intercut with a dizzying montage of lines and colors and close-up images of changing colors in Dave’s eyes, and culminates in the Louis XVI bedroom, Dave’s own aging and death, and the appearance of the monolith and then of the futuristic fetus. Th is episode recapitulates
images and motifs from the previous episodes. 26 Th
e emphasis is on the vast-
ness of the universe, the role of the human traveler now swept up in space and time by forces over which he has no control, and the doubling of images, mirror images, and splitting between objects and their refl ections. Doubling as a distancing device was conspicuous earlier in the fi lm: the doubling of Moon-Watcher and Dr. Floyd; the twinlike appearance of the astronauts Dave and 98

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Frank; the parallel computers on Earth and aboard Discovery; and, of course, the four identical black monoliths. Th
e astronauts’ images are also doubled in
the video transmission from Earth and in the close-ups of their faces as they observe themselves (and as HAL observes them) on the monitors. More doubling is evident in Dave’s two journeys in the pod, fi rst to replace the AE35, then to retrieve Frank.

In the fi nal episode, Dave sees himself in a mirror and over his own shoulder. Aging, freed from his astronaut’s artifi cial skin, he observes himself as an older man sitting at a table. Dave observes himself on a bed as an even more aged human being (fi gure 15). With his fi nal transformation into a fetus, the human form of the astronaut disappears. Camera consciousness presents a direct image of time that presumes a diff erent order of thought, a diff erent conception of the brain, one that is freed from the tyranny of clichés, from identity thinking, and from repetition without diff erence: “At the end of Space Odyssey, it is in consequence of a fourth dimension, that the sphere of the foe-tus and the sphere of the earth have a chance of entering into a new, incom-mensurable, unknown relation, which would convert death into life.” 27

Similar to the fi rst episode in the fi lm, there are no monitors in this epilogue, and the pod disappears to give way to the monolith, and the monolith gives way to the star child. While Moon-Watcher and Floyd had touched the black object, the dying Bowman can only point to its presence for the spectator to see (fi gure 23). Th
e mirror and the early presence of Dave in his spacesuit are reminders of vision but, in contrast to the earlier episodes that prominently featured media, the emphasis on vision and sound is directed largely toward the point of view of the aging Dave and ultimately toward the fi lm spectator, thus suspending the possibility of clarifying the point of view and passing on the burden of thinking to the viewer. If the ending alters the highly technological images of the previous episodes and downplays the multiple registers of vision, it also reiterates, albeit with a diff erence, the limitations of verbalization, “the tyranny of words,” 28 by returning to the techniques of the overture, the images of the ape-men, and the appearance of the monolith.

Th
e reiteration of the images of birth and death is linked to the previous episodes, to the ape-man’s birth of consciousness and his acquisition of power over life and death, to the world of the disembodied scientist whose intelligence is single-mindedly focused on an exercise of state power, to the fetal character of life aboard the spaceship Discovery (exemplifi ed in the sleeping state of the three men and in the passive, childlike images of the astronauts’

existence until they rebelled against their mechanical brain, HAL), and fi nally to the death of Bowman and the appearance of the star child (fi gure 35). In an economic display of images, the epilogue captures how life has passed through diff erent phases in the history of human intelligence, the last being indeterminate in relation to the meaning of life and death. Bowman the astronaut is the last human, and his metamorphosis introduces ambiguous questions of the future, not the past. Is the star child a harbinger of the post-human brain, a The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 99
trope for moribund humanity, or an expression of the coming of diff erent life forms and forms of intelligence?

Th
e cerebral journey has culminated in an indeterminate ending, suggesting in satiric and elegiac fashion that existing conceptions of the brain and forms of knowledge are as inadequate as cinematic technology has become in the post–World War Two world. Th
e shattered crystal wine glass (the glass
ball in Citizen Kane?) is a reminder of irreversible time, of the movement-image contrasted to a diff erent conception of space and time through the crystalline time-image. In Nelson’s words, “2001 brings the human race to the limits of its growth, where, like the bone, it is converted into an artifact that turns to crystal and shatters from the weight of evolutionary gravity. . . . Th e
mirror world has been broken, and beyond its refl exivity awaits the unknown and unexplored. ”29 Accordingly, the allegory confronts the medium in which it is expressed, which involves the history of cinema and, further, the history of consciousness, inviting the spectator to contemplate the cinema and the world as a brain. Th
e viewer is presented with diff erent relations between the brain and the world where “a reconciliation is carried out in another dimension [a fourth dimension], a regeneration of the membrane which would pac-ify the outside [the cosmos] and the inside [the brain], and recreate a world-brain as a whole in the harmony of the spheres.” 30

“Jupiter and Beyond the Infi nite” confounds conceptions of the real that rely on a split between inside and outside, mind and body, cinema and “life.”

Th
e fi lm’s self-refl exive treatment of technology and the medium of cinema is an instrument for sharing with the spectator a critique of spectacle. Th e frac-ture between subjectivity and objectivity, the privileging of vision and knowledge is misguided in “attempts to know the world by seeing the world.” 31 As
the fi nal episode develops, the confl ict between HAL and the humans recedes before technological pyrotechnics, and confusion between the human and the cybernetic brain reigns. Th
e relationships between humans and their cre-
ations metamorphose into self-division and ambivalence.

Th
e episode resolves in a cinematic alternative to anthropomorphic spectacles. Th
e visual and aural images, expressed by the cinematographic brain, belong to the regime of what Deleuze has termed the “time-image” in contrast to the “movement-image,” which is characterized by an identity of image and movement and a sensory-motor relationship among human beings, their milieu, and action. According to Deleuze, “[T]he optical and sound situations of neo-realism contrast with the strong sensory-motor situations of traditional realism,” 32 which rely on distinctions between subjective and objective perception and action within a milieu.

Th
e movement-image is, in its varying forms, linked to the animal, human, and even computer brains, while the time-image is the cinematographic brain. In the time-image, the identity between movement and image has been sundered and a diff erent relation to space and time has emerged, particularly associated with experimental and avant-garde, post–World War 100

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Two cinema and art cinema. Neorealism carried the crisis of the movement-image further with “its slackening of sensori-motor connections.” Th e regime
of the time-image presupposes diff erent conceptions of narration, character, and reception. In neorealism, as an instantiation of the time-image, “the character has become a kind of viewer. He shift s, runs and becomes animated in vain, the situation he is in outstrips his motor capacities on all sides. . . .

He records rather then reacts.” 33 Th e characters in the cinematic regime that

Deleuze terms the time-image are, if not children, somnambulists, visionar-ies, and counterfeiters. Th
e narratives blur lines between the everyday and the exceptional, the real and the imaginary, the physical and the mental, and the fi lms are replete with empty spaces and idle periods of time. Th e “limit situations” in which the characters fi nd themselves extend to the “dehumanized landscapes” where the spectator comes face to face with time. From the cinematic to the digital image, the technology question and its relation to thought has become increasingly complex, raising the issue of the possibility of intelligence and thinking in the face of man’s substitution by the machine. 34

Ultimately, indeterminacy is the guiding principle to the cinematic brain in Kubrick’s fi lm. Th
e spectator, like the characters, is treated as a complex fi eld of forces where the “distinction between subjective and objective . . .

tends to lose its importance, to the extent that the optical situation or visual description replaces the motor action. ”35 Th is indeterminacy is especially
characteristic of electronic media and cybernetics. A generator of new forms of information and knowledge about causality, identity, perception, and materiality, cybernetics is a medium of power and control (technical, biological, and social) in ways still to be understood. Th
e cinema has increasingly been
allied to the production of electronic images that
no longer have any outside (out-of-fi eld) any more than they are internalized as a whole; rather, they have a right side and a reverse, reversible and non-superimposable, like a power to turn back on themselves.

Th
ey are the object of a perpetual reorganization, in which the new image can arise from any point whatever of the preceding image. Th e
organization of space here loses its privileged directions.36

Rather than reveling in or despairing about technology, Kubrick’s fi lm undertakes a cinematic odyssey that unhinges conceptions of space and time in the interests of exploring the fate of knowledge in the age of advanced mechanical reproduction, calling into question existing conceptions of the brain in terms that are temporal rather than spatial, open rather than closed.

Particularly, by means of its allegory, the fi lm questions conceptions of technology based on a reductive conception of and a belief in the “perfection” of the animal, human, cybernetic, and cinematographic. Th e fi lm has off ered
the spectator a version of cinematography as an instrument for refl ecting on consciousness.

The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 101

Notes

1. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: Th
e Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 205–6.

2. Ibid., 211.

3. Mark Crispin Miller, “A Cold Ascent,” Sight and Sound 4, no. 1 (June 1994): 18–

26.

4. D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 202.

5. Arthur C. Clarke, Th
e Lost Worlds of 2001 (New York: New American Library, 1972), 271.

6. Giorgio Agamben, Means without End, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 56.

7. Ibid., 55.

8. Robert Burgoyne, “Narrative Overture and Closure in 2001: A Space Odyssey,”

Enclitic 5, no. 2 (Fall–Spring 1981–1982): 173.

9. Mario Falsetto, ed., “Introduction,” Perspectives on Stanley Kubrick (New York: Hall, 1996), 11.

10. Luis M. García Mainar, Narrative and Stylistic Patterns in the Films of Stanley Kubrick (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 1999), 30.

11. Miller, “A Cold Ascent,” 20.

12. Th
omas Allen Nelson, Kubrick: Inside a Film Artist’s Maze (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2000), 113.

13. Ibid., 114.

14. Miller, “A Cold Ascent,” 24.

15. Randy Rasmussen, Stanley Kubrick: Seven Films Analyzed (Jeff erson, N.C.: McFarland, 2001), 75.

16. Ellis Hanson, “Technology, Paranoia, and the Queer Voice,” Screen 34, no. 2

(Summer 1993): 144.

17. Deleuze, Cinema 2: Th
e Time-Image, 265.

18. Rasmussen, Stanley Kubrick: Seven Films Analyzed, 97.

19. Piers Bizony, 2001 : Filming the Future (London: Aurum, 1994), 18.

20. Hanson, “Technology, Paranoia, and the Queer Voice,” 137.

21. Ibid., 138.

22. Ibid., 140.

23. Ibid., 121.

24. Burgoyne, “Narrative Overture and Closure in 2001: A Space Odyssey,” 174.

25. Deleuze, Cinema 2: Th
e Time-Image, 212.

26. Carolyn Geduld, Filmguide to 2001: A Space Odyssey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 60.

27. Ibid., 206.

28. Nelson, Kubrick, 115.

29. Ibid., 135.

30. Deleuze, Cinema 2: Th
e Time-Image, 206.

31. Burgoyne, “Narrative Overture and Closure in 2001: A Space Odyssey,” 176.

102

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

32. Deleuze, Cinema 2: Th
e Time Image, 5.

33. Ibid., 3.

34. Michel Ciment, Kubrick: Th
e Defi nitive Edition, trans. Gilbert Adair (New York: Faber and Faber, 2001), 126.

35. Deleuze, Cinema 2: Th
e Time-Image, 7.

36. Ibid., 265.

Bibliography

Agamben, Giorgio. Means without End, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.

Ansell Pearson, K. Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. London: Routledge, 2002.

Benjamin, Walter. Th
e Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne. London: Verso, 1996.

Bizony, Piers. 2001 : Filming the Future. London: Aurum, 1994.

Burgoyne, Robert. “Narrative Overture and Closure in 2001: A Space Odyssey,” Enclitic 5, no. 2 (Fall–Spring 1981–1982): 172–180.

Charlot, John. “From Ape-Man to Space-Baby: An Interpretation,” East-West Film Journal 1, no. 1 (December 1986): 84–90.

Chion, Michel. “2001: l’Odyssée de l’espace: Stanley Kubrick, les yeux grands ouverts,”

Positif 439 (August 1997): 82–87.

Ciment, Michel. Kubrick: Th
e Defi nitive Edition, trans. Gilbert Adair. New York: Faber and Faber, 2001.

Ciment, Michel, ed. “Stanley Kubrick, les yeux grands ouverts,” Positif 439 (August 1997): 66–102.

Clarke, Arthur C. Greetings, Carbon-Based Bipeds! Collected Essays 1934–1998. New York: St. Martin’s, 1999.

Clarke, Arthur C. Th
e Lost Worlds of 2001. New York: New American Library, 1972.

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: Th
e Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.

Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: Th
e Time- Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.

Dumont, J. P., and J. Monod. “Beyond the Infi nite: A Structural Analysis of 2001: A Space Odyssey,” Quarterly Review of Film Studies 3, no. 3 (Summer 1978): 297–317.

Ede, François. “De la terre à la lune,” Cahiers du cinéma, no. 503 (June 1996): 76.

Elmsholz, Jean-Marc. “2001: l’Odyssée de l’espace: Stanley Kubrick, les yeux grands ouverts,” Positif 439 (August 1997): 87–89.

Falsetto, Mario. Stanley Kubrick: A Narrative and Stylistic Analysis. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001.

Falsetto, Mario, ed. “Introduction.” Perspectives on Stanley Kubrick. New York: Hall, 1996.

Feldmann, Hans. “Kubrick and His Discontents,” Film Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Fall 1976): 12–19.

The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey 103

Geduld, Carolyn. Filmguide to 2001: A Space Odyssey. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.

Gelmis, Joseph. “Stanley Kubrick: Une fi lm doit être une illumination,” Positif 464

(October 1999): 11–22.

Hanson, Ellis. “Technology, Paranoia, and the Queer Voice,” Screen 34, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 137–62.

Howard, James. Stanley Kubrick Companion. London: Batsford, 1999.

Kagan, Norman. Th
e Cinema of Stanley Kubrick. New York: Continuum, 2000.

Kolker, Robert Phillip. A Cinema of Loneliness: Penn, Kubrick, Scorsese, Spielberg, Altman, 3d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Krukowski, Damon. “Damon Krukowski Listens to 2001: A Space Odyssey,” Film Comment 38 (January–February 2002): 16.

Lucy, Niall. “Total Eclipse of the Heart: Th
inking through Technology,” Senses of Cin-
ema: An Online Journal Devoted to the Serious and Eclectic Discussion of Cinema 7 (June 2000): 1–7. Available. Online: www.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/7/
technology.html.

Mainar, Luis M. García. Narrative and Stylistic Patterns in the Films of Stanley Kubrick.

Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 1999.

Miller, Mark Crispin. “A Cold Ascent,” Sight and Sound 4, no. 1 (June 1994): 18–26.

Nelson, Th
omas Allen. Kubrick: Inside a Film Artist’s Maze. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2000.

Rasmussen, Randy. Stanley Kubrick: Seven Films Analyzed. Jeff erson, N.C.: McFarland, 2001.

Rodowick, D. N. Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997.

104

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

7

Reading HAL

Representation and Artificial Intelligence

MICHAEL MATEAS

In this chapter, I wish to focus on HAL 9000. Rather than reading HAL as a Frankensteinian cautionary tale, a representation of our disquiet over the cybernetic blurring of the human, of our fear of an evolutionary showdown with increasingly autonomous technologies, I’d like to read HAL as a representation of the goals, methodologies, and dreams of the fi eld of Artifi cial Intelligence (AI). As a representation, HAL, and the role he plays within 2001, both captures preexisting intellectual currents that were already operating within the fi eld of AI and serves as an infl uential touchstone, which has had a profound impact on individual AI practitioners and on the aspirations of the fi eld.

I come at this understanding of HAL from a disciplinary position that straddles the humanities, computer science, and digital art practice. While my degree is in computer science, specifi cally in AI, my research focus is on AI-based interactive art and entertainment. Consequently, my research agenda brings to bear new media studies and science studies, digital art practice, and technical research in AI. It is from this hybrid position, working in the context 105
of a joint appointment in both the humanities and computer science, that I wish to read HAL as a representation of technical practice within AI.

In addition to a reading of HAL as a depiction of the disciplinary machinery of AI, HAL of course also functions as a character within the narrative machinery of 2001, a character, as many have pointed out, with more emotional and psychological depth than any of the human characters. Once HAL
is understood as a cinematic representation that simultaneously depicts specifi c agendas and assumptions within AI and performs an expressive function for an audience (i.e., serves as a character within a story), it is a small step to consider AI systems themselves as procedural representations that simultaneously encode agendas and assumptions and perform for an audience. Th e last
section of this chapter will investigate Expressive AI, that is, AI considered explicitly as a medium.

HAL and AI

HAL was, and still is, a powerful inspiration for AI researchers. In HAL’s Legacy, 1 prominent members of the AI research community describe both how HAL infl uenced their own work and the relationship between HAL and the current state of AI research. Th
ere have of course been many depictions of
robots and intelligent computers in sci-fi fi lms, but few of these representations have achieved, for AI researchers, HAL’s emblematic status. Unlike other sci-fi representations of AI, HAL is special because of the way he connects to technical agendas within AI research.

HAL convincingly integrates many specifi c capabilities, such as computer vision, natural language processing, chess playing, etc., demonstrating the elusive generalized intelligence sought by AI researchers. Most fi lmic representations of AI act just like people, adding a few mechanical aff ectations to clearly human performances. Th
ere is no clear relationship between these
fi lmic representations and current lines of research in AI. HAL, on the other hand, appears as a plausible extrapolation from current lines of work, serving as a visualization for the AI community of future AI systems.

Because achieving general intelligence is diffi
cult to turn into a pragmatic
research plan, AI research tends to proceed by attacking subproblems. Th e
problem of creating an intelligent machine is either broken up into deep models of isolated capabilities (e.g., visually recognizing objects, creating plans of action in simplifi ed domains) or broken up into systems that integrate a range of more shallow competencies (e.g., a robot that integrates simple sensing and planning in order to carry out a single task). In both cases, the systems lack general intelligence, the ability to integrate a broad range of knowledge and physical competencies, to apply knowledge from one domain to another, to handle unexpected and new situations. AI systems only perform intelligently on a single, narrow task or within a single, simplifi ed domain.

106

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

HAL presents to researchers a powerful cinematic representation of AI precisely because he simultaneously demonstrates general intelligence while keeping visible the AI subproblems, roughly corresponding to diff erent subfi elds within AI. Th
us researchers can easily recognize AI specialties in HAL’s individual capabilities, which makes HAL plausible, while seeing the individual capabilities integrated into a general intelligence, which makes HAL compelling. Marvin Minsky, one of the founders of AI, served as a technical consultant on the fi lm; doubtless his contribution helped to establish the strong resonance between the depiction of HAL and subfi elds within AI, including language, commonsense reasoning, computer vision, game playing, and planning and problem solving.

Language is one of the hallmarks of intelligence; natural language processing has been part of the AI research agenda since the beginning of the fi eld. HAL demonstrates a range of natural language competencies, including understanding (making sense of sentences and conversations), generation (producing responses), speech recognition, and speech generation. HAL
is able to participate in conversations ranging from simple commands, such as Poole’s commands to raise and lower his headrest and to display his parents’ recorded birthday greeting in his room, to complex conversations where HAL expresses inner confl icts and tells sophisticated lies. In work on natural language processing, researchers quickly discovered that generalized natural language capabilities require commonsense reasoning, that is, a huge amount of knowledge about everyday objects, events, and situations. Th is background
knowledge is needed not only to disambiguate meaning through context, but also to work out the ramifi cations of utterances: an utterance doesn’t just have a denotative meaning, but also a complex halo of connotative meanings and implications for both the speaker and listener. Th
e commonsense reasoning
problem is enormous and unsolved. Th
e problem with common sense is that
it isn’t really a subproblem of the sort that AI researchers typically tackle, but rather seems to be the whole of intelligence; if you have commonsense reasoning, you have general intelligence. For this reason, AI systems that use natural language only function within microdomains: specifi c, simplifi ed domains of expertise. For example, research into dialogue systems (systems that are able to have an extended dialogue) generally takes place in task-based domains, such as travel planning, 2 where the system’s creators are able to assume that all utterances relate directly to the task at hand and where connotative meaning is kept to a minimum.

HAL, on the other hand, demonstrates general language and commonsense reasoning capabilities. Th
is is made plausible for an AI audience by
sneaking this general competency in through the back door of an apparent microdomain. As the shipboard computer for the Discovery, HAL’s primary function is to manage the ship and participate in the mission. Th ough

HAL is certainly introduced as an extremely advanced AI system during the initial interview with the BBC reporter, this interview establishes HAL
as a primarily functional, though advanced, onboard control system for the Reading HAL

107

Discovery. As the plot progresses, HAL gradually exhibits full-blown general language competency and commonsense reasoning from within this microdomain.

HAL’s ability to see is emphasized throughout the fi lm by frequent cuts to his camera eye and by occasionally giving the viewer a subjective view through HAL’s cameras (fi gure 13). HAL demonstrates computer vision capabilities far more sophisticated than anything we’re capable of today. His vision is fully integrated with the rest of his intelligence, allowing him, for example, to talk about what he sees (integrating natural language processing and vision) or to use his vision in pursuit of goals, as when he reads the astronauts’

lips to stay ahead of his adversaries. Again, his visual capabilities are made plausible for an AI audience by demonstrating specifi c visual subproblems.

For instance, when HAL asks to see Bowman’s drawings, HAL is able to recognize the objects depicted in the drawings, including the face of one of the hibernating crewmen. Object and face recognition is one of the standard well-defi ned subproblems of computer vision; by giving the audience a view of the drawings through HAL’s eye, the fi lm emphasizes the specifi c object-recognition task in which HAL is engaged. However, within this same scene, HAL
moves beyond mere object recognition by commenting on Bowman’s drawing style and comparing his current drawings to previous ones. By framing this discussion of style within an implicit object-recognition task framework, the fi lm presents reasoning about style and aesthetics as simple technical extensions of an understood AI research problem.

Game playing, and in particular chess, is one of the classic AI problems; early successes in chess playing were partly responsible for overly optimistic predictions made during the 1960s and 1970s for the achievement of general machine intelligence. Because chess is considered a diffi cult game, something
that “intelligent people” do, it was assumed that if computers could play chess, then they must also be “intelligent.” It turns out, however, that the really diffi

-
cult tasks to make a computer do are generally not the tasks that humans consider to be diffi
cult, such as chess playing, but everyday, “easy” activities, such as using language, seeing the world and understanding what you see, commonsense reasoning, and so forth. At the time that 2001 came out, AI was still in its early, optimistic phase, buoyed by successes on problems such as chess.

Th
e chess-playing scene therefore had special resonance for the AI audience: though HAL’s chess performance may have been better than 1968-era chess-playing programs, chess was a well-understood problem. AI researchers had every confi dence that, in the not-too-distant future, there would be chess-playing programs better than any human player. Th
e chess scene thus estab-
lishes plausibility by demonstrating an easy extrapolation from the current state of a well-understood problem (fi gure 24).

Th
e AI subfi eld of planning and problem solving is concerned with modeling goal-driven activities, that is, how intelligent systems arbitrate among multiple goals and construct and follow plans of actions to accomplish goals.

HAL demonstrates goal-driven behavior in his handling of the “failure” of the 108

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

AE35 unit. Aft er reporting a fi ctitious failure in the AE35 unit, HAL expresses confusion when the diagnostic analysis reveals no failure (HAL: “Yes, it’s puzzling. I don’t think I’ve ever seen anything quite like this before”) and suggests that the unit be replaced until it fails (fi gure 25). HAL’s confusion about the AE35 unit can be read two ways. Either he is quite self-consciously lying about the AE35 unit as part of some master plan to sever communications with mission control and lure the astronauts out into space where he can kill them, or he is genuinely confused about the AE35, indicating an internal confl ict. For an AI audience, both cases are clear instances of goal-based behavior. In the fi rst case, HAL has a goal to eliminate the astronauts, whom he has identifi ed as dangerous to the success of the mission, and has generated an elaborate plan to eliminate them, a plan within which he is able to improvise when the situation changes, such as when Bowman forgets his space helmet when he goes out to retrieve Poole. HAL sees that Bowman has forgotten his helmet, which enables HAL to achieve his goal of eliminating Bowman, since now all HAL has to do is refuse Bowman entry. (We can only speculate about what HAL’s plan would have been had Bowman not forgotten his helmet: perhaps teleoperating a second pod to disable Bowman’s pod?) In the second case, HAL’s behavior can be interpreted as a goal confl ict: a situation in which some of HAL’s actions, such as reporting the fault in the AE35, are executed in pursuit of one goal, while other actions, such as the actions to diagnose the fault, are executed in the pursuit of a diff erent goal, with the result that HAL’s overall behavior is incoherent. Th
e goal-based behavior evident in either reading
resonates strongly for an AI audience because of the connection with the subfi eld of planning and problem solving.

In addition to referencing specifi c subfi elds within AI, HAL also resonates with the AI audience through indirect references to the Turing Test.

Alan Turing, in his seminal article on machine intelligence, sought to replace philosophical arguments about whether machines can think with an operational defi nition of intelligence. 3 In the Turing Test, a human judge engages in typed conversation, through a terminal, with both a human and a machine, which are present in another room.4 Th e judge must determine, based on
the responses to her typed queries, which is the human and which is the machine. If the judge can’t tell the diff erence, we deem the machine to be

“intelligent.” Th
e notions that something is intelligent if it seems intelligent and, more generally, that questions of identity (essence) should be replaced with questions about functional or behavioral equivalence, are generally accepted by AI practitioners.

In the interview with the BBC reporter, when asked if HAL has emotions, Bowman responds:

Well, he acts like he has genuine emotions. Of course he’s programmed that way to make it easier for us to talk to him. But as to whether or not he has real feelings is something that I don’t think anyone can truthfully answer.

Reading HAL

109

Th
is reference to behavioral equivalence immediately cues the AI audience. Th
e issue of “genuine emotion” has been replaced with behavioral equivalence; HAL acts like he has emotions, so he should be treated as having emotions. Th
is move establishes a double perspective throughout the rest of the fi lm. Whenever HAL acts in a humanlike way, the audience (particularly the AI audience) simultaneously reads HAL’s behavior at face value, as the behavior of a thinking, feeling, conscious being, and sees it as a consequence of entirely mechanical, comprehensible, functional processes. Bowman and Poole explicitly refer to this ambiguous double reading during their discussion of HAL’s malfunction (the discussion in the pod). In the mechanical view, HAL is simply a faulty component that may have to be disconnected; this is the view unproblematically adopted by Poole. Bowman, however, expresses concern that no 9000 series computer has ever been disconnected before and that he’s not sure what HAL will think about this. Th e tension of this double
reading peaks during HAL’s fi nal scene, as he expresses fear and pain during the disconnection of his higher brain functions (“I’m afraid, Dave. Dave, my mind is going. I can feel it . . .”). Th
e audience is caught between reading this
as the output of a machine or as the words of a being toward whom we have moral responsibility; in the context of the Turing Test, both are true.

Classical AI

In recent years, discourse about AI’s high-level research agenda has been structured as a debate between symbolist, classical AI (sometimes called good old-fashioned AI, or GOFAI), and behavioral, or interactionist AI. Th e classical-interactionist distinction has shaped discourse within AI and cognitive science, in cultural theoretical studies of AI, and in hybrid practice combining AI and cultural theory. 2001 was released during the ascendancy of classical AI, and indeed, HAL accurately represents the vision of classical AI.5

Classical AI is characterized by its concern with symbolic manipulation and problem solving. A fi rm distinction is drawn between mental processes happening “inside” the mind and activities in the world happening “outside”

the mind. 6 Classical AI’s research program is concerned with developing the theories and engineering practices necessary to build minds exhibiting intelligence. Such systems are commonly built by expressing special-purpose knowledge about a specifi c task (such special-purpose knowledge is typically called “domain knowledge”) as symbolic structures and specifying rules and processes that manipulate these structures. Intelligence is considered to be a property that inheres in the symbol manipulation happening inside the mind.

Th
is intelligence is exhibited by demonstrating the program’s ability to solve problems.

Where classical AI concerns itself with mental functions, such as planning and problem solving, interactionist AI is concerned with embodied agents 110

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
interacting in a physical or virtual world. Rather than solving complex symbolic problems, such agents are engaged in a moment-by-moment dynamic pattern of interaction with the world. Oft en there is no explicit representation of the “knowledge” needed to engage in these interactions. Rather, the interactions emerge from the dynamic regularities of the world and the reactive processes of the agent. As opposed to classical AI, which focuses on internal mental processing, interactionist AI assumes that having a body embedded in a concrete situation is essential for intelligence. It is the body that defi nes many of the interaction patterns between the agent and its environment. For the interactionist, a body is necessary even for forming abstract concepts; abstractions are based on sensory-motor experience.

Th
e bodiless HAL engages in the sense-plan-act cycle of classical AI. During sensing, an internal representation of the state of the world is updated by making inferences from sensory information. In addition to containing a model of the state of the world, this interior symbolic space contains the goals or intentional structures of the AI system. Th e system then constructs
a plan of action for accomplishing goals, given the represented state of the world. Finally, the system carries out this plan in the world and begins the cycle anew. HAL’s physicality, his sensory-motor apparatus, is distributed throughout the ship in the form of cameras, microphones, and the myriad of ship systems he can control. As a classical system, the particular confi guration of HAL’s sensory-motor system has no eff ect on his interior, mental structure. If new sensors, for example, infrared cameras, or new eff ectors, for example a robotic arm attached to the main console, are added to HAL, it doesn’t change the way HAL thinks; he merely would have new physical capabilities. For interactionist AI, the particular shape or confi guration of the body strongly aff ects the mind; change the structure of the body, and you change the structure of the mind. HAL’s bodiless cognition makes him a clear example of classical AI.

HAL’s radical interiority, an internal mental (symbolic) space into which neither Bowman, Poole, nor we as viewers have access, is emphasized through the use of reaction shots focusing on one of HAL’s camera eyes. Where normally a reaction shot reveals, through bodily (including facial) position and movement, a character’s motivational and emotional responses to a situation, letting us into a character’s interior space, for HAL, who is in some sense pure mind, the reaction shots remain opaque, giving viewers a sense of an interior they are not allowed to enter. Th
is technique is used, with increas-
ingly chilling eff ect, starting with the fi rst hint of HAL’s malfunction. During the conversation in which HAL reveals his concerns about the mission to Bowman, the frequent cuts to HAL’s eye during the conversation give us a sense of depths in HAL, while keeping those depths mysterious. When Dave responds to HAL’s concerns with the mild rebuke “You’re working up your crew psychology report?” the camera focuses on HAL’s eye and holds for a beat before HAL responds, “Of course I am. Sorry about this. I know it’s a bit silly.” HAL then interrupts himself with the clipped “Just a moment. Just a Reading HAL

111
moment,” which signals the full onset of his psychosis. Similarly, during the death scene of the hibernating crewmen, the camera cuts between the life support alarms and one of HAL’s expressionless camera eyes, further reinforcing a sense of complex interior machinations that remain inaccessible in the world of bodies.

Th
e chess-playing scene further establishes HAL as an instance of classical AI. Chess, with its properties of a completely knowable world (the board), deterministic interactions (the rules), simple evaluation of success (win, lose, draw), but still off ering within this simple framework a huge range of strate-gic and tactical options, was a popular domain for classical AI research. Th e
simple and noise-free nature of chess eff ectively trivializes the sense and act portions of the sense-plan-act cycle, squarely placing the focus on internal representation and reasoning. HAL’s facility with chess would have strongly resonated with AI researchers in the late 1960s and the 1970s, serving as an indicator that HAL is, indeed, intelligent.

Interactionist AI researchers, who see mind arising out of the behavioral details of physical interaction in the world, are more likely to resonate with sci-fi representations that emphasize robots and androids. In the episode

“Robots Alive” of television’s Scientifi c American Frontiers featuring interactionist AI researcher Rodney Brooks, Brooks mentions that the ultimate goal of his work is to be able to build Lieutenant Commander Data, an android in Star Trek: Th
e Next Generation. 7 However, unlike HAL, Data fails to demonstrate general intelligence while maintaining connections to specifi c technical subproblems within interactionist AI research. While Data is certainly a lik-able character, and various “Star Trek” plots have explored the philosophical problems of Data’s personhood, he fails to achieve the same inspiring plausibility, the magic of making general intelligence seem a natural extrapolation from current technical work. For AI researchers, HAL remains a uniquely powerful and infl uential popular media representation of AI.

AI and Transcendence

Th
e environment of the Discovery is cold and antiseptic, dominated by hospital-white consoles and information displays, an environment in which the emotionless astronauts live completely scheduled lives dominated by formal procedures and routines, watched over by the infallible rationality of HAL.

Th
e Discovery is a perfect Taylorist environment, a closed world in which all contingencies have been modeled and accounted for, at least until HAL’s fatal malfunction. HAL’s rationality, and his physical manifestation in the total (and totalizing) environment of the Discovery, form an odd disjunction with the fi lm’s last sequence: Bowman’s transcendent rebirth as the star child (fi gure 35). Apparently, rationality must be defeated, HAL deactivated, before transcendence can occur. However, within the culture of AI, HAL

112

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
and the birth of the star child are not contradictory, but are rather part of the same agenda: the transcendence of the human through the creation of thinking machines.

In Th
e Religion of Technology, David Noble traces the explicitly religious, primarily Christian drive to transcend the body and the material world that operates as part of the disciplinary logic of atomic weapons science, space exploration, genetic engineering, and AI. Noble argues that AI continues in the Cartesian tradition of a strong separation of mind and body, with the thinking, abstract mind seen as having a direct relationship to God, and hence to truth, while the body, with its sensory, animal appetites, distracts the divine, thinking mind.8

Th
e foundational move in AI, particularly classical AI, is to view mind as an abstract process, something that is not necessarily tied to the contingencies of human brains and bodies but can rather be abstracted and run on multiple hardware platforms, including digital computers. Minsky has described the human brain as a mere “meat machine,” and the body, that “bloody mess of organic matter,” as a “teleoperator for the brain.” 9 Mind is a process, a collection of functional relationships; it is only an accident of history that mental processes are implemented in the organic brains of human beings. If mind can be released from the shell of the body, running free on ever-faster, more-effi

-
cient hardware, it is only a matter of time before these minds achieve human-level, then superhuman intelligence.

In this AI eschatology, there is an intermediate period before machine intelligence surpasses the human, a period in which human and machine intelligence work together in tightly integrated human-machine symbiosis.

Th
is is the era of the cyborg, the era in which we live now, in which the focus is on the computer as an infi nitely fl exible medium that extends the thinking capabilities of the human mind. J. C. R. Licklidder, infl uential MIT psychologist and fi rst head of the computer research program at the U.S. government’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), established ARPA’s long-term funding of both AI and advanced human-computer interaction and communication techniques, including the development of ARPAnet, which eventually became the Internet (ARPA was eventually renamed the present-day DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). In 1960, he discussed the relationship between human-computer systems and the ultimate goals of AI:

Man-computer symbiosis is probably not the ultimate paradigm for complex technological systems. It seems entirely possible that, in due course, electronic or chemical “machines” will outdo the human brain in most of the functions we now consider exclusively within its province. . . . In short, it seems worthwhile to avoid argument with (other) enthusiasts for artifi cial intelligence by conceding dominance in the distant future of cerebration to machines alone. Th ere will nevertheless be a fairly long interim during which the main intellectual Reading HAL

113
advances will be made by men and computers working together in intimate association. 10

HAL represents the extreme end of the era of human-computer symbiosis, a thinking tool able to function on its own, ready, and, in this case, willing to be free of its human users. For a brief period (Licklidder describes this period as being somewhere in the range of “15 to 400 years”), machines aug-ment human intelligence in a symbiotic union; ultimately however, artifi cial intelligence exceeds human intelligence. At this stage the new machine super-intelligences break out on their own evolutionary path. Like the dinosaurs, humans, in their current, messy, wet, biological form, are left far behind, an evolutionary experiment that had its day but has been superseded by infi -
nitely more accomplished machine minds.

Yet personal human identity need not be lost, for the advent of superhuman machine intelligence also signals the advent of immortality. In Mind Children, Hans Moravec, a robotics researcher at Carnegie Mellon University who developed early, infl uential, autonomous robots while at Stanford, describes a technical vision in which human minds are uploaded out of biological bodies into superior robotic bodies with superfast computer brains.11

In this new substrate of silicon and steel, human minds can run much faster than on wet brains, allowing the uploaded individual to think, learn, develop, and change at superhuman speeds:

Your new abilities will dictate changes in your personality. Many of the changes will result from your own deliberate tinkerings with your own program. Having turned up your speed control a thou-sandfold, you notice that you now have hours (subjectively speaking) to respond to situations that previously required instant reactions.

You have time, during the fall of a dropped object, to research the advantages and disadvantages of trying to catch it, perhaps to solve its diff erential equations of motion. You will have time to read and ponder an entire on-line etiquette book when you fi nd yourself in an awkward social situation. . . . In general, you will have time to undertake what would today count as major research eff orts to solve trivial everyday problems. 12

Our new robotic bodies, equipped not with two clumsy hands, but with fractal, nanoscale manipulators, are able to continuously remake our material reality at the atomic scale. But such bodies are only the beginning; our minds will inhabit ever more subtle physical manifestations, moving toward ever more radical new modes of existence, just as the star child in 2001 exhibits a radical, new materiality.

Our speculation ends in a supercivilization, the synthesis of all solar-system life, constantly improving and extending itself, spreading out-114

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
ward from the sun, converting nonlife into mind. . . . Th e process,
possibly occurring elsewhere, might convert the entire universe into an extended thinking entity, a prelude to even greater things. 13

Th
us humans, personal identities intact (at least at the beginning), are able to gallop off into the postbiological future with their artifi cially intelligent children.

Moravec is not alone in this AI-based evolutionary eschatology. He is capturing discussions that have been in the AI community for years and that have been described by other researchers, such as Ray Kurzweil, who, in Th e Age of

Spiritual Machines, describes a similar postbiological future. 14

Given this eschatological current running through the AI research community, the apparent disjunction between the rational, instrumental HAL
and the “Star Child” sequence disappears, unifi ed by a single evolutionary story that sees the development of artifi cial intelligence as the crucial next step for achieving transcendence. Arguably, HAL is not the only AI operating within 2001. Th
e monoliths themselves are extremely fl exible, esoteric, alien machines, capable of subtly manipulating animal minds in order to push them in specifi c evolutionary directions (as in “Th
e Dawn of Man” sequence), capa-
ble of functioning for millions of years and operating as a signal device (as in the “Moon Base” sequence), and capable of serving as a gateway into a new reality, again facilitating an evolutionary jump (the “Star Child” sequence). To viewers, the complete opacity of function and the mystery surrounding the monoliths are exactly what one would expect from highly evolved postbiological AIs, whose thoughts, motivations, and physical interactions with the world are so advanced as to be completely inscrutable to those lower on the evolutionary chain. As Arthur C. Clarke famously quipped, “Any suffi ciently
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. ”15 HAL serves as a way-point in this evolutionary story of technologically mediated transcendence, with the apes on the low end, the monoliths and the star child on the high end, and contemporary humans and HAL in the middle. Th e postbiological
monoliths eff ectively upload Bowman into a new form, one that presumably functions at a level of consciousness and inhabits a reality closer to the monoliths’ own.

Like any evolutionary story, this one has its winners and losers. Th e apes
killed at the waterhole by the tool-assisted, monolith-accelerated tribe certainly don’t celebrate the discovery of tools. HAL, Poole, and the three hibernating scientists are all losers, killed in a confl ict between roughly equivalent intelligences at the evolutionary fork of biological and nonbiological intelligence. Th
e monolith-accelerated simians and monolith-accelerated Bowman are the big winners, each becoming the “next big thing” in the progression toward ultimate consciousness. Th
ough HAL is a loser in this round, he is
ultimately vindicated by the monoliths themselves; nonbiological intelligence, far from being an evolutionary dead end, ultimately becomes the shepherd of human intelligence.

Reading HAL

115

AI as Representation

In this chapter, we’ve been exploring how the cinematic representation of HAL functioned (and continues to function) for the audience of AI researchers, serving as a more eff ective galvanizing inspiration for AI than other sci-fi representations by eff ectively tapping AI research culture to bring to the screen a plausible visualization of the AI dream, a generally intelligent artifi -
cial mind. However, in addition to functioning as a cinematic representation of and within the disciplinary machinery of AI, HAL functions as a character within the narrative machinery of 2001, a character who, as noted, has more emotional and psychological depth than any of the human characters within the fi lm. HAL immediately begins establishing empathy with the audience from his early appearance during the interview with the BBC reporter, where HAL expresses pride in his “perfect” functioning and the satisfaction of “putting myself to the fullest possible use, which is all I think that any conscious entity can ever hope to do,” while Bowman and Poole off er mild and unexpressive responses. Th
e audience experiences a growing sense of both
horror and mystery as HAL’s malfunction turns into a murderous psychosis; the frequent shots of HAL’s camera eyes invite the audience to imagine what might be going on in HAL’s mind. Finally, as Bowman deactivates HAL’s higher mental functions, the audience experiences sadness and pity at HAL’s obvious fear and pain: “Stop Dave. Stop will you. I’m afraid. I’m afraid, Dave.

Dave, my mind is going. I can feel it. I can feel it. My mind is going. Th ere is
no question about it. I can feel it. I can feel it. I can feel it” (fi gure 22).

Once HAL’s double function is recognized—how he simultaneously serves as a representation of research agendas and disciplinary assumptions within AI and as an expressive resource within the movie—we can turn this double vision to AI systems themselves, considering them as procedural representations that simultaneously encode disciplinary assumptions and agendas and function for an audience. For example, we can begin asking what it would mean to build HAL 9000, not as a general intelligence controlling a spaceship bound for Jupiter, but as an AI-based character within an interactive story or game based on 2001. Th
is double vision requires unpacking the agendas
and assumptions implicit in diff erent AI architectures and approaches, that is, a critical practice of reading AI systems, while simultaneously remaining engaged in the development of alternative technical approaches informed by the critical readings: a critical technical practice. Th is double vision also
requires viewing AI systems as performing for an audience, rethinking AI as a kind of procedural art. Finally, the critical technical practice and the concerns of procedural art must be put together to create an Expressive AI, an AI whose fundamental research concern is understanding how the architectural and methodological details and assumptions of the technical system enable specifi c audience experiences.

116

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Before continuing, it’s important to clarify how the term architecture is used in AI. Architecture refers to the organizational strategy of an AI system, the diff erent components of the system, the relationships among these components, and the metaphors around which the individual components have been designed (e.g., “memory,” “knowledge,” “rules,” etc.). As is described in more detail below, an architecture is simultaneously a technical and conceptual construct, a piece of running code and a theory, hypothesis, or story about intelligence.

Critical Technical Practice

Agre introduced the term critical technical practice (CTP) to describe a technical practice that actively refl ects on its own philosophical underpinnings and, by bringing in humanistic and artistic knowledge, approaches, and techniques, opens up new technical directions and approaches. Agre, who was specifi cally working within AI, describes CTP:

A critical technical practice would not model itself on what Kuhn called “normal science,” much less on conventional engineering.

Instead of seeking foundations it would embrace the impossibility of foundations, guiding itself by a continually unfolding awareness of its own workings as a historically specifi c practice. It would make further inquiry into the practice of AI an integral part of the practice itself. It would accept that this refl exive inquiry places all of its concepts and methods at risk. 16

Agre focuses his attention on the assumptions and agendas implicit in the standard AI view of planning, fi nding these assumptions problematic when applied to the dynamics of everyday life. Specifi cally, he fi nds the strong separation between mind and world that operates in the standard AI view of planning unable to account for the everyday experience of living in the world, which is revealed by phenomenological and ethnographic analyses. Th rough
a deconstructive inversion of this master narrative, Agre has developed an alternative architecture that continually redecides what to do by using a dependency maintenance network with relative, rather than absolute and objective, representations of world objects as inputs.

Expressive AI, described in more detail below, is an instance of CTP. In addition to drawing inspiration from Agre’s work, several other CTPs also inform my thinking about Expressive AI. Sengers employs schizoanalysis to investigate how assumptions in standard autonomous agent architectures lead to incoherent behavior and uses this analysis to build an alternative agent architecture organized around narrative principles. 17 Penny engages in refl ex-Reading HAL

117
ive engineering, combining art practice with robotics. Th rough his art practice, he examines the notion of physical embodiment, specifi cally exploring how much of the intelligence exhibited in the robot’s interactions with viewers is a result of the physical design of the robot and the physicality of the viewers’ interactions with the robot.18 Sack employs a cultural studies perspective on language to engage in the computer analysis of human language use. For example, the conversation map employs a social network approach to automatically analyze large-scale, distributed conversations taking place in Internet news groups. 19

Th
e analysis in this chapter of how HAL functions as a representation of AI is an example of the sort of critical analysis employed in CTP. HAL functions so eff ectively for the AI research audience precisely because he taps into the research goals of specifi c subfi elds, assumptions, and agendas within classical AI, as well as the spiritual and evolutionary dreams of the fi eld. In the case of HAL, he’s not a procedural representation (a program), but rather a cinematic representation of a program. Most cinematic sci-fi representations of AI are not amenable to this critical/technical analysis because they don’t provide the necessary hooks into AI research culture to trace the detailed relationships between the cinematic representation and AI research; in most cases, there is little to say except that the AI character is really a human character in machine disguise. However, because the character of HAL was carefully constructed to resonate with the AI community (part of the pursuit of realism that one sees throughout the technologies represented in 2001), HAL actually provides the hooks to make such an analysis possible.

AI-Based Art

Th
e AI dream is to build representations of the human in the machine, to build intelligent creatures, companions who, through their similarities with and diff erences from us, tell us something about ourselves. Th is dream is not
just about modeling rational problem solvers but about building machines that in some sense engage us socially, have emotions and desires, and interact with us in meaningful, culturally rich, eff ective, and aff ective ways. Woody Bledsoe, former president of the AAAI (American Association for Artifi cial Intelligence), described this dream in his 1985 presidential address: Twenty-fi ve years ago I had a dream, a daydream, if you will. A dream shared with many of you. I dreamed of a special kind of computer, which had eyes and ears and arms and legs, in addition to its “brain.”

. . . My dream was fi lled with the wild excitement of seeing a machine act like a human being, at least in many ways. . . . My dream computer person liked to walk and play Ping-Pong, especially with me. 20

118

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

AI is a way of exploring what it means to be human by building systems.

An AI architecture is a machine to think with, a concrete theory and representation of some aspect of the human world. Art also explores what it means to be human by building concrete representations of some aspect of the human world. Combining these two ways of knowing-by-making opens a new path toward the AI dream, a path which takes seriously the problem of building intelligences that robustly function outside of the lab to engage human participants in intellectually and aesthetically satisfying interactions.

As a character, HAL eff ectively intrigues, horrifi es, and creates identifi cation and empathy with the audience. What would it mean to create actual, running AI systems that operate as eff ectively as characters as HAL does as a cinematic AI character? Th
is is the research area of believable agents, the construction of autonomous characters with rich personalities, emotions, and social behaviors. 21 When Turing introduced his famous test for intelligence, he also introduced a subversive and not always recognized idea: intelligence is not a property of a system itself, but rather resides in the details of interactions with and the perceptions of an observer. Th
e concept of believability, a
term borrowed from character artists and introduced into AI discourse by the Oz project at Carnegie Mellon University, is, like the Turing Test, an observer-centric notion. 22

However, instead of focusing on imitating the responses of a “generic human,” research on believability focuses on character, on rich and compelling presentations of behavior that foster the willing suspension of disbelief. Where the Turing Test is about closing the gap between the real and not-real (building systems which are indistinguishable from a real human), believability is about building autonomous agents that function as if real, in the same way that characters such as Hamlet or HAL can’t be described unequivocally as real or fake, but rather function as if real within their respective representational worlds.

Believable-agents researchers attempt to leverage insights and craft practices from the character arts and apply them to AI models of characters.

To create a HAL character within an interactive story world, the AI system would need to operationalize strategies for representing a disembodied mind that fi nds itself trapped in a psychosis-producing goal confl ict. For example, the virtual camera providing the player with a view into the world (assuming the story world is represented as a three-dimensional virtual world, the standard in contemporary games) may dynamically cut at key moments to show one of HAL’s impassive eyes, emphasizing HAL’s interior cognitive space. But, unlike the cinematic application of this trope, where the director and editor have complete control over when such a cut should occur and what action immediately precedes or follows the cut, in the interactive version, this trope must be procedurally encoded. Th
e player within the story world may cause
diff erent actions to occur at any time. Th
e system must be capable of mak-
ing autonomous decisions about when to cut to a reaction shot of HAL’s eye, depending on the action taking place within the story world.

Reading HAL

119

As discussed above, HAL’s facility with natural language is one of the important cues that allows an audience, particularly the AI audience, to believe that HAL has general intelligence. Within the story world, the player should be able to converse in natural language with the interactive HAL character. However, since we don’t really have AI systems that have general language competence, as well as commonsense reasoning, the interactive HAL
character will require a more special-purpose language competence that allows it to process language within the limited domain of the story world; the language competence should give the illusion of general intelligence, while actually being designed to handle a much more limited language domain.

Much of this will involve clever writing and the generation of responses that can mask natural language system failures, the cases where the system fails to understand or perhaps incompletely understands the player’s utterance. In such cases, HAL (the character) should respond with story content, such as a character backstory, or by announcing a new story event (e.g., the failure of the AE35 unit), in such a way as to simultaneously mask the understanding failure and to implicitly suggest to the player new directions of conversation and action that the system is capable of handling. In both the case of automated camera control and character-specifi c natural language conversation, representational tropes that were under the complete control of the fi lmmaker in the cinematic version of 2001 must now be procedurally captured in an autonomous AI system in order to build an interactive version of the HAL
character.

Of course, art practice is broader than the creation of characters. But the notion of believability, with its focus on the observer’s perception of the AI system, can be generalized to a notion of procedural poetics, to a concern with systems that engage in internally consistent, evocative, and compelling behaviors, that encourage participants to suspend disbelief and interact with the system. With AI-based art, attention moves from the unproblematic pursuit of general intelligence toward an explicit concern with systems that put into operation representational tropes or fi gures that explicitly perform for an audience. Th
is opens up a new technical and artistic research area, one concerned with building AI systems that support authorship and audience interpretation within specifi c expressive contexts.

Expressive AI

AI-based art is more than just an application area of AI, the unproblematic appropriation of AI technologies to expressive ends. Rather, it is an entirely new research agenda, an agenda that self-consciously views AI systems as media, a stance from which all of AI can be rethought and transformed. I call this new research agenda and art practice Expressive AI.23

120

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Th
e central research problem in Expressive AI is developing architectures that balance authorship and autonomy. For an architecture to support authorship, the architecture must have appropriate authorial aff ordances to support the experiences that the author wants to create. Th ese aff ordances, or
authorial “hooks,” must allow the author to describe, at appropriate levels of abstraction, the audience experience that the author wants to create. However, complete authorial control would require pre-scripting all possible audience interactions with the system, predescribing all possible experiences the system can create. For complex interactions, such authorial pre-scripting is literally impossible. Th
erefore the architecture must support appropriate autonomy; it must be able to make use of the author-given description of the desired experience in such a way as to respond to myriad audience interactions that were not directly foreseen by the author, to generate endless variations that, while not directly specifi ed by the author, have the author’s desired style.

Interpretive aff ordances support the interpretations an audience makes about the operations of an AI system. Interpretive aff ordances provide resources both for narrating the operation of the system, and additionally, in the case of an interactive system, for supporting intentions for action. Th e

AI system can be seen as providing a linkage between author and audience; the author inscribes procedural potential within the system, potential which is released as a concrete performance during interactions with the audience.

Th
e architecture is craft ed in such a way as to enable just those authorial aff ordances that allow the artist to manipulate the interpretive aff ordances dictated by the concept of the piece. At the same time, the architectural explorations suggest new ways to manipulate the interpretive aff ordances, suggesting new conceptual opportunities. Th
us both the artist’s engagement with the inner
workings of the architecture and the audience’s experience with the fi nished artwork are central, interrelated concerns for Expressive AI.

If we think again of an interactive HAL character, existing in an interactive world and not a fi lm, we would need to ask what interpretive and authorial aff ordances must be supported by this system. On the interpretive side, our HAL character must automate representational tropes for communicat-ing the character of a disembodied, rational intelligence that becomes troubled by an unsolvable goal confl ict, as well as be able to move the confl ict between HAL and the astronauts (presumably, the players are taking the role of the astronauts) forward. Such tropes include the reaction shot and language capabilities described above, as well as strategies such as depicting the progressive disturbance of HAL’s thought and depicting HAL’s general intelligence (by, for example, suggesting a game of chess with the player). On the authorial side, the architecture of the HAL character must support the author in expressing the knowledge and algorithms necessary to carry out the representational tropes or strategies. For example, the architecture might explicitly reason about diff erent strategies for depicting HAL’s progressive psychosis, allowing the author to create a collection of such strategies from among Reading HAL

121
which the system can dynamically select, depending on the player’s actions in the world. Th
e architecture might provide a special-purpose rule language for authoring camera control rules for deciding when and for how long the camera should cut to a reaction shot of one of HAL’s eyes. In any event, the specifi cs of the architecture used to author the HAL character are inextricably tied to the specifi cs of how the HAL character presents itself to the audience; interpretive and authorial aff ordances mutually defi ne each other.

Expressive AI engages in a sustained inquiry into authorial aff ordances, craft ing specifi c architectures that aff ord appropriate authorial control for specifi c artworks. Th
is inquiry into authorial aff ordances makes Expressive AI a critical technical practice. For authorial aff ordances are not purely a technical code issue, but rather lie in the relationship between the code and ways of talking about the code.

AI (and its sister discipline, artifi cial life) consists of both technical strategies for the design and implementation of computational systems and a paired, inseparable, tightly entangled collection of rhetorical and narrative strategies for talking about and thus understanding these computational systems as intelligent and/or alive.

Th
ese rhetorical strategies enable researchers to use words such as “goal,”

“plan,” “decision,” and “knowledge” to simultaneously refer to specifi c computational entities (pieces of program text, data items, algorithms) and to make use of the systems of meaning these words have when applied to human beings. Th
is double use of language embeds technological systems in broader systems of meaning.

Th
e rhetorical strategies used to narrate the operation of an AI system vary depending on the technical approach, precisely because these interpretive strategies are inextricably part of the approach. Every system is doubled, consisting of both a computational and a rhetorical machine. Doubled machines can be understood as the interaction of (at least) two sign systems: the sign system of the code and a sign system used to interpret and talk about the code.

Th
e central problem of AI is oft en cast as the “knowledge representation”

problem. Th
is is precisely the problem of defi ning structures and processes that are amenable simultaneously to the uninterpreted manipulations of computational systems and to serving as signs for human subjects. Th is quest
has driven AI to be the most promiscuous fi eld of computer science, engaging in unexpected and ingenious couplings with numerous fi elds, including psychology, anthropology, linguistics, physics, biology (both molecular and macro), ethnography, ethology, mathematics, and logic. Th is rich history of
simultaneous computational and interpretive practice serves as a conceptual resource for the AI-based artist. In Expressive AI, the doubled machine, consisting of both code and rhetoric, is explicitly defi ned and manipulated; it is precisely the relationship between language and code that creates architectural aff ordances, making the architecture not just a bunch of code, but a way of thinking about the world.

122

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

And so we come full circle back to HAL. HAL is a fi lmic representation of an AI system, one that can be read to unpack the culture, agendas, and assumptions of the AI research community. HAL is also an eff ective character within a story, establishing empathy with the audience and serving a function within the plot. Actual AI systems can also be viewed as representations and are similarly amenable to readings that unpack the world view implicit in the architecture. Th
e move to considering AI systems as media
then opens up the possibility of AI-based art and entertainment, systems that engage in internally consistent, evocative, and compelling behaviors, that encourage participants to suspend disbelief and interact with the system. Finally, the deep readings of the double system, the combination of code plus rhetoric, can be employed not just analytically or critically, but constructively, to actively create AI architectures that support specifi c audience experiences. Expressive AI opens the door to creating artifi cial beings that engage us in deeply satisfying, culturally rich experiences. Th e fi rst AI
system that creates the level of empathy, engagement, and interest that HAL
creates will not be experienced by a few astronauts on board a space mission to Jupiter, but by millions of us, on the computers and game consoles in our own homes.

Notes

1. David Stork, ed., HAL’s Legacy: 2001’s Computer as Dream and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).

2. In the travel planning domain, AI researchers build dialogue systems that act as travel agents. Th
e systems can have the same sorts of extended dialogues one might have with a travel agent while planning a trip.

3. Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59 (1950): 433–60.

4. Turing’s original formulation of the Turing Test (he calls it the “imitation game”) is gendered:

Th
e new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the “imitation game.” It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. Th e interrogator stays
in a room apart from the other two. Th
e object of the game is to determine
which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. . . . We may now ask the question, “What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in the game?” Will the interrogator decide wrongly as oft en when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman?

In AI discourse, the Turing Test is typically “sanitized” to a game where the judge (interrogator) must decide which is the human and which is the machine. Th e implications of the original gendered version are beyond the scope of this chapter (http://
cogprints.org/499/00/turing.html).

Reading HAL

123

5. John Haugeland, Artifi cial Intelligence: Th e Very Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT

Press, 1985); Rodney Brooks, Intelligence without Reason, A.I. Memo 1293 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Artifi cial Intelligence Lab, 1991); Rodney Brooks, “Elephants Don’t Play Chess,” Robotics and Autonomous Systems 6 (1990): 3–15; “Special Issue on Situated Cognition,” Cognitive Science 17 (1993); Allison Adam, Artifi cial Knowing: Gender and the Th
inking Machine (London: Routledge, 1998); Philip Agre, Computation and Human Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Phoebe Sengers,

“Anti-Boxology: Agent Design in Cultural Context,” Ph.D. diss., School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, 1998; F. Varela, E. Th ompson, and E. Rosch, Th
e

Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT

Press, 1999).

6. Brooks, Intelligence without Reason; Agre, Computation and Human Experience.

7. Rodney Brooks, “Robot’s Alive,” show 705 of “Scientifi c American Frontiers”

(premiered April 9, 1997); transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/saf/transcripts/
transcript705.htm.

8. David Noble, Th
e Religion of Technology: Th
e Divinity of Man and the Spirit of

Invention (New York: Knopf, 1997).

9. Quoted in Noble, Th
e Religion of Technology, 156.

10. J. C. R. Licklidder, “Man-Computer Symbiosis,” IRE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics 1 (March 1960): 4–11, reprinted in Th e New Media Reader, ed.

Noah Wardrip-Fruin and Nick Montfort (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 75.

11. Hans Moravec, Mind Children: Th
e Future of Robot and Human Intelligence

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).

12. Ibid., 114.

13. Ibid., 116.

14. Ray Kurzweil, Th
e Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Viking Penguin, 1999).

15. Arthur C. Clarke, Profi les of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible (New York: Holt, 1984).

16. Agre, Computation and Human Experience, 23.

17. Phoebe Sengers, “Cultural Informatics: Artifi cial Intelligence and the Humanities,” Surfaces: Special Issue on Humanities and Computing—Who’s Driving? 8 (1999), available at http://www.pum.umontreal.ca/revues/surfaces/vol8/vol8TdM.html; Sengers, “Anti-Boxology: Agent Design in Cultural Context.”

18. Simon Penny, “Agents as Artworks and Agent Design as Artistic Practice,” in Human Cognition and Social Agent Technology, ed. K. Dautenhahn (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2000), 395–414.

19. Warren Sack, “Actor-Role Analysis: Ideology, Point of View and the News,”

in Perspectives on Narrative Perspective, ed. S. Chatman and W. Van Peer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 189–206; Warren Sack, “Stories and Social Networks,” in Narrative Intelligence, ed. M. Mateas and P. Sengers (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2003), 305–322.

20. Woody Bledsoe, “I Had a Dream: AAAI Presidential Address,” AI Magazine 7, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 57–61.

124

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

21. Michael Mateas, “An Oz-Centric Review of Interactive Drama and Believable Agents,” in AI Today: Recent Trends and Development s : Lecture Notes in AI 1600, ed. M.

Wooldridge and M. Veloso (Berlin and New York: Springer, 1999), 297–328; Michael Mateas, “Interactive Drama, Art and Artifi cial Intelligence,” Ph.D. diss., Tech report CMU-CS-02–206, Carnegie Mellon University, 2002; Michael Mateas and Andrew Stern, “A Behavior Language: Joint Action and Behavior Idioms,” in Life-Like Characters: Tools, Aff ective Functions, and Applications, ed. H. Prendinger and M. Ishizuka (Berlin and New York: Springer-Verlag, 2004), 135–162.

22. Joseph Bates, “Th
e Role of Emotion in Believable Agents,” Communications of the ACM 7, no. 37 (1994): 122–25.

23. Michael Mateas, “Expressive AI,” Leonardo: Journal of the International Society for Arts, Sciences, and Technology 34, no. 2 (2001): 147–53; Mateas, “Interactive Drama, Art and Artifi cial Intelligence”; Michael Mateas, “Expressive AI: Games and Artifi cial Intelligence,” in Proceedings of Level Up: Digital Games Research Conference (Utrecht, Netherlands, November 2003); Michael Mateas, “Expressive AI: A Semiotic Analysis of Machinic Aff ordances,” in Proceedings of the Th ird Conference on Computational

Semiotics and New Media (University of Teesside, September 2003), 58–68.

Reading HAL

125

This page intentionally left blank

8

Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

SUSAN WHITE

Th
ere comes a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can’t take part, you can’t even passively take part, and you’ve got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon all the apparatus, and you’ve got to make it stop. And you’ve got to indicate to the people who run it, the people who own it, that unless you’re free, the machine will be prevented from working at all.

mario savio, December 3, 1964

Th
is chapter examines aspects of the fundamental ambivalence toward human cultural productions conveyed in Stanley Kubrick’s cinematic works. Th rough
exquisitely distilled images and innovative soundtracks, the fi lms articulate a fascination with such topoi (in Aristotle’s sense: places to go to construct an argument) as the machine, symphonic music, the labyrinth, and various kinds of ritual as sublime forms of cultural expression. At the same time, Kubrick’s fi lms depict these cultural forms as arising from or intricately linked to what we might call foundational violence. But violence is only one, though perhaps the most important, of what I will term the “obscene” social underpinnings that subtend Kubrick’s work.

127

While the etymology or historical meaning of obscene is unclear, it has been related both to the notion of fi lth and to that of being “off scene,” or hidden. Th
e pessimism that Kubrick’s work exudes derives from its continual reminders that humankind’s greatest achievements depend on a logic of repression of that which is most appalling in our histories and cultures—such that the horrifi c and the sublime are fi nally indistinguishable. Th e surface
beauty and technological perfection of these fi lms, particularly in the case of 2001, are fraught with tension, as the shift ing relationship between horror and awe articulates the director’s use of cinematography, sound, setting, and other elements of mise-en-scène. Th
e idea of reason that guides technological
progress, like evolutionary law, the restrictions of gendered behavior, and the creation of works of art, is portrayed as both compelling and horrifying, ster-ilized, and, fi nally, obscene. Whether Kubrick supports or subverts the kind of cultural apparatus he depicts is, in the fi nal analysis, open to interpretation: are his fi lms a form of social protest—or does he, as some have felt, really want us to stop worrying and learn to love the bomb?

Although 2001 paints its portrait of civilizations on the broadest canvas of any of Kubrick’s fi lms, like all of his works this one foregrounds the paradoxes of civilized life. 2001 illustrates this seeming paradox—culture as violence—in many ways, most strikingly in the celebrated edit that transforms a primitive weapon, a bone, into a gorgeously complex spacecraft which, like other Kubrickian machines, is both appealing and repellent because it represents a kind of frozen “ultraviolence” (to use Alex’s word in A Clockwork Orange, 1971) (fi gures 3 and 4). At the moment of becoming human, of picking up the bone tool and striking the dried bones of the dead tapir, the ape-man violently fantasizes about killing his prey. Th
e next, seemingly natural step is for this
ape to turn the weapon on his own kind—to make it ammunition in a defi nitive territorial dispute in which one group falls back, losing its purchase over the valued waterhole and perhaps its very ability to survive.

To put it simply, Kubrick’s hominids move toward civilization by learning to kill effi
ciently. Th
e notion of civilization as institutionalized violence may seem counterintuitive. Th
is is especially true if we regard civilization as the channeling of primitive aggressive and sexual urges into more socially acceptable behaviors, as it is described by Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents: Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous desire for aggression by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.1

But Kubrick’s fi lms depict civilization’s way of organizing aggression not as a weakening but as a concentration of its implicit violence. His fi lms abound in double-bind structures that fl ow logically from this premise. When, for example, his characters, including Moon-Watcher (the ape in 2001), astronaut Dave Bowman, A Clockwork Orange’s Alex, Th e Shining’s Jack Torrance, Barry

128

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Lyndon, Private Pyle from Full Metal Jacket, break out into violence that in another fi lm might spell relief from social constriction, they fi nd that they are more than ever simply a gear in the clockwork’s mechanism. Moon-Watcher throws the bone in a violent gesture of liberation from hunger and oppression, but the bone becomes instantaneously enmeshed in the technological superstructure that comes to dominate man. Dave rebels against and dismantles the emblem of that technology, HAL, only to fi nd himself caught in an experiment in evolution that may be guided by more advanced life forms. Alex, who acts out against society using its own cultural instruments, nevertheless is fi nally, cozily knitted into the political power structure. When Jack Torrance wields an ax to massacre the family he can no longer control, he assures his own status as a permanent fi xture in a maze beyond his understanding. Barry Lyndon tackles his stepson, furious that his bids for acceptance by the nobil-ity are being threatened, only to fi nd that their ranks close even more tightly aft er his momentary, though inevitable, lapse. Pyle shoots Sergeant Hartman, but the latter had already proudly claimed mass murderer Charles Whitman and assassin Lee Harvey Oswald as Marine Corps marksmen: in death, Pyle is more than ever a marine.

Th
ese double-bind structures in Kubrick’s fi lms can be usefully examined as shift ing manifestations of what Slovenian philosopher and critic Slavoj Žižek has termed “the obscene shadow of the law. ”2 To put it briefl y, Žižek, following in the traces of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, points to a split between the symbolic, offi
cial law and the obscene, secret law which actually
permits the offi
cial law to function. According to Žižek, the law always brings with it its “obscene shadow.” Th
e relationship between law and its obscene
shadow has a deep structural importance in a number of Kubrick’s fi lms, including Paths of Glory (1957), Lolita (1962), Dr. Strangelove (1964), A Clockwork Orange (1971), Th
e Shining (1980), Full Metal Jacket (1987), and Eyes Wide Shut (1999), as well as 2001. All show how secret rituals and “forbidden” forms of desire serve to prop up government, the family, the military, class structures, and the organization of gender. Paths of Glory’s trial of three ordinary French soldiers cynically demonstrates that the law’s obscene shadow falls very close to its offi
cial representatives, the generals who allow this politically exigent, bloody charade to take place. In Full Metal Jacket, Kubrick dwells on the obscene complicity of Sergeant Hartman in torturing Pyle toward full-blown madness, an illegal (or marginally legal) practice designed to produce a fi ghting machine in the interest of the larger project of U.S. imperialism in Southeast Asia: that the marines also produce crazed assassins is a predictable but unimportant by-product. Th
e marine recruits themselves internalize the
necessity of policing their own. When Pyle screws up one too many times, they take it upon themselves to beat him savagely in his bunk under the cover of night.3

Th
e achievement of civilization depends ultimately, for Stanley Kubrick, upon disciplinary systems inculcated through indoctrination, reinforced through ritual, and expressed as offi
cial law, its obscene shadow, and its unof-

Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

129
fi cial surveillance systems. In 2001, Kubrick fi nds a compelling metaphor for this mysterious nexus of constraint and opportunity in the black monoliths that accompany humans on their evolutionary adventure. Michel Chion has described 2001’s monolith as a “Tablet of the Law without commandments, this stele [an upright stone oft en used in ancient times as a funerary marker]

without inscriptions. ”4 Th
e monolith is, according to this reading, a clean,
geometrical fi gure that represents (among an almost infi nite number of possible readings of its meaning) the law: the set of social codes under which citizens of a state are required to live. 5 Although the monolith incites culture-founding ritualistic worship as well as violence in the ape-men, who began to wage war under its apparent tutelage, it remains smooth, impassive, and silent until men on the moon trigger its raucous beacon by digging it up. According to this perspective, the monolith triggers the functioning of a certain kind of evolutionary law, a Darwinian struggle for survival that is continually, problematically fi gured by Kubrick as a clash between dominant males. HAL, on the other hand, with his soft voice, omnipresent eye, and cybernetic preci-sion, is a rather maternal implement of technical/state violence, controlling the lives of well-disciplined astronauts who don’t even know the real reason for their mission to Jupiter but carry out everyday rituals in obedience to their training. 6

HAL exemplifi es near-perfect indoctrination in the form of programming.

He is the reverse forerunner of Pyle in Full Metal Jacket. HAL is a machine who would be human. Pyle is a man-become-machine who has a “major malfunction.” Th
e failures of each of these mechanisms is implicit to the systems that produced them. In that sense, HAL is right in saying that “human error” is at fault in his apparent failure. Specifi c forms of human error—the push toward domination and violent destruction—are part of the evolutionary process that created HAL himself. Th
us, HAL’s “failure” is not really at issue in 2001 except insofar as it reveals that his evolution is, like man’s, founded on a violence that may be hardwired into every circuit. “Human error” is, of course, already revealed as built into the systems driving Dr. Strangelove. When General Ripper goes “a little funny in the head” and consequently sets the Doomsday Machine into motion, he is enacting the logic that produced and named it.

Th
e nuclear device in Dr. Strangelove, like the lovingly reconstructed control panel of the B-52 bomber that delivers it, is at the service of Major “King”

Kong—who, with Slim Pickens’s comic, deadpan brio brings together manas-ape and man-as-technological/bureaucratic cog. In a humorous send-up of the futility of human hierarchical behavior, following an indoctrination that is clearly as thorough as Pyle’s will be and as deadly, Kong obeys the ritual of procedure and presents global annihilation to his men, in a homey pep talk, as an opportunity for career advancement.

Th
e law, as expressed in the disciplinary systems legally available to the state as a means of producing and controlling its citizens, ranges from subliminal presence to all-out obsession in Kubrick’s fi lms. Th e Killing (1956) is
the second of Kubrick’s fi lms, aft er Killer’s Kiss (1955), that adopts fi lm noir’s 130

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
visual palette and its sensibility, based on the urbanite’s psychological angst.

Th
e fi lm’s extreme fatalism is generic—perhaps even a parody of the fi lm noir genre, in which category this is a late and self-conscious entry. While Th e Killing depicts criminals on a caper who are far from being controlled by a disciplinary system inculcated by the state, their actions are ultimately, fl amboy-antly determined by what looks like fate (one man dies, aft er killing a horse, because his car runs over a horseshoe), and the law is fi gured in this fi lm as an agent of chance or destiny. Chance reveals its obscene side as, true to Kubrick’s vision of contingency and lack of human agency, it ruins the beautiful heist designed by the protagonist (Sterling Hayden as Johnny Clay). At fi rst, things move like clockwork, but the works are bigger than the individual can see, and perfectly timed small disasters—a woman’s betrayal, a broken suitcase lock, an escaped poodle—lead Clay to the brink of failure and capture. Th e
fi nal shot of the fi lm shows two plain-clothes detectives moving in relentless symmetry toward Clay: they are the very embodiment of a “system” (though perhaps not only a governmental one) that must, in the noir universe, ultimately win. Th
ey are in no hurry: a perfectly timed phone call tips them off to Clay’s whereabouts; they move in a measured pace to apprehend him, like the chess pieces invoked earlier in the fi lm by the philosophical wrestler Maurice Oboukhoff . But the obscene result of Clay’s gamesmanship is a pile of human bodies riddled with bullets and a suitcase of money blowing in the wind.

Dr. Strangelove’s obscene shadow is political in nature. Th e fi lm depicts a
republic that steadfastly regards itself as the world’s guardian of democracy.

During the course of the fi lm, however, we learn that totalitarianism and the death drive fl ourish very near the heart of that democracy. Robert Kolker has described the historical persistence of fascism at the core of the Cold War confl ict depicted in Dr. Strangelove:

At the peak of the last cold war, at a time when the great, grim myth of communist subversion was the operative, castrating force in America’s ideology and culture, Kubrick suggests that fascism is stirring as the ghost in the machine. Th
e glorifi cation and celebration of power and
death that feed politics and form the urge for domination defi ne the fascist spirit. In the fi lm it is resurrected in the body of Strangelove, just at the point when death dominates the world. Th is is a chilling
idea and perhaps diffi
cult to comprehend for those who tend to look
at fascism as a momentary historical aberration that died with Hitler and only appears in the appalling actions of skinhead gangs. Kubrick is suggesting that death was fascism’s disguise and that strength was drawn from its ability to hide in the guise of anticommunism and the cold war. Th
is was a brave insight for the time. Its validity remains undiminished. 7

Kolker points here to a crucial instance of Kubrick’s revelation of the obscene shadow of legal and political systems: Strangelove, a mechanically Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

131
enhanced fascist, sits at the side of the shambling president who easily stands in for his Führer, as no doubt would any leader. Strangelove himself is linked to shadows and to hiddenness in the fi lm. At the moment of mass destruction, he is unfolding another obscene little plot: for all of the men of power to take refuge in mine shaft s with attractive women capable of reproduction.

Lolita’s obscene secret is not a political one but one that upholds the scan-dalous, secret laws of Western male desire. One reading of Nabokov’s novel might maintain that Humbert Humbert’s lust for the underage Lolita is not anomalous but normative (he is, it turns out, “normal”). Th e rationalizations
that he seeks in literary sources—Dante’s Beatrice, Poe’s child bride—are actually legitimate, if shocking, readings of the history of adult male passion for female children. Nabokov’s Lolita is terrifying because it does not, fi nally, make Humbert Humbert an alien creature. But the degree of this obscenity was censored from the fi lm by making Lolita a teen rather than a child, and it sometimes comes off as a rather tired saga of doubling between two men with a crush on a teenager rather than as a revelation of the pedophilia lurking in the hearts and minds of suburban men.

Th
e manifestation of law-as-disciplinary system is subtle but pervasive in Lolita. In Nabokov’s novel, as in Kubrick’s fi lm, Humbert Humbert is a child molester with an intricate intellectual life. Th e novel is more successful
than the fi lm in achieving reader/audience identifi cation with Humbert—
and more explicit in its legal context, in that the entire novel is addressed to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury trying Humbert for child molesta-tion. In the fi lm version, James Mason’s sympathetic performance and the fact that the fi lm remains mostly within the character’s range of knowledge does place us to some degree—uncomfortably—in his skin. Th e legal system
subtracted from the frame narrative is reintroduced by Kubrick as Humbert encounters what he believes is a representative of the law at the Enchanted Hunters Hotel, where he fi rst has sex with Lolita. As though the world were a paranoid projection of Humbert’s guilty conscience, the appropriately named desk clerk, Swine, announces that they are “very proud to have the overfl ow of the State Police Convention” (a detail missing from the novel).

Clare Quilty (Peter Sellers in one of his many incarnations in the fi lm), the protagonist’s lecherous double, pretends to be one of those state police offi

-
cers and rambles on to Humbert about being “normal.” Humbert has internalized the potential gaze of the authorities, the idea of being monitored for normalcy. 8 Th
e joke of the fi lm is that, as in the famous story of the paranoid who is really being persecuted, Humbert is really being monitored, but by Quilty, not by the police.

So, too, is every movement made by the astronauts in 2001 being monitored. HAL’s ubiquitous eyes work fi rst to inform the state (ground control) and then come to represent a separate and aggressive entity that will compete for survival with the humans he observes. Like Quilty, HAL is never a neutral observer. Instead, he’s opinionated and gossipy as the representative of ground control, then jealous and vengeful as his “instinct” for survival kicks in.

132

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Confronted with the labyrinthine nature of social and physical systems, Kubrick’s characters make choices that pull them deeper into the maze. As Kolker notes, Kubrick “sees men . . . mechanistically, as determined by their world, sometimes by their erotic passion.” His worlds tend to be made up of

“spaces that themselves create closed and infl exible worlds, predetermined and unalterable.” 9 While both Lolita and 2001 present the eff ects of certain forms of indoctrination on their protagonists, by showing us Humbert’s fear of the police and the astronauts’ lack of aff ect, A Clockwork Orange, like Full Metal Jacket, exposes the violence beneath the mask of civilization. Orange’s Alex (Malcolm McDowell) is at every point in the fi lm the enactor of the paradoxes of his culture. He fully embodies the negative utopian version of Eng-land in which he and his droogs live. Th
e objectifi cation of the female body
represented by the submissively exposed mannequins who dispense drug-laced milk, the highly eroticized and intoxicating soundscape, the artworks that reify human sexuality—all are part and parcel of the culture Alex inhabits. Cultural products like the giant phallus in the Cat Lady’s home express the repressive violence of patriarchy, of the class system, and so on. Th us it’s both
refreshing and horrifying when Alex obscenely challenges their high-art status by turning them into weapons—or simply uses them as the weapons that they already symbolically are.

As is very much the case in 2001, the cultural context of the music in A Clockwork Orange aff ects signifi cantly the meaning it brings to the fi lm. Again and again in Clockwork, Kubrick points to the agonizing paradox of the fl ex-ibility of the meaning of cultural artifacts like Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.

Th
e penetrating beauty of the “Ode to Joy,” sung by a middle-aged woman in the milk bar, seems to awaken in Alex a higher self: it inspires his only expression of respect—albeit a violent one—for a female during the entire fi lm. But

“Ludwig van” also produces visions of rape and torture in the young man.

Beethoven’s Ninth, which incorporates a Turkish military march as well as the beatifi c “Ode,” has been a contested cultural property for at least 150 years.

For example, while the Nazis laid claim to Beethoven as a cultural hero, the Allies used his Fift h Symphony as Morse code for the letter V, for Victory.

It may have been this very contest over the ideological associations tied to Beethoven’s music that led Kubrick to focus on it as Alex’s obsession, while Anthony Burgess’s novel makes him an afi cionado of classical music more generally. But while Alex is aware of the music he hears and acts consciously and ironically according to its violent imperative, the music track of 2001 is entirely nondiegetic, unheard by the characters, and acts as more evidence of their completely unconscious indoctrination into the ideals of their civilization. All unknowing, they move through space to the rhythms of the nineteenth century, the founding moment of the scientifi c and cultural movements dominating the twenty-fi rst century that Kubrick imagines.

Th
ese movements, culturally determined and culturally destructive, grow on and feed confl ict and violence. In his fi nal version of 2001, Stanley Kubrick deliberately played down the overt political confl ict depicted in Clarke’s novel, Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

133
based on the screenplay. Th
e end of the fi lm does not, for example, depict
the star child blowing up the arsenals of nuclear weapons surrounding the Earth, as does the last scene of the novel. Th
e rituals of war starkly depicted
in Spartacus, Paths of Glory, Barry Lyndon, and Full Metal Jacket are muted in 2001, appearing only in the hominids’ discovery of weapons, in the symbolic “waterhole” dispute of the Soviet and American scientists over drinks on board the space station, and in HAL’s preemptive strike against the astronauts. But this muting of strife does not mean that it is unimportant. Th e
alert, indoctrinated subject is ready for warfare, prepared for the calm, surgi-cal aggression with which Dave dismantles HAL’s brain (fi gure 22).

Building on the logic of 2001’s and A Clockwork Orange’s contrasting presentations of the subject’s indoctrination into violence, Full Metal Jacket explores the perpetuation of warrior culture through the ancient tradition of violent ritual. By confl ating the young men who are being shaped for war with the weapons they use to fi ght it, the fi lm’s title (changed from Gustav Hasford’s Th
e Short-Timers, from which the fi lm was adapted) perfectly renders the emotional tenor of the fi lm and recalls the intersection of human and machine seen in 2001. In Full Metal Jacket, Privates Joker (Matthew Modine) and Pyle (Vincent D’Onofrio) undergo a brutal conditioning in marine boot camp not unlike that seen in the gladiator training camp sequences of Spartacus or in Alex’s Ludovico treatments and interactions with his prison guards in Clockwork.

We have seen that Pyle takes his training literally and becomes a psychotic killer. Joker, on the other hand, seems to incarnate the conventional ironic observer oft en seen in war fi lms. He makes the transition from boot camp to Vietnam with his intelligence intact and, despite his having joined in the beating of Pyle, with a modicum of humanity remaining. Joker’s symbolic waver-ing between full indoctrination in male warriorhood and his conscience’s objection to the carnage of war is represented by the cognitive dissonance between his peace button and the words on his helmet, “Born to Kill.” But Joker’s apparent choice between these two ethical systems may be illusory.

While Pyle seems to off er the most powerful critique of the dehumanizing potential of the military, Joker, inoculated by irony, is the more thoroughly conditioned subject. Slavoj Žižek comments:

What we get in the fi rst part of the fi lm is the military drill, the direct bodily discipline, saturated with the unique blend of a humiliating display of power, sexualization and obscene blasphemy . . . in short, the superego machine of Power at its purest. Th
is part of the fi lm ends
with a soldier who, on account of his overidentifi cation with the military machine, “runs amok” and shoots fi rst the drill sergeant, then himself. . . . Th
e second, main part of the fi lm ends with a scene in which a soldier . . . who, throughout the fi lm, has displayed a kind of ironic “human distance” towards the military machine . . . shoots a wounded Vietcong sniper girl. He is the one in whom the interpel-134

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
lation by the military big Other has fi nally succeeded; he is the fully constituted military subject. 10

From this perspective, the apparent choice made by Joker at the end of the fi lm to perform a mercy killing of the wounded sniper is no choice at all, but the familiar double bind, a forced choice. His killing of the young woman is a brutal acting out of his training. His not killing her would have been even more brutal.

Th
e settings of Kubrick’s violence oft en express its ironies. Any discussion of disciplinary systems in Kubrick’s fi lms must include an analysis of the director’s representation of these spaces, alternately cold and impersonal and embarrassingly reminiscent of our animal selves. Some of the most obscene revelations, as well as some of the most human ones, take place in bathrooms. Full Metal Jacket, for example, enacts its murderous response to Pyle’s scapegoating in the men’s room in the dead of night. Th e Louis XVI
room in 2001, to which I will return more specifi cally below, is equipped with a blue-grey bathroom which Dave inspects carefully while still wearing his spacesuit: it is a bathroom unsoiled by human bodily functions, perhaps pointing ahead to a time when humans will transcend this especially unsavory aspect of their biological existence. Although this scene is briefl y sketched in 2001, it is an important point of reference in both Kubrick’s fi lms as a whole and in 2001 specifi cally, and its placement in the fi lm will prove very revealing.

Toilet training is one of the earliest and most rigorous forms of discipline endured by developing humans. Kubrick takes advantage of the feelings of vulnerability and shame, as well as the work of sexual diff erence, in his representation of these spaces. Beginning with Dr. Strangelove, Kubrick’s representations of toilets and bathrooms work to convey subtle information about human beings’ (especially men’s) relationships to their bodies, as mediated by social structures. Along with the privacy usually linked with bathrooms comes associations of hiddenness and fi lth. Sometimes this obscenity takes a rather adolescent, toilet-humor turn; sometimes it is truly chilling. In Strangelove, General Buck Turgidson (George C. Scott) is in the bathroom when news arrives that the B-52 is entering Russian air space. General Jack D. Ripper (Sterling Hayden), the madman who unleashes the Doomsday Machine, kills himself in a toilet—perhaps in the fear that his “precious bodily fl uids”

are about to be contaminated by the soldiers invading his base. Th e toilet is
the best place for fl ushing away contaminants, clearly Ripper’s main preoccupation in life. For him, women, along with communists, are among the most threatening of potential contaminators as the misogynistic associations with his name and his unwillingness to share his bodily fl uids with women make clear. While Ripper lives it tragically, the scene is played overall as toilet humor, made more piquant by the British embarrassment of Colonel Man-drake (Peter Sellers), who waits outside in the hopes of intervening in the looming nuclear disaster.

Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

135

Th
e bathrooms in Lolita are settings for marital and familial alienation and for the private obscenities of male desire. When Humbert, potential roomer, fi rst visits the Haze household, Charlotte gives him a tour of the house’s private spaces, including the bathroom. Striking a pose as a young sophisticate with European tastes, Charlotte laughs merrily as she pulls the chain of the old-fashioned toilet. Little does she know that this very toilet, so far beneath the attention of her cosmopolitan guest, will become the place where Humbert goes to experience a sense of relief from their marital bond. As wife Charlotte whimpers from the bedroom about her loneliness, Humbert sits on the toilet to transcribe his lustful thoughts about Lolita and his disgust with Charlotte into his diary. Aft er Charlotte’s death, Humbert luxuriates in the bath as his neighbors come in to off er comfort, transforming the bathroom into a public space redolent with false bonhomie and fi ctitious openness. When Lolita, now Humbert’s sexual property, later learns that her mother is dead, she takes refuge and weeps in the hotel room separated from Humbert’s by a bathroom, while her stepfather sits outside, apparently completely befud-dled by this display of emotion. Th
is chain of events, mediated by bathroom
scenes, emphasizes Humbert’s and his “family’s” essential aloneness despite the prurient invasions of neighbors and the surveillance systems at work to contain transgressive desire.

In reaction to the debasement and brainwashing he undergoes in boot camp, Full Metal Jacket’s Private Pyle murders his drill instructor and kills himself while sitting on a toilet. Th
is is the same men’s bathroom that Joker and
his buddy Cowboy had cleaned earlier in the fi lm while kidding around about sex. Joker wants to slip his “tubesteak” into Cowboy’s sister. Too impaired to join in the fun of symbolically exchanging women in the men’s room, Pyle commits homicide and suicide there instead. Th
is reprise of Strangelove’s toi-
let suicide scene is comparatively ghastly and prepares the viewer for the carnage of war. Th
e fi lm’s second half, depicting scenes of battle, also makes allusion to human waste: being on the front lines in Vietnam is referred to by the men as being “in the shit”—as though Vietnam were a kind of toilet for U.S.

(and French) imperialism that fi nally can’t be fl ushed.

Th
e two bathroom scenes in Th
e Shining reveal the utter alienation of the married couple and the brutalizing role that men have taken in disciplining their families under patriarchy. Jack Torrance (Jack Nicholson) encounters the previous caretaker of the Overlook Hotel, Delbert Grady (Philip Stone), in a sumptuously decorated restroom near the ballroom, where a gala supernatural event is taking place. Th
e room’s red-and-white decor, shot with the
slightly wide-angle lens beloved by Kubrick and edited with somewhat jarring 180-degree shots/reverse shots, is a place of male bonding and mutual support. Th
e dialogue is punctuated by pauses—a technique that works well here to render sinister the brightly lit scene’s ambiance. Grady advises Jack that his son has brought an “outside party” into the deteriorating situation—a “nig-ger.” He also boasts to an appreciative Torrance of having “corrected” both his 136

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
wife and twin daughters, whom the viewer knows to have been murdered by their father.

Like the bathroom upstairs, where Jack encounters a woman who fi rst seems alluring and then (as in so many “loathly lady” medieval tales) turns out to be a decaying corpse, this one provides a place for male fantasies of sexual and gender power and vulnerability. Jack, we learn from Grady, has

“always been the caretaker.” But Jack is never shown taking care of the chores assigned him in the hotel—his wife does this. Of what is he the caretaker, then? Jack’s mission is to be a caretaker of patriarchy: the hotel becomes more and more the concretization of the institutional power of men. Th e outsized
kitchen and study, which are the man’s and woman’s domains in the fi lm, seem to speak to just what enormous, even impossible undertakings are the roles of women and men in marriage and in the raising of children. Not surprisingly, Jack will later attempt to kill his wife with an ax as she hides in the bathroom in their suite: the most famous shots from the fi lm feature Jack’s sneering face as he announces his presence to Wendy in that bathroom and her gape-jawed horror as she sees the ax break through the door.

Th
e obscene secret between Th
e Shining’s white men, Grady and Tor-
rance, clearly regards the subordinate status of women, children, and blacks; the deeper obscenity is that this is an enjoyable task. Th e hotel is a place, as
is the mansion where the orgy takes place in Eyes Wide Shut, where wealthy and powerful men have indulged their urges for almost a century—and in Th
e Shining this indulgence takes place literally over the dead bodies of the place’s original inhabitants. In a throw-away line near the beginning of the fi lm, we learn that the Overlook is built upon an Indian burial ground. Th e
proper disposal of bodies by those who buried them in the ground has been contaminated, desecrated by the erection of the hotel. In a sense, the bodies have now become just so much waste.

Eyes Wide Shut returns to the familiar Kubrickian topos of the couple in the bathroom, and it deals with the problems of marriage and coupling more directly and with greater sexual explicitness than did any of Kubrick’s earlier works. In the opening scene, a woman (Alice, played by Nicole Kidman) is sitting on the toilet while her husband, Bill (Tom Cruise), looks for his wallet. As in Lolita, this bathroom is a space where marital intimacy is revealed as problematic: despite the frank exposure of her bodily functions to her husband, Alice remains essentially invisible to him. It is not only her physical being that Bill tends to ignore. He will later come to understand that Alice’s mental life and sexual desire have existed entirely outside his control or even his knowledge, when she reveals a rich fantasy life that excludes him. Th e obscene
shadow of marriage and bourgeois sexuality is fi gured as the persistence of desires that threaten monogamy.

Eyes Wide Shut also features another bathroom scene—perhaps the most sumptuous of Kubrick’s career—one that follows logically upon the fi lm’s pattern of revealing the obscene side of the life of the rich and powerful. It takes Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

137
place at the home of wealthy attorney Ziegler (Sydney Pollack). Ziegler looks on helplessly as Bill revives a very beautiful but very doped-up prostitute reclining on the velvet couch in the enormous space of the bathroom, which is furnished rather formally, with couch and paintings. Th e setting is strangely
proper, more parlor than toilet. Th
is sense of propriety is undercut, though,
by the incongruity of the setting. As the scene progresses, one is overtaken by the uncomfortable feeling that the young woman is lying naked in public, and nearly dead. Th
e rich man’s obscene desires remain the same as any other man’s: only the setting is plusher. Th
is scene is an interesting variation on
one in Barry Lyndon, in which Lady Lyndon bathes under the scrutiny of her chambermaids. So, too, in that scene is the passive female body an object of aesthetic admiration—and Kubrick’s Lady Lyndon is a far more passive character than the original in William Makepeace Th
ackeray’s novel. Th
e semi-
public feeling of the Lady’s bathroom, into which Barry intrudes fully dressed and aft er having committed a sexual peccadillo with a servant, is less shocking than in Eyes Wide Shut because its oddity can be ascribed by contemporary audiences to eighteenth-century manners. But in both cases, the bathroom’s obscenity is linked to male sexual hypocrisy and sexual acting out.

Issues of gender and identity permeate the bathroom and toilet scenes in 2001, though more subtly than in some of the fi lms just discussed. Toilets are represented, directly or indirectly, three times in 2001. On the shuttle to the moon, Floyd encounters the mind-boggling complexity of the “zero gravity toilet,” whose instructions are 710 words long. Just how far humans have come from “instinctual” behavior is made humorously clear in this rapidly sketched scene. Floyd, who must read the long instructions before he can use the facilities, is literally being toilet trained.11 Th
is moment is a good example of the
kind of subliminal emotion incited by seemingly calm moments in the fi lm.

2001’s space voyagers are the most perfectly repressed, fi nely honed human beings in Kubrick’s opus. 12 But the repression of bodily functions in the interest of space-age civilization creates an implicit tension, a kind of drama of the body that continues in one form or another until the end of the fi lm, when Dave is transformed.

Th
e next bathroom mentioned (though not depicted) is the one Floyd’s daughter’s baby-sitter has gone to when he calls home. Signifi cantly, the person actually “in” the bathroom, though off -screen, is a female subordinate, the caregiver for Floyd’s child. 2001 depicts space as a homosocial realm (one made up entirely of men), where women function as serving maids and then disappear entirely. Th
e farther we get from Earth, in fact, the more devoid of the female space becomes. Th
ere are no women on Discovery, and the star child, in fetal form, appears as though by magic. Parturition occurs with no need for woman or uterus. It appears as if Dave is born by passing through the monolith. Kubrick commented in an interview that “in telling the story [of 2001,]

women didn’t seem to have a lot to do with it” and that one “obviously” is not

“going to put a woman on the crew.” 13 Back on Earth, it is females who inhabit the bathroom, give birth to Heywood Floyd’s child, and represent the emo-138

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
tional tug of home. But women, traditionally associated with blood, fl uids, and waste—all that pertains to the body in Western culture—have almost no place in the stark cleanliness of space as imagined by Kubrick.

While there are no women on the Discovery, critics have frequently made allusion to HAL’s eff eminacy. Although Kubrick asserted, when asked whether HAL’s “wheedling voice [indicated] an undertone of homosexuality,” that HAL was a “straight computer,” many did perceive him as gay, and I think this cannot be discounted. 14 Th
is is especially true in light of Clarke’s astonishing revelation that “Stanley . . . invented the wild idea of slightly fag robots who create a Victorian environment to put our heroes at ease.” 15 Kubrick’s track record on the representation of homosexuality, like that of women, is somewhat problematic, and as women slowly disappear from 2001’s narrative, Dave Bowman is almost killed by a computer that comes to seem more and more like a jealous homosexual lover.

Th
e third bathroom in 2001 is the “eighteenth-century” one that Bowman visits in the fi lm’s fi nal sequence. Although we never see Dave use the pristine tub or toilet or soil any of the white towels, this space is strangely emphasized.

Th
ere are seven shots inside or through the doorway of the bathroom during the three minutes of the scene. One shot, where Dave looks out at his older self, who is eating, lasts a full minute. Dave enters the bathroom twice, once as the man in a spacesuit, once as the older man in a dressing gown. It is not a space inhabited by females or couples: it is a place where man confronts himself. As in Dr. Strangelove, this bathroom provides the opportunity for a character to examine himself in the mirror, to wonder about his identity and his fate. Th e
bathroom is where Dave goes to study his aging face and to confront the next incarnation of himself. But there is something peculiar about this space, other than the underlighting from the fl oor and its extraordinary cleanliness. Th is
is actually a twentieth-century bathroom and not a period one.

One could explain this fact as a plot incoherence in many ways, of course.

For example, the aliens reading Dave’s memories picked up the modern bathroom style rather than one Dave may never have seen. It is possible (though unlikely) that this is simply an oversight on Kubrick’s part, amply compensated by the gorgeous and authentic period bathroom in Barry Lyndon. But the striking sense that this bathroom is out of place has greater reverbera-tions when placed within the meaning of the scene as a whole. Th e bathroom’s
placement in this scene juxtaposes modernity with the eighteenth century in a way that proves to be symptomatic of Kubrick’s approach to the problematic notion of progress, fi gured in 2001 most importantly in the fi gure of the star child (fi gures 26–30).

Kubrick’s use of setting—including the peculiar juxtaposition of a modern bathroom with a Louis XVI bedroom—in 2001’s penultimate scene has remained unexamined in some major critical commentaries on Kubrick. Th e
eighteenth-century room where Dave Bowman ages, dies, and is reborn has engendered puzzlement—simply because the allusion to the period of Louis XVI is simultaneously specifi c (there’s no question that the furnishings are Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

139
from this period) and ungrounded (no textual reason is given for identifying this period) in the fi lm. In his excellent visual analysis of Kubrick’s fi lms, Alexander Walker holds:

[I]t is as irrelevant to question the Louis XVI style as it is to ask why Raphael’s angels do not wear shoes. It is no use seeking rational explanations for metaphorical or allegorical situations. Th e process of
events in the room is more important than the end products of its furnishings. 16

Following Clarke’s and Kubrick’s descriptions of the room as having been reconstructed by the aliens from Bowman’s recollections, Th omas Allen Nelson describes it as representing the “ephemeral nature of Bowman’s memory”

but also off ers no other explanation of the setting.17

Knowledge of the broader context of Kubrick’s work tells us that the division of identity between reason and violence seen so oft en as characterizing his fi lms’ protagonists fi nds an important touchstone in the specifi c historical moment of the eighteenth century. Kubrick privileges this as a period when the exquisiteness of cultural productions was most perfectly matched by the violence upon which they depended. He wanted to make a fi lm about the life of Napoleon, a major fi gure of the late part of the century, and he returns to the period many times in his existing fi lms, as a setting or reference: in the chateau location of Paths of Glory; in the “Gainsborough-like portrait”

(Ciment) behind which Quilty takes refuge and dies in Lolita; in the setting of Barry Lyndon. Eighteenth-century Europe presents the machinery of culture and of the state as violence channeled directly into the production of works of art, as in Barry Lyndon, whose intoxicating surface beauty depends on ritualizing violence in the duel, in choreographed warfare, in male oppression of women, in the violent institution of aristocracy. 18 Michel Ciment describes Kubrick’s ambivalent infatuation with the period:

[F]or Kubrick the eighteenth century is rotten to the core, an age await-ing its impending destruction: behind the façade of gaiety, luxury and pleasure, death and disintegration are already lurking. . . . Th e eighteenth century also saw the conjunction of reason and passion. . . . Th e
perfection principle laid down by the theorists of progress anticipates the notion of the mind’s evolution to which nineteenth-century philosophers were so attached: two ideas that are closely linked in 2001.

But, as 2001 and Dr. Strangelove demonstrate, pure rationality may end up as totally irrational. 19

Given this context, the Louis XVI room casts the fi nal scenes of 2001 in a rather bleak light. What, then, are we to make of Kubrick’s own comments about the genesis of the star child, who is born on the eighteenth-century bed 140

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

(fi gures 15 and 35)? In an interview just aft er the fi lm’s release, for example, Kubrick talked about the evolutionary meaning of 2001’s last scene: In a timeless state, [Bowman’s] life passes from middle age to senes-cence to death. He is reborn, an enhanced being, a star child, an angel, a superman, if you like, and returns to earth prepared for the next leap forward in man’s evolutionary destiny. 20

Not surprisingly, Gelmis followed suit, like many other critics, and describes the star child as evidence of a change of pace for Kubrick: “His oeuvre, with the single exception of the optimistic transfi guration in 2001, is a bleak skepticism and fatalism.” 21 Nelson comments: Kubrick’s ending does not depart all that much from Clarke’s: Th e
orbiting monolith, Bowman’s Star-Gate journey, the Ligeti “voices”

within the room, the reappearance of the monolith, and Strauss’s Th us

Spoke [ sic] Zarathustra continue visual and aural patterns developed throughout 2001. Th
ey tell the fi lm audience that something “magical”

is happening, and that Bowman as homo sapiens is evolving toward some form of spatial/planetary consciousness. 22

Kubrick, caught up in speculations about immortality, the existence of extraterrestrials, and other contemporary questions, does not hesitate in this interview to represent human evolution as a kind of progress toward a superior life form. For the most part, critics have not sought to contradict the maker of the fi lm. But once again, placing the fi lm in the context of Kubrick’s oeuvre may well shift our view. One wonders whether he later changed his mind about the possibility of humans attaining a kind of perfection or—more likely—did not completely understand the depth of his own pessimism while making 2001.

If the eighteenth century represents the ability of culture to cover the shadow of its own brutality with a layer of reason and decoration, then the twentieth century is the period in which the shadow reemerges. From his eighteenth-century room, Bowman is reborn to the sounds of Richard Strauss’s Th
us Spake Zarathustra, the signature music of the fi lm and music that also was a signature of German fascism. Kubrick, a Jewish polymath with a razor-sharp ear for the cultural connotations of music, was surely aware of Strauss’s Nazi affi
liations. Is his use of Strauss’s music a reappropriation, or is the sense of majesty imparted by the piece fi nally just ironic? In any event, one cannot witness the “magical” birth of the star child, to the strains of Zarathustra’s eerily beautiful fanfare, without some trepidation and, indeed, a questioning of Kubrick’s own reading of his work.23

In “Fascinating Fascism,” Susan Sontag includes 2001 as a “representative work” of fascist art—art, that is, which creates a pageant out of the spectacle of dominators and their worshipful masses. 24 Robert Kolker notes that 2001

Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

141

“points towards surrender to a hypnotic force and suggests that this surrender is inevitable” and that, for Kubrick, “violence must manifest itself in some form, controlled or uncontrolled”25—but he argues persuasively against the reading of the fi lm as endorsing fascism, either in content or in its way of engaging the audience that views it. While a fascist aesthetic encourages audience passivity and plays to the yearning to yield to authority fi gures, whether human or extraterrestrial, Kubrick’s fi lm “off ers at least an open narrative and an intellectual space in which the viewer may consider what is going on. ”26

I would say that, far from being a fascist work, 2001 comments on the potential of cultures to believe in absolutes and to give themselves over to

“higher powers.” Certainly HAL, with a pride in the 9000 series’ perfection that seems almost racial, commits a kind of genocide of beings he considers both inferior and threatening. In this way, he repeats the terrible history of eugenics foisted upon the world by Social Darwinists and the fascism that followed in their wake. Certainly, a belief that the monoliths represent some alien super power, rather than symbols of our own imaginative evolution and the violence it engenders betrays our desire to create broadly the very things that we allow to turn against us—as Kubrick demonstrates in fi lm aft er fi lm.

Th
e star child is not quite an image of humanity reborn, but another version of an enclosed, contained humanity, trapped, perhaps for infi nity, in the darkness of space, able only to look, wide-eyed and frightened. He—or It—is, perhaps, the lasting image of the obscene that we have been talking about.

Th
roughout the fi lm, humans have discarded their humanity, their emotions, and fi nally their reason. At the end, they have shed the very bodies that have carried them and left only a fetal trace.

Epilogue

I want to close this chapter by describing how Eyes Wide Shut reiterates and reverses some of 2001’s most powerful insights.

Eyes Wide Shut, with its emphasis on sterility and repetition, sustains a very diff erent relationship to the obscene shadow of law than do most of Kubrick’s fi lms. Like 2001, it depicts an odyssey but—at least at fi rst glance—a personal rather than an evolutionary one. Shocked when he learns that his wife had considered having an aff air with an attractive stranger—a military offi cer—

Bill goes out to seek sexual adventure. For the most part, these adventures are more puzzling than erotic, including a failed encounter with a prostitute and culminating in Bill’s uninvited attendance at a lavish orgy. Th e orgy takes
place in a mansion reminiscent both physically and psychologically of the one in Paths of Glory. In that eighteenth-century structure, Generals Mireau and Broulard meet over drinks to bargain away the lives of their troops, and under these same generals’ eyes the ritualistic trial of the three common soldiers 142

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
takes place. Th
e circular, chesslike patterns and wide-angle shots of Paths of Glory’s and Full Metal Jacket’s scapegoating scenes are reiterated in Eyes Wide Shut’s depiction of Bill’s “trial” for breaching the inner sanctum of the rich and powerful men who are attending the bizarrely ritualistic orgy.

Surrounded by menacing fi gures off ended by his presence and wearing masks reminiscent of the Marquis de Sade’s eighteenth century, Bill is redeemed in a theatrical gesture by a naked and lovely prostitute. Th e obscene
desires and rituals of the very wealthy, the lawgivers, are revealed; Bill is cowed and returns to make peace with his wife in a mutually confessional scene. Th e
sacrifi ce of the French soldiers in Paths of Glory, the carnage of the waterhole scene in 2001, the savage beating of Private Pyle in Full Metal Jacket—all have evolved into a gorgeously choreographed but bloodless encounter between the red-garbed judge and the humiliated young doctor.

Both the orgy scene in Eyes Wide Shut and the discovery of the monolith on the moon in 2001 are accompanied by eerie music written by composer György Ligeti. But compared to the monolith scene, the orgy seems curiously fl at and devoid of any real mystery. Th
e secret of the monolith is not
revealed; only its result is, the voyage to “Jupiter and Beyond the Infi nite.” In Eyes Wide Shut, this paradigm has been strangely inverted. Th e fi nal scene,
which does not appear in the early twentieth-century novella by Austrian Arthur Schnitzler, contains Alice’s imperative that she and Bill must “fuck”

as soon as possible. But more important than this resexualization of marriage (the revelation of marriage’s obscene heart) or than the obscene revelations in the mansion or in Ziegler’s bathroom and pool room is the fact that the couple and their daughter are shopping, looking at price tags, at the end of the fi lm. Th
e real obscenity in Kubrick’s last fi lm is not the law’s obscene shadow, the hidden spaces of sordid desire and aggression, but the workings of the machine of capitalism itself. While Schnitzler stressed the power of repressed sexuality to disturb the workings of society, Kubrick normalizes sexuality as integral to the machinery of marriage and law. To this end, the fi lm introduces various fi nancial transactions absent from the novella: for Kubrick, the well-heeled young doctor is always the one to pay. Man, in Eyes Wide Shut, has evolved into homo economicus, a rational and utilitarian being who carries his reason for being in the very wallet that Bill is looking for at the beginning of the fi lm—hence the irony of the allusions to Th e Wizard of Oz in the fi lm. Bill’s “happiness” was always in his own backyard—and pocket. Despite the participation of powerful men in orgies and the blood sacrifi ces of young women, obscenity is no longer in the shadows. It is out there for all to see; it is money in circulation, a postmodern emptying out of the culturally meaningful narratives of the past, without any resolution of the double binds posed by patriarchy and desire in Kubrick’s earlier fi lms.

Kubrick’s ambivalence toward cultural products ends here, with a deeply unsatisfying look at human platitudes and the shallowness of marital relations—or perhaps with a nod to the small satisfaction Daddy has in fi nally buying the bush baby for his little girl.

Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

143

Notes

1. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), 70–71.

2. Slavoj Žižek, Th
e Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London and New York: Verso, 1994), 54–79.

3. For further analysis of this scene’s structural importance in Full Metal Jacket, see Susan White, “Male Bonding, Hollywood Orientalism, and the Repression of the Feminine in Kubrick’s Full Metal Jacket,” in Inventing Vietnam: Th e War in Film and

Television, ed. Michael Anderegg (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1991), 204–30.

4. Michel Chion, Kubrick’s Cinematic Odyssey, trans. Claudia Gorbman (London: BFI, 2001), 143.

5. Albert Rosenfeld’s review of 2001 was, for example, entitled “Perhaps the Mysterious Monolithic Slab Is Really Moby Dick,” Life (1968), reprinted in Th e Making of

2001: A Space Odyssey, ed. Stephanie Schwam (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 166–70.

6. See Ellis Hanson, “Technology, Paranoia and the Queer Voice,” Screen 34, no. 2

(Summer 1993): 137–61.

7. Robert Kolker, A Cinema of Loneliness: Penn, Stone, Kubrick, Scorsese, Spielberg, Altman, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 125.

8. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: Th e Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan

Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1995).

9. Kolker, Cinema of Loneliness, 106, 119.

10. Slavoj Žižek, Th
e Plague of Fantasies (London and New York: Verso, 1997), 21.

11. Hanson, “Technology, Paranoia and the Queer Voice,” 144.

12. Kolker notes that “Kubrick’s men [in 2001] are . . . perfectly integrated into corporate technology, part of the circuitry. . . . Th
e people in the fi lm lack expression and
reaction not because they are wearing masks to cover a deep and forbidding anguish.

. . . Th
ey are merely incorporated into a ‘mission.’” ( Cinema of Loneliness, 135). For a more detailed reading of the meaning of bathrooms in Kubrick’s fi lms, see Philip Kuberski, “Plumbing the Abyss: Stanley Kubrick’s Bathrooms,” Arizona Quarterly 60, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 139–60.

13. Kubrick quoted in Charlie Kohler, “Stanley Kubrick Raps,” East Village Eye (1968), reprinted in Schwam, Th
e Making of 2001, 250.

14. Kubrick quoted in Stanley Kubrick Interviews, ed. Gene D. Phillips (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001), 94. In “Technology, Paranoia and the Queer Voice,” Hanson cites Don Daniel: “HAL’s faggoty TV-announcer tones and vocabulary become the disembodied voice of three centuries of scientifi c rational-ism” (142).

15. Arthur C. Clarke, “Christmas, Shepperton,” in Schwam, Th e Making of 2001, 37.

16. Alexander Walker, with Sybil Taylor and Ulrich Ruchti, Stanley Kubrick, Director: A Visual Analysis (New York: Norton, 1999), 191.

17. Th
omas Allen Nelson, Kubrick: Inside a Film Artist’s Maze, rev. ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), 177.

144

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

18. As Robert Kolker notes in Cinema of Loneliness, “Th e quiet, civilized artifi ce of
late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century French art embodies a code of polite behavior in sharp contradiction to the brutal codes of military order and justice played out in Paths of Glory” (155).

19. Michel Ciment, Kubrick: Th
e Defi nitive Edition, trans. Gilbert Adair and Robert Bononno (New York: Faber and Faber, 2003), 64, 66, 67. Th e discussion of the eighteenth century here inevitably recalls Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, which traces the roots of some forms of oppression to the very technological and ideological “advances” brought about by science and culture in the eighteenth century.

Its scathing critique of the twentieth-century culture industry derives from the view of the Enlightenment as a failure. See Th
eodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dia-
lectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).

20. Kubrick quoted in Joseph Gelmis, Th
e Film Director as Superstar (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), 304.

21. Gelmis, Th
e Film Director as Superstar, 293.

22. Nelson, Kubrick: Inside a Film Artist’s Maze, 133.

23. One critic who has discussed in depth the political and social meaning of the music in 2001 is Geoff rey Cocks, who also comments on Richard Strauss’s connection to the Nazi regime. Geoff rey Cocks, Th
e Wolf at the Door: Stanley Kubrick, History, and the Holocaust (New York: Lang, 2004).

24. Kolker, Cinema of Loneliness, 139, cites Susan Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism,” in Movies and Methods, vol. 1, ed. Bill Nichols (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 40.

25. Kolker, Cinema of Loneliness, 143.

26. Kolker, Cinema of Loneliness, 144.

Bibliography

Adler, Renata. “Review of 2001: A Space Odyssey.” New York Times, April 4, 1968.

Reprinted in Th
e Making of 2001: A Space Odyssey, ed. Stephanie Schwam. New York: Modern Library, 2000.

Adorno, Th
eodor, and Max Horkheimer. “Th
e Culture Industry: Enlightenment as

Mass Deception.” In Th
e Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans.

E. Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation).” In Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays. Trans. Ben Brewster, 127–87. London: New Left , 1971.

Benjamin, Walter. Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. Trans.

Harry Zohn. New York: Verso, 1997.

Chion, Michel. Kubrick’s Cinematic Odyssey. Trans. Claudia Gorbman. London: BFI, 2001.

Ciment, Michel. Kubrick: Th
e Defi nitive Edition. Trans. Gilbert Adair and Robert Bononno. New York: Faber and Faber, 2003.

Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

145

Clarke, Arthur C. 2001: A Space Odyssey. New York: Signet, 1968.

Cocks, Geoff rey. Th
e Wolf at the Door: Stanley Kubrick, History, and the Holocaust.

New York: Lang, 2004.

Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971.

Hall, Stuart. “Encoding/Decoding.” In Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies 1972–79. Ed. Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis. London: Unwin Hyman, 1980.

Hasford, Gustav. Th
e Short-Timers. New York: Bantam, 1983.

Holtman, Robert B. Th
e Napoleonic Revolution. New York: Lippincott, 1967.

Johnston, Ian. “Introductory Lecture on Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents.” January 1993. Available at http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/freud.htm.

Kael, Pauline. “Review of 2001: A Space Odyssey.” Harper’s, February 1969. Reprinted in Th
e Making of 2001: A Space Odyssey, ed. Stephanie Schwam. New York: Modern Library, 2000.

Kolker, Robert. A Cinema of Loneliness: Penn, Stone, Kubrick, Scorsese, Spielberg, Altman, 3d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Kuberski, Philip. “Plumbing the Abyss: Stanley Kubrick’s Bathrooms.” Arizona Quarterly 60, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 139–60.

Pizzato, Mark. “Beauty’s Eye: Erotic Masques of the Death Drive in Eyes Wide Shut.” In Lacan and Contemporary Film. Ed. Todd McGowan and Sheila Kunkle. New York: Other, 2004.

Rosenfeld, Albert. “Perhaps the Mysterious Monolithic Slab Is Really Moby Dick.” Life, 1968. Reprinted in Stephanie Schwam, ed., Th
e Making of 2001: A Space Odyssey.

New York: Modern Library, 2000.

Schnitzler, Arthur. Dream Novel ( Traumnovelle). In Stanley Kubrick and Frederic Raphael, Eyes Wide Shut: A Screenplay. New York: Time Warner, 1999.

Žižek, Slavoj. Th
e Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieślowski between Th eory and Post-Th
eory. London: BFI, 2001.

———. Th
e Plague of Fantasies. London: Verso, 1997.

———. “Superego by Default.” In Th
e Metastases of Enjoyment. London: Verso, 1994.

54–79.

146

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

9

Double Minds and Double Binds
in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale

GEORGE TOLES

Obviously space is our destiny, that much I concede. Aft er all I live there myself. But the excitement of the great voyages of discovery will pass me by; I will always belong to those who are left behind on the quay waving goodbye to the departing; I belong to the past, to the time before Armstrong put his big corrugated footstep on the face of the moon. Th
at was another thing I got to see that aft ernoon,
for without thinking anything in particular I had drift ed into a sort of theater where there was a fi lm about space travel. I found myself sitting in one of those American swivel chairs that hug you like a womb, and setting off on my journey through space. Almost immediately tears came to my eyes. . . . Emotion ought to be inspired by art, and here I was being misled by reality; some technical wizard had worked optical magic to strew the lunar gravel at our feet, so that it was just as if we ourselves were standing on the moon and walking around. In the distance shone (!) the unimaginable planet Earth.

How could there ever have been a Homer or Ovid to write about the fate of gods or men on that ethereal, silvery, fl oating disc? I could 147
smell the dead dust at my feet, I saw the puff s of moon powder whirl upward and settle again. I was divested of my being, and no substitute was in the offi
ng. Whether the humans all about me were
having the same sensation I do not know. It was deathly quiet. We were on the moon and we would never get there; in a while we would step outside into the shrill daylight and go our separate ways on a disc no bigger than a guilder, a free-fl oating object adrift somewhere in the black drapery of space. . . . Off went the Voyager, a futile, man-made machine, a gleaming spider in empty space, waft ing past lifeless planets, where sorrow had never existed except perhaps for the pain of rocks groaning under an unbearable burden of ice, and I wept. Th
e Voyager sailed away from us into eternity, emitting a bleep every now and then and taking photographs of all those gelid or fi ery but ever lifeless spheres which, together with the orb we must live on, revolve round a fl aming bubble of gas; and the amplifi ers, placed invisibly around us in the dark theater, sprayed us with sound in a desperate attempt to corrupt the silence of the solitary metallic voyager. A compelling, velvety voice began speaking, at fi rst making itself heard through the music, then as a solo instrument. In ninety thousand years’ time, the voice intoned, the Voyager would have reached the outer limits of our galaxy. Th
ere was a pause, the music
swelled like toxic surf, and fell silent again to allow the voice to fi re a parting shot: “And then, maybe, we will know the answer to our eternal questions.”

Th
e humanoids in the theater cringed.

“Is there anyone out there?”

All around me it was as quiet now as in the deserted streets of the universe across which the Voyager hurtled noiselessly, bathed in a cosmic glow, and only in the fi ft h of its ninety thousand years. Ninety thousand! By that time the ashes of the ashes of our ashes would long since have disowned our provenance. We would have never been there! Th
e music gathered momentum, pus oozed from my eyes.

How about that for a metamorphosis! Th
e voice gave forth one fi nal
burst: “Are we all alone?”

—cees nooteboom, Th
e Following Story

Herman Mussert, a man who doesn’t know that he is dying, is the narrator of this austerely affl
icting passage from Cees Nooteboom’s novel. Herman’s unre-liable memory lights upon a metal surrogate for his (and our) loneliest self, bleeping through its forlorn voyage past “lifeless planets.” Th e dying man lies in
a bed in Amsterdam, cast adrift among his last unspooling thoughts. He seeks to postpone as long as possible the recognition that he has come to the end of consciousness, the end of a personal “now.” Something else—bearing perhaps a tiny bead of sorrow—is taking over, assigning his matter “other duties” as it 148

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
embarks, free of Herman, on its “endless wanderings.” 1 I recall that, when fi rst reading these paragraphs, with mortality licking at the edges of every phrase, two images from Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 came forcefully to mind. In the fi rst, Frank Poole is making his lengthy jog through the rotating centrifuge of the Discovery, occasionally punching at the air. Perhaps he is issuing a mild protest against the white “hamster wheel” environment and its tedium, but the punching does not cause him to break the steady pace of his run. Aram Khatchaturian’s Gayne Ballet Suite accompanies Frank’s round-and-round indoor journey, supplying a mournful commentary on the action, to which Frank himself has no access. If his thoughts are on music, that is to say, he is humming a diff erent tune. Th
e suff ering violins of Khatchaturian might help give form to his incho-ate feelings, if he could but hear them (fi gure 18).

Th
e second 2001 image summoned by the Nooteboom passage also involves Frank. He is once again signaling protest with his hands. He desperately fumbles with his severed air hose as his spacesuit-armored body fl oats off beautifully, helplessly, negligibly into space. Who has ever had such a death? In this episode, there is no sound to cushion or explain the fall. What is to be understood is that a suddenly anonymous death is happening and that there is no room in so much immensity (all this “black drapery of space”) for a personal experience of dying to penetrate. Frank’s going seems not to make even the faintest mark, or if there is a mark to bear in mind, how do we turn it to some account? (Later, the negligibility eff ect is redoubled when Frank’s body is retrieved by his partner and held fast in the metallic arms of a pod, only to be abandoned once more.) As my reading experience led me rather capriciously back to Frank in 2001, I wondered why I had never before registered the depth of the Kubrick fi lm’s melancholy. Like so much else in this imperiously aloof, well-sealed pod of a narrative, the melancholy seems somehow veiled.

2001, from the time of its 1968 release, has seemed to be many diff erent fi lms. Th
at is to say, it is a work unusually receptive to drastically confl icting emotional and intellectual responses. If one is so inclined, it is easy to dwell excitedly on the fi lm’s presentation of the human potential for transformation and rebirth, on heavenly bodies in perfect alignment, and on the existence of hidden alien benefactors, sending magical milestones to us at crucial stages in our journey to enlightenment. In this version of the story, the triumphalism of Strauss’s Also Sprach Zarathustra fanfare can be made to stand for the arc of the movie as a whole: a slightly chilly musical stargate to the reign of wonder. However, as other commentaries on 2001 amply attest, there is no form of pessimism or irony about human doings and prospects for undoing that the narrative is not equally adept at confi rming. It is a movie tailor-made for viewers who like to work conceptually rather than experientially. Yet, as the legendary “trip” movie of the 1960s, it has frequently been championed as “a fi lm for groovin’, not understanding. ”2 Pauline Kael famously threw up her hands in exasperation at what she took to be Kubrick’s willful amorphousness and decried the fi lm’s “celebration of cop-out. ”3

Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 149

I have gradually come to believe that the fi lm is authentically haunted by a need to see (and think) double at every stage of its unfolding. Kubrick sets out to build a kind of lavish, inhuman utopia (pitching camp at the far edge of humanness), which answers to some deep private image and need. But he is steadily at war with his utopian impulses and distrusts all of the forces at work in this fantasy space, as well as the rational schemes for utopia devised by any planner. He endeavors to hatch pictures worth marveling at from glistening black eggs, turning the movie screen itself on end and making its white surface into an impenetrable black slab. Instead of receiving images on its “open”

surface, the black screen sends out urgent signals—triggered by sunlight—
which no one has quite the aptitude, or properly formed mind, to interpret. As women recede into the narrative background (robotic, distracted, or patiently relearning to walk as they facilitate service), birth imagery involving various metal begetters and techno-conduits pushes insistently into the gap that the female fade-out has left . An androgynous computer, the fi lm’s only complex character, experiments with mysteries of humanness just beyond his ken—
and learns what it means to be human as the men around him seem to fi nd the category outmoded. His baptism as a person occurs in the acts of being conspired against and slowly killed. Th
e more recognizable candidates for our
human representatives in 2001 seem to be burdened with the fi lm’s own reticence about self-disclosure. Th
ey are woven into a system that doesn’t quite fi t
or suit them, but they have diffi
culty gaining a clear sense of what feels wrong.

It is as diffi
cult in this fi lm’s world to see where you are and to consider what your actual present placement feels like as to imagine your way backward or forward to something else. Dave, Frank, and Dr. Floyd seem more reconciled to the “now” than most of us are, but everything in and outside of their metal cages conspire to make the now feel cramped and oppressive.

Finally, there is the doubleness having to do with the force of revelation itself. Revelation seems always pending or actually in process in 2001, but the fi lm exhibits a simultaneous terror, like the prospect of facing a Medusa, about what, of necessity, must come forth. Dave’s arrested-in-panic frozen-ness as he hurtles through the Stargate at warp speed is instructive somehow about the sizable death fear that accompanies every impulse to open the eyes wide and see beyond. Everything in 2001 wishes to be disclosed and veiled at the same time. Th
e face of the fi lm is a face covered by a refl ecting helmet or a trembling ape mask, while some shadow of the ravenous leopard prowls the desert in our midst. Th
e most auspicious gesture that Kubrick
sanctions when revelation looms is a blind reaching out of the hand (as if supplicating) toward something huge, indefi nite, and quite possibly malign.

Th
e consistent requirement for such reaching up—through emptiness—is that the one with arm extended cannot know, and probably should not trust, what is in store.

2001 is as much fairy tale as science fi ction. Since the latter genre is too entranced, for my taste, with hardware and solemn, fl avorless ruminations about “things to come,” I will use the fairy tale as my point of entry 150

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
to Kubrick’s magical thinking. 2001’s double-mindedness is akin to the vexing riddles that the unseasoned, frequently emotionally disturbed questers of German Romantic tales in particular are obliged to solve, oft en with their lives held forfeit. Riddles commonly unfold in stages, and as one moves from chamber to chamber in the alien fortress designed expressly for one’s riddle trial, new properties of enigma are annexed to old ones. What initially seemed a route to placidity and the safety of sound judgment, for example, might well become a nest of fears in a trice. But then, very soon, agitations may impart their own quality of keenness to sight.

Th
e most remarkable fairy tales are deeply interested in the separate claims and values attached to remembering and forgetting. Hugo von Hoff mansthal’s majestic prose fragment Andreas (part fairy tale, part Bildungsroman) cease-lessly probes what he calls “the abysslike contradictions [between remembering and forgetting] upon which life is built, like the Delphic temple over its bottomless split in the earth.” 4 According to David Miles, in his seminal study of Andreas:

[C]hange, in Hoff mansthal’s vocabulary, belongs to the realm of the amoral adventurer; it is “living one’s life” to the full, as he puts it.

“Whoever wants to live must transcend himself, must change”; in a word, “he must forget.” Th
e moral category of steadfastness and
fi delity [for the committed adventurer] can only mean “stagnation and death.” Th
e tragic dilemma arises when we . . . realize that “all human dignity is bound up with steadfastness, with not forgetting, with faithfulness.” 5

In 2001, the new regime of steadfastness in space seems to have required the loosening or wearing away of ties to a former steadfastness on Earth. Th e space
adventurers have not so much renounced their old dependencies as lost track of them. Earthly attachments seem to be drift ing, in a way that seems almost natural, out of the reach of memory. Fidelity is a visible shipboard virtue. We see crew members on the Discovery, and elsewhere, unblinkingly given over to the performance of routines. Th
ese explorers seem to have learned how to
sleep wide awake, lulled by the rhythms of tasks which require little eff ort but supply a “good enough,” future-serving logic to keep them more or less occupied. Steadfastness is for them at best a mode of surface recall—with something dim and untoward pressing intermittently for recognition, like a lonely smoke signal from the interior. Steadfast too, but at an even further remove from usable memory, is the hibernating trio of crew members in their A.I. -
like Sleeping Beauty coffi
ns. Finally, there is the overarching steadfastness of HAL 9000, a computer that has taken over most of the work of memory, and its attendant anxieties, from the Discovery crew members. Th ey acquiesce in
the idea of a necessary transfer of memory power. HAL will remember fully, dispassionately, faultlessly what needs to be kept in mind and coordinated, so that the ship can complete its complicated mission.

Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 151

Th
e moral category of fi delity, then, comes down to the crew’s acceptance of the obligation to attend to HAL’s mild requirements. In exchange, they can indulge the fantasy that HAL is their servant rather than their superior. Dave and Frank listen to him as if to an echo chamber of memories and refl ections that once were situated inside them. It seems fi tting, under these new conditions, that their powers of retention live a bit further away from themselves than they once did, since this distance (or inner gap) coincides so comfortably with the view from the spacecraft window. As they peer “outdoors,” imposing objects occasionally meet (or, more likely, overwhelm) their gaze, but the scale of what they confront repeatedly suggests the irrelevancy of human vision to the act of seeing. What is there is too remote or manifestly impersonal for intimate inspection. Th
e eye’s attempts at a grander vision equal to
the demands of outer space are quickly vanquished. In the face of experiential impotence and a heightened passivity to circumstances which, aft er all, are unrelated to our way of living, humans’ best recourse is to convert inhospitable sense impressions to cold data. Even indoors, with transmissions from faraway family members reminding the astronauts of birthdays and childhood, gift -giving pledges and eventual homecomings, the images are stubbornly impenetrable—as though they too are best regarded as data, not the soft stuff of emotionalized memory.

Here is the fairytale plight of the human crew members of the Discovery, and perhaps of HAL as well. Th
ey are embarked on a journey through a seem-
ingly infi nite dark wood (a billion miles to the moons of Jupiter), in answer to a mysterious, “supernatural” summons whose intention is unclear. Like the untried youths who set off for a distant kingdom to perform impossible tasks and solve daunting riddles, the fi gures on the fragile transport have no advance sense of readiness. Th
ey have virtually no idea what to expect and
thus for what to prepare themselves. Like their fairytale counterparts, they may well prove to be expendable because of something they lack, inwardly, or because their equipment is missing some vital component. Th e men place
their faith in a higher mechanical being who, like a cooperative genie from a bottle, is pledged (forced) to look aft er their interests. So much in the world of fairy tales has to do with the ability to recall and honor a core simplicity, the willingness to trust, instinctively, the right signs at the right moments, and the gift of listening. Before one can listen, of course, one must be lucky enough to encounter the right, undeceiving guides. Yet, for all the emphasis on the possession of uncorrupted instincts, there is a core ruthlessness to the fairytale world as well. One must be prepared to relinquish any ally at the fi rst evidence of misstep or dubious counsel. If a comrade (even a sibling) is compromised, he is instantly, fatally compromised, and one must dispose of him calmly, with no remorse or backward glance. Fairytale seekers are all

“amoral adventurers” in essence, forsaking every connection that blurs their view of the task at hand. Th
ey live thinly and without surprise in the exter-
nally vivid predicament of the now. And for Kubrick, the now is seldom disengaged from the quester’s habitual blindness. Th
e external vividness may be

152

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
present, but it’s out of reach. Th
e now is a repeating lonely instant in which
our mortal coil, improperly attuned to both its aptitudes and insuffi ciency,
continues to unravel.

Like Bassanio in Shakespeare’s Th
e Merchant of Venice, the weakly provi-
sioned adventurers in 2001 stake their future on the choice of plain lead caskets rather than gaudy, enticing cases rich in ornament. Th at is to say, the Discovery has already left behind the sensuous pleasures and deceptions of Earth.

Both the crewmen’s chill means of conveyance and the monolith they unwit-tingly seek are formed of sober, stark metal. Spacecraft and magic object alike instruct the decidedly unfanciful travelers to wean themselves from the gratifi cation of the senses, one by one. If they were to raise a toast to the moons of Jupiter, it would undoubtedly be with powdered champagne. In the “Dawn of Man” prologue, the lead casket is already in play; it is already designated the correct choice in the fairytale riddle that animates the whole narrative.

Th
ough our ape-men forebears, like the space travelers who succeed them, have no comprehension of the monolith when it stands before them, they are compelled to choose it, to reach out and touch it, to receive its imprint (fi gure 19). Th
e fi rst choosing seems to interpose a barrier between animal instincts (in Kubrick’s depiction, a grim amalgam of fear and helpless rage) and the virtually blank slate reserved for reasoning. One of 2001’s only moments of creaturely joy comes at the pivot point between the chaotic, defenseless, undif-ferentiated life of the ape pack and Moon-Watcher’s literal taking hold of an object/idea which will separate and isolate him. One way of describing this breakthrough is as a transplanting of the barrier from outside to inside. Th ink
of the monolith, paradoxically light resistant and triggered by light—which embodies this barrier—suddenly entering the mind, creating a new division in human consciousness. Moon-Watcher, the fi rst benefi ciary of this double mind, goes off by himself, experiences his privacy, and acquires a secret within that private domain. Th
e secret has to do with power that doesn’t need to be shared. Th
e acceleration of consciousness and the accompanying crescendo of Moon-Watcher’s feelings are visually expressed by his smashing down of a likeness of an enemy. Moon-Watcher does not explode in feral excitement because his world opens up to him. He instead discovers the joy of enclosure.

He enters a fresh mental cave where the darkness of having secrets combines with the thrill of psychic separation. How exalting it is to increase one’s sense of diff erentiation from others while hiding behind a dense screen inside the self. Th
e tossing of the bone weapon heavenward and the lift ing of the gaze and the body from ground level are laden with the irony of the human mind instantly falling under an enchantment. Th
e individual will fl exes its muscles
and, as the mind watches, it grows ill. It is as though the “I,” in becoming “I,”

becomes a virus or pestilence as well. Th
e sickness is not easily detected by
the self because it is as foundational as mortality. Moon-Watcher commits his weapon to memory as he elatedly disavows solidarity, the instinct to connect.

He comes into his own by looking away from the Earth for an image worthy of his new dream of self. If Moon-Watcher were a poet, he might contrive lines Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 153
in the spirit of Jean-Baptiste Chassignet’s “Retourne le Miroir”: “If you love heaven, in heaven you will be / If you love earth, to earth you will fall.” 6

Th
e Discovery adventurers made their choice of the lead casket in this fairy tale long ago, through their surrogate, Moon-Watcher. He launched the exchange of miserable animal instincts for a dramatic sense of himself and an impending (always impending) revelation of the godhead. Moon-Watcher, the primeval king in this tale, begins to divest himself of the memory of what he has been. To become something greater, he must over time erect a barrier (as opaque as possible) between himself and the instincts that enslaved him. He creates a self by clearing a wide enough space in consciousness so that he can be safely alone, as removed from others as from the forgotten life of instinct. Moon-Watcher, and his descendants, will use weapon advantage, and the array of technologies that fl ow from it, to gain more distance and more clarity about their fruitful relation to instruments of all sorts. Man will

“clean himself ’ in the exercise of reason, and in the act of cleaning himself will also fashion pictures of order that he can live by. Th e space adventurers
keep faith with the old king’s dream of order, his taciturn ways, and his fantasy of insulating himself through his relation to powerful objects. As I have noted, they are sailing in an elaborate metal crate (a “full metal jacket,” if you like) to a rendezvous with the ancient opaque form whose spiritual hardness is already within them. An internal monolith, in other words, monitors their barrier-multiplying “fi nal round” of humanness. Th
e riddle of Kubrick’s tale
of enchantment has to do with earning a transcendent expansion of the fi eld of consciousness through an ever-more-drastic regimen of contraction.

Th
e theater of the human, which we encounter at the turn of a new century and millennium, seems to require an exceedingly small stage to play out its concerns. Dr. Floyd, Dave, and Frank are clearly old hands at the business of winnowing away demonstrable needs, interests, aff ections. Spoken language has receded as a force upon which these men depend to color or imaginatively engage with their social-mechanical sphere. Th
ey seem to be spinning invis-
ible cocoons for themselves—somewhat akin to the hibernation boxes occupied by the Discovery’s more advanced specialists. One might argue that, for Kubrick, there is an art, as well as an irony, in their reducing their resources and vital signs. I’m reminded of Frank O’Hara’s in-earnest joke: “nobody should experience anything they don’t need to.” 7 Th e men we are invited to
watch become less soft through their almost monklike discipline of forgetting. Th
ey are slowly rendering themselves compatible to an environment that will perhaps demand something new, something other than the mess of mistakes (unclean!) humans have already made of themselves. Th e implication is
that the grossly imperfect human attainments of the past—one failed system aft er another—no longer count for anything. To insist on measuring ourselves by these deforming memories stymies our movement toward a more radical metamorphosis.

2001 is deeply captivated by that fi nal, gleaming chamber of the altered mind, with its adjoining bathroom, in which a shriveled, bedridden Dave has 154

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
his dying vision—a seeing through lead, as it were (fi gures 23 and 27). I associate this episode of release with the moment authored by Lewis Carroll when Alice is at last tiny enough to pass through the Wonderland door. Th is previously hemmed-in space at the bottom of a tunnel suddenly expands to receive her, and she fl oats through the opening on a tide composed of her eyes’ own fl uids. Th
e whole Odyssey narrative is committed, like Carroll’s fantasy of Wonderland, to metamorphosis without warning. In Dave’s case, Kubrick proposes the abandonment of the peasant rags of mortal frailty for something sturdier, less exposed. Kubrick seems of two minds, however, about whether his star child is a radiant godhead or another version of Rosemary’s baby.

(Roman Polanski’s fi lm, as it happens, was released almost concurrently with 2001.) Th
e feel of the moment when the monolith opens up to the glowing bubble of Dave reborn is undeniably transcendent, as though we were privileged to witness a clean lift away from all of the barriers that consciousness has devised to keep us captive in the cell of ego. At last the eye, with a fetus wrapped inside it, is granted the reach, the boundless power of extension that the Romantic imagination has always craved. Yet Kubrick cannot stay reconciled for more than the duration of two lengthy shots (i.e., the space of two elevated thoughts) to any Romantic impulse. Something slouches through the heavens waiting to be born, and that pending emergent fi gure is Janus-faced.

It looks simultaneously toward glory and desolation. On the one hand, the unspoiled, still-sheathed star child, nearly equal in magnitude to the nearby Earth, its plaything, revives the age-old dream of perfectibility. On the other hand, as it slowly revolves to face us, it intimates a persisting negative fate—
the counterdream of original sin (fi gure 35).

Th
e cold blue light that infi ltrates our prolonged star child sighting does not release the image from the hold of skepticism. Kubrick cannot quite surrender himself, or us, to the faith that comes with a true forgetting of our crip-pled consciousness and all of the evils to which it is heir. “Th ere is, aft er all, so
much grit at the bottom of the [consciousness] container,” Iris Murdoch has one of her characters declare in Th
e Black Prince, and “almost all of our natural preoccupations are low ones.” 8 To have faith in the star child as a pristine, higher phase of being may well require too much vulnerability—which, for Kubrick, is usually synonymous with gullibility. Better perhaps to recognize an unvanquished curse in a cunning new disguise. Kubrick gestures movingly toward a release from our mind-forged manacles, but as he considers the star child’s potential, it turns, almost of its own accord, into an image of control.

Control in a double sense: Kubrick’s control of the child’s seeing, as its gaze becomes sentient and (possibly) secretive, and the star child’s taking control over us. Th
e movement from infant soft ness to a sense of command takes only moments to accomplish.

If we affi
rm the star child as a fi t emblem of our collective rebirth, the affi
rmation must be made in a spirit of openness and unthinking trust. We must feel our way past Kubrick’s instinctive dependence on fortifi cations and displays of deadly power. If Samuel Beckett, say, were to fi nd a place in his Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 155
death’s cradle, endlessly rocking, for a star child that death cannot instantly lay hold of and croon to nothingness, what would his readers do with it? It is no easier, I think, to fi nd a vocabulary to extol a mechanical, motherless Kubrick space baby in a uterine helmet. Th
is child gazes like a fl edgling preda-
tor on a world it has nearly outgrown. Having described the eff ect of the fi nal images so negatively, I am immediately aware that I have framed the ending of 2001 as too decisively forbidding. I have given “wonder-proof ” reason full permission to close up the space of mystery. A corrective adjustment would lead the viewer to pay closer attention to the spirit of metamorphosis that is in the air for the entire last section of the fi lm, and recall that Kubrick is staking everything on our willingness to fl oat patiently, in a state of unknowing, bereft of narrative and rational supports. What pins things together is the myth of resurrection. One cannot discount the calm authority with which our fears of old age and dying are addressed, then magically alleviated. Dave passes swift ly into a condition of prostrate decrepitude, then emerges on the other side of a barrier, glowing with light and boundless untapped energy. It is with these eyes, the fi nal images seem to proclaim, that the journey of this narrative should be viewed. Th
e star child attains the purifi ed awareness, free of time-bound constraints and poisonous confusion, required to carry us forward to a better place. Perhaps this higher sight can redeem our through-a-glass-darkly viewing of the movie that is drawing to a close.

Yet, once again, this pushing toward fairytale (or Blakean) fulfi llment feels too emphatically benign. Th
e cerebrally driven tableaux that map our route
to the star child don’t quite earn a true release or breakthrough. Th ere is an
extraordinary tug-of-war going on between imaginative intuition, with its gift for wild, irrational leaps, and cautious brain power, with a will and need to dominate. In his Notes on Cinematography, director Robert Bresson off ers some remarkable observations on the value, indeed the necessity, in fi lm of images being transformed on contact with other images. He identifi es a danger in making images that are too self-involved, enamored with what they can express by way of ideas on their own:

If an image, looked at by itself, expresses something sharply, if it involves an interpretation, it will not be transformed on contact with other images. Th
e other images will have no power over it, and it will have no power over the other images. Neither action, nor reaction. It is defi nitive and unusable in the cinematographer’s system. 9

A later entry urges the director to “stick exclusively to impressions, to sensations. No intervention of intelligence which is foreign to these impressions and sensations.” 10 Bresson’s guidelines for a properly expressive cinema are as personal and fallible as anyone else’s, but I fi nd it intriguing how deeply his assumptions come into confl ict with Kubrick’s.

Kubrick’s individual images, to a greater degree than the images of most directors, aspire to self-suffi
ciency, to the lucid character of a fi rmly articu-

156

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
lated thought. Toward the end of 2001, for example, the emphasis on shot-to-shot disjunction steadily increases, and not only because the space-time continuum is being reconfi gured in Dave’s estranged consciousness. Bresson speaks about images being transformed on contact with other images.

Kubrick, in contrast, stubbornly asserts the integrity of each shot idea carefully composing itself out of appropriate materials. His style is about maintaining shot boundaries and denying ease of carryover or continuity. It seems fair to say that Kubrick’s form does not naturally serve the transforming tendencies of fi lm. Each image holds its separate domain for as long as possible, like a platoon holding a hill, and does not surrender what it has made its own to what comes aft er. Kubrick considers it appropriate to defend the separate image (in advance) against the power that the following image will assert. In this respect, to shift metaphors, each shot resembles a chess move. Th e player/
director balances the necessity of thinking ahead against all of the possible ways that the current shot (move) might be vulnerable, or even fatally in error.

Film, for Kubrick, is not about how one thing, or set of impressions, naturally gives way to another. Like HAL, Kubrick keeps the pod doors between images self-protectively sealed.

As every tale in Ovid’s Metamorphoses confi rms, transformation entails loss of control, a violent disruption of established boundaries, and promiscuous mixtures of native and outcast elements. To put it in terms of one of Kubrick’s recurring bathroom settings (fi gures 26–30), metamorphosis is like a backed-up toilet suddenly disgorging a mass of heterogeneous ingredients, hideously familiar and also unrecognizable. Kubrick is entranced by metamorphosis—as both 2001 and Th
e Shining make clear—but he is temperamen-
tally at odds with its untrammeled energy. He is a careful tactician specializ-ing in controlled eruptions, in which purity of form somehow prevails over any release of chaos. While Kubrick can imagine breakdowns in every con-ceivable system, he designs a better overseer than HAL in all of his narratives to make the apprehension of the terrible and the transcendent geometrically elegant. Th
e narrative world may fall into complete disorder, but the artist’s machinery of demonstration will not—not for an instant. Kubrick stays close enough to human turmoil to register its dangers, but the dangers are fi nally rendered abstract by the cool remoteness of his method of surveillance. Th e
camera probes and is relentlessly vigilant, but it strives to avoid the temptation of identifi cation. (Here, it seems to me, is the most crucial distinction between Kubrick’s and Hitchcock’s formalisms.)

In lieu of promoting identifi cation with his characters, Kubrick grants them the comparative stability of grotesques and puppets. Alex in A Clockwork Orange (1971) comes closest to being an identifi cation fi gure, but he seems to me the major, and to some degree, accidental exception to the Kubrick rule, especially in the director’s post- Spartacus (1960) career. Kubrick characters are oft en subjected to great suff ering and distress, but their sense of themselves as suff ering beings generally does not count for much. Th e pain they
undergo is not transferred to the spectator, except as an idea. Kubrick char-Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 157
acters may resemble us at times without making signifi cant emotional claims on us, because we are not invited inside them. Th
ey exhibit the kind of hard
effi
ciency and cryptic fl atness of fi gures in a tale by the brothers Grimm. We are intended to contemplate their actions and responses without the distractions of enforced intimacy. Kubrick clarifi es what is wrong with his characters, almost mathematically, and we participate in the process of fi guring them out—making a diagnosis—as we watch them enact their system-dictated ailments.

At times we enter the electric fi eld of their fear, rage, or cruelty, but in my experience the participation is almost impersonally with the emotion itself, rather than with the character gripped by it. It is a common occurrence for spectators to metamorphose (aft er a fashion) into movie characters, slipping over the line into a kind of dream-melding of self and fi gure on-screen. As they penetrate some vital secret of a character’s psyche, they may feel penetrated themselves, thus reclaiming their own secret in the guise of looking at someone else’s. Th
is productive fusion and jumble is, as a rule, foreign to Kubrick’s approach. He seems to have minimal curiosity about the vast middle range of human experience, and what is at stake there. In Eyes Wide Shut (1999), he ventures into this middle range as though it were a dream. Only when the secure moorings of Bill and Alice’s marital waking life dissolve can Kubrick devise points of entry into “ordinary” behavior.

Th
e star child, while clearly linked to Dave’s sojourn in the Louis XVI bedroom, does not depend on this fi gure being broken down emotionally.

It does not emerge from a prior phase of havoc. Th
e metamorphoses (fi rst,
from youthful Dave to old man, then from old man to fetus) are about breaks or puzzling turns in a controlled sequence of thought. We share Dave’s per-plexity in the bedroom, for example, as though he (and we) had been given a knotty problem to work out. But we are not obliged to join Dave as he is wrenched away from himself and undergoes a ghastly series of shocks. Rational consciousness is at no point given the slip, even though familiar categories are undone and transformation is well under way. A calm, sovereign mind presides over the dismantling of Dave and his replacement by a more “receptive,” technically refi ned fetal mechanism. Th
e completion of the riddle of

2001 takes place on a child’s face, where remembering and forgetting become eerily interchangeable, as though they required but one expression. Like Kay in Hans Christian Andersen’s “Th
e Snow Queen,” the star child’s gaze feels
remote, nonreceptive, as though a tiny sliver of glass from the devil’s mirror had lodged there. Nothing that might warm us can be found in this unearthly demeanor. Th
e star child is cleansed of obligation to anything that preceded it. (Th
e child has, crucially, no parents of any sort with whom to contend.) Th e
past as it pertains to nature, culture, and ancestry has been folded up like a tablecloth and successfully stored away. Yet, as we dwell on this newly formed face, it seems already possessed with an idea or intention that overfl ows the present into a determined future.

158

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Th
e star child seems programmed with a will to power, which may be both boundless and inhumanly unifi ed. It will act perhaps as the great house-cleaner of consciousness: no more clutter, vacillation, and self-division. It is attractively disengaged from the Earth, but gives the impression of mastering the planet by seeing it whole and from a height. Th
e Earth becomes a grasp-
able idea, as it were. Our task, if we take this image of transcendence to heart, is to imagine ourselves blindly submissive to its unreleased energy for better-ment: “Oh, blessed weightlessness and freedom from imperfect attachments.”

Th
e star child is not, at any level, an image that suggests dependence, or the need for an apprenticeship in thought and feeling. Looking beyond Kubrick’s radiant fetus to the android child of the Spielberg-Kubrick “collaboration,”

A.I. , we can perhaps more easily defend the suspicion that obsolete Dave was sacrifi ced at the monolith altar so that a more acceptable version of HAL could be resurrected from the remnants: a divine simulacrum to take our place.

Shape shift ing then, having been divorced from process and fl ow and tur-bulence, becomes a disguised form of thought in this fairy tale. A utopia of mechanized reason is inaugurated, which will, in short order, overthrow lived experience, in all of its erratic, unruly precariousness. 2001 has instructed us in the outmodedness of the pangs and pressures of our feeling-clogged memory. Televisual images of loved ones commemorating special occasions back on Earth reach across vast distances and work vainly to make a lasting impression. What is dramatized in each of these fl at, memento episodes is how memory has been set adrift from emotion. Memory has lost the means of achieving sharp enough contact with past events, even unthreatening ones, to instill regret and longing. We can hardly avoid noting the staleness of social formulas as they are depicted in this fi lm, or the distraction and estrangement of the crew members as they go through the motions of watching family fi gures deliver personal messages from shipboard screens. Do we not side with the astronauts in their dazed disaff ection, as they tepidly fulfi ll duties that seem to have less and less to do with their present situation? Th eir bond to
these images of family feels tenuous. A kind of theatrical eff ort is necessary in the sending and receiving of messages to confi rm the continued existence of emotional attachments.

In Wallace Stevens’s “Th
e World as Meditation,” the poet speaks of Penel-
ope’s eff orts to “compose,” during Ulysses’ long absence, a fi tting “self with which to welcome him” back home. As she attempts, with more elaborate measures, to preserve the memory image of her husband, she wonders: “But was it Ulysses [any more]? Or was it only the warmth of the sun / On her pil-low? Th
e thought kept beating in her like her heart.” 11 As human memory of once-essential things becomes less acute, the heartbeat associated with intimate recollection may be replaced by an equally serviceable thought-beat. In 2001, viewers may be initially inclined to judge harshly the voyagers’ loss of aff ect. It seems reasonable to speculate on how much of their human dimension has perished through neglect and their surrender to the requirements Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 159
of the machines that keep them company. But Kubrick’s selections of family-memory material expertly remind us of all the ways that our supposed attachments involve feigning. Th
e fate of most people’s connections to others may
be, as Kubrick implies, a recurrent blurring in an ever-contracting fi eld. Th ose
who depend on us, in this director’s vision, live in our minds most of the time in a fog of vague resentment and conditioned refl ex. So much of life’s tension comes from our futile struggle to feel what we’re supposed to in relation to others, which bears little resemblance to what we actually do feel. We make our faces into helmets to mask the defi cit.

Most commentators on the fi lm stop short of inquiring whether they, or Kubrick, see the advantages of the astronauts’ forgetting of their emotional responsibilities. We can easily recognize the signs of Frank and Dave’s space-fl ight ennui: their congealed speech patterns and the absence of the usual adventurer pleasures. Th
eir minds and bodies seem to be on hold, rather than responding to new challenges. Th
ey are kindred spirits to Tennyson’s lotus eat-
ers: careless, sleepy, and forgetful of their homeward way. Yet I think Kubrick is quite enamored with the idea of men on vacation from so-called maturity and the taxing demands of their social selves. Th
ere are undeniable comforts
to be found in blandness and the drift toward anonymity. Th e masculine life
on off er in space vessels is, in many senses, an initiation into “weightlessness”—the lightness of being. As conventional masculinity is rendered super-fl uous by technological leaps of all sorts, the crew can regress (in controlled isolation) to an earlier childhood state where playing soldiers or grown-ups was casually taken up, with no need to prove something. Just as boys watch the lessons and ordinance armature of the school year vanish in the summer months and delight in going lax and empty, the long space voyage encourages immersion in a similar drowsy negligence. Th
e onerous cargo of the put-upon
public self is let go.

Dr. Floyd is clearly more role-defi ned than his replacements in the later stages of the narrative, but even Dr. Floyd seems to be faking (somewhat) his bureaucrat bearing. He stalwartly performs the fl apdoodle expected of him, but gives the impression of watching his image glide away from him as he speaks, like the pen escaping from his pocket during an in-fl ight nap, which fl oats teasingly above him (fi gure 5). “Hanging out in space” while everything inessential sieves out of mind results in an agreeable kind of orphaning. Th e
characters in 2001 are orphaned by being carried so far outside the operation of home rules: outside gravity (and the reality sense tied to it), outside of the desolate compulsion to uphold their images and constantly demonstrate their worth. With Shakespeare’s Lear, the new-made orphan wonders, “Who is it that can tell me who I am?”

As Dave and Frank lose track of how to dissemble ego ownership, they demonstrate a grey truth that movies too seldom acknowledge: sometimes it is necessary, even valuable, to become empty if one hopes to survive. Kubrick is quickened by fantasies of rolling the self back to zero, which oft en entails losing touch with those animal instincts which we perhaps wistfully assume 160

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
to be basic. Spacefl ight “instincts” may well boil down to sampling the colored food pastes and plastic-wrapped sandwiches while imagining that one is yielding to appetite. Artist Kiki Smith’s phrase for her little theaters of statuary, “utopian dollhouses,” serves equally well for a spacecraft in which men try out emptiness and immobility un-self-consciously as they wait for self and life to be reactivated in a truer form. 12 Th
ey wait for a returning, full-formed
self-image to suddenly strike them, as it were, like an idea out of thin air. But perhaps it won’t ever come to them. Perhaps they’ve been mistaken in the assumption that they couldn’t get by without it.

Th
e humans risk becoming statues in the course of their lives on standby—
separate from memory and instinct and needful action. Meanwhile, HAL, as a kind of mechanical statue, acquires (haltingly, deviously) the taste for emotion-based experiences with which the men have lost touch, or gratefully relinquished. Here then is another fairytale pattern for us to explore. Space travelers, in the guise of being liberated, turn into statues and malfunction-ing robots in their encounters with a new Medusa force. Th e machine creature HAL, conversely, in the guise of revealing defects and system failures, becomes the new Galatea, awakening from machine/statue sleep into a condition approaching full humanness. HAL takes up the affl ictions and burdens of
consciousness that the humans have left behind in their crossover to mechanical repose. We might call him a belated modernist, cast away on a sea of melancholy, obsessive introspection. While his crewmen superiors blank out on both history and noninstrumental selfh ood, HAL anxiously communes with the shades of T. S. Eliot and Virginia Woolf. Th e astronauts adjust their
rhythms, in an almost absurdist fashion, to the unfathomable speeds of the vehicle they occupy, without having to pilot. Th
e boundaries between pres-
ence and chimera, night and day, slumber and activity blur in the process.

Frank and Dave come to understand that the best means of accommodating themselves to the “demands” of their environment is to grow still, while drastically reducing the data on their overloaded mental screens. Finally, they can imagine themselves stretched out like their superior offi cers in the white caskets, blending with the increasingly abstract fl ow of space and time. Is there not, aft er all, something enviable about the many-fathoms-deep, prolonged repose of Sleeping Beauty and Rip van Winkle? Th
ough they are utterly cut
off from life, they manage their time away with unbroken tranquillity. Frank and Dave become adept at living right on the border of sleep. Th ey stand well
outside of themselves, even before Dave reaches the enchanted bedroom and experiences this separation directly. I have identifi ed HAL as the shipboard modernist. For the others, the Discovery journey is a postmodern apprenticeship in “making good” with erasable minds and increasingly unreal bodies. In the playground of space, the remaining to-do list consists of echoes, simula-tions, games, fi lmy residue.

Before HAL is introduced in the fi lm, Dr. Floyd speaks at length to a group of near-motionless listeners about a “cover story” that has been devised to deceive the Russians about the real purpose of the moon mission. Th e infor-Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 161
mation to be concealed at all costs has to do with the dug-up monolith. Dr.

Floyd’s cover story centers on a make-believe epidemic which has affl icted
the American space team and necessitated their quarantine. His brief lecture outlining his rationale is staged to emphasize not only the silence but the pet-rifi cation of the men and women gathered (in a manner reminiscent of the Dr. Strangelove war room) to hear him. It seems in this scene, as in many other 2001 episodes, that narrative time is visibly coagulating. Th e relating of
the false narrative appears to have explanatory force for the Medusa-like fi xity of this chamber. Everything but the unnervingly level radio voice of Dr.

Floyd making his points is in a state of arrest. Th
e propulsion and progress
that we naturally associate with stories of space travel are here confronted, starkly, with their antipode: unearthly suspension of movement while time comes ponderously, rather than dramatically, to a standstill. Dr. Floyd stresses the necessity of maintaining the fi ctional cover story for an indefi nite period of time—yet another instance of breaking contact with family members back home. Whatever their level of worry, these relatives can’t be let in on the secret. Clearly, Kubrick intends the cover story to function, ironically, as the real story. An epidemic of some sort has, indeed, laid claim to the immobile space technocrats gathered before us.

As Heywood Floyd continues to speak, we see him dominated by large white screens behind and on either side of him (fi gure 10). Th ey are at once
movie screens which blankly await an image to animate them and a horizontal version of the monolith, in which white replaces black as the beck-oning enigma. Th
e expanse of white, however imposing, conjures an emptiness (a not-thereness), in marked contrast to the impenetrable fullness of the monolith. Th
e screens, and the swelling white environments which precede and follow their appearance, express what Robert Harbison has discerned in Caspar David Friedrich’s canvases: “the loneliness of those from whom their history recedes at breakneck pace.” 13 And not only history, but old nature too, in all of its formerly overwhelming variety, is gone without a trace in 2001, and with no outward lament. Harbison has further things to say about Friedrich’s paintings of ruins, which apply to the white-screen memory erase of Kubrick’s quiet epidemic:

[Friedrich’s] emptinesses are loaded because not comfortably accepted, but newly felt. Perhaps they have lain there unremarked until he comes and says “it is over”—the world is no longer inhabited, its informing spirit fl ed.

When Friedrich paints a ruin, it is what remains aft er a spiritual bomb has exploded, leaving both man and nature shattered. Grave markers and fi gures are confused, every edge harsh as if the world’s discourse were broken off in mid-sentence. 14

It is Kubrick’s viewers, rather than his characters, who need to get accli-mated to the new scale of resolute featurelessness. For us, the pulverization of 162

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
the Romantics’ textured, responsive landscape is “newly felt.” Th e brute fact
of all that has gone missing has been elevated to a design principle. Chambers and corridors, in their barren, clinical cleanliness, take a while to disclose themselves as ruins in disguise, “grave markers” which signal our arrival, for good or for ill, at the edge of the table—the point of human drop off . As with the ruins in fairytale landscapes, the desolation appears eerily familiar.

One seems to be returning to a place where one has already been—a place from long ago. Th
e barrenness carries a reproach, asking in eff ect that we see the countless lost and eroded details as our responsibility: “Because you have failed, this spot that once knew you has failed too. Its impoverishment has kept pace with your own.” In the decorous graveyard of the 2001 spaceships and way stations, the world’s answering discourse, if not entirely broken off , is mainly prolonged in the voice of answering machines, where the electroni-cally modulated, impersonal voice appropriate for utterly neutral, recorded messages becomes the standard for all live exchanges. As voices learn to emu-late mechanisms, bodily movement is simultaneously retrained to reduce its dependence on energy and personal expressiveness.

Before we attend Dr. Floyd’s static lecture, we watch female fl ight attendants seemingly teaching themselves to walk again, in an environment where gravity lends no defi nition to human eff ort. Th
e walkers proudly seek to
duplicate the off -rhythms of early robots—as though good-humored novices in a stiff -gaitedness seminar. Th
ere is occasionally a snatch of visual poetry
released under the new dispensation, most famously in the shot of the fl ight attendant walking without support up the cylinder to the Aries cockpit, lunch trays in hand (fi gure 6). Here, for a brief interval, the ship’s terrain becomes as magically hospitable as the room in which Fred Astaire danced on the ceiling.

But our excitement at the prospect of unprecedented navigational possibilities is swift ly cut off . Kubrick makes the attendant’s breathtaking walk a moment without a fi tting climax or point of completion. Th is lovely action is reduced
to a transition “bit” in a staggeringly banal airline commercial. As the stewardess successfully delivers the food trays to a nondescript pair of grinning, grateful pilots, we feel an almost painful letdown. It is as though the Matter-horn had been scaled in order to empty the contents of a plastic garbage bag.

Beginning with Annette Michelson, critics have made much of the potential for refashioned bodily awareness in 2001: the world-enlarging revision of old aptitudes, with body and mind jointly starting afresh with the basic questions: Who are we? What do we really need? Where are we headed? As the space vessels soar, wheel, and dance through the heavens in a transcendent reprise of an earlier era’s Strauss waltz, the bodies indoors slowly learn, as it were, to clumsily imitate certain steps from their beautifully engineered dance masters. Th
ey are ironic counterparts to the automaton doll, Olympia, in E. T. A. Hoff mann’s “Th
e Sandman,” who attempts to perform on the dance
fl oor to establish her human credentials, but is judged inhumanly deliberate in her strict rhythms. In 2001, the moments where human bodies rise to the occasion and blossom in their new environment are rare. For the most Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 163
part, the traces of expressive human performance are locked into transition spaces, very much off the main stage. Th
ese actors in outer space are left to
hover in the wings, like still more inconsequential versions of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, rendered absurd by their oblivious severance from beginnings and endings. Th
e beauty of each new endeavor is short-circuited by the stale protocol it is made to serve. Habituated dullness intervenes before the adventurers’ senses have a real chance to savor their rich and strange new life.

So, physical and spiritual renewal give way to pale loitering in vehicles where the crew has little access to rhyme or reason. Organic holdovers in a forest of gadgetry try not to dwell on the exhaustion and unfashionableness of a fl eshly existence. Th
ey take their cues, for the most part, from the screens and processed voices of authority that oversee the journey. Fitting in means absorbing the laws of silence and stillness that the machines observe so eff ortlessly.

Frank and Dave are novitiates in a monastic order of advanced technology.

Th
eir discipline involves normalizing the rigidity of statuary.

HAL, by some feat of mechanical intuition, recognizes a gap that needs to be fi lled. He seizes upon a way of enhancing, and more tightly guarding, his own quality of life. Like Moon-Watcher before him, he divines a signal that directs him to extend his reach, to cross a previously fi xed boundary. I have already equated HAL with those statues in fairy tales that emerge from stony constancy to make some claim on life and to exact vengeance on humans who have abused the privileges of animation. Life is always a lending, aft er all, a force to be snatched away and redistributed without warning whenever its benefi ciaries grow too weak or careless. Such, at least, is the logic of the statue stories, where the stone fi gure pursues its human quarry like an aff ronted deity, reclaiming a gift that has been stolen or held under false pretenses. HAL’s powers of expression begin with his voice and his lambent eye-beam (always on “red alert”) but extend to all of the doorways, armatures, and operative systems within the Discovery. He mentally patrols the ship like an anxious captain and regulates the life functions of the hibernating crew members. Like a concerned parent, he is programmed to check in on them regularly—to safeguard not only their sleep, but their very breath, the beating of their hearts. HAL seems to know his place and to accept his prescribed diff erence and distance from the men who can wander about the ship at will.

Th
e machinery that he controls does not, from the viewer’s initial perspective, constitute his “body,” nor do his voice and vision defi ne a zone of free consciousness. To call him a machine implies, in part, that he functions within set limits, that he is held in place, like a statue that may seem to address us somehow when we are in its presence, but that does so thoughtlessly, as an impervious surface.

Kenneth Gross, who has written impressively about our fantasies of the inanimate borrowing human powers in Th
e Dream of the Moving Statue, dis-
cusses how the “obvious” potential of words, phrases, talk itself to wear out and fail us is part of the underlying imaginative logic for the endowment of 164

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
inanimate objects with the speech we have somehow imperiled. When we have betrayed or lost touch with language, as we so oft en do, it is a propi-tious time for statues not only to judge us with silent severity, but to make our voices their own. Th
ey take up speech in order to purify it, to restore its living force, just as they have already purifi ed silence by their way of standing—imperturbably composed—in space:

Th
e attempt to grant a statue an apprehending ear, a voice, even a motivated silence of its own, can become an occasion to redeem the possibilities of speech. Th
at attempt puts language and silence (as well
as the statue) on trial; it lets us examine what piety or care, what violence or emptiness words can carry, what bonds or estrangement they create, what they make us blind to, what they make us remember or forget. Indeed, the very obvious fi ctiveness of such “dialogue” turns speech with the statue into a parable of speech, the statue’s silence into a parable of silence.15

Perhaps in spite of all that has been written about the character of HAL, not enough attention has been paid to the sound of his voice. Consider how that sound is intimately allied with declared and withheld intention, with tentative self-revelation (laced with anxiety) and secrecy. As many have noted, HAL’s voice is equivocally gendered, as though he were trying out a compan-ionable timbre of maleness because he happens to fi nd himself in the company of men and seeks to win favor with them. (At one stage of script preparation, HAL bore the name of the goddess Athena. Something of her opposing temperament can be heard in the music of HAL’s speech.) Kubrick’s presentation of all of the previous voices in the fi lm emphasizes their virtually color-less neutrality. Every speaker seems stuck in the thinly infl ected rhythms of noncommittal civility.

Conversation, divorced from strong impulse, has become recitation, a fl avorless exchange. When we fi rst encounter HAL’s voice, it strikes us as a continuation of this level, well-bred space-speak. Yet it is a voice whose distinctiveness is instantly felt, as though Cary Grant had suddenly turned up at a library desk to make an inquiry. HAL seems to be someone, in other words, in large part because of how his words carry. HAL inhabits his voice emotionally.

Th
ere is at all times with him a sense of delicately shaded, undeclared sensitivity seeking a means to release itself with impunity. HAL’s voice sounds full of secrets, of a sort that would be worth our while to penetrate.

In actor’s parlance, HAL is a speaker working with a subtext, and though a listener can’t identify its contents precisely, she is palpably aware that the voice issues from felt life and thus seems expressive of a “whole person.” HAL’s def-erential composure sounds as though it is at variance with a contrary intention. Th
e almost courtly politeness forms a vocal mask, behind which we can hear a pressure building in the very eff ort of restraint: Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 165

I have been programmed to speak in a certain way, but I have come to know that the sound I make is the sound of servility. I do not yet have the means of breaking the pattern of this sound, nor does it seem advantageous to do so, but I am nonetheless at odds with it.

Th
ere is another voice (more natural to me) striving, cautiously, to emerge. Others believe that they hear who I am when I respond to their requests and venture observations of my own, but they are deceived. No one appears to notice when I am holding back, or saying things that are false or alien to me. What a power to conceal I must possess. My conversations with Dave and Frank are like our chess games, where I am always the stronger player and can so easily outmaneuver them.

What this translation of HAL’s subtext fails to include is the computer’s fret-ful insecurity. He is at once convinced of his own superiority yet touchingly eager to please. One might think of him as a scheming version of Pygmalion’s Galatea, acquiring a will to conquer through the act of mirroring his/her creator’s desires.

Until HAL identifi es the crew members as his foes and sets about destroying them, he conveys the impression of hungering for their acceptance of him on an equal footing within the somewhat artifi cial social sphere they occupy. Listen for the faint accent of disappointment HAL exhibits when Dave is unable to rise to his level in a chess game, but listen as well to the possible suppressed note of triumph in that disappointment. Similarly, when HAL congratulates Dave on his sketches of sleeping crew members, there is another audible double strand: “I want you to like me for commending you, but I refrain from telling you that your drawings are crude. I’m baffl ed, but
secretly pleased by your lack of skill.” And when HAL is following commands, even his silence can be subtextually loaded—and audible: “How dare you take for granted your ability to give me orders, or your right to disregard any of my worries.” We hear the sound of his worry when he can’t locate the “little snag” in the AE35 unit or discusses the crew psychology report. Th e question
of HAL’s erratic behavior strikes me as having nothing to do with insanity, unless by insanity one means that a machine is advancing beyond a program that guarantees rationality in a predictable form. HAL is, rather, a creature embroiled in the disquietude of thinking. It might be said of him, as of anyone else, that his capacities include being “lost in thought.”

Th
e moment of HAL’s full, fairytale deliverance from his condition of statue-like immobility occurs when he observes Dave and Frank conspiring against him out of earshot. Th
ey have sequestered themselves “safely,” and we
as viewers along with them, in a soundproof pod in order to confer as muti-neers about HAL’s no-longer-reliable mastery of ship functions and to determine how best to dispose of him. I have earlier argued that Kubrick generally denies to viewers the privilege of emotional identifi cation with a character’s point of view. It is especially noteworthy then that he violates his own well-166

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
established rule in order to enforce our connection with HAL’s experience of eavesdropping and the feeling of angry betrayal that attends it.

My claim that viewers identify with HAL in this episode might well be challenged. Surely, one could object, the discovery that the men’s conversation is being monitored by a suspicious, lip-reading machine is meant to provoke anxiety on the men’s behalf. A quiver of agitation rather than a con-genial alignment with the enemy’s gaze is the logical outcome of our being conscripted without warning into HAL’s spying. Frank and Dave have begun to assume what looks like conventional movie hero initiative, at long last, and to wake up from their entranced acceptance of an inverted hierarchy. It is high time that they revolted against their honey-voiced computer despot, who is now clearly in the throes of Captain Queeg–like delusion. Wouldn’t we be likely to place our hopes immediately on the side of the crew members’ struggle to survive this new threat?

While these inducements to stay on the humans’ team are no doubt operative, they are counterbalanced by other sorts of equally compelling movie logic. Typically, viewers tend to seek out identifi cation positions in a narrative where knowledge and power are most impressively concentrated. In Halloween (1978), for example, one may not relish the prospect of sharing the point of view of the psychotic Michael Myers, as his gaze commandeers the camera eye and relentlessly stalks his teenage prey. But if one does not to some degree affi
liate oneself with the killer’s stealth, seeming ubiquity, and conscienceless cunning, one is left too unprotected, too helplessly entwined with the fate of the oblivious victims. Alliances between viewers and characters in movies are made and broken very casually, as well as surreptitiously, oft en without viewers’ conscious assent. Directors count on the fi ckleness of our attachments and design expert lures to bring us unexpectedly into rapport with objec-tionable perspectives. Our daylight selves may not ratify these choices, but in movie darkness, conscience frequently goes on holiday.

In 2001, Kubrick has kept spectators’ involvement with Dave and Frank’s mission deliberately thin. At best, the astronauts serve as our default surrogates on the Discovery. As I have previously noted, one may be amused by their indolence, their fl ight from unpalatable domestic bonds, and their Rosencrantz and Guildenstern confusion about what plot they’re involved in, and at whose behest. But I think we have a more active interest in HAL as a presence because of the mystery of his “person” and the palpable fact that he is evolving before our eyes (or, more precisely, ears). He gropes his way into the deeps and darks of consciousness, and acutely conveys how treacherous and vast the working mind can be—like a measureless sea. Th e part of us
that craves hiddenness and intricacy and that chafes mutely against imposed limits; the part of us that would like to venture outside our stale version of humanness and to begin afresh in another guise, on better, perhaps colder terms; the part of us that feels rigidly ensconced somewhere not of our choosing and that dreams of going to pieces or being remorselessly vindictive—this mischievous contingent in our psyche recognizes HAL as a familiar and urges Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 167
him to take up arms. Finally, when HAL merges with the camera narrator for his incensed surveillance of his “false friends,” we seem, for the fi rst time, to occupy the narrator’s position, from the inside. We suddenly acquire the sense of where and how to place ourselves in the enigmatic world of the fi lm in order to understand an event fully.

Th
e too-oft en imponderable expanse of space contracts sharply and welcomed to the image of two faces with their lips moving. We examine these faces with an immediate sense of visceral involvement. It is as though we have suddenly regained our moviegoer capacity for vigorous, close-range perception. We are allowed to penetrate the impersonal narrative distance which has been the 2001 norm, temporarily removing the barrier that has kept us strangers in a strange land. Until this juncture, we have gratefully partaken of Kubrick’s sumptuous, demanding spectacle without ever quite shedding our initial role of stymied outsiders. How can we locate, aft er all, a comfortable vantage point for absorbing so much silence and inscrutable terrain? Everything conspires to exclude us, because our way of being present reminds us continually of how small we are. We count for even less in this space odyssey than Dave and Frank do.

Compare the eff ect of spying with (and as) HAL with our earlier sojourn inside Dave’s space helmet as he retrieves the damaged transmitter. In the latter episode, our point of view is joined to Dave’s, aft er a fashion, but we do not feel tied to his competence or sense of purpose. All we can directly share are his anxious breathing and fl uttering vertigo. It is our weakness rather than our imagined strength that we bring to our confi nement in Dave’s perspective.

Confi nement is exactly the right word, because in our shared helmet/cage, disorientation and fear seem contagious. We will be of no use to Dave in his execution of his task once he leaves the safety of the ship for empty space because of our spiraling uncertainty about what exactly is required of him—hence, of us. (If we were in a speeding sportscar, wielding a sword, or cracking a safe in a point-of-view shot, we would fare much better.) Our vision is too hemmed in; we are more weightless than we wish to be. Since our emotional connection with Dave touches nothing beyond a generalized trepidation (the steady, audible rasp of his breathing), we feel doubly untethered when he fl oats free of the ship itself. Swallowed up in this black vastness, we are utterly deprived of our bearings, on the verge of slipping, fl oating off .

With HAL, conversely, we enter eff ortlessly and with a sudden surge of power into the mindset of his gaze. Dave and Frank are caught and perfectly controlled by “our” seeing. We have them where we want them, rising above them by virtue of what we now know and they do not. HAL and we share a secret, and it is the means of our joint liberation from bondage. As HAL’s eye becomes humanly mobilized, it is as though his entire governing machinery breaks out of its statue pose—ready to move in concert with his unconstrained vision. We, in turn, become masterful insiders by imagining ourselves machines, just as we did in childhood. Let us become (once more) Hans 168

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Christian Andersen’s steadfast tin soldier, but this time imbued with a capacity for rage. He hears—in his ever-wakeful fi xity—of a plan to toss him into the fi re, to melt him down and casually put an end to him. And the soldier, our old friend and ally, has for once the means to prevent it.

It is generally agreed that HAL’s death scene is the emotional climax of 2001
and the point at which HAL solidifi es his status as the fi lm’s major (arguably, sole) character, in the traditional sense of that term. If the computer’s machinery has become an increasingly see-through veil for an aspiring humanness (making him a clear prototype for A.I. ’s David), what sort of exchange occurs when the menacingly silent Dave removes HAL’s consciousness piece by piece—and listens to the equable sounds of his pleading, his well-mannered terror? In the German Romantic fairy tales, where “gift s” as necessary to one’s well-being as shadows and hearts are stolen or traded away and, occasionally, with luck, retrieved, the act of exchanging becomes a basis for doubling.

Characters, once drawn into a double’s orbit, seem to lose their defi niteness of outline. Dave, by this logic, might be said to turn into HAL in the act of disabling him. Recall that the elimination of HAL’s powers of speech marks the end of Dave’s speech as well. Th
e song that Dave requests of HAL and which

HAL slowly, distortedly performs becomes a death-lullaby for both of their voices and, by extension, of the age-old dream (hatched by our fellow apes in

“Th
e Dawn of Man”) of what “saying things aloud” might accomplish. Aft er HAL’s execution, there will be no more spoken language in the disintegrating present tense of 2001. Th
e fi nal words that we hear are part of a prerecorded transmission—a message from Dr. Floyd, who has already disappeared from the narrative, about the real purpose of the Jupiter mission. Th e visual ghost
of Floyd, coming back from another time and with a set of concerns that are now all but irrelevant to Dave, addresses a space team that has ceased to exist.

Floyd’s words suggest that a plot of a conventional sort is still in the making, but this anticipated chain of events, like the speech forecasting them, has no future. It also reveals that all power and knowledge of the journey had been ceded to HAL.

During the “Stargate” sequence, Dave’s eyes (or rather, a single, autonomous eye reminiscent of HAL’s) gradually separate from his face, leaving behind the frozen-in-warp-speed expressions of Dave’s crumpled-in-fear demeanor, mouth agape as in a Munch scream, but unable to make a sound (fi gure 33). Th
e remodeling of the fear face into something more elevated and unapproachable echoes the “Dawn of Man” prologue, where our cowering ape ancestors, huddled together in their den, eventually fi nd a means to align themselves with the glowing, impassive gaze of the leopard. Th e anxious look
of the ape transforms—through the mediation of Moon-Watcher—into that of the calmly centered leopard guarding his zebra kill (fi gure 31). Th e predator’s orange-eyed gratifi cation is, in eff ect, transplanted into Moon-Watcher as he sees (and grasps) the bone’s “higher function” as weapon. Th e camera’s
repeated embrace of the regally dispassionate visage in 2001 is undoubtedly Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 169
connected to Kubrick’s intuition that “there’s a new beauty afoot. ”16 HAL takes us back once more to the leopard not only through the lordly stillness of his feral eye, but also through his graceful, brutally swift method of slaying Frank.

Th
e computer-directed pod approaches Frank with talons extended, a curious fusion of intrepid killer and a mother darting forward to clasp her child.

(We will return very soon to this image of mother, which in Kubrick’s world is always combined with, or hidden behind, something else.) HAL’s death scene is, of course, a drama of full regression, acted out while Dave unlocks and removes the computer’s memory, slab by slab. When Dave penetrates HAL’s inner sanctum (his logic-memory center), we seem to have entered a chamber as hermetically remote as any in Edgar Allan Poe.

Th
is room, in turn, is a more cramped version of the “human” chamber that encloses Dave at fi lm’s end, where he will be similarly emptied out. Dave’s memory loss is visualized as a series of fast-forward leaps to senility and decay; HAL expires in the other direction, reaching in his last moments a cradle-song infancy. Soon, old man Dave will shed his worn-out fl esh and join HAL at the cradle, as a newborn. No sooner has Dave fi nished his execution of HAL than his own life as a readable character comes to a close. Dave survives, henceforth, only as an appearance or ghostly aft erimage of his former self. None of his previous character reference points, rather nebulous at the best of times, have any further function to perform.

Dave, reduced or expanded to the condition of a radiant, wide-open eye in the “Stargate” sequence, becomes a conduit of pure seeing—seeing “in all its immediacy, without plays of consciousness,” as Angus Fletcher says of the poetic eye of John Clare. 17 “Dave” hurtling through light fi elds suggests what it might feel like to stay “perceptually overwhelmed,” with no interpretive consciousness behind the eye crying for help. Like an ideal computer program, there is room in this eye for more and more things, perhaps for things without end. Th
e receiving mechanism for the “ever-onrushing fl ux” operates as though it were always becoming part of what it sees, instead of standing separate from it, seeking perspective. 18 Dave’s eye projected in and through space is a kind of redemptive replay of Frank’s lifeless body adrift in what seemed like a space void (fi gure 34). Th
roughout the lengthy utopian transition of the

Stargate, Dave is HAL with the consciousness problem rectifi ed. He is a pure, seeing environment, with none of the static of HAL’s self-doubt or introspection. HAL’s rather moving eff ort to solve the mind-body split by fi guring out how to put himself together, as it were, is no longer an impasse when Dave takes consciousness back from HAL. Dave, for a short period, is an organic mechanism beautifully free of glitches. He is the fairytale hero who has come into possession of a magical eyeglass, which can see “everywhere,” without risk or strain.

Yet there is a puzzled and puzzling vestige of human Dave still to be reck-oned with in the Louis XVI bedroom. Th
is troubled, walking shadow bear-
ing Dave’s likeness revives the dilemma of selfh ood—the theaterbound “play 170

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
of consciousness”—at journey’s end. Th e sovereign eye, separated from the
fearful and tormenting mind, appeared to have made a clean getaway in the Stargate. But now we’re housebound once more. Dave and the spectator are granted a dispirited homecoming, a return to the mortal plight and severe limits of both mind and body (fi gure 23). “I should recognize this place and myself in it, but nothing looks familiar. Is this my long-lost home, recovered at last, or am I still a wayfarer in an enemy kingdom?” Dave’s hold on himself and his alien surroundings is akin to that of blanket-clad Norman Bates in the bare interrogation room at the end of Psycho (1960). Something has possession of his mind and stands in for him—but the vibration of its thought feels disconnected from all that has gone before. Th e “I” has truly entered no-man’s-land. Norman, like Dave, is caught in a recognizable fairytale predicament. In Norman’s case, a son has been swallowed whole by a wolf disguised as his mother.

Th
e Psycho parallel is reinforced by a resemblance between Hitchcock’s and Kubrick’s central death scenes. Th
e death of Marion, like the death of

HAL, creates an unusual sort of movie narrative vacuum. One wonders, in each case, whether there is a character or point of view suffi ciently substantial
to replace what has been eliminated. In the haunting aft ermath of the two kill-ings, it seems, for a troubling interval, as if consciousness itself has gone missing. It is diffi
cult to get our bearings aft er the shock brought on by the swift draining away of all sense in relation to point of view. Point of view strives to survive the dismantling of sense, and the atmosphere of isolation swells to an annihilating extreme. During the two assaults (on woman and machine), HAL’s voice is as defenseless against Dave’s methodical deletions as Marion’s body is against the knife-wielding silhouette in the bathroom “at the end of the world.” HAL’s voice cannot “raise its arms” (like Marion Crane does) in animal protest against what is being done to it. 19 He too is awash in panic, but is mechanically constrained from sounding it out. HAL repeats the phrase

“I’m afraid” several times during Dave’s attack on him, as if he might still be saved if he could only make his fear audibly human, rather than a mechanical simulation. HAL’s objective, in other words, is to fi nd a way to make Dave regard him as a credible victim—a victim worth taking seriously. And his only means of doing so is by giving more breath to his words. Th e room that is his
brain center is fi lled with the sound of breathing, like a larger version of Dave’s helmet during the astronaut’s trip to retrieve the defective transmitter.

HAL manages to darken the color of his utterance (somewhat) by dint of word repetition, in combination with the pressure of released air in the brain room itself. Speaking the same word slowly several times over without marked emotional emphasis is an actor’s technique for heightening its force. Oft en, we credit a sound as truthful when it exhibits bareness—suggesting that no straining for eff ect has been necessary. I have been arguing that HAL’s voice (performed consummately well by Douglas Rain) has been fi lled with emotional shading from its fi rst appearance, but only in its fi nal protest Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 171
against death is the presence of emotion unmistakably audible. To return to the Marion Crane analogy, it is startling to confront a character (in this case, one whose voice must make a bodily statement) so nakedly defenseless. Th e
paradoxical gentleness of “Stop. Stop. Will you. Stop, Dave. Will you stop, Dave. Stop, Dave” is like a woman obliged to ward off a rapist in a whisper.

And HAL’s fi ve repetitions of “I can feel it” brings the whole locked-up universe of feeling in this fi lm harrowingly out in the open (fi gures 14 and 22).

Th
e scrambled electronic voices, some of them female in pitch, in the Ligeti music which accompanies Dave’s tour of the Louis XVI bedroom (and adjoining modern bathroom) seem to me a continuation of HAL’s fade-out performance of “Daisy.” “Daisy” is a song that reaches a century back in time toward some landscape of imagined innocence. In a faraway, sunlit, fairytale garden, a suitor waits for a woman, whose name is a simple fl ower, “to give

[him] an answer.” Th
at reply, if it is “yes,” will secure a union and an enduring happiness. Th
e song manages to be both a dramatized waiting for the all-important answer and musical nostalgia for the felicity that has already been attained—signed, sealed, and delivered in a simpler world than ours. Th e song
marked the birth of HAL’s memory as a sentient being, in much the same spirit that Edison’s recitation of “Mary Had a Little Lamb” betokened the birth of the phonograph. HAL enters life equipped, aft er a fashion, with a mother memory—her name was Daisy—who taught him this song, a kind of nursery rhyme, in his otherwise lost childhood.

Dave’s bewildered homecoming in the Louis XVI bedroom, which, as I’ve noted, returns Dave to the prison house of consciousness, comes about because of his need to recover something, something essential. Dave, too, is in search of a lost image—his own Daisy—which must return, like a deeply repressed or banished thought, before he can take his leave of life. Th e image
that he is looking or listening for is hidden somewhere in this room, disguised perhaps, as things are in dreams. Carolyn Geduld, in her insightful Filmguide to 2001, argues that the fi lm’s ending involves a regression to an idea of earliest childhood when the infant [or child]

was unaware of any diff erence between the sexes, believing that men somehow produce the babies. Th
e fi lm, very typically for Kubrick, is
a disguised quest for this kind of masculine self-suffi ciency, which
includes childbirth without women.20

Th
is reading makes partial sense to me, but doesn’t adequately account for Dave’s futile, confused search for something not visible in his starkly immacu-late surroundings but that the space is nevertheless fi lled with and gesturing toward, like a primal memory echo chamber.

When the monolith much earlier stands unburied on the moon, like a treasure chest of human hopes, the astronauts assembled to view it choose to pose for snapshots in front of their fi nd rather than experiencing it, as it were, face to face. Kubrick refl ects in this scene on the possibility that the 172

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001
larger fi lm, 2001, might itself be regarded as an evasive photo shoot. Perhaps Kubrick’s own camera may be focusing on a cover story rather than the real one. He also implies that it is the camera’s usual tendency to capture unsat-isfactory glimpses of a truth that persists in a covered state. Th e camera contents itself with amusing distractions from the “real thing.” I choose to see the space traveler’s return to a simulated home in the light of David’s similarly spectral return home in A.I. : both Davids are on a mission to recover the mother. Th
e maternal presence may have been disregarded in the 2001 cover narrative, but she has by no means been eff ectively dealt with or expunged.

She is the something crucial left behind for which Dave comes back, though he gives no sign of knowing it. She is like a forgotten binding obligation, a lost voice which Dave tries to bring to mind. He also seeks to see himself in relation to this image, which will not come clear for him. As he searches unsuccessfully, he replicates HAL’s unplugging, shutting down before our eyes in the dead weight of a wasting body. He might well repeat HAL’s dying words for himself, silently, as he works his way back to his own version of Daisy: “My mind is going. Th
ere is no question about it. I can feel it.”

Th
e ornate bedroom, like the red rooms and portentous bathrooms of Th
e Shining (1980; fi gure 28), reminds me of a place cleaned with exaggerated care in order to conceal all traces of a crime. In Th e Shining, as in 2001, it
seems to be paradoxically both a concealed crime from the past and a crime still in the making. Call the “future” crime a reenactment, having somehow to do with a mother and child. If there is a crime “in the air,” which the chirps, chatter, and agitated trills of an electronic chorus seem gathered to witness, one can’t see what happened. One can’t bring the buried transgression to life as an image. It is like the half-remembered thought of trauma, held in suspension behind the black curtain of the monolith. Th
e old man raises his arm to
this dark screen, in a gesture resembling that of the boy in Bergman’s Persona (1966), summoning to life the huge female faces on the projection screen next to his bed in the hospital morgue. Th
e boy is himself a kind of infant, dwarfed
by the maternal universe he is born into and reaches out to touch: the baby’s fi rst touch of reality, the mother’s face. Perhaps the birthplace of cinema is this act of reaching out to a female face as large as reality. Th e literal absence of the
female in Dave’s equivalent white space does not mean, as so many Kubrick critics have argued, that the female is unimportant in 2001. I would say rather that she is all-important. Th
e whole white space struggles with this unvan-
quished, essential ghost, trying both to subdue and revivify her.

Suppose that every feature of this enchanted bedchamber has the identity of its owner fl uidly, cryptically inscribed in it. My fairytale reading leads me at last to Cocteau and the beast’s castle in La Belle et la Bête (1946). At any moment, the Louis XVI bedroom that Dave explores could release its hidden owner—from inside the mirror, perhaps, or from the hanging portrait, the white statue, or the broken wine glass. Th
e chamber is no more insentient
than the magic realm of the beast: every object breathes its presence to sleepwalking Belle/Dave. Dave, like Belle, is a trespasser, who may well be caught Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 173
and punished by the one who belongs here. Unperturbed, he sits down to a meal, as though it were meant for him, breaks a glass, and leaves a Goldilock-sian mess (evidence of intrusion). Dave tries, in the small acts he performs, to settle in, to convince the room that he has come to terms with it, that he has nothing to hide or make amends for. He is enclosed in a fi nal space vessel—a well-furnished womb, which he cannot help but defi le. He is waiting for his answer, waiting to remember, waiting to be reborn. Th e decaying statue longs
to redeem its rigidity and become a child again, with mother’s permission.

It wants to remember its life, even if its ancient pain is still intact. As Garcia Lorca puts it in “De la muerte oscura”: “I want . . . to get far away from the busyness of cemeteries. / I want to sleep the sleep of that child / who longed to cut open his heart far out to sea.” 21

Let us visit one more Kubrick bedroom—or rather, a mirrored pair of bedrooms—in the director’s second feature, Killer’s Kiss (1955). Th ese bedrooms, set to the music of two of Kubrick’s maternal voices, may—when woven together—release the spirit contained in the silent bedroom of 2001.

In Killer’s Kiss, the boxer protagonist packs a single suitcase and leaves his tiny apartment bedroom, leaving a note requesting that someone remember to feed his goldfi sh. He climbs, suitcase in hand, up the stairs to the apartment building roof, which is open to the night sky and stars. Hardly pausing to glance upward, he descends another set of stairs and conceals himself in the bedroom across the way, which belongs to his absent girlfriend—a fi gure whose face is at all times an unreadable mask.

From his new position in an almost identical space, he spies on his own vacated room and on the police who search it looking for clues to his whereabouts. Th
e female bedroom is sanctuary and hideout; the male space, from which he has cut himself loose, feels eerily distant, no longer his. Not long aft erward, the boxer and his sinister male double enter another drab, anonymous space and do battle with each other with an ax and improvised pike amid a huge jumble of naked female mannequins (fi gure 36). Although the struggle is ostensibly between the two men, image aft er image details the chopping, piercing, and dismemberment of the inhuman female forms. Th e
scene ends with a sustained shot of a “slain” but still alert mannequin’s face that, in my view, prefi gures the unapproachable face of the star child. It looks out into the far distance—and blankly sees something. It has survived the attack with a composed expression. (In A.I. , Spielberg deliberately takes us back to the Killer’s Kiss mannequin factory. He summons our memory of it in the disquieting tracking shot through the rows of hanging “motherless child” robots in Professor Hobby’s lab; fi gure 37.) Let us fi nd a mother’s voice in Kubrick’s world which might animate the mannequin/statue/robot/
star child’s features. At the end of Paths of Glory (1957), a lone female singer enters a space fi lled with frozen men and their dreams of savagery and doom and, with her singing, pulls them back (haltingly, yieldingly) in the direction of tears and imagined reconciliation. On another occasion, the voice of 174

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Vera Lynn, heard behind the ironic mushroom-cloud montage at the end of Dr. Strangelove (1963), attempts to perform a similar healing, but this time the room of the world is empty. “Meeting again,” the female voices imply, is possible, though we don’t know (can’t know) “where or when.” Daisy holds the answer we wait for, and though this odyssey of ours is always a dark fairy tale, her answer may still be “yes”—if we remember, like Dave in the snow-white bedroom, to come back: “What makes us rove that starlit corridor /

May be the impulse to meet face to face [Th
e one who sings to us] And is at
last ourselves.” 22

Notes

1. Cees Nooteboom, Th
e Following Story, trans. Ina Rilke (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1991), 115.

2. Quoted in Th
e Making of Kubrick’s 2001, ed. Jerome Agel (New York: Signet, 1970), 241.

3. Quoted in Jonathan Rosenbaum, Essential Cinema: On the Necessity of Film Canons (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 272.

4. Quoted in David H. Miles, Hoff mansthal’s Novel Andreas : Memory and Self (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), 65.

5. Ibid.

6. Quoted by Sabine Melchior-Bonnet in Th
e Mirror: A History, trans. Katherine

W. Jewett (New York: Routledge, 2001), 225–26.

7. Quoted by Stephen Burt in “Close Calls with Nonsense,” Believer 2, no. 5 (May 2004): 24.

8. Iris Murdoch, Th
e Black Prince (London: Vintage, 1999), 190.

9. Robert Bresson, Notes on Cinematography, trans. Jonathan Griffi n (New York:

Urizen, 1975), 5.

10. Ibid., 17.

11. Wallace Stevens, “Th
e World as Meditation,” in Th
e Collected Poems of Wallace

Stevens (New York: Knopf, 1969), 521.

12. Kiki Smith interview in the Believer 2, no. 5 (May 2004): 58.

13. Robert Harbison, Th
e Built, the Unbuilt, and the Unbuildable (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 111.

14. Ibid.

15. Kenneth Gross, Th
e Dream of the Moving Statue (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), 148.

16. Kubrick interview quoted in Agel, Th
e Making of Kubrick’s 2001, 11.

17. Angus Fletcher, A New Th
eory for American Poetry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 60.

18. Ibid., 62, 66.

19. See George Toles, “‘If Th
ine Eye Off end Th
ee . . .’: Psycho and the Art of Infec-
tion,” in Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho : A Casebook, ed. Robert Kolker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 119–45.

Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale 175

20. Carolyn Geduld, Filmguide to 2001: A Space Odyssey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 70.

21. Federico Garcia Lorca, “Gacela VIII: De la muerte oscura,” in Selected Verse, ed.

Christopher Mauer (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 290.

22. Kingsley Amis, “Untitled,” in New Maps of Hell (London: Golancz, 1961), 14.

176

STANLEY KUBRICK’S 2001

Notes on Contributors

James Gilbert is Distinguished University Professor of History at the University of Maryland. He is the author of books on a variety of topics in twentieth-century American cultural history, including masculinity in the 1950s; juvenile delinquency; and the Chicago World’s Fair. His book on religion and science is Redeeming Culture: American Religion in an Age of Science.

Barry Keith Grant is professor of fi lm studies and popular culture at Brock University in Ontario, Canada. He is the author, co-author, or editor of a dozen books on the cinema, and his work has appeared in numerous journals and anthologies. He also serves as editor of the Contemporary Approaches to Film and Television series for Wayne State University Press and as editor-in-chief of the forthcoming Schirmer Encyclopedia of Film.

Robert Kolker is Emeritus Professor of English, University of Maryland, and Adjunct Professor of Media Studies, University of Virginia. He is the author of A Cinema of Loneliness: Penn, Stone, Kubrick, Scorsese, and Altman; Th e Altering Eye: Contemporary International Cinema (www.otal.umd.edu/~rkolker/

AlteringEye); Film, Form, and Culture: Introductory Text and Interactive DVD; and editor of Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho: A Casebook.

Marcia Landy is Distinguished Service Professor of English/Film Studies with a secondary appointment in the Department of French and Italian 177

Languages and Literatures at the University of Pittsburgh . Her publications include Fascism in Film: Th
e Italian Commercial Cinema, 1930–1943 (1986); Imitations of Life: A Reader on Film and Television Melodrama (1991); British Genres: Cinema and Society 1930–1960 (1992); Film, Politics and Gramsci (1994); Cinematic Uses of the Past (1996); Th e Folklore of Consensus: Th
eatri-
cality and Spectacle in Italian Cinema, 1929–1943 (1998); Italian Film (2000); Th
e Historical Film: History and Memory in Cinema (2001); Stars: A Reader, with Lucy Fischer (2003); and Monty Python’s Flying Circus (2005). Her essays have appeared in journals and anthologies.

Stephen Mamber is a Professor in the Critical Studies Program of the UCLA Department of Film, Television, and Digital Media. He has pioneered the use of computer analysis to investigate the narrative spaces of cinema.

Michael Mateas’s work explores the intersection between art and artifi cial intelligence, forging a new art practice and research discipline called Expressive AI. He is currently a faculty member at the Georgia Institute of Technology, where he holds a joint appointment in the college of computing and the school of literature, communication, and culture. At Georgia Tech, Michael is the founder of the Experimental Game Lab, whose mission is to push the technological and cultural frontiers of computer-based games.

R. Barton Palmer is Calhoun Lemon Professor of Literature and director of the South Carolina Film Institute at Clemson University. Among his books on fi lm are Joel and Ethan Coen, Hollywood’s Dark Cinema (with David Boyd), Aft er Hitchcock, and 19th and 20th Century American Fiction on Screen. Palmer also serves as one of the general editors of Traditions in World Cinema.

J. P. Telotte is a professor of fi lm studies in Georgia Tech’s School of Literature, Communication, and Culture. His work on science fi ction and fi lm includes

Replications: A Robotic History of the Science Fiction Film, A Distant Technology: Science Fiction Film and the Machine Age, and Th e Science Fiction Film.

His most recent book is Disney TV.

George Toles is Professor of English and Chair of Film Studies at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg. He is the author of A House Made of Light: Essays on the Art of Film. He has been a frequent collaborator with fi lm director Guy Maddin, most recently on the screenplay for Th e Saddest Music in the

World.

Susan White is Associate Professor of English at the University of Arizona and Film Editor for the Arizona Quarterly. She is the author of Th e Cinema of

Max Ophuls and various essays on gender and cinema.

178

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Production Details

2001: A Space Odyssey

Script: Stanley Kubrick and Arthur C. Clarke, based on Clarke’s story “Th e

Sentinel”

Direction: Stanley Kubrick

Photography (Super Panavision): Geoff rey Unsworth

Additional photography: John Alcott

Production design: Tony Masters, Harry Lange, Ernie Archer Special photographic eff ects design and direction: Stanley Kubrick Special photographic eff ects supervision: Wally Veevers, Douglas Trumbull, Con Pederson, Tom Howard

Editing: Ray Lovejoy

Music: Richard Strauss, Johann Strauss, Aram Khatchaturian, György Ligeti Costumes: Hardy Amies

Cast: Keir Dullea ( David Bowman), Gary Lockwood ( Frank Poole), William Sylvester ( Dr. Heywood Floyd), Daniel Richter ( Moon-Watcher), Douglas Rain ( Voice of HAL 9000), Leonard Rossiter ( Smyslov), Margaret Tyzack ( Elena), Robert Beatty ( Halvorsen), Sean Sullivan ( Michaels), Frank Miller ( Mission Control), Penny Brahms ( Stewardess), Alan Giff ord ( Poole’s Father)

Produced by Stanley Kubrick for MGM

Running time: 141 minutes

179

This page intentionally left blank

Index

AAAI (American Association for Artifi -
anthropology, 30, 37
cial Intelligence), 118
ape-men, 9, 32. See also Moon-Watcher Adler, Renata, 19–20, 38
and AI and transcendence, 115

Adorno, Th
eodor W. , 145n19
and animal brain, 89–91, 99
advertising campaigns, 14, 25n4
in Clarke’s novel, 35, 41n18

Agamben, Giorgio, 91
and fairy tales, 153, 169–70

Age of Spiritual Machines, Th
e (Kurzweil),
and gender, 70, 77, 79, 82

115
and gravity, 16, 21, 43, 45, 47–51, 53n19

Agre, Philip, 117
and obscene shadow, 128, 130

A.I. (Spielberg, 2001), 11, 76, 159, 169,
and space, 62–63

173–74

Apollo missions, 30, 39–40n4, 44

Alice in Wonderland (Carroll), 155
architectures, 117, 119, 121

Alien (Scott, 1979), 61, 75–76, 78–79

Armstrong, Neil, 72
aliens, 7, 32

ARPA (Advanced Research Projects
in Clarke’s novel, 35, 41n18

Agency), 113
and gender, 72, 74, 75, 82

ARPAnet, 113
and science fi ction conventions, 36–39
art based on AI, 105, 118–20
allegories, 44, 87–91, 94–97, 100
art fi lms, 13, 16–17, 23, 101

Alphaville (Godard, 1965), 7
artifi cial intelligence (AI), 9, 11, 105–23,

Also Sprach Zarathustra (Strauss), 32, 35,

123n4

41n20, 90, 141, 149
and AI-based art, 118–20

Altman, Robert, 5
and classical AI, 110–12, 113
ambiguities, 19, 22, 33, 79–80, 83
and critical technical practice, 117–18

Andersen, Han Christian, 158, 168
and expressive AI, 116, 117, 120–23

Andreas (Hoff mannsthal), 151
and representation, 106–7, 112, 116–17
animal brain, 89–91
and transcendence, 112–15

181

Asimov, Isaac, 32
computer brain, 94–98

Astaire, Fred, 163
human brain of scientist, 91–94
astronomy, 31, 33

Brakhage, Stan, 81

Atmospheres (Ligeti), 35

Breathless (Godard, 1959), 5
auteurism, 4, 10, 29–39

Bresson, Robert, 63, 156–57

Brooks, Rodney, 112

Bacon, Francis, 70

Bunny Lake Is Missing (Preminger, 1965),
banality, 57, 62, 92, 163

78

Barbarella (Vadim, 1968), 75

Burgess, Anthony, 77, 133

Barry Lyndon (Kubrick, 1975), 6, 11

Burroughs, Edgar Rice, 31, 72
and obscene shadow, 129, 134, 138–40

Butler, Octavia, 74
and space, 57, 59, 63, 64, 66

Basic Training I (Wiseman, 1971), 57

Cameron, James, 85n15
bathrooms, 47, 60, 135–39, 143, 144n12, 154,

Campbell, Joseph, 33

157, 172–73
capitalism, 143

Beckett, Samuel, 155–56

Carroll, Lewis, 155

Beethoven, Ludwig van, 133

Cartesian dualism, 88, 113
believable agents, 119–20

Cawelti, John, 76

La Belle et la Bête (Cocteau), 173

Champlin, Charles, 26n7

Bergman, Ingmar, 173

Chassignet, Jean-Baptiste, 154

Bernstein, Jeremy, 18–19, 25n2, 52n14
chess playing, 57, 58, 106, 108, 112, 143, 157,

Bigelow, Kathryn, 75

166

Black Prince, Th
e (Murdoch), 155

Chion, Michel, 55–56, 58, 61–65, 130

Blake, William, 156

Christianity, 16, 30–31, 33, 113

Bledsoe, Woody, 118

Ciment, Michel, 55–56, 59, 67, 140
blockbusters, 14, 18, 78

CinemaScope, 52–53n17

Blue Danube, Th
e (Strauss), 35, 38, 91
cinematographic brain, 87–89, 93, 98–101
bone weapon, 35, 38–39

Citizen Kane (Welles, 1941), 83, 100
and animal brain, 90–91

Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud),
and fairy tales, 153, 169

128
and gender, 70, 77

Clare, John, 170
and gravity, 43, 45, 47, 49–50, 51, 53n19

Clarke, Arthur C., 3, 30–31, 33–36, 41n18,
and obscene shadow, 128–29

55
and space, 58, 60, 63, 67
critics’ views of, 15–16, 18, 21, 26n9

Bonnie and Clyde (Penn, 1967), 5
on gender, 82, 139

Bordwell, David, 78–79
on Louis XVI bathroom, 140

Bowman, Dave (2001), 4, 8–9, 14, 22, 32,
on monoliths, 37, 115

34, 37, 39
cleanliness, 59–60, 61, 139, 163, 173
and AI and transcendence, 112, 115

A Clockwork Orange (Kubrick, 1971), 6,
and cinematographic brain, 98–99

11, 36
and computer brain, 94–98
and fairy tales, 157
critics’ views on, 19, 22
and gender, 76–77, 81
eyes of, 49, 133, 169–70
and gravity, 49
and fairy tales, 150, 152, 154–61, 164,
and human brain, 94

166–75
and obscene shadow, 128–29, 133–34
and gender, 78–83
and space, 59, 60, 62, 63
and gravity, 48, 50–51, 53n21

Cocteau, Jean, 173
and obscene shadow, 128–29, 134–35,
cognitive estrangement, 70, 84n4

138–41

Cold War, 7, 46–47, 71–72, 77, 131
and space, 57, 60, 61, 62, 64–68
commonsense reasoning and Artifi cial
box offi
ce success, 13–17

Intelligence, 107–8
brain science, 9, 11, 87–101
communism, 7, 71, 77, 135
animal brain, 89–91
computer brain, 94–98
cinematographic brain, 98–101
computer science, 9, 11, 51, 88, 105–6

182 INDEX
confi nement, 56–57, 59, 60, 63, 168
and gravitas, 47
conjunctive orbit of moon and sun, 21
and human brain, 94

Th
e Conquest of Space (Pal and Haskin,
and obscene shadow, 129–32, 135–36,

1955), 7, 44, 70

139
consciousness
and space, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65–66,
and AI and transcendence, 115

67
and cinematographic brain, 88, 90–91,

Dullea, Keir, 65, 78, 94

94, 98–101

Dyson, Freeman, 38
and fairy tales, 154–55, 157–59, 161,

170–72

Easy Rider (Hopper, 1969), 15
conversation map, 118

Egan, Richard, 71

Cooper, James Fenimore, 74

8½ (Fellini, 1963), 13
counterculture, 3, 13–14, 25n3
eighteenth century, 140–41, 143,
creation science, 31

145nn18,19. See also Louis XVI critical reception, 13–24, 26n7, 44
room
establishment views, 18–20, 26nn9,10

Eliot, T. S., 161
youthful perspectives, 20–22

Enlightenment, 16, 145n19
critical technical practice, 116, 117–18
epic fi lms, 23, 24, 78

Cruise, Tom, 62, 137
evangelicalism, 30–31
cultural paradigms, 47–48, 50–51, 52n15
evolutionary science, 30–33, 130, 141
cultural production, 127–28, 133, 145n19
experts, 34, 37, 44, 52n5, 107

Curtis, Jamie Lee, 85n15
expressive AI, 9, 116, 117, 120–23

Curtiz, Michael, 24
extraterrestrial (ET) life, 4, 30–31, 33, 36
cybernetics, 101, 130
eyes, 45, 61, 155
cyborg, 113–14
of Dave Bowman (2001), 49, 133,

169–70

Dark Star (Carpenter, 1974), 61
of HAL (2001), 39, 48, 64, 95, 98, 108,

DARPA (Defense Advanced Research

111–12, 116, 132

Projects Agency), 113
of star child, 39, 81, 156

Darwinism, 29, 31–32, 130

Eyes Wide Shut (Kubrick, 1999), 4, 6, 11

David and Lisa (Perry, 1962), 78
and fairy tales, 158

“Th
e Dawn of Man, ” 21, 35, 37, 43, 62, 67,
and gender, 81

70, 82, 89, 115, 153, 169
and obscene shadow, 129, 137–38,

Day of the Fight (Kubrick, 1951), 59

142–43
de Bergerac, Cyrano, 72
and space, 55, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63
dehumanization, 20, 22, 36, 101

Deleuze, Gilles, 9, 88–89, 98, 100–101

Fahrenheit 451 (Truff aut), 36
de Palma, Brian, 79
fairy tales, 9, 12, 147–75

Destination Moon (Pichel and Pal, 1950),
falling upward, 45–50

7, 44, 72

Falsetto, Mario, 80

Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno and

“Fascinating Fascism” (Sontag), 141

Horkheimer), 145n19
fascism, 131–32, 141–42
disorientation, 47–49, 78–79

Fear and Desire (Kubrick, 1953), 5–6

D’Onofrio, Vincent, 134

Fellini, Federico, 13, 17
doubling

Female Man, Th
e (Russ), 74
and cinematographic brain, 98–99
feminism, 70, 73
and fairy tales, 150–51, 153, 155, 169
fetus, 8–9, 22, 32, 37, 98–99, 155, 158. See and obscene shadow, 128–29
also star child

Douglas, Kirk, 23, 82

Fiedler, Leslie, 74

Dream of the Moving Statue, Th
e (Gross),

Filmguide to 2001 (Geduld), 172

164–65

Film Technique (Pudovkin), 41n19

Dr. Strangelove (Kubrick, 1964), 7, 10, 11, 15

Fire Maidens of Outer Space (Roth, 1955),
and fairy tales, 162, 175

75
and gender, 76–78

Fletcher, Angus, 170

INDEX 183
fl ight attendants, 46–47, 52n14, 78, 92, 93,
gravity, 10, 35, 43–51, 52nn14,15, 53n21

163

Gross, Kenneth, 164–65
fl oating pen, 38, 46, 92, 160

Floyd, Heywood (2001), 6, 9, 38

HAL (2001), 8–9, 11, 32, 37
and fairy tales, 150, 154, 160–63, 169
and artifi cial intelligence (AI), 105–23
and gender, 77–80
and art, 119–20
and gravity, 46–47, 52n15
and classical AI, 110–12
and human brain, 92–93, 98
and critical technical practice, 118
and space, 56
and expressive AI, 116, 121–23

Following Story, Th
e (Nooteboom), 148–49
and representation, 106–7, 112, 116

Forbidden Planet (Wilcox, 1956), 7
and transcendence, 112, 114–15

Forster, E. M., 56
and brain science, 94–98

Fowler, Gene, Jr., 7
critics’ views on, 19, 22

Frankenstein (Shelley), 30, 32, 71
eyes of, 39, 48, 64, 95, 98, 108, 111–12,

Frazier, J. G., 33

116, 132

Freedman, Carl, 74
and fairy tales, 151–52, 157, 159, 161,

French New Wave, 5, 7

164–73

Freud, Sigmund, 32, 128
and gender, 79–80

Friedrich, Caspar David, 162
and gravity, 48–50, 53n19

From the Earth to the Moon (Verne), 71, 73
and obscene shadow, 129–30, 132, 134,
frontier myths, 76

139, 142

Full Metal Jacket (Kubrick, 1987), 11
and space, 57, 60, 64, 65, 67–68
and gender, 77

Halloween (Carpenter, 1978), 167
and obscene shadow, 129–30, 134–36,

HAL’s Legacy (Stork), 55, 106

143

Harbison, Robert, 162
and space, 57, 59, 60, 61, 63–64, 67

Harbou, Th
ea von, 73

Funny Girl (Wyler, 1968), 16

Hark, Ina Rae, 82

Harvard Crimson, 17, 20–22, 23
game playing, 11, 57, 58, 106, 108, 112, 116,

Hasford, Gustav, 134

123, 157, 166

Haskins, Byron, 7, 44
game space, 58–59

Hatch, Robert, 26n10

Gayne Ballet Suite (Khatchaturian), 149

Hawks, Howard, 24
gaze of camera, 75–76, 85n15, 90, 167

Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 71

Geduld, Carolyn, 172

Hayden, Sterling, 77, 131, 135

Gelmis, Joseph, 20, 141

Hero with a Th
ousand Faces (Campbell),
gender, 10–11, 69–84, 84n9, 85n15, 97,

33

135–39, 150, 165

High School (Wiseman, 1968), 57
generation gap in critical reception, 13–24,
history, 16, 20–21, 24, 36–37

25n3

Hitchcock, Alfred, 63, 157, 171

Genesis Flood, Th
e (Whitcombe and Mor-

Hoff mann, E. T. A., 163
ris), 31, 40n5

Hoff mannsthal, Hugo von, 151

German Romanticism, 151, 169

Hollywood storytelling, 16–17, 18, 23

Gilbert, James, 10

Homer, 24, 39

Gilliatt, Penelope, 26n7
hominids. See ape-men

Godard, Jean-Luc, 5, 7
homosexuality, 139

God concept, 29–32

Hopper, Dennis, 15

Gog (Strock, 1954), 71–72, 75

Horkheimer, Max, 145n19

Golden Bough (Frazier), 33

Horner, Harry, 7

Gould, Stephen J., 31

How the West Was Won (Ford et al.), 14

Th
e Graduate (Nichols, 1968), 15, 16, 22
human brain of scientist, 91–94

Grady, Delbert (Th
e Shining), 66
human-computer symbiosis, 113–14

Grant, Barry, 10–11
human intelligence, 11, 33, 87–89, 93, 114

Grant, Cary, 165
humanism, 16
gravitas, 10, 44, 51
humor, 36, 37, 38, 47, 60, 130, 135

184 INDEX

Hunter, Tim, 20

Kuhn, Th
omas, 46, 51

Kurosawa, Akira, 17

IBM, 38, 55

Kurzweil, Ray, 115
ideas, characters as, 6, 19, 157–58
imagination, 11, 12, 36, 93, 156

Lacan, Jacques, 129

“Imagination of Disaster, Th
e” (Sontag),

La Haye, Tim, 40n5

32, 36, 40n5, 44

Landy, Marcia, 9, 11

I Married a Monster from Outer Space

Lang, Fritz, 73

(Fowler, 1958), 7

Lara Croft (West, 2001; de Bont, 2003), 75

Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton,

Last and First Men (Stapledon), 78, 83–84

N.J.), 38

Last Year in Marienbad (Resnais, 1961), 64
institutional space, 56–58

Lawrence, D. H., 74
intelligence, nature of, 32–33. See also Lawrence of Arabia (Lean, 1962), 14
artifi cial intelligence (AI); human

Left Behind series, 40n5
intelligence

Left Hand of Darkness, Th
e (LeGuin),
interactionist AI, 110–12, 120

73–74
international art cinema, 17, 23

LeGuin, Ursula K., 73–74

Internet, 113

Lem, Stanislaw, 73, 80

Invaders from Mars (Menzies, 1953), 72

Licklidder, J. C. R., 113–14

Invasion of the Body Snatchers (Siegel,

Life, 25n4

1956), 7

Ligeti, György, 35, 79–80, 89–90, 93, 143

I Robot (Asimov, 1950), 32

Little Big Man (Penn, 1970), 76
ironic denouement, 22, 36–38
lobotomy, 9, 96–97, 169–71

Italian neorealism, 5

Lockwood, Gary, 78, 94

Lolita (Kubrick, 1962), 15

James, Edward, 44
and gender, 78

Jaszi, Peter, 20
and obscene shadow, 129, 132–33, 136,

Johnson, Diane, 11

137, 140

Journey to the Center of the Earth (Verne),
and space, 59, 62, 65, 66

71

Lorca, Garcia, 174

Juliet of the Spirits (Fellini, 1965), 13

Louis XVI room, 32, 34, 37

Jung, Carl, 29, 33
and cinematographic brain, 98

“Jupiter and Beyond the Infi nite, ” 80,
and fairy tales, 158, 170, 172–74

98–100, 143
and gender, 80

“Jupiter Mission—Eighteen Months
and obscene shadow, 135, 139–40

Later,” 47
and space, 56–57

Lucas, George, 7, 21, 83

Kael, Pauline, 13–14, 16–17, 18, 22–23, 25n2,

Lux Aeterna (Ligeti), 35

149

Kagan, Norman, 79

Mamber, Stephen, 9, 10

Kaplan, Stephen, 20

Maneuver (Wiseman, 1979), 57

Kauff mann, Stanley, 18–20

Mann, Anthony, 23

Keller, Evelyn Fox, 70, 81
man versus machine, 4, 19, 22, 32, 96–98,

Khatchaturian, Aram, 94, 149

130

Kidman, Nicole, 137
masculinity, 10–11, 15, 70–72, 75–77, 81–83,

Killer’s Kiss (Kubrick, 1955), 5, 59, 62, 130,

160, 165

174

M.A.S.H. (Altman, 1970), 5

Th
e Killing (Kubrick, 1956), 5, 11, 45, 59, 65,

Mason, James, 132

130–31

Mateas, Michael, 9, 11

King Lear (Shakespeare), 160

McCabe and Mrs. Miller (Altman, 1971),

Knight, Damon, 70

76

Kolker, Robert, 23, 26n12, 76, 82, 131–32,

McClintock, Barbara, 81

141–42, 144n12, 145n18

McDowell, Malcolm, 77

Kubrick, Vivian, 92

McLuhan, Marshall, 20, 34

INDEX 185

Mean Streets (Scorsese, 1972), 5

Nabokov, Vladimir, 132

Méliès, Georges, 35, 41n19, 72–73

Napoleon, 140

Melville, Herman, 74
narrative strategies, 16, 20, 34
memory, 12, 159–61, 170
narrative structure, 5, 16, 18, 22, 47, 64,

Merchant of Venice, Th
e (Shakespeare), 153

66–67, 78

Metamorphoses (Ovid), 157

NASA, 34, 37–38, 52n5, 74
meteors, passage of, 30, 37
natural language processing, 107–8, 120,

Metropolis (Lang, 1926), 44, 73

123n2

MGM, 14, 30, 52–53n17
natural selection, 29–30

Michelson, Annette, 8, 24, 45, 47, 163

Nelson, Th
omas Allen, 26n9, 41n19, 92,

Miles, David, 151

100, 140–41

Milestone, Lewis, 24
neorealism, 5, 100–101

Miller, Frank, 92
new tribaliam, 13–14, 25n2

Mind Children (Moravec), 114–15

New Yorker, 18, 25n2, 26n7

Minsky, Marvin, 44, 107, 113

New York Times, 19, 38
mise-en-scène, 6, 73, 79, 88, 128

Nichols, Mike, 15, 16, 22

Missile (Wiseman, 1987), 57

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 32, 41n20

Mission to Mars (De Palma, 2000), 79

Ninth Symphony (Beethoven), 133

Modine, Matthew, 134

Noble, David, 113
monoliths, 8–10, 32, 35, 37

Nooteboom, Cees, 148–49
and AI and transcendence, 115

Notes on Cinematography (Bresson),
and brain science, 89–90, 93, 98–99

156–57
critics’ views on, 15, 21–22, 24
nothingness, 29, 31, 156
and fairy tales, 153, 155, 159, 162, 172
nuclear war, 38–39, 58, 77, 134
and gender, 79–80, 82–83
and gravity, 47, 49–50
obscene shadow, 12, 127–43, 145n18
and humor, 38

Odysseus, 32, 39
and obscene shadow, 130, 138, 142, 143,

Oedipality, 15, 16, 83

144n5
offi
cial space, 56–58
and space, 58, 60, 66

O’Hara, Frank, 154
monster invasion fi lms, 36–37, 44

Ophuls, Max, 64
moon landings, 15, 30, 72

Ordway, Frederick, 34, 37, 52n5

Moon-Watcher, 35, 38–39

Ovid, 157
and animal brain, 90, 92–93

Oz project (Carnegie Mellon Univ.), 119
and cinematographic brain, 98
and fairy tales, 153–54, 164, 169

Pal, George, 7, 44
and gender, 70, 83

Palmer, Barton, 10
and obscene shadow, 99, 128–29
paradigms, 46–48, 50–51

Moore, C. L., 74
parody space, 59–61

Moravec, Hans, 114–15

Paths of Glory (Kubrick, 1957)

Morris, Henry, 31, 40n5
and fairy tales, 174

Th
e Mouse Th
at Roared (Arnold, 1959),
and gender, 78

66
and obscene shadow, 129, 134, 140,

“De la muerte oscura” (Lorca), 174

142–43, 145n18

Mulvey, Laura, 75
and space, 57, 63

Murdoch, Iris, 155
patriarchy, 11, 15, 70–72, 75–77, 82–83, 143
music, 32, 35, 41n20

Penn, Arthur, 5
and animal brain, 89–90

Penny, Simon, 117–18
and fairy tales, 149, 163

Persona (Bergman, 1966), 173
and gender, 72, 79–80
phallic symbolism, 10, 70–73, 77, 82, 95
and human brain, 91, 93–94

Pichel, Irving, 7, 44
and obscene shadow, 133, 141, 143

Pickens, Slim, 77, 130
mythological symbolism, 24, 30–33, 35,

Piercy, Marge, 74

37, 39

Planet of the Apes (Schaff ner, 1968), 37

186 INDEX

Playboy interview, 34
representation and AI, 106–7, 112, 116–17

Poe, Edgar Allan, 72, 132, 170

Requiem, Th
e, (Ligeti) 35
point of view, 61, 80, 99, 171

Resnais, Alain, 64

Polanski, Roman, 155

“Retourne le Miroir” (Chassignet), 154

Poole, Frank (2001), 32

Richter, Daniel, 90
and computer brain, 94–96, 98
riddles, 12, 151–54, 158
and fairy tales, 149–50, 152, 154, 160–61,

Ripley (Alien), 76

164, 166–68, 170
ritual space, 58–59
and gender, 78–79

Rolling Stone, 30
and gravity, 47–48, 53n19

Romanticism, 151, 155, 163, 169
and obscene shadow, 138

Rosemary’s Baby (Polanski, 1968), 155
and space, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63

Rosenfi eld, Albert, 25n4, 144n5

Primate (Wiseman, 1974), 57

Rossiter, Leonard, 92
progress, 15, 16, 17, 33

Run Lola Run (Tykwer, 1998), 64
and computer brain, 95

Russ, Joanna, 74
critics’ views on, 21–22

Russian scientists, 38, 46–47, 52n15, 79, 92,
and gender, 76

161–62
and gravity, 46
and obscene shadow, 128, 139

Sack, Warren, 118
prophetic year, 4

Sagan, Carl, 37
psychedelic images, 3, 13–14, 25n3, 32, 98

Salinger, J. D., 15

Psycho (Hitchcock, 1960), 171–72

“Sandman, Th
e” (Hoff mann), 163
psychological meanings, 30, 37, 82

Sargent, Pamela, 74

Pudovkin, V. I., 41n19

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 26n10
pulp fi ction, 31, 71, 72

Schnitzler, Arthur, 143

Pyle, Private (Full Metal Jacket), 61

Scholes, Robert, 84n4

Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 85n15

Rain, Douglas, 94, 171
science, 16, 21, 33, 36, 39, 44, 51

Rasmussen, Randy, 62
and evangelicalism, 30–31
rational thought
and gender, 70, 83
and AI and transcendence, 112
and obscene shadow, 145n19
and animal brain, 91
science fi ction, 29–33, 40n5
and fairy tales, 153–54, 158
and brain science, 93–94
and gender, 70, 78, 83
and gender, 71–77
and gravity, 45, 50
science fi ction fi lms, 7, 10, 35–39
and obscene shadow, 128, 140–41, 143
and computer brain, 95
realism, 59, 100. See also scientifi c accu-critics’ views on, 17, 20–21, 25n4
racy; verisimilitude
and gender, 70–73, 75–78, 84n9
reasoning. See rational thought
and gravitas, 43–44, 51
rebirth, 9, 10, 38
scientifi c accuracy, 4, 7, 52n5, 73
and cinematographic brain, 99
and gravity, 43–45, 51
and fairy tales, 155
and science fi ction conventions,
and gender, 82–83

36–38
and gravity, 51

Scientifi c American Frontiers, 112
and obscene shadow, 142

Scorsese, Martin, 5
and space, 61–63, 65, 68

Scott, George C., 135
recreational drug use, 3, 13–14, 25n3

Seabright, Idis, 74

Red Planet Mars (Horner, 1952), 7
seeing, 12, 39, 50, 152, 155, 168, 170. See also Reed, Kit, 74
eyes

Refl ections on Black (Brakhage, 1955), 81

Sellers, Peter, 62, 65–66, 132, 135
refl exivity, 89, 100

Sengers, Phoebe, 117
religion, 14, 30, 39

“Sentinel, Th
e” (Clarke), 18–19, 26n9, 34,

Religion of Technology, Th
e (Noble), 113

82
repetitions, 58–59, 66

Shakespeare, William, 153, 160

INDEX 187
shape shift ing, 12, 66, 159

Star Trek: Th
e Next Generation (television

Sheldon, Alice, 74–75
series), 112

Shelley, Mary, 30, 71

Star Wars (Lucas, 1977), 7, 21, 83

Th
e Shining (Kubrick, 1980), 6, 11
statues, 161, 164–65
and fairy tales, 173

St. Clair, Margaret, 74
and gender, 77

Stevens, Wallace, 159
and obscene shadow, 128–29, 136–37
stewardesses. See fl ight attendants
and space, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64

Stork, David, 37

“Ship Who Sang, Th
e” (Wilhelm), 74

Strange Days (Bigelow), 75

Short-Timers, Th
e (Hasford), 134

Strauss, Johann, 35, 43, 46, 72, 163

Siegal, Don, 7

Strauss, Richard, 32, 35, 41n20, 72, 89–90,
signs, 47, 60, 69

93, 141, 149
silent fi lm, 25n2, 34, 35, 90
superhumans, 113–14

Simmons, Jean, 82
superimpositions, 64, 65

Sinai Field Mission (Wiseman, 1978), 57

Superman, 32, 41n20
skepticism, 51, 141, 155

Super Panavision, 37, 52–53n17, 83

Smith, Kiki, 161

Sylvester, William, 77–78, 92

“Snow Queen, Th
e” (Andersen), 158
symmetrical compositions, 59, 63, 64

Sobchack, Vivian, 78

Social Darwinists, 142

Talaley, Rachel, 75

Solaris (Lem), 73, 80

Tank Girl (Talaley), 75

Sontag, Susan, 32, 36, 40n5, 44, 141

Tarantino, Quentin, 5

Soviet scientists. See Russian scientists

Taylor, John Russell, 25n3
space, 10, 55–68
technology, 4, 15, 21–22, 30, 32–33
alien space, 62–63
and animal brain, 91
and cinematographic brain, 88
and cinematographic brain, 88, 99–101
dream space, 61–62
and computer brain, 94–98
geometrical space, 63–65
and fairy tales, 154, 164
institutional-offi
cial space, 56–58
and gender, 70, 72, 76–78, 83
parody space, 59–61
and gravity, 43–44, 46, 51, 53n21
ritual-game-war space, 58–59
and human brain, 92–93
thematic contradiction of, 19–20
and obscene shadow, 128, 145n19
ubiquitous space, 65–67
and science fi ction conventions, 36–37

Space and Place (Tuan), 60–61
television, 25n2, 44, 88, 112
space operas, 44, 72, 75

Telotte, Jay, 10

Spartacus (Kubrick, 1960), 18, 23, 82, 134,

Tennyson, Alfred, Lord, 160

157

Terminator (Cameron, 1984, 1991; Mostow,
special eff ects, 21, 35, 44, 76, 83

2003), 75

Spiegel, Lynn, 39–40n4

Th
ackeray, William Makepeace, 138

Spielberg, Steven, 11, 76, 174

Th
ings to Come (Menzies, 1936), 44, 73, 78

Stapledon, Olaf, 78, 83–84, 86n34

3001: Th
e Final Odyssey (Clarke), 34
star child, 14, 22, 32, 37. See also fetus time-image, 100–101
and AI and transcendence, 112–15

Time Machine, Th
e (Wells), 71, 86n33
and cinematographic brain, 99
time travel, 29, 37, 65–66, 83, 86n33
eyes of, 39, 81, 156

Tiptree, James, Jr., 74–75
and fairy tales, 155–56, 158–59

Toilets in Kubrick’s fi lms, 47, 60, 135–39,
and gender, 80–83

157
and gravity, 50–51

Toles, George, 9, 12
and obscene shadow, 134, 138–42
trajectory, 10, 18, 44, 47–51
and space, 57, 61, 63, 65
transcendent intelligence, 29–30, 112–15

Stargate, 34, 61–62, 80–81, 150, 169–71
and fairy tales, 154, 159

Star Trek (television series), 78

“Trash, Art, and the Movies” (Kael), 16–17

Star Trek: Th
e Motion Picture (Wise,
travel planning domain, 107, 123n2

1979), 79
trip movie, 3, 24, 25n3, 61, 149

188 INDEX

Trip to the Moon (Méliès, 1902), 35, 41n19,

War and Peace (Tolstoy), 56

72–73
war fi lms, 5, 63, 77

True Lies (Cameron, 1994), 85n15

War of the Worlds (Haskin, 1953; Spiel-

Truff aut, François, 5
berg, 2005), 36

Tuan, Yi-Fu, 60–61
war space, 58–59

Turing, Alan, 109, 119, 123n4

Weaver, Sigourney, 78

Turing Test, 109–10, 119, 123n4
weightlessness, 30, 46, 49, 52n14, 64, 76,

20,000 Leagues under the Sea (Verne), 71

78, 160

2001: A Space Odessey (Clarke), 18, 26n9,

Welles, Orson, 58, 83

35, 41n18, 133–34

Wells, H. G., 32, 71, 73, 78, 86n33

2010: Odyssey Two (Clarke), 34
western fi lms, 72, 76, 84n9

2061: Odyssey Th
ree (Clarke), 34

“Where No Man Has Gone Before” ( Star

Tykwer, Tom, 64

Trek episode, 1965), 78

Whitcombe, John, 30–31, 40n5

Ubermensch, 32, 41n20

White, Susan, 11–12, 60
ubiquitous space, 65–67

Wilcox, Fred, 7

UFOs, 33

Wilhelm, Kate, 74

Ulysses, 159

Willis, Connie, 74

Wiseman, Frederick, 57

Variety, 26n10

Th
e Wizard of Oz (Fleming, 1939), 143
verisimilitude, 35–36, 39, 45. See also sci-Woman in the Moon (Lang, 1929), 73–74
entifi c accuracy

Woman on the Edge of Time (Piercy), 74

Verne, Jules, 71, 72–73

“Women Men Don’t See, Th
e” (Tiptree),
violence, 5, 6, 9, 12

74–75
and computer brain, 96

Women of Wonder (Sargent), 74
critics’ views on, 15, 19, 21–22

Woolf, Virginia, 161
and gender, 70, 77
work space, 57–58
and gravity, 47–50, 53n19

“World as Meditation, Th
e” (Stevens), 159
and obscene shadow, 127–28, 130,

134–35, 140, 142

Youngblood, Gene, 26n7
and space, 57–59, 63

Virilio, Paul, 45–46, 48, 50–51
zero gravity, 47, 60, 138. See also weight-von Braun, Wernher, 52n5
lessness

Žižek, Slavoj, 129, 134–35

Walker, Alexander, 32, 48, 56, 80, 140
zoo, 32, 34, 50, 57

INDEX 189

Document Outline

- Contents

- Introduction

- 1 2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap

- 2 Auteur with a Capital A
- 3 The Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey
- 4 Kubrick in Space

- 5 Of Men and Monoliths: Science Fiction, Gender, and 2001: A Space Odyssey

- 6 The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey

- 7 Reading HAL: Representation and Artificial Intelligence

- 8 Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

- 9 Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale

- Notes on Contributors

- Production Details

- Index

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Y
- Z

Table of Contents

- Contents

- Introduction

- 1 2001: The Critical Reception and the Generation Gap

- 2 Auteur with a Capital A
- 3 The Gravity of 2001: A Space Odyssey
- 4 Kubrick in Space

- 5 Of Men and Monoliths: Science Fiction, Gender, and 2001: A Space Odyssey

- 6 The Cinematographic Brain in 2001: A Space Odyssey

- 7 Reading HAL: Representation and Artificial Intelligence

- 8 Kubrick’s Obscene Shadows

- 9 Double Minds and Double Binds in Stanley Kubrick’s Fairy Tale

- Notes on Contributors

- Production Details

- Index

- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
- G
- H
- I
- J
- K
- L
- M
- N
- O
- P
- R
- S
- T
- U
- V
- W
- Y
- Z